



“Do People reckon that they will be left alone because they say: “We believe”; and will not be put to test (trial). And we put to test those who were before them. Thus does Allah prove those who are true and who are false.”

The Quran (29:2,3)



THE HISTORY OF ARMY SERVICE CORPS VOL. I.



THE COMMISSARIAT

The Islamic Ideology on War, Series.

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
The Islamic Military Science Association
KUDSI, KARACHI-29. (PAKISTAN)

By Rangrut

[Major General (Rtd.)
MOHD. AKBAR KHAN]


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Life Sketch of
Major-General (Rtd.) MOHAMMAD AKBAR KHAN
The Author—Rangrut

Mohammad Akbar Khan comes from Chakwal in District JHELUM (Punjab), the eldest son of Major Raja Fazal Dad Khan.

He started his career as a Siladar in the PROBYNS HORSE and rose to the rank of General Commanding an Army Corps in British India and later in Pakistan, a record of distinction unsurpassed in the army history of his time in the sub-continent.

General Akbar has seen action in both World Wars with great distinction, in World War I, first as a Siladar and then as a viceroy-commissioned officer in the Probyns Horse in Mesopotmia, where, for his outstanding meritorious and gallant services in the field, he was selected for the British KING'S COMMISSION in 1918. The first and the only Indian Soldier to achieve this rare honour.

After commission he was posted as an officer in his own regiment KING EDWARD'S OWN PROBYNS HORSE. It was the first occasion in the history of the British Army when a private was accepted as a commissioned officer in his own regiment. Later accepted transfer to 1/14 Punjab, the latter he commanded during the 'Mohammad Operations' in 1935. From 1936 to 1939 he fought with the striking force in the WAZIRISTAN Campaign and was mentioned in despatches twice for showing conspicuous gallantry.

In WORLD WAR II he saw services with the British Expeditionary Force on the Maginot Line in France. On his return to London after his evacuation from Dunkirk with the allied forces he served as an instructor in the School of Mechanization and Commandos. In recognition of his meritorious services the distinguished painter Henry Lamb was commissioned to paint his Portrait which now hangs in the Imperial Defence Museum in London among the distinguished soldiers of our time.

He returned to India in 1941 and a year later was sent to the Burma Front to fight the war against Japan, where he was again mentioned in despatches for gallantry and devotion to duty in the field.

At the end of the WORLD WAR II he returned to Meerut as a Brigadier General, the very city where he got his first appointment as a 'Siladar' in Probyn's Horse. Here, in addition to his soldierly duties, he was entrusted the difficult job of maintaining law and order in the very important province (U.P.) of India. A job which he performed with equal distinction and was subsequently promoted to the rank of Major General, the first General of pre-partition India and took over the command of No. 1 Corps on 1st August 1947 and subsequently served as General Officer Commanding in Pakistan after its birth on 14th August 1947 later to be appointed A. D. C. to Quaid-e-Azam, and Colonel Commandant A.S.C.

The Veteran of two world wars and many a campaigns who has won more than fifteen decorations of gallantry and valour. General Akbar, on retirement, took the paper and pen. In the last two decades he has contributed vastly in English as well as in Urdu on varied subjects, and has to his credit more than 50 books. He is considered internationally as an authority on ISLAMIC MILITARY HISTORY. His books have been accepted by Military Academies the world over as text

books. Many countries have got them translated in their respective languages. He works with missionary zeal and the returns of the sale of his books are contributed towards the running of Islamic Military Science Association and the welfare of ex-servicemen.

General Akbar has travelled widely and has in particular some very happy memories of his visit to the People's Republic of China as the guest of 'Mao' and the peoples of this great nation.

—Publishers.

Dedicated to
**My Brother Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers,
and other ranks of Army Service Corps of the
Past, Present and Future.**



Rangrut

WHAT THEY SAY OF US ? (Only few opinions out of many)

HONG KONG

‘South China Morning Post’, Honk Kong : “A soldier and

author, General Akbar Khan was invited to Chira on account of his books by Chairman Mao-Tse-Tung..... his books dispelled the old and outdated belief of inferiority of the East and superiority of the West.....he has done it creditably.....”

PAKISTAN

General M. Musa Khan, as Governor and Chancellor Universities in West Pakistan : “...In writing books on this subject you have indeed undertaken a tremendous task and I admire you for your courage and industry...”

Professor A.B.A. Haleem: “...It is time that persons who have a study of the development of military strategy and tactics through ages took up pen.....Major General has brought out classic books on the campaigns of the Holy Prophet and other Muslim leaders...”

Chairman, Federal Selection Board : “...I knew you were a great General but I did not know you had such a great insight into history and such analytical mind. You are doing great service to Islam...”

Defence Minister Vice Admiral A. R. Khan : “...We have been watching with admiration your efforts to record the important events of early Islamic history, especially its military aspect as well as to record the biographies of heroes of Islam...”

INDIA

Maulana Darya-abadi, Editor, Sidiq-Jadid : “.....The books are indeed classic and in my opinion no one has written Urdu books on this subject.....The books become all the more important when the policy and strategy is compared with strategy used by the great Captains of Western world.....The comparative study makes it all the more stimulating and educative.....”

C. L. Desai, M.P. and High Commissioner for India :
“.....I entirely agree with you that we have a longer
and more glorious military history than any other of
these Western nations who have stolen a march over
us during the last few hundred years—at least you are
doing that service and we are very grateful to you.....”

FRANCE

Professor Dr. Hamid Ullah Khan : “.....First of all I
congratulate you for the great service you have rendered
to Islam by writing books (on Islamic Ideology on War).
Secondly, but convincingly pointed out the mistakes or
errors committed by previous writers.....”

U.S.A.

E. W. Bethman, Director of Research (C.I.A.), and a
Zionist, an Arabic Scholar : “.....Many of the ideas
and reflections are in it (books) are certainly most
worthwhile.....And your point (The Holy Prophet as a
military genius) is well taken despite the enormous dif-
ference in weaponry.....”

SAUDI ARABIA

Brigadier Albaj Hafiz Al Shair, General Staff : “.....This
searching study is the work of soldier writer.....He has
done his level best to keep the fact, whether spiritual
or material.....”

TURKISH ARMY

Colonel A. Gurtuna, P. S. C. : “.....You brought out the
most brilliant examples of history from the early ages
of Islam up to modern war of our time.....”

THE VOICE OF ISLAM

“.....Here is an epic, if there could be one.....who has
actually fought in two World Wars and so many cam.

paigns besides having trained thousands of recruits..... Not only that he is a keen student of history..... It is not actually war that is the subject of Rangrut's study but life which is the primary thing, showing him not the burner of the night oil but a live human being, actually alive to the life of his fellow human beings whether they belong to the East or the West.....The work has been done so thoroughly that loopholes seem to be few and far between.....Thus the series is a far more effective preaching of Islam than any direct mode of propagating it. What is more : the ideas presented in the series would change mentality of those who are against it... We would like this fascinating series to be secured and read over and over again by all who are interested in the present affairs and problems of the world and feign find a satisfactory solution of them leading to the good of the whole humanity."

General H. I. Ahmad & Colonel G. Mehdi : "We found going through this monumental work a lifting experience. The effort put in would do credit to any author.....General Akbar has done a marvellous job and one is really astounded on the prodigal effort put in by him....."

Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, Former Prime Minister of Pakistan : ".....The Islamic Ideology on War and Jihad has been explained and illustrated by a writer who is very adequately fitted by it, as he is an expert veteran of many wars where he won many distinction. This being so he has very creditably fulfilled his mission....."

Brigadier (Rtd.) Gulzar Ahmed, M.B.E., P.S.C., M.A., LL.B., Hafiz, Al-haj : ".....The author is undoubtedly a seasoned Rangrut, a veteran, who has learnt the Art of War with head and heart and wishes his countrymen to give the absorbing attention to this lofty profession by relating to them the stories of others....."

PREFACE

I have followed, as in previous 'Recollections', the method of Defoe's "Memoris of a Cavalier", as far as, I am able, in which author hangs the chronicle and discussions of great military events upon the thread of the personal experiences of an individual. I can write, since my retirement, more freely than was possible in my earlier writings while in service.

"History is to knowledge in general what politics is to application and action, and the former is treated as a necessary compliment to the latter, for the great officers of the State, the ruler, the ministers, generals, and judges, are all admonished to study history in order that they may know their position, their rights and duties in the light of the action of their predecessors in title in the past..." Muslim great historian: Ibn Ali Rabi.

I do not describe it as official history of the A.S.C., for that belongs to another generation. But I claim with confidence, that it is a contribution to history which will be of service to the future.

These—nearly 40 years of action and nearly 60 years of advocacy—comprise and express my life effort, and I am content to be judged upon them. I have adhered to my rule never criticising any measure of war, or policy after the event, unless I had expressed publicly, or formally my opinion about it. It has given me pain to record some of these disagreements with so many men whom I liked, or respected: but it would be wrong not to lay the lessons of the past before the future. Let no one look down on those honourable, well meaning men whose actions are chronicled in these pages without searching

his own heart, reviewing his own discharge of public, or national duty, and applying the lessons of the past to his future conduct.

I learnt a great deal through association with very noted personalities, such as, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Mohammad Ali Jauhar, Sir Iqbal, Sir Abdul Qadir, Sir Mian Fazal-i-Hussain, Mhatma Gandhi, Mr. Jawahar Lal Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Mr. A.M. Khawaja, Nawab Sir Buland Jung, Nawab Sir Zulfikar Ali Khan, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, H. H. Maharaja Partab Singh of Jodhpur, Sardar Patel, Pundit Pant and Mr. Kidwai, Master Tara Singh, Sardar Sohan Singh, Sir Jogindar Singh, Sir Pundit Hari Kishan Kaul, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Dr. Syed Mahmud, Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar, Raja Aurangzeb Khan.

I was very fortunate to remain close to many very distinguished soldiers. such as, Field Marshals, Birdwood, Gort, Wavell, Auchinleck, Deverill, Admiral Mountbattan, Generals Hartlev, Muspratt, Douglas Baird, Dennis Deane, McDonald, Savoury, Briggs, Robert Cassals, and Colonels R. H. Anderson and W. R. P. Henry, Generals de La Beresford and N. M. S. Irwin.

I learnt a lot from these above mentioned and many others not mentioned for brevity noted personalities, intellectually, in professional matters, as well as, in general world affairs. I owe to them most grateful thanks.

I had very happily settled down in Probyn's Horse which was raised by my grandfather and where my father had also served for 38 years with great distinction. It had become our home and we considered ourselves as a member of Probyn's family. But fate decided otherwise, and once again, I became a recruit, now in an infantry at a ripe age of 21 years of service in cavalry. But when the hawks noticed that I had led the battalion in 1935 Mohmand war succesfully and had won the luals of

being the first Indian to do so, then, once again, I was posted "in the interests of the State to I.A.S.C—as a recruit—once again—I carried the bat to the gallery with honour, was due to the mercy of the Providence.

I do neither claim originality in this book, nor perfection, and I most gratefully express my gratitude to the authors of the books I have referred to in the context of this book, or in bibliography, and also my Corps Officers whose encouragement has been a source of great inspiration to me. The object that I have kept in view is to give the readers some "food for thought" which may eventually persuade those who are better qualified than Rangrut to write a book on this very vital but often neglected and pressing subject—the history of logistics.

As I do not pretend that this work is, either a definite work, or an original one; nor would claim it to be objective in selection of materials for all the volumes—a work which should be undertaken by a team rather than an individual. I have made a start for others to carry on. Throughout the study we shall be concerned with certain special aspects of financial, of ideo-political and pure military combats. It should, therefore, be remembered this study is selective, dealing with only limited aspects of a far broader subject.

I fully realize that the task of writing a short History of Supply and Transport is a huge task which normally should be undertaken by a team of editors. But the task is vital for preserving the traditions of the Pakistan Army Service Corps of the Pakistan Army, as heir and successor of the Commissariat, the Supply and Transport Corps, the Royal Army Service Corps, the Indian Army Service Corps and the Royal Indian Army Service Corps and the Royal Pakistan Army Service Corps. It is considered that it may be of service here to recapitulate—though briefly—the principal stages in its development. Training is generally speaking outside the scope of this history, and only some particular aspects of specialist

training are noticed. Again voluminous statistics would be out of place in a history of this kind. The material used in the compilation of this history has been drawn from diversity of sources.

The principle object of this book is to provide a contemporary account of measure of reorganization carried out in the Commissariat in India since the British came to India as Colonists in 1615 A.C. in the guise of traders of the East India Company. It is intended to describe—though briefly—in a connected form, the essential features of the Supply and Transport of the army as thus constructed. This book is also intended for the information of the general public, the political leaders and particularly for the use of the Army Service Corps as the lessons learnt in the past may soon stand in danger to be forgotten, for example, those which occurred during the struggle for the Liberation of Kashmir 1947-1949 and 1965 and 1970-71.

Even the present age leaders and ministers all over the world bluster about the way of fighting wars—in most cases ignorant about its causes and direction. and yet they refuse to study the Art-of-War through study—which costs little ; or to spend money to make armed forces and the public, a fighting fit machine as enjoined in the Quran and Hadith. The history has very clearly recorded that all such warnings about maintaining most modern armed forces have been persistently ignored, yet, it is matter which touches all and it must be the concern of all. In spite of it, invasion of Afghan forces in 1948 and 1950, the Kashmir war 1948, and Indo-Pak war 1965 and 1970-71 crisis were ordered. It has been compiled with the aid of books as in the bibliography, however, it must not be taken as extending explicitly to every statement or expression of opinion which these various volumes of this book contain. I have given my own personal views as I saw them, as a cavalryman, Infantryman and later on as Member of the Corps.

For good and sufficient reasons the length of the volumes has been strictly limited. Accordingly, out of the sources consulted, *i.e.*, various books written on the subject and what I heard from my grand parents who had taken part in Afghanistan wars, the so-called Mutiny 1957-78, and the Punjab wars. Moreover, as a student of Islamic Military History, I found the comparative study of this period very educative and informative.

The scope of the work has in any case forbidden me to include the tracing of the story of every formation and unit. It has generally only been possible to pick out the high lights of the picture. The extent of the detail in which a topic has been treated ought not to be taken as a measure of its comparative importance, or interest. A brief reference must often serve to summarize a large amount of work carried out over a period. The inference is that, where the organization and method were functioning normally, they were satisfactory for the purpose, but if there was a breakdown, or an improvisation, it requires to be noticed. However, no attempt is being made to write in great detail the activities of the Corps for the following reasons :

(a) To avoid undue repetition and also to adjudicate on the importance of each theatre and to allot space accordingly would be impossible.

(b) Secondly, there is the complication which is inevitable from the existence of its branches :

- (i) the supply-rations, oils for mechanical transport and spare parts, clothes and other comforts for British patients in hospitals and for British canteens.
- (ii) to provide the horse, bullock, mule, donkey, camel, elephant, transport and river transport etc., the activities of their own side naturally loom greatest.

(iii) the Remounts, their supply, purchase and training and the care of breeding areas. The "Rakhs" ; the forest) for the browsing of Camels and farmland for producing green grass, hay, and Bhoosa.

It is intended to give in some detail—as far as, it is available and is considered necessary for our purpose—three campaigns of the early days, i.e. :

(i) Invasion of Nepal, which had most difficult terrain, hardly any local supplies and where transport problems were very difficult. There were no roads, the goat tracks were hardly negotiable for even pack transport.

(ii) The Burma Campaign, a campaign in jungle, in the torrential monsoon which turned the roads in a sea of mud. In a country where malaria and dysentery were the most dangerous enemies. The local people were anti-British, hence commissariat problems were most serious.

(c) The campaigns in the Punjab (Sikh Wars) and the so called mutiny, 1857-58.

Moreover, these campaigns will portray difference between a well-planned war or otherwise as regards logistics. How these shortcomings were overcome by the Commissariat Department? Again when no family accompanied the forces—its effects.

(d) The Kabul War :

This had special peculiarities and problems. A very long march for 'advance to contact' in a newly-conquered country which was different in different areas, i.e. a rich productive country, barren arid land, a desert—a mountainous area with poor resources and provisions.

In short, each campaign had peculiarities of its own.

There must necessarily be left unrecorded here by far the

greater part of the technical and internal details of its work ; but since the culminating aim of this work, and indeed the sole justification of the existence of the corps, is, that maintenance of the fighting troops in face of the enemy, it is the part that the Army Service Corps played in operations of war which is the real history. "The army marches on its belly" said Napoleon. Now it equally be said: "without Petrol, oil and lubricants, the mechanical Armed Force, the Air Force and the NAVY cannot function, the medical supplies must reach at the right time, and place, and the wounded must be evacuated, and the reinforcements must be pushed up the line soonest possible.

In general, the fighting troops are apt to overlook the importance of studying war in its wider aspects, such as, administrative services, and the fact that they have too often tended to become immersed in strategy and tactics, just as, the administrative became too much absorbed in technicalities, has been responsible for many failures in the past.

This volume will be divided into :

- Vol. I — 1670-1858 ; First Burma War, First Afghan War, Conquest of Sind, the Punjab, Sikh Wars and Mutiny 1857-58.
- Vol. II — 1858-1916 ; 1916-1924 ; B. E. Forces 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 1923 Reforms.
- Vol. III — 1929-1935 ; Mohmand Operation, Waristan Operation 1936-38, France 1939-40, U.K. 1940-41.
- Vol. IV — On Burma-Assam Front.
- Vol. V — 1947-50 ; After partition.

It is hoped that it may be of service to the Corps to re-capitulate, very briefly, the principal stages in its development.

Like my other books, I have omitted foot notes in the interests of the reader, but in a book like this, it is impossible to avoid quoting a great many dreary references which could be found in the bibliography which are not easily accessible to general reader. I have done my best to reduce references to the barest essential minimum, so as not to disattract the reader's interest or attention. I only trust that the reader's patience will not be exhausted. In many such cases all I can do is to ask the non-specialist to "skip judiciously". I trust, however, that nothing important has been omitted.

Finally, in these volumes we would recall the impressions of a man (Rangrut) himself, as a prudent, unbiased contemporary observer as cavalryman, Infantryman and later on as a man in the Corps who studied the situation from every point of view. (He is now presenting it in writing to the future planners while his memory lasts). Man modifies with circumstances and time. And of what value, indeed, would it be for us to study the deeds of those men if no universal truths were to be deduced from them.

25-10-1971

Rangrut

Postscript

Bharat unleashed her wanton aggression with unprecedented brutality unparalleled in human history while the history of A.S.C. was under print. Civilians in Karachi city were bombed every day and night. Many civilians were killed. In spite of fact that Akberi Art Printers lost some technicians, they decided to carry on. I am glad to present these volumes to my brothers-at-arms who, I hope, will accept it and E & O.E. I thank the printers and congratulate them for their courage and determination.—(Rangrut)

INTRODUCTION

It is a brief history of the Commissariat which I have collected from books and information received from my grand parents. It is hoped that it will give some food for thought to the readers, as regards the strength of character of the Officers and their civilian co-workers of the Commissariat Department—our pioneers ! The majority of the Indian staff were civilians—as agents, beoparis, banjaras and Banias. They met every situation with fortitude. They won by improvisation—under most adverse and most difficult conditions due more to poor planning in logistics for war and faulty policy of the Government of India.

I have also endeavoured to draw attention to only some drawbacks, which were man made. In spite of it, the Commissariat met it squarely, cheerfully and with a will to win to deliver the goods.

Finally I do strongly feel that inspite of the fact that so few of the Indian Commissariat did so much for so many of the fighting forces on the battlefields, there is hardly any mention of the services rendered by the Indian Commissariat in the official history of Wars written either by the War Office or the Government of India. I leave it to the younger generation to supplement or re-write the brief history which I have the honour to present to my younger brothers—at—arms.

Rangrut
September, 1971.

CHAPTER — I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Vascoda Gama landed at Calicut in 1498 for the purposes of trade but the Hindu Raja Zamorin did not allow him to establish a warehouse as he feared some hidden ulterior Motives: He was followed by Alvarez Cabral, who too was refused to build a warehouse. In 1508 Alphonso Albuquerque came. He succeeded by force to establish a warehouse and also foundation of a colonial power by military occupation at Goa. Towards the end of the sixteenth century the Portuguese possessions extended 1200 miles of coast line.

The French established factories at Surat, Masulipatam, Chandernagore, Mahe and Pondichery in 1674.

The first Englishman in India was Thomas Stevans, a missionary from Oxford who roused the interest of other missionaries in U.K. for trade in the East. The East India Company was thus formed in 1615, who followed the policy of colonization of their rivals the Portugues, the French, the Dutch. They also established factories at Surat, Calicut and Masulipatam. They obtained from Moghal Ruler Shah Jahan, the privilege of trading in Bengal and the Coromandal coast. The East India Company established Forts at Madras, Fort William at Calcutta and at Bombay. The English colonies were called Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. Each Presidency was a complete unit in itself, i.e., a complete commercial-cum-military unit. By 1715 they had gained politico-commercial contacts in the interior of the country.

For a student of history, it would be of great interest to study the events of the East in retrospect. It was in eleventh century that the missionaries and stateless Dukes, Earls and Lords of Europe came to the Holy Land. The former came for pilgrimage

and trade, and the latter to carve out new princely states. The net result was crusades and creation of new Frankish State, in the Holy land. However, by fifteenth century these princely states were reconquered by the Muslims. These missionaries and jobless and landless Lords therefore, went to India and the Far East to seek their fortune. Again, by the dawn of eighteenth century, the Moghal Empire in India had disintegrated into some rival princely states who invariably were at one another's throat for greedy designs.

It was but natural for the French and the English to take sides with these princes as both desired to build a colonial empire. The colonial policy of these foreigners was identical. Both invited European soldiers of fortune who in turn invited their relations and friends from their home countries, as there was adventure, rich rewards in loot for any one who could carry arms. Each foreign party planned to expel the other nations by force of arms. Both raised large armies, in spite of the fact, that all these rival parties had originally displayed the facets of very peaceful traders! The war of the Austrian succession in Europe made matters worse, hence the war between these parties on the soil of India and in the Indian Ocean began in earnest. All these parties were outwardly supposed to be fighting to defend the rights of an Indian princely state, who paid the mercenaries to cover up the cost; but in fact, they were fighting the war not only to eliminate his rival western mercenary force but also to gain his own end, i.e., eventually to carve out a English or French (Indian) Empire. At last, the French were eliminated and the British alone were left to build a British Empire in India:

System of Supply and Transport.

In the early period the military forces of the East India Company were divided into three Presidency Armies. Each one was trained, equipped, armed according to the whim of his Commander-in-Chief. During this period, we find fighting men were fed by the sales of speculative tradesmen, or sutlers, such as, "BANJARAS, BEGPARKIES, LOCAL BANIAS"; market prices being

fixed by a military official, called the Provost, who was assisted by an Indian semi-official—"chaudhari". The animals for transport and vehicles were more or less under the control of another military official called the Wagon-Master, on European pattern. This signified that the force was attended by a rabble of Indians men, women and children, who were grouped together under the term 'FOLLOWERS' (—"SHANGARD PESHA"). It included carpenters, sicklers for sharpening swords, lances, bayonets; smiths, boot makers, saddlers etc. There was no restraint on private baggage of officers, most of whom took with them enormous quantities. Officers, Indian officers and other ranks—i e, soldiers' and followers' wives and children, as well as, the sutlers' families invariably accompanied the army on the move, either in peace, or, war. An obscene crowd who plundered everywhere, especially, in the enemy country, rifled the corpses of the dead after a battle; were an encumbrance and a curse, whether in India, or Europe or in the Holy land.

There is no occasion to recapitulate the dismal story of the earlier operations, nor the short comings of the leaders of the army who had to carry out an operation financially on a contract basis. There was no question of getting a further grant for unforeseen situation. The Directors of the Company carried out these operation on profit basis and demanded quick return from the General Commanders of the forces for the money spent on any adventure. It was not till 1810-11 that' commissariat system of three Presidencies was formally constituted as "DEPARTMENTS" of the army. The purpose of this chapter is to give a very broad outline of the arrangements in retrospect then in force. Moreover, the systems obtaining in the three Presidencies varied considerably in detail and from time to time but broadly speaking, the organization had begun to take new look from 1770 till 1810 when from trial and error, a newer system was evolved and again put to test. We will discuss the Bengal Presidency system for our purpose in this book.

The office of Commissary General was created about 1760,

later abolished and revived in 1773. He was, however, an audit official only. His duties were :—

- (a) to control and regulate all payments and contractors,
- (b) to audit and verify all bills for military charges.
- (c) to suggest means for economy; but from 1810, his title changed to Military Auditor—General; the Controller of military Accounts of our time.

The executive commissariat officers were known as Commissaries of Supplies: They were paymasters, covenanted civil servants of the company—military officers were usually debarred from the appointment.

Garrison Storekeepers held charge of stocks of rations for the British troops at the Presidency forts and at other large stations. The ration was turned over as new stocks came in with the harvesting season. Provisions, or victuals (i.e. rations) for the British troops were composed of meat, flour and rum. In case of emergency only, grain (whole) was kept for sepoy who received grain only as rations on payment in times of war. The Indian troops carried their own grain crushing hand mills (chaki) with which they produced atta (flour) for their own meals. The British troops received free rations both in peace and war. The British families, both of civil service and military, were issued rations free only on war. But the families of Indians, both military and civil servants could purchase rations at fixed rates from the agents or contractors of the Commissariat, only if, the rations were not available from the Indian 'BEOPARIES'.

In peace time, rations for British troops were obtained either by contract, or by agency. The Company generally appointed an 'AGENT', invariably a British civil servant for provisioning the troops, or for providing and maintaining transport. He was remunerated on a commission basis.

“In time of war, rations for the British troops were either

supplied in bulk—say two, or three months' requirements at a time, from reserves maintained by the Garrison Storekeepers to the Commissioners of Supplies in the field; or the latter officials might buy them locally if such a course were practicable and advantageous to the Company. An initial issue of rations for Indian troops and grain for horses in the field was similarly made by the Garrison Storekeeper to the Commissioners of Supplies in the field, and further requirements were obtained either from the reserves, or by local purchase. Other stores, excluding rations and ordinance (Magazine) stores, were provided by the Paymasters acting as Commissaries of Supplies. A price list of stores was drawn up, and every commissary bound himself in writing to furnish any article at its price within five days of a demand for it being received by him, on pain of forfeiting its value. The disputes were settled by a board of officers. These Commissaries of Supplies did not supply petty stores needed by regiments which were got direct by quartermasters."

Bazars.

In peace, the bazars of the more important cantonments were controlled by "COMMISSARIES OF BAZARS" who also were paymasters and never combatant officers. Similarly, each regiment had its own regimental bazar, under the Quartermaster who appointed his agent i.e. "CHAUDHRI" of the bazar. The author witnessed it in a Sillardar Cavalry regiment (now Probyn's Horse) when he joined it as a recruit (Rangrut) in 1913. The Bazar Chaudhri kept an eye on the prices of articles as fixed by the Commissary of Bazar. The bania produced grain for the horses, atta, ghi and dal etc. Separate shopkeepers were appointed for cooked meals, milk, vegetable, meat, etc. These shopkeepers provided essentials also on the line of march and during manoeuvres and on Frontier operations. They did not proceed with the regiment when she proceeded to Mesopotamia (I.E.F.D.) 1914-18. However, private boot makers, saddlers, tailors, barbers and civilian clerks, proceeded as private followers. But they were enrolled as non-combatants in 1916 and became combatants in 1924.

Transport, was Divided Into :

(a) 'Public Cattle', denoted—transport animals permanently maintained, and were either the property of the Company, or under control by reason of some binding obligation.

(b) "Carriage Cattle", denoted-hired temporary transport. Term "CARRIAGE" was also used as a general term to denote transportation by road, river, or sea. During the period under discussion, carriage was used in a third sense, for a synonym for "PACK"—"A CARRIAGE BULLOCK" was a pack, as distinguished from a draught bullock. The permanent transport (public cattle) included elephants, bullocks and camels. Ponies or mules did not come in use till late in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

They Made War With Profit!

Warrin Hastings as Governor of Bengal 1774-1785

He was charged, because, (a) "in 1779 he annualled the existing contract for the provision of bullocks, and concluded an other by his friend Charles Graftes Esq, upon wantonly extravagant terms". (b) "that he granted the provision of bullocks to Sir Charles Blunt, by mode of an Agency, though the Directors had condemned Agencies." The above charges are only two of the many which have been recorded here for the readers for the purpose of drawing some lessons for themselves.

"According to Hastings before many annual contracts had run their course, it became a matter of public noteriety that by making the contract an annual one, and "by granting it always to the lowest tenderer", the bullock contract, if honestly carried out was inevitably unremunerative to its holder; for no man could obtain and maintain the specified number of cattle, keep them fit, and at the same time make a profit. The result was that the condition of the Bengal transport animals was, in general, bad; they were not up to their work, and often had to be replaced on the line of march by hastily impressed local substitutes. Hastings went to say that

he, therefore, resolved to set matters upon a proper footing by making a fair and equitable contract for the future, a contract which should give its holder a reasonable rate of profit and which should be strictly carried out. In his view and, he said, it was a view shared by other and independent authorities it was often, if not always unwise to offer such contracts openly for tender. Unsuitable and incompetent persons would always bid lower rates than men of ability and reputation, and their tenure of contract would cause more harm to the public service than the extra expense would have done, had the contract gone to a better man."

The military situation was already threatening, and soon became worse; from 1778 to 1784, the company's forces were constantly engaged in hostilities, and in more than one theatre of war.

Sir Charles Blunt, Bart, was appointed Agent on Hastings' recommendation, and in January, 1785, he reported that the cattle purchased from the contractor were in poor condition, being MOSTLY of such as have been at work five or six years, a very small number of them being less than ten or twelve years old", and that the expences of the Agency had much exceeded the estimates, owing to the high price of grain which was, expected not to last.

The Agent undoubtedly found his post lucrative. Blunt died worth £ 100,000. He remained company's servant, removable at pleasure and dependent entirely upon their good will. But these are matters of consideration rather on the general issue; contract versus Agency. After the war of American Independence, British statesmen began to consider seriously India as a fair substitute for the lost territories in America. Accordingly Pitt's India Bill of 1784 was a further encroachment upon the rights of the company. A Board of control was created which was vested with sole right and power to engage in offensive warfare, and to enter into alliances with the Indian princes. Lord Cornwallis refused to accept the office of Governor General unless he

was given the power in extreme cases of importance to act without the Council's consent—his request was accepted by the Parliament, and thus the Governor General was practically made independent of his council. By the way of conclusion, it may be said that Pitt's India Bill left but a semblance of power to the Company: the Board of Directors exercised a control which was largely nominal in character, while the real governing body was the Board of Control. Finally Carnwallis was the first Governor General that became virtually independent of Council.

Lord Hastings' first action was to withdraw the management of the financial departments from the Agents (Dewan) of the Nawabs and transferred it to the servants of the Company, whose business it was to collect the revenue. They were called "COLLECTORS". Hastings also transformed the administration of justice of the Nawab to those of the Company. Warren Hastings was bent on improving the financial prospects of the Company. Warren Hastings cut down the annual allowances of Indian princes to the tune of 132 lac rupees.

Haider Ali had defeated the Marathas. The British were forced to fight war against Haider Ali and the Marathas. Warren Hastings had not spared either himself, or his soldiers: nor had he spared the money of the company. The result was that he was in great financial straits. To fill the treasury of the Company, therefore, he exacted a sum amounting to over a hundred lacs rupees from the feudatory Raja of Benares and from the Begum of Oudh. It should be noted that after Clive had returned home, the administration of Bengal was entrusted to men who were devoid of administrative ability. Everything was in chaos when Warren Hastings took over as Governor.

New System of Supply As Ordered By Hastings.

Warren Hastings decided to replace the system of supply through contractors to the appointment of Agent for the provision of "VICTUALLING STORES". The rations were to be placed in the Fort under the joint charge of the Agent and the Fort

Major, who should keep a key of the warehouses. The stock was to be maintained in good order by the periodical substitution by the Agent of fresh stores for such as had deteriorated, i.e. by what we now call, "TURNING OVER"; the old stock might be disposed of by the Agent at his own risk. "It was anticipated that on many of the articles, such as, ghi, salted meat and dried fish, he would suffer a dead loss due to evaporation and other loss such as, of Madeira, arrack, vinegar and oil was certain: but with good management, he might "SAVE HIMSELF" over gram and firewood. For his services and responsibilities, he was to receive a commission on the cost price of the stores, to be paid to him annually, and this commission was to cover" his trouble, risk of the markets, servants wages, cooly hire, and all other expenses of what nature soever."

The Agent was further to receive an advance of Rs. 25,000 for the first purchase, and an advance of the same sum again each time he delivered stores to the amount. The Fort Major was to examine all provisions on delivery, and to certify whether they were correct in quality and quantity, he was to keep the store accounts and was allowed an office establishment for the purpose.

Hastings made no proposal as to the rate of the Agent's Commission, but suggested that it should be assessed under three heads :—

- a) Loss by decay, wastage and variations of market.
- b) Compensation for the Agent's trouble.
- c) Servants wages, cooly hire and other expenses.

Hastings also suggested that "an advertisement for a contract for such stores would be improper, it would be to tell the World what provision was made for the defence of the garrison."

Hasting's suggestions were approved and Fort William was filled with provisions not only for the forces but also for the civilians who in case of emergency would be drawn into the fort.

What the Supply Agent made out of his Agency must remain a matter of conjecture but from the record of the case, in which Warren Hastings was charged with corrupt system for the purchase of supplies and commission of 30 percent allowed to the Agent, but he hoped to draw about £6500 a year. He certainly died a wealthy man.

In the meantime Warren Hastings had been appointed as Governor General of India. But the Directors of Company severely censured him and even threatened to dismiss him. They brought many charges against him which he had to undergo before the House of Lords. Warren Hastings resigned. The trial lasted for seven years, 1788-1795, and Warren Hastings was finally acquitted.

CHAPTER. II.

THE BIRTH OF COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT

Contract-Versus-Agency.

It may be of service here to recapitulate very briefly the principal changes in the arrangements of supply and transport :—

- (a) We find fighting men were fed by the sales of speculative tradesmen or sutlers (banjaras, beopari), market prices being fixed by a military official.
- (b) The animals and vehicles were more or less under the control of another military official, the Wagon-Master.
- (c) There was no restriction to the amount of baggage each, officer, or his family carried. This equally applied to the Indian officers and their families, Even the other ranks, who could afford it, took their wives and children with them. in addition to the above, there were the contractors, their animals and servants and their families. A huge mob to feed and to be taken along in peace or war.
- (d) The contractors took the place of speculators.
- (e) The necessity to limit soldier's wives that accompanied a regiment on foreign, or active service, was seriously discussed. It was a moot point which was not at all easy to decide, so it was left undecided.

Subsidiary System.

The Maquis of Wellesley was sent out (1798-1805) with explicit instructions to preserve among the Indian princes the balance of power, which had been so materially disturbed during

Sir John Shore's term of office (Governor General) as to endanger British supremacy in India. Accordingly Wellesley at once set to work to make British power paramount in India by means of the subsidiary system. The main characteristic features of "THE SUBSIDIARY SYSTEM" policy was, that the Indian prince, with whom a subsidiary treaty was made, first of all he could not have among his servants any European belonging to a nation hostile to England (i.e. French). Next, he had to promise not to wage offensive wars and not to enter into alliance with the princes of neighbouring states.

Furthermore, by way of protection of his state against hostile incursions, and in order to preserve peace within his dominions, he was provided with an army under British Command for whose upkeep he had to pay. Finally, he had to acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government. As the money, which had to be paid for the upkeep of the army, was called a subsidy, the whole system therefore, came to be called the 'subsidiary system.' The Subsidiary system policy was eminently successful in firmly establishing British supremacy in India.

We have seen how during the 1775-85, the changes were rung with two rival systems of contract and Agency. However, that may be, it is certain that at the time no decided preference was arrived at in favour of either system. Hastings, however, has left on record a minute! He proposed that "an Agent should be appointed, to be remunerated by a commission of 15 per cent on all his disbursements in that office" and added: "I propose this method in preference to a contract, because I am convinced from experience that the service will be performed by this alteration, although it is liable to one material objection, in its natural influence on his (the Agent's) expenses. This is a defeat which can only be corrected by the probity of the person who is entrusted with so important charge."

It is certain that at the time no decided preference was arrived at in favour of either system, for immediately previous to

the institution of Bengal Commissariat Department in 1810, rations, elephants and bullocks, were furnished by contract, and camels, remounts and grain by Agents. Hasting's remedy was to appoint an Agent, a man whom he believed to be above temptation.' What tended to set many against Agencies was, their apparent costliness. The Company was still essentially a trading concern, and this fact tended to narrow the field from which suitable outside contractors could be drawn, as well as, to render it unlikely that the company would assume direct control of details of military administration. The natural tendency was to appoint a civil servant, a trader by calling, to minister to the army needs on the quasicommercial footing of an Agent.

Another advantage of a civil servant as an Agent was, that the company was able to insist on his keeping and producing proper accounts, from which they could judge whether the money was well spent. Should they think him too lavish, or lacking in the ability to obtain good supplies and animals cheaply, they could at once supersede him by another Agent or by a contractor. In short, the Directors of the company had a far tighter hold on an Agent than they could have on any contractor, and thus exercised a closer control over the public expenditure.

The inherent defects of an Agency tended to become more marked as the Company ceased to restrict itself to commerce and exercised more and more of the functions of the Government, led to the adoption of the only real remedy. This was the assumption by the Company's administration of a direct and detailed control over the provision and maintenance of supplies and transport for the army, by the setting up of a Commissariat Department in each Presidency. Through such a department, the army, subject only to general control of its policy and audit of its expenditure could become responsible for the provision and efficiency of the means of keeping itself alive and mobile, fit to take the field when needed. A very marked advance for a commander to know that he could take the field. Only with the coming of the Departments in 1810-11, did the Company's forces, European, cease to be depen-

dent for their daily bread in peace—and in war, also for their power to strike—upon organization which was wholly commercial in conception and largely so in operation.

The forces of the sister Presidency of Madras, at this time rivalled those of Bengal by also rising The Madras Commissariat.

African Campaign.

At the end of the eighteenth century an effort was made to place transport in some degree upon a military footing, so as to diminish the number of the irresponsibilities on the lines of communications and subject the selected few to military discipline. A corps of gunner-drivers was formed in 1794 and a "ROYAL WAGON TRAIN" in the same year. This latter came to a speedy end but it was replaced by a second 'Royal Wagon Train' in 1799, which lasted until 1834.

A Guide Line.

Professor Dodwell states in his paper on transport and the Second Mysore war that: "though nearly all writers on the Second Mysore War of 1731-85 have said that Sir Eyre Coote saved the Carnatic and would have expelled Haider Ali if only the Madras Government had furnished him with adequate supplies and transport, it is doubtful whether he was not attempting a military impossibility and whether he would in any circumstances, had succeeded in driving Haider Ali out of Carnatic. Coote's chief disabilities were lack of cavalry and lack of transport. Without these he 'could not move with freedom and rapidity: he could never secure such close contact with the enemy as to prevent the latter from breaking off action when and where they chose; after a battle his men were too exhausted to pursue; on the march they could hardly protect their baggage; and they could never maintain themselves for many days together at a distance from the coast.'"

Profit By Experience ?

Deficiencies of cavalry and transport were no new pheno-

menon in Company's armies, but the authorities in India and England, had failed to profit by experience, and 1781-82 the difficulties recurred in an aggravated degree. Coote had only about 800 cavalry when he set forth in January, 1781, and he was, therefore, forced to strengthen his columns with artillery instead. This increase in guns necessitated an increase also in draught oxen, which were already hard enough to find; "and such was the inferior stamp of cattle and their enfeebled state that forty of them were needed to drag a 12 pounder through the streets of Fort St. George, whereas only twelve oxen were the normal complement for such a piece." Transport and supply situation were also aggravated by additional animals and gunners.

Almost every town and village near Madras and operational area, had been laid waste by the enemy and the roving bands of decoits. No reserve stocks existed outside the Presidency town; and these too, were limited. All supplies had, therefore, to be brought by sea, landed at Madras, or elsewhere on the coast, and brought up by road to, or with the army, which was encumbered by a host of hungry followers and their families.

The Snow Ball.

It is interesting to note that Coote had only 6000 combatants, while the followers numbered 15,000. Coote was unable to find transport for more than one day's rice for his 21,000 men. He was pinned down by the weight of his guns and dependants, and though he had one bullock to every fighting man, he wanted twice as many again for the followers, and yet more for the fodder for the animals themselves. Foraging in the country devastated by enemy was a hopeless affair. Again, in any enemy country, it was essential to provide strong escorts for the protection of the convoys. This is how the snow ball of supply and transport become bigger as it moved forward.

It does not appear that Coote or other Commanders took any effectual steps to put matters right. They did not, for inst-

ance restrict the number of families and private servants, as a resolute commander might have done in defiance of custom. "On the contrary they accepted the situation which was, that they and their commander were in the air with no lines of communication, little transport and few rations, and starvation in prospect unless they chose to retire to the coast, where alone food was to be found.

Such was the state into which an army might fall when it took the field without due preparation and which is depended for its upkeep upon strings of hastily impressed transport!

In the Maratha campaign of 1803 Sir Arthur Wellesley-the Duke of Wellington, introduced a new era in India by cutting down his impediments as low as possible, and taking special care that the drivers of the vehicles should look after their beasts, which so far had been badly neglected. Wellesley's despatches of the Second Maratha War of 1803-05 are informative and educative, which is very briefly being narrated here. "This account written in 1804, is based on his experience in the Deccan (India) between 1799-1803 and describes how a Madras army took the field. He begins by enumerating" four descriptions of persons or animals", which required to be supplied with food :-

- i) European soldiers.
- ii) Indian Troops
- iii) Cavalry horses.

iv) Followers, including horses, cattle, servants, etc. of officers, departments, soldiers etc". (The classification of transport animals as followers may seem curious but it was done to make it clear that they were not Government property, hence not vital. It also makes clear the means by which each of these classes was rationed). The writer, Rangrut, witnessed this system in vogue in a silladar cavalry regiment when Rangrut joined it pre-First World War. In fact, when the regiment went to Mesopotamia as British Expeditionary Force D, the officers and Indian

- (iii) Provision of cavalry and horse artillery (British) horses, and of grain for them.
- (iv) Provision of boats for transportation of troops and stores.
- (v) Provision of petty magazine store.
- (vi) Supply of temporary transport.
- (vii) Supply of quilts for British troops.

The next clauses provided for the taking over by the Department from the contractor of the elephants, bullocks, cattle, sheds and breaking-in-carriages. The duties of the Commissary-General were: —

- “(i) The manner of making the different supplies available was left entirely to him.
- (ii) He would, of course, avail himself of the means which contract, or agency may afford, as to him may appear advisable.
- (iii) No officer of the Department was to make any disbursement, save in emergency, without his previous sanction; and all payments by the Commissariat were put under his direct control. Accounts were to be sworn to half-yearly upon oath to be taken before the nearest Magistrate, or Justice of the Peace, by which it is to be testified that neither directly, nor indirectly, have the officer by whom the accounts are signed derived, or will derive, any profit or emolument whatsoever from their situations beyond their regular salary. The accounts of the Deputy Commissary-General and of all assistants and sub-assistants were normally to be rendered to the Commissary-General, who was to consolidate them and submit them monthly for audit to the Military Auditor-General.

- (iv) The Commissary-General was authorized to address the Governor-General on the business of the Commissariat, through the Secretary to the Government in the Military Department; and the number of British and Indian employees of the Department was left entirely to his discretion. His headquarters were not fixed, and he was enjoined to reside from time to time at such places where the business of the important Department committed to his charge may seem to require his presence."

"The Quartermaster-General was appointed to hold, in addition, the post of Commissary-General. The additional pay allowed to the Officers of the Commissariat (*i.e.* his deputy, or Assistant Commissaries-General or sub-Assistant Commissary-General), over and above the pay, bhatta and tent allowance appropriate to their regimental rank, was rupees 3,000 monthly for the Commissary-General, Rs. 1,000 monthly for the Deputy Commissary-General, and Rs. 200 to Rs. 500 for sub-Assistants, and their actual travelling expenses were to be defrayed by the State."

As we have seen, the immediate superior of the Commissary-General was at first the Secretary of the Military Department, and he was thus virtually independent of the Military Board (on which he had seat) and of the Commander-in-Chief. But he was not long permitted to retain this commanding position. Early in 1817 the Department was placed directly under the Military Board, and on the principle "that no officer should have a seat on the Board, whose disbursements and conduct were liable to be brought under its superintendence and cognizance", the Commissary-General was thus deprived of his place on the Board. The reasons for this change are not explicitly stated, but it is probable that in its infancy, the Department suffered from over centralization, and the Commissary-General's high position, second only to the Secretary to Government and very high rate monthly allowance, may have

give rise to not unreasonable criticism! As a smile, the writer remembers that until 1930, in Silladar Cavalry regiments, an officer (British) could draw full monthly allowance of say Rs. 300/- and in addition draw 50 percent of allowances as an officiating adjustment and also as a Quartermaster, *i.e.* Rs. 100/- for each officiating appointments. This system brought much jealousy and criticism from non-Silladar Indian cavalry regiments and infantry battalions. It was eventually stopped. Similary officers of the I.A.S.C. and R.I.A.S.C. received corps pay of Rs. 300/- p.m. for Lieut-Colonels Rs. 200/- for Majors commanding a unit and other officers Rs. 100/- p.m. for their extra professional qualifications and responsibilities.

System on Accounts in Persian and English.

The first occasion on which the new system was subjected to the test of maintaining an army in the field, was the Nepal War of 1814-15. "Much inconvenience was felt by troops through the Commissariat Officers, being too over-burdened with accounts, to be able to attend to their more active duties, such as, of liaison with troops and inspection of supplies and animals of transport. These accounts, which were kept by Indian agents in Persian script and Arabic numerals, ahdall to be forwarded to the Commissary-General's office at Calcutta, where they were translated into English, checked and recompiled in consolidated form, and then transmitted to the Military Auditor General for final scrutiny. Delay and other evils attended upon this procedure were to some extent abated by the establishment in 1815 of a Field Accounts Office at Cawnpore under the Deputy Commissary-General, aided by an Assistant Commissary-General and a Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, where the Indian Agents were translated, checked and consolidated befor submission to the Commissary at Calcutta."

The Reform of 1817.

The effect of the reform of 1817 was that, instead of the De-

partment being virtually under the exclusive control of the Commissary-General, with the military Auditor-General as the final referee of the accounts, the military supervision was henceforth exercised by the Board, which annually furnished a detailed report to the Government on the "conduct and accounts of the Department". The Military Auditor-General's audit report also went forward to the Board and was laid before the Government.

Though the original organization, as now modified, was soon to be put to test in its operational role; although the new department was by no means lacking in efficiency; the new system was soon called upon to stand the strain of war, and that war was of a nature entirely novel to the armies of India—a mountain campaign in an unknown Himalayan terrain, peopled by a proudly intact and martial nation—the Gurkhas. Nothing more different to the long series of conflicts with the Marathas and the Nawabs of Bengal and Oudh and their allies that had become the traditional warfare of India could be imagined. Into this situation the Bengal Commissariat entered with zest and emerged triumphant beyond all expectations. What was more, the cost of their triumph fell below the lowest of financial forecasts, and that was the sort of victory that carried conviction to their supreme masters of the court of Directors—of a purely business concern, which was solely interested with every business concern, including fighting a war—with profit! Hence it made all the Commissariat's colleagues in India friends of the new organization. Politically, it was a very subtle move. It was the first serious attempt to replace Persian and Urdu by English language. Many Indian Muslims lost their jobs

I

Marquis of Hastings, 1813-1823.

When Hastings became Governor-General, Rajputana was the

scene of civil and fratricidal wars; the Gurkhas had encroached upon Oudh; and the Marathas were bent upon casting off the British yoke, whilst in Central India the Pindaris (decoits and highway robbers) were openly carrying out their nefarious and predatory excursions.

Hastings set to work to confirm British supremacy in India by waging offensive wars. The Gurkhas took advantage of the "non-intervention Policy" to make inroads into the state of Oudh which was under the protection of the British. Hastings insisted on an immediate cession by the Gurkhas of every inch of Oudh's territory. When this request was not complied with war was declared.

Leading Events...Invasion of Nepal

The British forces were divided into four expeditionary forces and invaded Nepal from four different points :—

(i) One column marched, which formed the Western border of Nepal state, under General Ocherlony from Ludhiana.

(ii) Second Column advanced on the capital, Khatmandu from the east from Saharanpur under General Gillespie, who suffered defeat and withdrew after loss of men and material. Gillespie was killed in action.

(iii) The third Column under General Morley marched from Patna to Khatmandu.

(iv) The fourth Column under General John Wood left Gorakhpur towards Khatmandu.

Columns (iii) and (iv) met with defeat and fell back, having accomplished nothing, save some loss of men and more of prestige.

As General Ocherlony advanced, he carried one stronghold

after another, till he reached at last the hill fortress of Malaon, where Ocherlony's troops drove back the defenders and occupied the outpost forts. Thereupon Amar Singh, the Commander of the fortress, entered into negotiations with the besiegers and surrendered the city on 15th May, 1815. After the capture of Malaon, Ocherlony advanced and defeated the Gurkhas at Magwampur, within five marches of the capital, on 28th February, 1816. A peace treaty was signed, namely "Treaty of Sagauli" under which the Gurkhas ceded Kumaon, Garkwal and the greater part of the Terai to the British. By the Treaty of Sagauli the British obtained possession of most productive area between the rivers Jamna and the Sutlej, including new famous recruiting centres and hill stations of Simla, Mussori, Dheradun and Nani Tal. Besides this, the Gurkhas consented to receive a British Resident.

II

Some Noteworthy Events—Pre-Requisites to a Successful Campaign.

The difficulties attendant upon entering a virtually unknown mountain territory, with very poor lines of communications and barren country, and conducting there a campaign, as different as it possibly could be, from the ordinary warfare upon the plains of India were realized and faced. Every effort was made to obtain reliable intelligence of the enemy, their country and its resources; and secret inquiries were addressed, at the earliest moment to the Europeans, who were in a position to provide such information, either their own knowledge, or through dependable Indian, or Gurkha agents. The preparation of such a war desired secrecy and a closest co-ordination of Political and Military Departments of the Government of India as a pre-requisite to the success of the invasion of Nepal whose people were brave and devoted to "their motherland." The needs of the commissariat, still going through change in administration, were neither forgotten, nor overlooked. Special attention was

paid to supply and transport problems and detailed reports were asked for.

Two persons, Doctor Thomas Rutherford and Captain Hearsey proved most useful, as they had been in close commercial touch with Nepal and had thus acquired very intimate knowledge of that country as regards their resources—military, economic and Manpower. Rutherford, who was a Civil Surgeon at Muradabad for several years, was appointed Extra Assistant Commissary-General in addition to his other duties in September, 1814.

Captain Hyder Young Hearsey was a former military adventurer of mixed blood, who had eventually settled down at Bareilly. He had very exhaustive knowledge of Kumaon and area around Mansorewer lake.

Some of the questions on which the Governor-General asked for information from these above mentioned offices relating to the Commissariat were :—

“(i) What species of carriage for provisions, stores, ammunition and liquer; and to what extent, are procurable ?

(ii) The mode of packing and securing those several articles, best adopted to the way in which they must be carried, for the use both of European and Indian Troops ?

It is presumed, too, that stocks for items (i) and also livestock, such as, sheep etc. could move with the troops ?

It is also presumed that elephants and bullocks would be available to certain points.

(iii) What number of ‘TANYANS’ (hill load carrying ponies) or mules, if any, are procurable in the country about to be invaded, or in the northern parts of Rohelkhand?”

These answers, it is likewise presumed, would be found very useful.

(iv) How are stores and provisions carried with the Gurkha army? Whence do they draw their Supplies?"

From the first Dr. Rutherford emphasized that :—

(a) "The Ordinary means of transport would not be practicable in a hill campaign, and this fact must materially affect the strategy of the contemplated operations.

(b) The formidable arms of artillery and cavalry can no longer be employed in the terrain of the field of operations."

However, it may be of interest to know that, Timur not only crossed the Himalays with his cavalry and artillery but used it effectively against the Syiah Posh Kafirs. This recommendation of Dr. Rutherford should, therefore, not be accepted too literally.

(c) "Instead of a baggage train conveyed by elephants and camels, and horses and bullocks, they must be content with such articles as can be conveyed on man and goats. Instead of tents, they must be satisfied with the covering of warm clothes and a thick razai (Quilt)."

"In the conduct of the Commissariat, instead of forging in the invaded country, supplies must be brought with labour with difficulty and expense from the plains"...6th July, 1814.

Dr. Rutherford wrote on 24th August, 1814, thinking (though mistakenly) that Hastings proposed to rely on mules, hill ponies, bullocks and elephants, he reiterated that: "This (*i.e.*, use of such transport) would be a very dangerous error. Every description of carriage, save porters, will be found precarious and inefficient, save in the initial advances to the foothills, and through the Doon Valley. Nor will the bearers (porters) of the low lands answer to carry burdens in the hills. It was difficult to forecast how many hill peasants would be available as porters in the campaign."

Both Rutherford and Hearsey were sure that, once the hill porters (Khasies) saw that the British were determined to invade Gurkha territory, they would come forward willingly and in large numbers—but then the Gurkhas would, of course, be making every effort to prevent them serving the British. Three rupees a month would be ample for a Khasia, who could perform long march at a speed of a mile and a half an hour, with sixty to eighty pounds, load in his wicker basket on his back. The aid we might receive from the source was not, therefore, ‘predicable with any accuracy—though Rutherford thought that four or five hundred could certainly be assembled at each of the ‘ghats’ (staging station) of Chilkia, Bilheri and Hardwar.

Hearsey counted on getting four or five thousand Khasis from Gurkhal alone from the markets at Saharanpur and other places in the plains, which places they visited to sell their produce.

Malis from the foothills were judged the next best porters. But by mid-October, 1814. Rutherford was already experiencing some difficulty over Khasis, the hill porters, who doubted the sincerity of British designs on Nepal. Meanwhile, he was assured by Malis that they would come to Dr. Rutherford’s call.

Anima' Transport.

“Mules were obtainable in considerable numbers. Hill ponies (tanyans) were few but might be handy for officers to ride. Litters (jhampons) would also carry officers, sick, wounded or baggage of officers. Bullocks and buffaloes might be tried in the hills for the transport of any surplus supplies, but should not be relied on for anything essential.”

Meat.

“Flocks of goats and sheep could travel “as MEAT ON

THE HOOF". These slaughter cattle could also carry two maunds (80 lbs.) or more of supplies on their backs; but in that event they would have to be accompanied by sufficient number of men to unload them at different places, improve the road there, and carry the animals loads across."

"The possibilities as pack animals of assess, and even sheep, were worth investigating." I (Rangrut) saw in 1946-47 the locals in Kumaon using the hill sheep to carry light pack loads and their children.

Local Supplies.

"The prospect of obtaining anything substantial in Kumaon and Nepal was not good. In the first instance, Gurkhas themselves would requisition most of the grain and deny its use to the British. Secondly not much was grown in the country. They imported it largely from Oudh." It was suggested to buy grain from the Punjab and Oudh. and therefrom build up large reserve depots near the points where our columns entered the hills. Government registered "banj'a'ras" in large numbers who had offered their services. Many hill banj'ar'as (locals) too came in and offered in formation of advanced grain depots within the actual mountains."

Rutherford also wrote hopefully of being able to induce some of his agents in Nepal to 'secret stores' of grain there, against the coming of the British columns. Rutherford was given (as an extra Assistant Commissary-General) "the probable points of attack" to guide him in collecting and organizing his resources and establishing suitable secret depots for their security.

The above detailed statement has been made to show that as the Commissary Officer (Rutherford) was taken into full and timely confidence, as a chief supply and transport officer should be. It paid very handsome dividends in making the supply of provisions and transport a success during the Nepal War.

The Planning for War.

As the information came in about the supplies and transport, it became evident, that the transportation of supplies and stores, especially after the Columns had entered the hills, was by the light of statistics alone, proved to be an almost insoluble problem, and that something drastic must be done to lighten the immense burdens of grain to be carried on countless human backs. How many porters the columns would otherwise have needed, we have not been able to ascertain ?

But Hearsey, in planning an expedition reckoned that 3,000 hillmen should be allowed as carriers to 300 fighting men travelling on a light scale with little camp equipment and relatively few followers, but forty-five days supplies. If his scale was correct, the number of porters needed for 19,000 British and 35,000 Indian soldiers (average strength during the winter 1814-15), who comprised the British forces in the field (to say nothing of their followers, and of the ban'jar'as and their followers, conservatively computed at one follower to every fighting man) would have been astronomical, even though many of these troops can never have entered the hills. It was not to be hoped that so many porters could be procured, or even existed, but major Lumsdaine extricated himself and the authorities from this apparent impasse by the brilliant invention of the "Free Half-Ration System."

Solution of the Problem.

As already stated according to the old Bengal Army rule, the Indian Officers, the sepoy, followers and civilians attached to the army had to pay for their rations both in peace and war. Even in the field they were expected to buy their food in the Government market. Only, when under special circumstances, when the private market supplies failed, did the Commissariat provide 'WHOLE GRAIN' for them, and even then, they had to pay for it. The price charged was at cost

price but overhead charges, such as, transportation being disregarded.

When the Nepal campaign was planned it was naturally proposed to follow the normal system, but in this it became evident that most of these supplies would have to be carried by porters. The porter procurement, even in sufficient numbers, was a very serious problem and its expenses were abnormal! What was to be done?

Hastings considered it "a very ungracious measure to curtail in just as the troops were entering on an arduous campaign!"

The sepoy and followers of three main divisions—Ochterlony's, Martindell's and John Wood's—were asked if they would voluntarily accept from the State, if and when the bazar supply of grain failed, "half a ration free instead of a full ration on payment". They jumped at the proposal, and the main difficulty confronting the commissariat was at once removed.

It is easy to see how the length of transport columns, its overall cost, and the size of reserve depots, must have been immensely reduced, and the conduct of operations correspondingly facilitated. Hastings wrote a special letter on 22nd May, 1815, to the Secret Committee in London, "emphasizing how he had saved John Company large sums of money which delighted London Street. Hastings showed an aggregate savings for the three divisions during the four months were 5-³/₄ lakhs of rupees."

Owing to the lack of records, it is not possible to trace the details of commissariat work during the course of the campaign. The order (General Orders) by the Governor-General of 2nd February, 1816 ran, "...The period has at length arrived in which the powers of the Commissariat have been put to the severest test. The result has exceeded the most sanguine expectations of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and of

the Government, and His Lordship in Council has no hesitation in pronouncing the Commissariat Department to be equally efficient in all its branches in time of war, as it has proved in peace. Unlike former campaigns in India, the late contest was not in the open plains, where the movements of troops were unimpeded by local difficulties, and where every article of supply or equipment could be transported with promptitude and facility. On the contrary, the British forces had to penetrate a mountainous country, singularly difficult of access, and easy for defence; in most places not affording a passage to wheeled carriages, and not infrequently impracticable for loaded cattle."

"But it was not against local obstacles alone that the Commissariat had to contend. The climate of these hilly regions presented further difficulties to be provided against and surmounted by corresponding preparation and precaution. The result of the exertions of the Commissariat during last campaign has left on His Excellency the Governor-General in Council nothing to be expected or even to be desired, which could add to the efficiency or reputation of Department; while the unprecedented economy with which supplies of every description were procured and transported, notwithstanding the difficulties and obstacles opposed to their transit, reflect unbounded credit on the officers of the department....."

III

Evolution 1820-1830

The Commissary-General, Bengal represented to the Government that the existing method was :—

- (i) "productive of great inconvenience, useless expense, and waste of time:
- (ii) and further, that it tied him and his Deputy to their

offices, preventing them from proceeding on inspection duty and supervising the general work of the Department."

To remedy this the Commissary-General suggested :—

(a) "to divest the Commissary-General and his Deputy of the charge and responsibility for the accounts of the Commissariat.

(b) that a special post might be created of Secretary and Accountant, Military Board, in the Commissariat Department. It should be this official's duty to examine, check and report upon all disbursements by the Department, preparatory to the details being laid before Government.

(c) Henceforth the accounts were to be kept in English instead of Persian, and by officers (British) instead of Indian subordinates."

The above recommendations were approved and the work of audit was transferred from the Military Auditor General to the Military Board, and pre-audit (*i.e.* audit before payment) was introduced as much as possible. The Field Accounts Office at Cawnpore was abolished. This phase (second) in the development of the Department lasted for about a decade—1830, and during it, the duties of the Commissariat changed in various respects, such as :—

(i) the provision of remounts was largely taken out of its hands ;

(ii) the Garrison storekeeper's office at Fort William hitherto an independent affair, was absorbed by the Department;

(iii) the Commissariat assumed responsibility for managing all military Saddar Bazars and for the provision of Hospital necessaries of every description, except European medicines and instruments;

(iv) Amongst the sidelines of the Department in its early days were the running of an oil factory at Monghyr, the provision of timber, the repair and custody of public building at outposts, the supply of country-made buff accoutrements, harness and saddlery, and the charge of various ferries.

Third Phase—1830.

This phase of the development of the Bengal Army Commissariat seems to have come about not by reason of any necessity for reform of the Department, but rather as a consequence of the reorganization of its parent body, the Military Board, at the end of 1830. Its direct effect was that the powers and duties of the Commissary-General were considerably restricted, and the control of the Board over the Department became both closer and wider. Provided that both the Board and the Commissary-General exercised tact, all might be well; and they did in fact do so at first, with the consequences that the reforms had little perceptible effect for some years. But it was inevitable that eventually, in a department where accounts came to play an almost dominant part, the entire control of the Military Board over every item of Departmental expenditure would involve, what commissariat officers looked on, as "interference" by the Board.

Differences arose on many points, leading to correspondence, acrimony, and delay resulting from repeated references to higher authority for orders and ruling upon matters in dispute. The Commissary-General complained that, "in effect, the Board took the management of the Department into their hands and out of his"! The Board rejoined that "the Commissary-General not only unwarrantably resisted their authority, but encouraged his officers to do the same!"

The system, in depending too much upon a fortuitous and personal factor—the possession of tact by all concerned—was clearly faulty, for continuity in this respect was too much

to expect; But the Government, after full consideration in 1837 saw no reason for changing it. They enjoined the Commissary-General to "CO-OPERATE ZEALOUSLY" with the Board, and the Board to utilize the Commissary-General's "TALENT, influence and local knowledge, as often and as fully as was consistent with their effectual supervision of the Department", and there they left it. This argues that, despite incessant paper warfare with the Board, the Department was really operating satisfactorily.

During this third phase, 1830-42, there were no other important changes within the Department. A General picture of the working of the Commissariat at this time may be gained from the account of Afghan war which would be discussed later on.

No Change in Transport Policy

In respect of transport, no change of policy was made. It was thus described by the Army Commissariat Commission of 1851-52: "Government deemed it expedient to always have within their own reach, and above suspicion, public cattle and carriage upon which at all times and in all circumstances, full dependence could be placed, and through means of which sudden and emergent exigencies could be met with promptitude and Vigour". Although such a description of cattle was more expensive to keep up, yet it was unquestionably safer than that which could be procured from any contractor, more especially from any among the inhabitants of a recently conquered country. The complement of Government cattle and carriage was calculated for the camp equipage of troops musket ammunition, troop stores, and hospital supplies. For every other purpose hired carriage was used."

In pursuance of these objects—though limited—many thousands of Government transport animals were maintained on

the charge of the Commissariat Department. In Bengal in 1812, for instance, the approximate numbers were :—

Bullocks	...	7,000.
Camel	...	3,000.
Elephants	...	500.

Elephants were kept for use in "KEDDAH" (elephant capturing) operations. A stud farm at Hissar (Punjab) bred Hissar draught bullocks noted for its strength and stamina, also camels who were noted for speed and hardiness. The Hissar Stud Farm is in East Punjab India, even exists today. This Stud Farm bred and maintained a reserve of 500 cattle and was run by Commissariat Department.

CHAPTER IV

THE BURMA WAR

Clash of Personalities.

Marquis of Hastings was succeeded by Lord Amherst, who was a hawk and believed in the expansion of the British Indian Empire at a speed more than it had been done so far. British territories were bordered on the eastern side by the Kingdom of Burma which had won great fame as an extremely rich country. Thucydides has remarked that: "wars have great causes and little occasions" and Burma war had certainly resulted from many occasions, such as, an insult actual, or fancied to the British national dignity, the paramount interests of civilization, or prolonged anarchy in a neighbouring state in India i.e. the Pindara.

To the Burmese, King of Ava, was the centre of universe, its arms invincible, its culture supreme! Ava had recently annexed petty states of Arakan, Manipur, Kachar and Assam. Since 1793 frontier incidents had been common and often serious.

Amherst had heard that King of Ava was negotiating with the French. Moreover, Amherst believed in Carlyle's Policy: "Just rights? What are rights, never so just, which you cannot make valid? The world is full of such. If you have right and can assert them into facts, do it, that is worth doing". It has been stated by historian J. H. Gense that: ".....The ruler of Burma ordered his General, Maha Bandula, to expel the

British from Bengal.....thus Lord Amherst had perforce to declare war on Burma!"

At the end of 1823 border clashes between the Burma's and the company's forces had taken place sometime in the favour of one and sometime in favour of other, till the advent of monsoon rains in June, 1824.

I

Special Peculiarities of Burma War.

The difficulties experienced by the British troops in operating among the swamps, and jungles during the frontier operations in Assam, Manipur and Arakan, led Lord Amherst to conclude that the best way to bring the Burmese to reason would be to send an expedition by sea to Rangoon, whence, it was expected, the ships could sail up the river Irrawaddy and the army intact at the enemy's capital Ava, some 500 miles up the river.

Accordingly, a force of 10,650 men were assembled under the command of Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell. Owing to the aversion of the Bengal sepoy going the overseas, the greater part of the Indian troops was drawn from the Madras Presidency. Captain W. Burlton was Assistant Commissary-General of the Bengal contingent, whilst the Assistant Commissaries-General from Madras were, Captains A. Cumming and C. Wilson.

After concentrating the force at Port Cornwallis in the Andaman Island, the fleet bearing the expeditionary force arrived off the mouth of the river on 10 May, 1824. The stockade of Rangoon lay 26 miles upstream.

The Diarchy.

As already stated Campbell's army in the first place was

virtually not one army, but two, i.e., of Madras Presidency and Bengal Presidency.

(a) The Madras portion was commanded by a Brigadier-General, who "corresponded with his own Government regarding with the (i) equipment, (ii) Organization (iii) and provisioning of the force, specially under his command; (iv) but in the Council, and in the field, he was subject to the Supreme control of the General (Campbell) of the Bengal Army.

(b) The staff of the army, as a whole, was found from Bengal; but the Madras contingent had a separate, self contained staff!

(c) "The force was on boardship and in the hands of sea officers. Some of the fleet were of the Royal Navy, and others from the East India Company's Navy and Merchant service; and it included the first steamship to be seen in the East," the Vessel Diana propelled by an engine of fifty horse power."

(d) The operation contemplated was a combined naval and military one.

(e) The British Army (Campbell's) brought with it to Burma, no land transport of any sort; organized or unorganized—neither coolies, nor animals. It relied entirely on being able to move by water, for which purpose it counted principally on being able to procure boats from the local inhabitants!

No details have come down to us about the intelligence reports sent by the British residents as merchants on Burma's resources: in grain, rice, wheat, or about boats, or transportation facilities. We have no returns of the supplies which each Presidency army took with it from Calcutta, or Madras. However, it has been stated that salted meat in sufficient quantities for the Europeans was conveyed from India, to the exclusion,

it would appear; of slaughter cattle, which it was hoped would be obtained in Burma.

The usual reserves of grain, rice for the Madres sepoy and other supplies were embarked with the fleet; and depots there of were set up in due course at Rangoon. It was "HOPED" that rice being so notoriously abundant in Burma as to afford every prospect of replenishing stock without difficulty!

The Burmese Force Commander General Maha Bandula Issued Orders.

"English ships have brought foreign soldiers to the mouth of the river. They are my prisoners: Cut me some thousands of spans of rope to bind them.....Evacuate the entire delta, not only clearing it of human population but also of all its food, animals and boats....."

In his despatch of 13 May 1824 General Campbell stated: "The troops took possession of a town scarcely tenanted by a living being.....a town of wooden dwellings and mouldering warehouses, destitute of supplies and inhabitants.....!"

No wonder, therefore that:" Campbell, who is said to have intended to stay only for four days at Rangoon before setting out for Ava in a flotilla of boats"; in fact, he remained there for nine months—until the middle of February, 1825. The reasons for his inactivity are obvious—no logistics—which had not been planned with clarity and farsightedness.

Courses open to General Campbell.

(a) Advance by sea to Prome, which was some 200 miles above Rangoon. But the few country boats which the British Army eventually collected together with the small quota of ships, boats, which might have been made available—were far from being enough to convey any sufficient force and its supplies to Prome.

(b) To advance by land was considered impossible due to any of these reasons:—

(i) There was no land transport.

(ii) The moonsoon, which had arrived at Rangoon coincidentally with Campbell's force, prevented all movement on country tracks for a force with no transport.

(iii) even with adequate land and sea transport and with no moonsoon, the track was such, that long columns could have got through only with heavy cost in the face of the sustained opposition that would certainly have been offered by the enemy. Would the British Force with no land transport be better off at Prome, if captured by them? Though not half way to the British objective—Ava, it would be far from her own base at Rangoon and could expect with ease neither reinforcement, nor revictualling!

(iv) The whole countryside had risen against the British and the main Burmese army would in all probability have attacked Prome with ease, as, when, and where it pleased; because it knew the country and the fact, that it had the necessary logistics, which made it mobile.

General Campbell, therefore, rightly chose the course to remain at Rangoon, till the situation was clearer!

Why he did not at once despatch the greater part of the fleet to fetch transport and provisions from India once he had witnessed total evacuation of cities by the locals and scarcity of local provision—has remained a mystery! The only answer can be given is bad intelligence and poor staff work, or uncertain situation!

He needed a few ships only for raiding parties, and for foraging purposes. But he decided to keep the whole fleet with him for both material, physical and moral support of his

foraging parties. The absence of naval fleet might have encouraged the enemy to cut off his force from his bases at Calcutta and Madras.

However, when moonsoon came, it brought in its wake great sickness—which in turn necessitated more food for hospital diets, hence few ships were sent to India. Four or five months would be needed for the round trip in moonsoon season.

II

The Change

On 10th of July, 1824 Captain Thomas Fiddes of the Bengal Army was "appointed to the General of the Commissariat Department of the combined Forces (of Bengal and Madras) in Burma" with the rank of Deputy Commissary-General. The Commissariat rations for Europeans included salt beef, salt pork, biscuit and arrak, Rice and grain, 'with some spices'. The sepoys purchased their rations on payment. There is no report that any of these commodities ever ran short, but there were complaints on their quality—probably due to difficulty of finding dry sites for depot and very heavy rainy season in the delta, the stocks were effected.

Malaria, typhoid, dysentery and scurvy appear to have been the Chief Scourge. It has been ascribed by some that much of the dysentery was due to over-indulgence in the local fruits—pineapples, citraus and limes! The ration scale in the hospitals was inadequate and the variety was poor. The few miserable animals that had been picked up locally, or imported by private traders (beoparies—from whom officers also obtained at great expense, sheeps or poultry), sufficed only to provide a little broth. But there was no milk for the patients. There was no bread for the Europeans till August, 1824, when enough was baked only for the sick—doubtless through the chance

positions at the Shwe-Dagon Pagada and Kemmendine. However, after four days' shirmishing; Campbell forestalled the enemy attack by a determined sortie, which was completely successful. The enemy was driven off with the loss of all their guns and stores, but continued their pressure by harassing attacks on the flanks. However, 7th December, 1824 Campbell having attacked, routed them. He followed up his success and inflicted further heavy losses till, by 15th December, the country around Rangoon was clear of the enemy. The morale of the British force went up. They became aggressive and full of confidence.

The advance.

With the arrival of reinforcements, preparation, for an advance were now in full swing, The army had been reinforced by; the Bengal Rocket Troop, a brigade of Bengal Horse Artillery and H. M. 47 Foot. Brigadier General Willoughby Cotton had succeeded to the command of the Madras contingent.

Valuable Corps.

The special transport corps had already been organized. One, 'the Maghs Levy', was a corps of boatmen. Five hundred Maghs had been sent to Rangoon from Chittagong in September, 1824 and with about 300 Malays and Chinese came under the control of Major J. H. Johnson, Deputy Quartermaster-General of the force. According to the original plan of company, they were intended to man the boats during Campbell's advance to Ava by water.

Havelock speaks also a "valuable corps of enlisted bearers—poers—from Madras who had been employed carrying small howitzer during a sortie in July. Though it is not possible whether they belonged to the Ordinance and not to the Commissariat, one would like to know more of them."

“Though the strength of European battalions was now only about 250 each and that of sepoy corps 350 each, transport was severely limited. A junior British campaigning in the early year of the nineteenth century usually had, “a single carriage animal, loaded with two small portmanteaus and the apparatus of the table. Against Seringapatam, or to the fields of Laswari, or Mahidpur, a subaltern advanced enforce with an equipage of 8 bullocks or four camels”. “But a single bullock was allotted to each officer of the Army of Rangoon”. Says Havelock, “when this was arranged, few bullocks remained.....It was necessary to look to the river for the means of transporting the biscuit, arreck and rice. It was necessary also to transport by water the battering-train and a prodigious quantity of ordnance stores. The meritime means were defective. The Folotilla, even with the addition of two divisions from Arakan, did not exceed thirty sail. The strawthatched Vessels of the country was either small or unmanageable. It was necessary to put in requisition all the boats of the naval squadron; and after all to choose between leaving at least seven hundred men above the proportion garrison in Rangoon, and causing them to advance by water.”

The above statement shows that, (a) the fighting units were still very understrength; (b) in spite of great effort by the Commissariat, the transport was still very inadequate. However, it was imperative that the enemy must be struck hardest and atonce.

IV

The plan.

The force was split up into three columns :—

(a) The first and largest, under the command of General Campbell, was to move by land, about 2,700 strong.

(b) The second, under Brigadier Cotton, some 1,200 strong, was to go by water.

(c) The third, under Major Sale, was first to clear the Bassein district of Henzada.

(d) The troops remaining at Rangoon, commanded by Brigadier-General M'creagh, were to move forward and join Campbell, as soon as, transport could be obtained for them. Including all sick and convalescents, they numbered about 3,750.

By this time 3,000 Burmese inhabitants had returned to Rangoon, and had promised to do their best to provide the British with draught cattle and bullock carts. Campbell was inclined to believe that they would "essentially contribute to the equipment of a column of reserve", so that he hoped that M'creagh's troops "would be ready to move forward upon Prome early next month (March—wide Campbell's despatch 12 February).

The main (land) column marched out of Rangoon on 13th February, 1825, the water column followed on the 16th February, and the Bassein Column sailed on the 24th February.

The advance to Prome.

It is intended to follow the movement of these columns in as far as they affected, or were affected by the Commissariat.

The water column under Cotton made good progress up the river Irrawaddy as far as Donabyo, arriving there on 27th February. It was held by General Bandula, in a strongly entrenched position with 15,000 Burmese, whilst Cotton now had only 600 men at his disposal;

Because, he had dropped a sepoy battalion on his line of communication and had expended another hundred men on boat escorts, for his water convoy carried the heavy guns and

commissariat and ordinance stores, not only for his own troops but also for Campbell's larger force.

Cotton's original plan was to seize an island upstream of the main Burmese stockades and thence to attack Donabye from the north so as to threaten Bandula's rear. But, according to Havelock, he was dissuaded by the naval commander on the grounds that this would leave the convoy of stores and guns remaining below Donabye a prey to the Burmese war-boats, and would probably make it impossible for the British Navy to carry out its responsibility of keeping the river open below. Cotton, therefore, determined on a frontal attack from southward; on 7th March, he landed his 600 men, but he was repulsed with a loss of 129 killed and wounded. Re-embarking, he fell back and waited for Campbell to join him.

Campbell's column, had advanced about 60 miles by 22 February, encountering no opposition on the way and receiving from the local inhabitants "some assistance in rice, roadmaking and slaughter buffaloes". It had "no" direct communication with Cotton who, as we have seen, had all its reserve supplies, heavy guns and ordinance stores in his boats? On 2nd March, Campbell reached Sarawa on the main channel of the Irrawady, 112 miles from Rangoon without having lost a single man from any cause. He had got into touch with Cotton, and both were confident that General Bandula had no intention of defending Donabyo. On 11th March, Campbell received a letter from Cotton telling him about his reserve at Donabyo. It became clear to Campbell that he would have to take that place without delay, or General Maha Bandula might sweep down the river in his war-boats, overwhelm Cotton and seize the guns and supplies of both columns. Campbell arrived before Donabyo on 25th March. The supplies, which he had brought with him by road were nearly finished, so on the night 25/26th March he sent his Deputy Quartermaster-General, Jackson across country to Cotton's boats.

Jackson thus records his orders: "A little before sunset on the 25th March, General Campbell sent for me and gave me a letter for Brigadier-General Cotton, desiring me at the same time in the strongest manner the necessity for a junction of the two columns, particularly as that under his own immediate command (Campbell's), was in very great distress for provisions, the whole of which was nearly expended, and the quantity of spirits totally consumed, with the exception of one day's supplies.....I should in strongest manner point out the very serious evils that were likely to accrue from the very slightest delay....."

The water column sailed up the river and cast anchor alongside the camp of Campbell's Column on 27th March. Campbell now planned an extensive bombardment, preparatory to storming Donabyo. The bombardment started at dawn on 2nd April. However, after few shots were fired the enemy fled. The British entered the stockades and found that General Maha Bandula had been killed the day before by a rocket shot. The enemy had left behind granaries and depots of stores sufficient for the consumption of the force for several months, as well as, a vast number of excellent river boats. All anxiety regarding grain and water transport was now at an end, but the situation in respect of land transport, slaughter cattle and some other supplies, were not yet satisfactory. But Campbell resolved to push on.

Advance to Prome.

Campbell left Donabyo on the night of 3rd April on way back to Sarawa. His advance guard crossed the river Irrawady in boats on 7th April. On 8th April M'Creagh joined Campbell's force with several hundred infantry and some elephants as reinforcements from India. On 25th April General Campbell entered Prome without firing a shot. The enemy had put the town in fire and much grain was lost but large stores nevertheless fell into his hands.

The armistice.

The loss of Rangoon, Donabyo and Prome, the steady advance of the British and the casualties suffered by the Burmese army, made the Court of Ava realize the true situation of the War. The British were no less anxious for peace. Negotiation began with the monsoon and soon a formal armistice was agreed upon. Meanwhile both sides prepared for war when the rains ended, if peace could not be arranged.

Final operations in Burma.

(a) Burmese forces concentrated 40,000 troops on the upper Irrawaddy and another 10,000 at Tongu.

(b) In August 1825, Campbell had 5000 troops at Prome, another 1,500 were on their way from Rangoon.

(i) The monsoon was much more bearable at Prome than at Rangoon.

(ii) Commissariat; The bazar was crowded with petty local dealers (beoparies) and the peasantry of the surrounding villagers. Cattle were procured in good quantity from the country. In May 1825, 600 head of cattle was brought by a foraging party and cattle depot were set up on the outskirts of the town. Even elephants were offered for sale by local people. Supplies came up rapidly from Rangoon by "Cargo Canoes".

As date of armistice on 16th October, it was extended to the beginning of November in order that the Burmese delegate might obtain their King's reply to General Campbell's terms.

On 24th October, 1825 General Campbell wrote to Calcutta ".....I am rapidly completing my artillery and commissariat in draught and carriage cattle, and by the end of the month,

we shall, I trust, be provided in both departments to the extent required

On 1st November, 1825, the Burmese King sent a reply to Campbell: "If the British really wanted peace they must raw frohqam" Burmese territory and then solicit. No demands for money territory would be listened to....."

The Battle.

The Burmese army took the initiative and inflicted a severe defeat upon a brigade of Madras sepoy. Encouraged by this, they advanced on Prome.

General Campbell quickly counterattacked and broke up their army in the first week of December, three elephants and some ponies also fell in the hands of the British. In spite of thirty hours incessant rain on 11th December which had held up British transport and spoiled much of supplies, yet Campbell pursuing the enemy, occupied Meaday on 19th December and he went straight on the Melloon, where on 29th December he decided to negotiate new peace proposals for peace offered by the Burmese Court. The Burmese yielded on every point save one—the amount of the indemnity—which was reduced accordingly to one crore of rupees instead of two. A treaty was executed on 3rd January 1826. An armistice was arranged till 18th January so that the document might be ratified and returned by the King from Ava.

But it failed to arrive back by that date. Campbell after storming and burning the Melloon stokades, resumed his advance. He overcame the final Burmese resistance at Pagan on 9th February and arrived at Yan-labo, less than sixty miles from Ava on 16th February. Havelock wrote :

".....During the final advance rations never ran short and only over forage for the cattle, was there and difficulty!"

The Treaty of Yandabo.

On 24th February, 1825 a treaty was signed at Yandabo according to it Burmese Bagdiyaw yielded Arakan, Tenasserim, Assam, Kachar, Jantia and Manipur to the British and also paid one crore of rupees as an indemnity. The British promised to retreat to Rangoon and to evacuate it after payment of the second of the four instalments of the indemnity had been paid to them.

On 22nd April 1826 Governor-General's orders stated: ".....The service of.....Captain Fiddes and the officers of the Commissariat are fully appreciated by His Lordship in Council....."

Lessons.

Let us first of all see the "OBJECT" which the Government of India wished to achieve by the despatch of this force for the prosecution of Burma War!

The Government of India had decided :—

(a) "The expulsion of the Burmese from the territory which they had recently annexed in Assam.

(b) The despatch of an expedition by sea to subdue the maritime provinces of Ava and, if possible to penetrate to the Capital along the line of the Irrawaddy river.

(c) To maintain a defensive attitude for the present on the Sylhet and Chittagong frontiers, merely strengthening the forces there so as to prevent any further incursions from the Burmese Force in Manipur and Assam"

In conveying the Commander-in-Chief's opinion on this policy, the adjutant General Wrote :

"Any military attempt beyond this upon the internal

dominions of the King of Ava, His Excellency is inclined to deprecate, as, instead of armies, fortresses and cities, he is led to believe we should find nothing but jungle, pestilence and famine..... ”

Before I proceed further, I (writer) wish to repeat that criticism will, as far as possible, be made on administrative matters. Strategy and tactics will not be put under cross fire. It is quite clear that the Government of India and the C-in-C fully appreciated that :—

(a) The operations on land in Assam and Manipur area had been halted not only by the enemy action, but enemy had proved superior in fighting power and administrative ability in jungle warfare than the British force. It was, therefore, considered necessary to send a strong force for diversion during the monsoon to defer the enemy sending strong reinforcement to his force in Assam to make an offensive after the operation. The British achieved her immediate objective in removing threat of a land invasion by the Burmese in Bengal.

(b) The Commander-in-Chief stressed on General Campbell that his enemy No. 1 in Burma would be pestilence due to bad climate. or incessant rain etc. The local Commander was warned that he would find most difficult obstacles neither in armies, nor fortresses nor in cities, but lack of means to operate freely on land due to jungle. The Commander was also warned that he may face “famine” due to local opposition, non-co-operation or any other man-made reasons in the enemy’s country.

The Commander-in-Chief and his staff was very clear in giving warning to the force Commander, but one is driven to the conclusion that beyond his lip service, he did not take the essential measures to provide the essential means which would have helped General Campbell to guard against “Jungle, pestilence and famine”! He certainly looked for ahead but made

no arrangements to ensure that the force which he was to despatch overseas had :—

(i) enough medical care in an unhealthy jungle country.

(ii) What facilities, if any, had been provided to escape the rigours of Monsoon, such as, supply of fresh supplies—meat, milk etc.

(iii) If the Government of India had desired to rely more on naval support in combined operation then the composition of the force, seemed unbalanced. The land force was strong but there was hardly enough naval war vessels to beat of Burmese naval war boats.

(iv) We have seen that Burmese Government did not reinforce his troops in Assam, who had so far been Victorious, but General Bandula sat and waited to be attacked by Campbell.

(v) General Campbell, it seemed paid little attention to his administration when he took over the Command at Port Cornwallis. He arrived at Rangoon on 10th May, 1824 and it was not till 10th July, 1824 that he felt the necessity of appointing Captain Fiddes to the general control of the Commissariat Department with the rank of Deputy Commissary General. A task which he should have undertaken as the first priority at Port Cornwallis due to the warning given to him by the Adjutant General to the Commander-in-Chief. What measures, if any, did he undertake at Port Cornwallis to defeat rigours of climate, pestilence and famine? This guilt—a most serious one—must be shared equally by the Government of India, the Commander-in-Chief and the Governments of Bengal and Madras Presidencies and their military advisers and General Campbell.

As it was, once the fleet carrying the army had sailed. India seems to have washed its hands off them till they were

shocked and awakened by the news of disaster—death, sickness, lack of transport, supplies and hospital facilities.

(vi) Several Company officials had visited Burma. Moreover, there were many European businessmen who had been trading at Rangoon, Prome and Ava. It is impossible to believe that they could not supply reliable intelligence about the hazards of war in Jungle or during monsoon, the political feelings of the Burmese against the British aggression, the availability or otherwise of Commissariat stores and transport, climate, communications, morale of the Burmese army. Unlike captain Hearsey or Dr. Rutherford no intelligence reports were submitted by any European trader. If the Government of India asked for it or not; it is not on record, or at least we have not seen it.

The vicissitudes of the expedition appear to have been due entirely to the lack of administrative foresight on the part of those who held responsible posts and destiny of the nation. The Commissariat Department seem to have done their duty well and faced the difficulties with determination. They were put to a most severe test but they did neither fail nor falter—is most creditable.

CHAPTER V

THE AFGHAN WAR 1838—ADVANCE TO SHIKARPUR

The Eastern Question in Central Asia.

Due to the existence of very strained relations between England and Russia in connection with their policy of colonial expansion in Asia, English statesmen had always viewed with distrust Russia's steady advance towards Afghanistan and India. It was the eagerness of the English to put a check on Russian Colonial designs that eventually led to the Afghan wars.

It has been stated that in 1835 the Shah of Persia, at the instigation of Russia, laid siege to Herat, the gateway into Afghanistan, by which passed the trade route from Persia into India. Accordingly, the British Government in London, feared that Russian influence would become supreme in Persia and Afghanistan. Furthermore, there were in Afghanistan two rival claimants to the throne, Dost Muhammad and Shah Shuja; and about that time Dost Muhammad had defeated his opponent and was in possession of the throne of Afghanistan. As the British refused to help Dost Muhammad to gain possession of Peshawar District, which Ranjit Singh had annexed, he had turned towards Russia. The famous Tripartite Treaty was concluded between the Government of India (Lord Auckland, the Maharaja Ranjit Singh of the Punjab, and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk for the purpose of deposing Dost Muhammad and placing Shah Shuja on the throne of Afghanistan.

However, General Fane, the Commander-in-Chief in India warned the Government of India in 1837 about the proposed plan ;—

“Every advance you might make beyond the river Sutlaj to the Westwards, in my opinion, adds to your military weakness. If you want your Empire to expand, expand it over Oudth, or over Gowaliar and the remain of the Maratha Empire. Make yourselves completely sovereigns of all within your bounds—but let alone the FAR WEST.” His advice was not taken.

Though Auckland accepted responsibility for his decision to conquer Afghanistan, he undoubtedly had serious misgivings as to its soundness, as he had declared: “I am sensible that my trans-Indus arrangements are in many points open to objections, but I had no time to pause. There was no choice but between them and more objectionable danger of remaining passive—and a friendly power and intimate connections with Afghanistan a peaceful alliance with Lahore for which some hazards may well be run...” 23 August, 1838.

In spite of the fact he restated his case publicly and forcibly in a justificatory declaration in October, 1838. The criticism did not die down. The Duke Wellington said that..... “The consequence of the proposed invasion would be perennial march into that country.” It came too true as the British had to fight many Afghan Wars.

There were others, who pointed out the dangers and difficulties of climate, most difficult terrain—which consisted of vast deserts, waterless, traceless saltpetry waste lands, high mountains where armed marauders and decoits would constantly harass the columns. Others stressed the dangers of very long distance and the unwisdom of employing Sikhs whom the Afghans hated—as our allies. Any how they asked, “how could Sha Shuja keep the throne once he had got it with our help?”

Concentration of the Army of the Indus.

General Fane, who was originally to command the expeditionary forces was dropped by Auckland, and General Keane, Commander-in-Chief Bombay Army was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of this force. The arrangements for the concentration of this Expeditionary Force, namely; the Army of the Indus, were changed more than once.

The Composition and Rendezvous

1. The composition of the Bengal Army portion of the expeditionary force, under the command of Major General Cotton, was finally fixed at :

- | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|----------------------|
| (i) At brigade of Artillery | } | to assemble at Kamal |
| (ii) One Brigade of Cavalry | | and elsewhere, and |
| (iii) Three brigade of Infantry | | much to Firozpur |

Shah Shuja's Contingent.

A mixed body of Sikhs, Hindustani (Muslims), Nepalese recruits and Indian ex-soldiers, under British Officers and Indian Officers who were seconded from the Company's armies, were raised at Ludhiana, about 6000 strong. But as the project developed, its role, originally a leading one, rapidly deminished in importance.

Bombay Column.

About 5600 in number, was under General Keane himself. Travelling by sea to the mouths of Indus, was to join the Army of the Indus at some place and time in Sind-Rohri or Shikarpur ?

Since Ranjit Singh was averse to British and Shah Shuja's force entering his dominions; these armies were to move into

Afghanistan by the southern route, through the Bolan and Khojak passes to Kandhar, whilst a Sikh Army was to take the northern route through the Khyber Pass to Kabul.

In spite of the fact, that General Fane had been dropped and sent on pension, he gave close personal supervision to the preparation of the expeditionary force and he accompanied it by water down the Indus, on his way to Bombay and to U. K. He paid special attention to two very important points :—

(a) Firstly, to the formation of advance depots of supplies on the line of march to the river Indus.

(b) and secondly, to the columns moving off in good time to allow of their traversing Sind and the Bolan Pass before the hot weather began in what is one of the hottest parts of the world.

The Commissariat Department.

Major J. D. Persons was appointed Deputy Officers of the Army of the Indus were :

Bengal Column.

D.A.C.G. Inf: Div:	Captain A Watt.
S. A. C. G. Cav: Bde.	Lieutenant G. B. Reddie.
S. A. C. G. Artillery	Lieutenant Ges. Newbolt.
S. A. C. G. 1st Inf. Bde.	Lieutenant K. S. Simpson.

Bambay Column.

Senior A. C. G.	Captain D. Davidson.
S. A. C. G.	Captain H. Stockly.
Acting S. A. C. G.	Lieutenant H. Wardell.
S. A. C. G. I/C Bazars.	Lieutenant R. P. Hogg,

Shah Shuja's Contingent.

Paymaster and comst Officer	Captain Hugh Johnson.
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The Political Department :

The Chief Political officer and direct representative, was William Hay Macnaghten of the Bengal Civil Service. He had a numerous body of political assistants, great and small, of whom one was Sir Alesander Burnes of the Bombay Political Department. He was sent ahead at an early stage with instructions to annex the Fort of Bhakkar, opposite Rohri, at which point it had been decided that the army should cross the Indus. Four political Officers were entrusted to collect supplies at various stages and also to arrange for the improvement of the road. For example; Clark, the political agent at Ambala and Greathead, his assistant, were responsible for arranging provisions for first few stages. A young subalterd F. Mackeson of the 14 Bengal Native Infantry and Assistant Surgeon A. G. Gordon whose official designation was "British Agent for the extension of commerce on the Indus." Mackeson established himself at Bahawalpur, where he remained till the Bengal Column arrived, and then accompanied it for part of its onward march, being later on transferred to the Khyber. Gordon made his headquarters at Multan, where he was later relieved when the army left Ferozpur by Captain W. Thomson, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General.

In the early stage much difficulty was encountered in inducing the Nawab of Bahawalpur and his officials to co-operate; but Gordon procured some grain from Pakpattan across the Indus, and the grain contractors of Ludhiana were persuaded to deliver some supplies at Bahawalpur. In addition to these and their ordinary Political duties, Mackeson and Gordon had also to procure boats and send them up from Bahawalpur to Ferozpur for the army's water-transport. Burnes had been at Shikarpur for several months where he was busy arranging for supplies, reminting rupees and last, but not the least, attempting to negotiate with the Amirs of Sind the cession of Bhakkar

—an island in the Indus opposite Rohri. It should be noted, that until quite recent years, Sind was part of Bombay Presidency. Burnes had served there and he had much valuable knowledge of Sind and its tangled affairs. The Amirs of Sind were not in favour of the British troops crossing their territory. But Bhakkar had been selected at which point, it had been decided that the British Army should cross the Indus.

It was a queer Arrangement but it Worked

A new experiment was made to the fact that the march from Ferozpur to Rohri was through the dominions of Indian rulers whose relations with the British were then "extremely delicate." The stocking of supplies at various halting stations in advance, were made the province of the political officers and not by the Commissariat Department. This system, through not wholly satisfactory, but was still in vogue pre-partition. It is arguable whether political officers were best fitted for the task and whether they could spare time for the job?

Some of the General Fane's orders that, *i.e.*, "during the concentration", make interesting reading. Havelock has stated: "Fane's last order before the Bengal column marched which was issued on 4-12-1838, shows that he expected his Commissariat Officers to extricate the army from any difficulty which should arise from shortages in the supplies collected by the political assistants. "Major General Sir Willoughby Cotton", Fane Wrote: "will be so good as to see that every brigade..... has its due supplies and Commissariat means. His Excellency taken this opportunity of reminding Commissariat officers that, after their departure from Ferozpur, the army will depend for its resources on them alone, and failure on the part of the civil officers will not be considered by him as a justification for any wants whatsoever. He desires them reflect on the highly important consequence to the army and the government of failure in their department. The Commissariat office for

each division or brigade will be considered by the Commander-in-Chief as strictly responsible on these subjects.....” Sir Fortescue states that: “the march of the army from Ferozpur, originally fixed for 1st December, had to be delayed for a week so as to enable food and forage to be cut for the passage of the force through Bahawalpur”, and if this is so, the postponement may have led to the issue of the above quoted order. He goes on to say that Fane was furious! “This staggers my confidence in the Commissariat” he wrote: “even an hour’s delay is serious.....and it is a great evil to the army to be delayed by want of common foresight.....”

Though Fane’s outspoken warning was ostensibly directed to his Commissariat staff, it was evidently for the eyes of the political Officer, to whom it was not within his jurisdiction to issue censure. It is admitted, that this area was not then canal irrigated as we find it today, but huge invading armies from the north and N. West-Afghanistan, Persia, or the Moghuls had found this land “of plenty”, what food grain they expected to cut or collect in December—is a very lame excuse, which could be accepted by those who are ignorant about the land they live or govern. For example, wheat is harvested in May-June, Maize in August and the rice in November. Forage is also harvested in October and wheat Bhussa in July or rice hay in November, *i.e.* when these crops are harvested. But this was not the first time that the Political Department get away with such a silly excuse.

II

THE MARCH TO SHIKARPUR—12-1838—2-1839.

The Order of March.

(a) A detachment of the Engineers and Sappers and Minors marched two or three days in advance of Shah Shuja’s column “TO PERFECT” the road, *i.e.* on 1-12.1838.

(b) Shah Shuja's column, started from Ludhiana and passed through Ferozpur on about 3.12 1838 without halting at that place.

(c) The first column, comprising General Cotton's headquarters and the brigades of Horse Artillery and Cavalry, moved off on 10-12-1838.

(d) The 1st, 2nd and 4th Infantry Brigades, the Park of Artillery, the 4th Local Horse and the Commissariat train followed in separate columns" at a days' interval between each. The last column, therefore, did not leave the starting point—FIROZPUR—not till 16-12-1838.

Each column had a certain amount of supplies with it, and this order of march was maintained throughout the route to Rohri.

The strength of the whole force was about 9,500 combatants and 28,500 followers; and they had with them thirty days supplies, with slaughter cattle, as meat, "on the hoof", enough for two and half months. Additional supplies of grain were dispatched by water to Rohri, as were the principal hospital stores and the sick. There were, however, insufficient boats to send the ordnance stores also by this method, they had, therefore, to be put on the road with the army, which much increased its transport. Throughout the long march of about six hundred miles to the Indus crossing, the troops were never separated by more than twenty miles from their water transport, flotilla which accompanied it, constant touch was maintained. In a reserve depot at Ferozpur, 50,000 maunds of wheat and two month's supplies of other grain were left. Archibald Gordon was ordered in 1838 to take charge of Ranjit Singh's fleet of boats, laden with produce of the Punjab and to proceed by Indus. Grain was scarce in India, as 1838 had been a famine year in United Provinces, India.

The Transport.

The transport consisted for the most part of no less than 30,000 camels, of which 14,325 carried 30 days Commissariat supplies and the remainder the Ordnance stores and baggage. The whole of Northern India was drained dry camels on hire for this immense train, so that when the vast resources of Rajputana, the Punjab and Hindustan were exhausted, it finally became necessary to take even the brood female camels from the Government Stud farm established at Hissar. One can safely assume that the need for transport was great indeed that had led to these valuable and almost irreplaceable animals being taken from the Stud for ordinary transport use.

III

The two Facets.

Sir John Fortescue states that: "trouble with supplies began immediately after leaving Ferozpur, and that at every stage the depots of grain by the way were found deficient."

On the other hand, General Cotton, gave it in evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Lords in 1852 that: "nothing could be better than the Commissariat arrangements for the march to Rohri, and that his troubles began after crossing the Indus, first, when Keane had to draw on him at Shikarpur for supplies and then when Burnes and his agents were disappointed over supplies from the Khan of Kalat....."

Havelock has stated,....."in every transaction he (the Nawab of Bahawalpur) fulfilled the duties of a sincere and constant ally. Not only did the force day after day move on without molestation, but the supplies collected long before were found in the towns and villages piled up for use as the Agents of the Commissariat had left them. A full share of these valuable articles, and occasionally a little more, had

indeed been consumed by the troops of Shah Shuja, who had proceeded us.....but, on the whole, our progress was through the midst of people eminently pacific, our wants were admirably supplied, the health of the troops was excellent, and their prospects were cheering..... There were only two things to mar the general satisfaction. The vexations desertions of the followers, who carried off their hired camels, and left their masters comfortless and without means of transport...insolvent and untutored fellows, only a loss under circumstances in which no other camels and no better followers could be procured, gave rise to anxiety where no description of men or animals could well be spared, though the allusion would appear to be to regimental and not to commissariat transport. The other grievance of which this otherwise happy force, even at this period complained, was the injurious effect produced on the health and strength of the baggage animals by their unavoidably feeding on the "JHAOO" or tamarisk bush—in fact LANA a saltish-bush—low forests of which everspread the territories of Bhawal Khan which we traversed, which, from April to September is excellent food for camels and was here indeed abundant; but is in December dry and unpalatable and utterly void of nutriment.....”

Sir Kaye has stated that : “.....The truth would seem to be that little, or no difficulty, was experienced on account of supplies, but that the transport gave growing cause for anxiety. Most of the officers had too many camels, too large tents and too much baggage altogether, despite on order by the Commnder-in-Chief against in such directions. Many of the camels were thus overloaded from this cause, partly because, the "SARWANS" hearts were not in their jobs, partly owing to the poor quality of the camel thorn and the absence of other grazing, and, lastly because at the end of the day's march, the camel got into camp too late to obtain sufficient grazing. At that season of the year the days were at their shortest, and the animals had to be brought in from grazing before nightfall in

view of the risk from marauders of the area who were professionals in this art. This risk prevented that transport from being sent ahead of the column of troops, so the whole force had to make an earlier start every day in order that the camels might graze after reaching the camp."

Hough has stated: ".....The first column arrived at Bahawalpur on 29-12-1838 and resumed its march on 1-1-1839. By 19-1-1839, when the Headquarters column was four marches short of Rohri, the camels were dying faster than the army could consume their loads, and many camel-owners, unwilling to face crossing the river Indus, departed with their beasts. The Commissariat had to transfer some of the grain to hired camels in regimental transport, though that was already fully loaded. By the time the head of the army reached Rohri on 24-1-1839, the horses were also losing condition....."

IV

Sind.

The political situation in Sind was extremely difficult. Burnes felt that politically, the Amirs of Sind were naturally and legitimately alarmed at the passage through their territories of huge armies of foreign troops, and specially at the prospect of Shah Shuja's restoration to the throne. A large and almost forgotten money claim against them was revived by the British who also broke the promise that military stores should not be moved along the Indus. Overcoming these obstacles by his diplomatic skill and local knowledge, Burns obtained the use of Bhakkar for as long as should be necessary—and wrung unwilling co-operation from the Amirs.

The Army of the Indus arrived to find that Shah Shuja's contingent had already been ferried across the river which was done in week's time. It was considered that a bridge was necessary for the passage across of 30,000 camels. All boats which had brought Commissariat stores down the river, were

used to construct a boat bridge. It took sixteen days to construct a bridge to span 500 yards of river with 74 large size boats. The Indus was crossed without incident; and Bengal Column marched into Shikarpur, where Shah Shuja's force awaited them, between the 17th and 30th February, 1839. "There were then 15,500 troops concentrated at this place, which with their followers made about one hundred thousand human beings to feed—to say nothing of many thousand camels, horses, oxen and 'the meat on hoof'. Through no fault of Major Persons, who, on crossing the Indus, had assumed general responsibility for the Bombay Commissariat arrangements as well, the supply and transport outlook now became extremely difficult."

"It was discovered that though the Army of the Indus had all along been "DEPENDING" on the Bombay authorities to find themselves from Sind (Sind formed a part of Bombay Presidency till early twentieth century), for the onward march from the river (Indus) to Kandhar, not only could none of these animals be provided, but also by some extraordinary omission that the Bengal Government had never been apprised of the fact. Moreover, to make matters worse, the Bombay contingent called on General Cotton and Major Parsons (Deputy Commissary-General of Cotton) for camels for their own use. General Keane had 3,000 camels with him on his march through Sind; but the bulk of his supplies were on river transport, and from Shikarpur onwards, he would want another 7,000 camels. These he proposed to borrow from Cotton, who had not got them, and they could not in fact be procured locally.

As Shah Shuja's force had already borrowed 100 camels from Bengal Commissariat, something had plainly to be done before the three armies could be committed to leaving India behind them and traversing a desert, two tablelands and two dangerous and difficult passes on their long march into Afghanistan. Parsons, therefore, proposed that Bengal force should halt at Shikarpur for twenty days, during which time he would

send all his camel transport that could be spared, on the round trip to the Indus and back, to bring forward supplies from Rohri. By this means he would be able to build up a strong reserve at the advanced base.

"The political officers, it is true, had reported that ten days' supplies would be available at Dadhar at the foot of the Bolan pass, and another twenty days' at Quetta. The Bengal transport could carry six weeks' rations for its own force, or a month's if they had to be shared with the Bombay army, and as it was calculated that for the whole march from Shikarpur to Kandhar forty-five to fifty days' supplies would be required, adequate supplies for the army during its march seemed to be in sight. And on this basis its march seemed to be in sight. But on this basis its welfare depended on the supplies at Dhadhar and Quetta being duly forthcoming; and if Parsons had his doubts on that point, as we conjecture that he had, they were to be justified. "Cotton was temporarily away from his headquarters, having gone down the Indus on a futile excursion with unnecessary reinforcements for Keane. In his absence Parson had actually despatched 4,000 of his camels to the rear for supplies. On 20th February the Bengal Commander (Cotton) returned to find that Macnaghton, whose authority was practically paramount, was furious at the delay, his Commissariat adviser's plans perforce having to be abandoned".

Comments.

Before we proceed further, it is suggested to take notice of certain happenings only to draw lessons and not to be critical or the sake of criticism only. First point that strikes one is that there were :—

(i) Fighting men numbered	9,500
(ii) Followers	28,500
(iii) Commissariat Camels	30,000

The above numbers do not include private baggage animals, camels, bullocks and horses belonging to the officers, their families, the contractors (beopa'ris and banja'r's) and their families, the first line transport for the cavalry, infantry and artillery units.

It is encouraging to find that the general staff had learnt the necessity of providing engineers and Sappers and Miners for improvement of roads, bridging rivers, etc.

In spite of fact that the retiring Commander-in-Chief had warned officers and men to travel light but no heed was paid either by the officers and men nor by the Commander (General Cotton) to ensure that the Chief's orders were carried out.

Space will not permit us to give an account of causes which led to delay in the first place the rendezvous and later on for finding reinforcements for General Kaye, who had not enough transport for the force already under his command. Again, there was no liaison between the general staff of the two Commander-in-Chiefs of Bengal and Bombay Presidency forces. They neither co-ordinated their supply and transport problems, nor apprised their shortcoming to each other, with the result Kaye's force reached Rohri by river transport without any land transport for their Commissariat.

It is a sad commentary that while the Commissariat paid too much attention on fighting men's food, they omitted to make necessary arrangements for the food of the followers, the sarwans of hired camels and for forage for the camels. They should have arranged for "Missa Bhoosa" and grain for the camels, whom they knew, would not get enough grazing due to, late arrival at camps, threat of cattle lifting Marauders of the area whose habits were notoriously known to all, should have been noted and arrangements should have planned for stall feeding,

Havelock have drawn attention to a very most point when he states: (a) "Hough, writing at the time, was unaware of (or as a serving officer could not publish) details of the conference. Macnaghten, writing to Colvin that evening says: "Any hint from me, however, quietly or modestly given, was received with hauteur; and I was distinctly told that I wanted to assume the command of the army.....All this arose out of my requesting 1,000 camels for the use of the Shah and his force. Sir Willoughby (Cotton) was ably backed by his Commissariat Officer."

(b) ".....On 20th February the Bengal Commander returned to find that Macaghten, whose authority was practically paramount was furious at the delays. After a stormy interview Cotton was persuaded to push on....."

Obviously the relations between the Commander of the Force and his over-riding and powerful political adviser were not smooth running. The choice of the Government of India in selecting William Hay Macnaghten of Bengal Civil Service as the Chief political officer and direct representative of the Government, was an unfortunate choice—especially when he himself was averse to taking the post.

CHAPTER VI

FIRST AFGHAN WAR (CONTINUED)

THE MARCH FROM SHIKARPUR TO KANDHAR FROM 20th TO 26th APRIL, 1839

New order of March.

The order of march was now changed. Hitherto Shah Shuja's contingent had headed the columns, but from Shikarpur onwards the Bengal Column took the lead, marching in echelons, the first of which moved off on 24th February, 1839. In the eighth and last echelon were the 'Commissariat Field Stores'; as the supplies in the non-regimental charge were called in those days; which set off on 1st March under escort of a regiment of Irregular (Silladar Cavalry) Horse and a company of Sepoy infantry. These stores amounted to six weeks' rations for the Bengal Column, with rum enough for 3 months, while in the regimental transport, 3 days unit supplies were carried.

For the first part of their journey the columns had to traverse the plain, flat, swampy salt-peterish and almost waterless plain which lay between Shikarpur and Dera Ismael Khan at the mouth of the Bolan Pass; then came the pass itself; next from Dasht, stretched the Quetta-Pishin plateau; then the Knojak pass, and finally, the Afghan tabeland. Most part of the country was barren, except some cultivation around shallow wells. The irrigation system in Sind came late in the twentieth century. The climate was as varied as the nature of the country. From the month of March onwards the first plain and

the lower end of the Bolan Pass grow fiercely hot and severe dust storms which, sometimes last ten days, are most unpleasant. Those who have visited Sibi and Jacobabad in the summer do not need to be reminded that the mercury rushes up to 128°F.

But as soon as the Quetta-Pishin tableland is entered, the nights at that season of the Year are bitterly cold and even snowstorms may be experienced, whilst the piercing dry cold blast of the "Khojak Winds" is proverbial. Water is generally scarce throughout the journey and local "Karez wells" are few even today and were scantier still in 1839!

The tribesmen were fast moving hardy cavalrymen, very resentful of intrusion, very clanish who lived on attacking, looting each other, if they could find no caravan to loot! They were hardy and good fighters, who fought on 'TIP AND RUN' basis. They were unlike the Pathans, who fought on foot. From the Commissariat point of view, decidedly then, it was not a country to enter without satisfactory supplies, transport, communications and where its long columns were not adequately protected by strong cavalry patrols and a reasonably compact force of good morale.

From Shikarpur to Dadhar was about 146 miles, which would normally have taken ten marches; but owing to shortage of water, the columns had sometimes to be split-up into smaller detachments, and the Headquarters column, for instance, actually took sixteen marches instead of ten. The long marches through desert and the lack of forage combined with the absence of adequate water between halting places, caused much distress to the troops and transport. For the night, the Headquarters column halted at Janidira where, as Havelock tells us, they had a foretaste of what they were to experience now, that the allied territory had been left behind.

Havelock has stated: "A depot of straw had been collected under the walls of a strifling mud hut for the use of our

cavalry and that of the Shah. But we were not now in the secure and friendly land of the Nawab Bahawal Khan (Bahawalpur). The guard of the Shah's Hindustani troops had been attacked and dispersed by a band of marauders, and the straw carried off....."

"The 2nd Brigade had already been left behind at Shikarpur for the time being; now the 1st Brigade was also dropped at Jagan, and the 4th Brigade was ordered to close upon it; and on the 27th February Headquarters moved forward with the artillery and a regiment of cavalry to Rajhan, where it was reported that there was water enough for them. Forward of this place lay an unbroken level of desert, in which there is not only, neither well, spring, stream nor puddle, but not even a tree, and scarcely a bush, an herb, or a blade of grass.....Thackwell pushed across this tract rapidly with the cavalry and a few infantry to Barsher, where he waited two days in the vain hope of procuring forage, and marched twenty seven miles more to Ustar, where he found grass and straw and enough water for a brigade for a day or two. At this juncture the Deputy Quartermaster-General succumbed to sunstroke, but Burnes and the Deputy Adjutant-General (Craigie) went ahead to make arrangements for water and forage up to Dadhar. Their reports were apparently encouraging, for Headquarters resumed its march from Rajhan on 3rd March, proceeded by the remainder of the Cavalry and the Horse Artillery, and entered the desert. Barsher was reached without incident, and the Headquarters caught up the cavalry at Bhag on 6th March. Here was found water in abundance, three or four hundred maunds of grain—about a day's supply and what was voted best of all, a crop of carrots, the only garden vegetable we had seen since we left Lower Sind!"

Havelock has stated : ".....News came in both good and bad. The 1st Infantry Brigade under Sala had crossed the desert between Rohan and Barsher without difficulty between

10 P. M. on 5th and 8 a. m. on the 6th March; but marauders were becoming daily more active and much damage was being done to the followers and animals. The local inhabitants naturally resented the seizure of their green crops for forage (a measure which an equal amount of harm to the animals which consumed them), though immediate compensation was paid in cash.

"On 8th March, Headquarters with the cavalry and Horse Artillery moved on to Mahesar on the Bolan river, whence the march was resumed on the 10th of April, when the confusion in passing through a narrow defile was another foretaste of difficulties to come. We found ourselves between two of the hills which we had observed to the northward the day before. They formed here a narrow pass, which was choked by a mass of led horses, camels, followers carrying "BUENGERS" (two baskets or two nets hung on each end of a bamboo to carry loads by the porters) coolies (palaguin, which carried women, children or sick on the line of march) bullocks, mules and asses, troopers and sowars guarding portions of this train, the quadrupeds roaring, neighing, bellowing, and braying and the bipeds grawling, veciferating and abusing each other, and all struggling to get on."

"They halted for the night at Naushahra, seven or eight miles short of Dadhar, and experiencing a good sample of duststorms which are frequent in that part and at that season. Dadhar was reached in a march of less than two hours on 11th March, where Headquarters learnt with feeling of painful dis-appointment that all the tact, industry, colloquial knowledge of Persian and local knowledge of Major Leach, Assistant Political Officer, had not enabled him to collect for us at Dadhar supplies for the whole force ready at this place.

"The force had now been three months on the road from Ferozepur, and whilst waiting in Dadhar in weather that was steadily growing hotter, it had time to reflect on the Persian distich, thus translated, which was a local proverb:

“Since Dadhar, Good Lord, fries poor mortals so well, why tookst thou the trouble to fabricate Hell ?

“As the two columns of infantry and the long trains of Commissariat and Ordnance stores were making their way across the desert to join Headquarters. Major Curton of the 16 Lancers was sent ahead to reconnoitre the Bolan Pass with an escort of a troop of his regiment and three companies of Sepoys, accompanied by Burnes in person. He sent back daily reports to Dadhar, and eventually reached Quetta safely.”


“It is not possible to give in detail the movements through the Pass of each of the various columns, which indeed between Dadhar and Quetta in a continuous stream of echelons of all sorts and sizes; nor it is possible to recover particulars of the marches of the various Commissariat convoys. The following table of the marches of Headquarters will give an idea of what was accomplished in the most favourable circumstances :—

Date (March, 1839)	From	to	Altitude of star- tating point	Distance in miles.
16	Dadhar	Kundalani	743 ft.	11
17	Kundalani	Kirta	1081 ft.	10-5/8
18	Kirta	Bibi Nani	1695	9-1/8
19	Bibi Nani	Ab-i-gum	2540	8-5/8
20	Ab-i-gum	Sar-i-bolan	4494	9-5/8
21	Sar-i-Balan	Dasht	5793	12-3/4
22		H a l t		
23	Dasht	Sariab		15-3/8
24	}	H a l t		
25				
26	Sariab	Quetta	5637	8

No supplies were collected in the pass, the passage of which harassed troops and transport.....”

Hough says of the march on the 20th March, for instance: “The destruction of animals and camels, this day has been very great, and the horses of the Artillery were greatly distressed... ..The camel Battery got on well: the camels in this pass performed their task with more ease than the horses. Some of the camels of officers were preserved by being fed with flour, gur and ghi—the mode of feeding riding camels.....And again, at Sariab, on 23rd March.....from Shikarpur to this place, we had marched 206 miles, of which 96 miles of a desert country between Shikarpur and Dadhar, and then to this place 59 miles of pass.....We were obliged to carry our supplies, not getting a days’ supply on the road. If we had entered the Pass with fresh cattle and animals not jaded after a march of 833 miles from Ferozepur, the animals would not have been so knocked up; but they were worn out by a long march, bad water, and want of food, and therefore, our loss was very severe, and those remaining had strength only equal to the carriage of half loads. As the Rewri camels (of which class they chiefly were are not fed on grain, it will be readily imagined what numbers would die on march where their food was to be derived from a barren country.”

Havelock has stated: “.....The infantry columns travelled the Pass without encountering any local difficulties or armed opposition, and without any loss of a public nature beyond that of the failure of many Commissariat camels; but the destruction of the carriage cattle (*viz*, regimental transport) of officers and men, and the consequent of tents and baggage, had been pitiable.....Meanwhile Burns set off for Kalat on 24th March with Lieutenant Simpson, an active Officer of the Commissariat Department to see if the ruler of that state, Mihrab Khan, could assist with transport and supplies—the rumour was—that he had collected all the grain and camels





from the provinces immediately around his capital, and stored and parked them within its walls.....Cureton and his escort had established themselves ahead at Quetta, to which place Headquarters with the Cavalry and the 1st Infantry Brigade marched on 27th March."

".....For months afterwards Commissariat convoys continued to trickle through from Sind to the Army of the Indus, and it would seem that the long journey was usually attended with great wastage."

Pieced up Story Narrated by Hough and Havelock

The story goes: Lieutenant Palmer, newly attached to the Commissariat Department, set out from the advanced base at Shikarpur with a train of 2,000 camels, bearing 8,000 maunds of grain and escorted by two companies of the 35 Bengal Native Infantry. On the way 800 of the camels were lost "from fatigue and indifferent forage"; and between Kirta and Bibi Nani tribesmen attacked the rear of the convoy. The casualties were relatively small—a havildar and a sepoy was killed, and five wounded—but Palmer was himself wounded and the already-low morale of the camel drivers (Sarwans) suffered further damage. The net proportion of grain delivered at Kandhar when the convoy at length arrived there, on 7th May, was under one-fifth of that which had been despatched from the reserve depot at Shikarpur. An inquiry was held, it was found that Palmer had not inspected and counted the camels and their loads before taking over the convoy, and had failed to check loads daily, and he was removed from the Commissariat."

Ration Situation at Quetta Serious.

"For some days before General Cotton's headquarters reached Quetta, the future, in respect of rations and fodder, had presented very serious misgivings; and on 25th March, Major Craigie, Deputy Adjutant-General, was sent back from Sariab with a small escort with orders to get into touch with

General Keane, of whose exact position nothing was known to the Bengal columns. He was confidentially charged with the duty of representing to his Excellency the state and prospects of the advanced force, as regards rations for the troops and forage for horses. He was instructed to point out that Quetta and the country around it could only furnish the most scanty supplies, whilst many days must elapse before any large convoy could reach us from the rear. The army, if it marched forthwith, could not arrive at Kandhar in fewer than from fifteen to twenty marches; so that if it found itself under its walls in the shorest space of time which could be anticipated on any reasonable calculation, not more than two or three days' provisions would then remain unconsumed of its present stock. A longer delay at Quetta would, of course, only aggravate the evil.... After making these and other weightly communications, the Major was directed to request His Excellency's specific instructions regarding the course to be pursued."

New Scale of Rations

Quetta, then in 1839, was a small village. The fort (Miri) of Khan of Kalat consisted of an enclosure of a mud wall of about 1200 yards in circumference. The fort was surrounded by mud huts. Its streets were narrow. Leech succeeded in persuading the local beoparis (shopkeepers) to open their shops and sell the grain to the British troops. Total amount procured did not exceed two days supply for the Bengal column. Efforts to obtain grain and forage at Pishin and Mustung, the entrepot in an oasis, failed. All the Commissariat managed to obtain locally was about 400 maunds flour. On 28th March, therefore, General Cotton issued the following order: ".....In consequence of the limited quantity of supplies at present in Camp, and the country so destitute as to afford nothing to replenish the Commissariat stores, General Cotton is sorry to be under the necessity of placing the European and Native troops and followers on the following rations, until supplies come in; European soldiers, 1 lb of atta in place of bread, except to men

in hospital. Native soldiers and followers, (on payment) half of their present ration.

“The native troops and followers will receive compensation in money, in lieu of their half ration of atta, at the nirakh (current price) of the day. Major Generals Thackwell and Nott will cause, it to be explained by Brigadiers and by Officers Commanding Regiments to the Indian Commissioned and European and Indian N.C.O's and rank and file, the urgency of the case. He fully relies on the military spirit which has always animated the Bengal soldier, and that they will meet him willingly in overcoming this difficulty, which he trusts will be of short duration.”

Hough comments that: “it gave sepoy 1 lb. flour and 2 oz. dhal, and the follower $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. flour and $\frac{1}{2}$ oz dhal. The British soldier had 1 lb. meat daily, for the “DUMBA” (fat-tailed sheep) was to be had in large numbers. The Muslim sepoys and the followers were also offered a meat ration, on repayment of its cost to the Commissariat, as was the rule in respect of all their rations at that period, and some of the sepoys took it; but at three rupees each the sheep were beyond the pockets of the followers. The officers' servants above received no cash compensation, but many of their masters managed to buy a little grain locally and gave their servants an extra 8 oz. daily, or mutton, or goat's flesh if they would eat it.”

“The effect of this order unevitably to set up keen competition for such small local supplies as were forthcoming. By the following day grain was selling at 3 seers, and flour at $2\frac{1}{2}$ seers, to the rupee, and a maund of bhoosa for four rupees. On 30 March the Onus of finding fodder was thrown on the Commanding Officers of mounted unit by the following general order :—

“The store of grain for Horse Artillery and cavalry horses being consumed, and the Commissariat Department being unable to collect a sufficient of bhoosa or other forage for

general issue of rations to troop horses; to preserve their condition until a further supply of grain reaches the army, Officers Commanding corps to make arrangements, under instructions from Major General Thackwell, for the purchase of such forage as may be procurable, to serve out to the horses, at a rate not exceeding the Government ration.....To be clearly explained that no interference with the inhabitants of the country is to take place; armed men not to enter the village under any pretext. If conciliatory measures be used, the Major General is confident, they will readily bring supplies to Camp. Major General Thackwell to hold Commanding Officers responsible."

I

Mirab Khan, the Khan of Kalat, courteously received Burnes and Simpson. Despite his extreme antipathy for Shah Shuja, he was soon persuaded to affix his seal to a treaty acknowledging the Shah's supremacy, and in return for annual subsidy of £ 15,000 from the British, "he engaged to use his best endeavours to procure supplies, carriage and guards to protect provisions and stores going and coming from Sikarpur by the route of Rozan, Dadhar, the Pass of Bolan, through Shawl (Quetta) to Kuchlak from frontier to frontier."

In spite of the fact that Burns kept the supply question, the Khan promised to do his best, but he pointed out the difficulty of doing anything fruitful till the new crop of grain was harvested and he, accordingly, sent his men to Gandava, Naushki and Kachhi where crops ready to be harvested. The Khan also suggested to shift the advance base depot from Shikarpur to Dadhar, *i.e.* in Khan's territory; So as to enable him to provide active aid in passing through the Bolan. Accordingly Burnes wrote to Cotton that he was convinced that Kalat State had already reached the point of famine and that the Khan would be unable to help the British forces but he would help when the new crop was harvested. However, the

Khan had offered ten to fifteen thousand sheep as "MEAT ON HOOF", if so desired.

It seems that the statements made by the political Officers that the Khan of Kalat had collected a very large stock at Kalat had proved baseless and untrue. The political Officers should have been more painstaking and they should not have relied on hearsay.

II

Bombay Column

We have so far left out the account about the Bombay column which had disembarked at Sukkur (Sind) at the end of November, 1838, under the command of General John Keane—the Commander-in-Chief designate of the Army of the Indus. Bombay column had brought no land transport with them. They had wrongly relied on the assistance on the Amirs of Sind, whose friendship was doubtful. Hence the efforts to get any help proved fruitless. At last when a batch of camels sent by Outram from Cutch arrived, the column set off on its march on 24-12-1838 up along the right bank of the Indus. But on arrival at Jerruk, the column halted and awaited there till the outcome of negotiations with the Amirs at Hyderabad; which bore on fruit.

General Keane heard the misfortune that had befallen on the Bengal Column and that the Shah's force had made very slow progress and had also created many new problems for the Bengal column.

Under the new order of march when Shah's contingent left Shikarpur on 7-3-1839, the Bombay column still under Keane, followed. However, before Bombay column reached Dadhar, Macnaghtan and written to General Keane that "the troops were on the point of starvation. The Bolan Pass presented

no special obstacle and Keane pushed on. General Cotton rode out from Quetta on 4-4-1839 and greeted the Commander-in-Chief and the Bombay Column, who had halted at the Shāwl Valley to recover from the fatigue of the passage of the defile. Two days later General Keane fixed his headquarters at Quetta and finally assumed command of the whole Army of the Indus.

General Keane, the Commander-in-Chief, lost no time as within two hours of his arrival in Quetta, he held a conference of heads of units and departments in General Cotton's tent, and before it broke up "EVERY ARRANGEMENTS WAS CONCLUDED FOR CONDUCTING FURTHER OPERATIONS". The Army was to move forward on the very next day—7th April, 1839. Brigadier Nott Commander 2nd Brigade, was to remain at Quetta, as guardian of the Bolan Pass, observe the activities of the Khan of Kalat and keep open the lines of communications with Shikarpur and the Indus.

On the evening of his arrival (6th April), wrote a letter to the Private Secretary to the Governor-General stating that "the troops and followers were nearly in a state of mutiny for want of food....." He seems to have accepted the views of his Chief political officer and major Craigie....."

"Some of the Camp-followers", records an Officer who was present, "were known to have fired the skins of the sheep and to have eaten them, and also to have devoured the congealed blood of animals, roots of plants etc....." Havelock relates how the faces of the followers: "expressed suffering and dreadful apprehensions;" the effects of insufficient food beginning to be plainly perceptible in the attenuated visages and shrunken limbs of our Indian soldiers and followers....."

Author's grand mother, was present in this long march from Ferozepur to Kabul and back, as she had accompanied her husband during the Afghan War. War against the Amirs of

Sind, the Sikh wars of Mudki, Firozeshah, Sobroon and the wars of 1857 when her husband was killed at the fall of Delhi. My cousins and I used to listen from her the accounts of these wars. She was very devoted to her husband who was a Risaldar in Kabul wars but later on he was promoted as a Risaldar Major, when he commanded a cavalry regiment. During 1857 wars he was A. D. C. to General Franks.

She said that: "many sarwans and their camels were carried away by the Baluch mauraders who were either mounted on horses or on camels." According to her, "many Indian Sarwans and followers deserted due to hunger and starvation only and due to lack of care and sympathy. These followers decided to become slaves of these who would give them food, care, and clothing." She blamed: "the political Agents and their staff whom the considered corrupt, haughty, arrogant and unefficient. These political agents kept the Commissariat Agents, the banj'ars and beopar'is away so far as to amass wealth and charge the Indians very high price for food. There were mutinies because while British had plenty to eat, free of cost, but the Indians, even on field service had to pay for their food through their nose." She stated that : "the Afghan War was the worst, as far as, administration was concerned. The Indian wives, the Indian contractors, banja'ra's, beopa'ris and, the banias etc. all were lumped together under the heading as "followers". There was not enough cavalry to protect the convoys, who were provided with few sepoy as escorts."

For quite a long time, some of us young children, considered her statements as fables. I began to believe it after I (the author) experienced similar hardships in the First World War in Expeditionary Force 'D' in Mesopotamia, when the political officers let down the troops again and again as regards poor intelligence reports about resources of the country and about the attitude of the local population about the British forces (British and Indian) in their country. The Government of India

had not learnt a lesson either from the First Burma War, or the Afghan War. She often praised the British as good masters, as her husband was a noted soldier who had won many honours and decorations, yet, when off her guard, she would say, that the Indian soldiers rebelled, because most of them were insulted and ill-treated by British Officials of the Company, whose only motive seems to have been to rob the Indians as much and as fast they could.' The Company did not really fight wars for conquests only, she stated; but also for plunder.' When the Sepoys of the Company felt most of the share of the plunder went either to the Company's Directors, or the British officers: they resented, which was termed Mutiny, so as to enable the British to punish them most severely. True facts of these mutinies were seldom, if ever made known to the Board at London, who were fed on factitious reports by the authorities in India.

III

The March to Kandhar

Brigadier H. Bullock has stated: "The first of the long columns left Quetta to time in the early morning of Sunday, the 7th April, 1839; in its rear were the bullocks carrying grain and Commissariat Field Depot under Captain A. Watt, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General. The fusillade by which sixty worn out cavalry horses were destroyed gave a grim salute to their departure, and the road they took was bestrewn with numerous dead followers who had been cut down by Kaker marauders on the outskirts of the Camp. As far as the foot of the Khojak Pass, which they reached on 12th of April, the leading columns made good going. That was the day when the last of the echolons of the Bombay Army entered the Bolan, so that the Army of the Indus, was at this moment strung out over about one hundred and twenty miles. Here Keane halted for a day to rest the troops and transport, and to arrange for the ascent of the Pass, for which detailed orders were issued. The

principal difficulty was expected to be met with in dragging the guns over the summit, but camels might also cause delay, as the following order recognized :—

“The Baggage Master to be on the alert, at the commencement of the ascent, to prevent crowding, and to take care to stop the baggage, at interval, before it enters the narrogorge, to admit of the animals filling over with regularity: only one camel can pass up at a time, and “His Excellency, impresses upon officers the necessity of having their own animals, as well as those of the men, as lightly laden as circumstances will admit; “this will be the only mode of preserving their baggage, as every camel that falls must be removed with his load out of the path, and the eventual loss of property must be the result.”

“Despite all precautions, the crossing of the Khojak was attended with worse confusion than ever. The orders entailed the simultaneous passage through the Pass of two batteries and six regiments with all their baggage—not as an isolated operation, but as part of a day’s march of eleven miles—and of the Commissariat Field Depot. The track was so narrow that camels had to move in single file; and each gun, tumbril and wagon had to be separately man-handled by infantry working parties. An attempt was made, but too late, to counter and the march of the cavalry and horse artillery and to divert the camels on to another track; the confusion was only increased and the pass was soon jammed with an indescribable mass of animals, vehicles and men. Many loaded camels fell over the precipices, and others shed their loads in the pathway. Eventually, by pushing the fallen animals and their burdens into side-nullahs, the troops (who had marched at 3. a.m.) managed to get clear of the Khojak by 4 p.m.; but the heavy artillery was not yet over, and the whole of the Commissariat Field Stores were still on the road. Throughout the night, animals and followers were trickling through: an augmented baggage guard, which had ordered back into the pass to protect them, was

insufficient to deter raiders, and when the main body had moved ahead next morning the Achakzai and Kakars came down on the transport and brought immense damage, capturing and killing many men and animals." Both Hough and Havelock pass somewhat rapidly over the events of these days, which, it is indeed unpleasant to dwell upon, and the exact vicissitudes of the Commissariat are difficult to establish. But the heavy artillery was not got clear of the pass till 21st April, and even then 27,400 rounds of musket ammunition and fourteen barrels of gun powder had to be destroyed on the spot to prevent their falling into enemy's hands. An immense quantity of baggage and a great number of camels, lents etc. were lost.

"From this point onwards, the horses and mules lost condition rapidly and numbers of them had to be destroyed; the surviving camels must have been in worse plight. Still the columns pushed on, for it was calculated on 16 or 17th April, that, if Headquarter reached Kandhar by the 27th April, the earliest possible date, the force would have only six days grain in hand, and the weather was steadily growing hotter, the route now lay through lower country, and the season was advancing." "Horses already half starved for want of grain and good grass were throughout the day panting in all agonies of thirst, and in the evening a few drops of water could not be obtained even to mix the medicines of the sick in our hospitals, or to supply them with the refreshment and comfort of a few spoonfuls of tea."—Havelock.

There was a scene of appalling distress and confusion on 23rd of April when the cavalry reached the Dori river after a march of twenty miles. Hough states :—

".....Those, who were present, describe the scene as most appalling. The moment the horses saw the water, they made sudden rush into the river as if mad; both men and horses drank till they nearly burst themselves. Officers declare that their tongues cleaved to the roofs of their mouths; the

water was very brackish, which induced them to drink the more.....Many dogs and other animals perished. No officer present ever witnessed such a scene of distress.....”

“A day’s halt somewhat restored the situation, and on 24th of April the march was resumed with the goal in sight. Headquarters reached Kandhar alone on 26th of April, just as rations were running out: it was 1,005 miles from their starting point at Firozpur. The camel drivers had been on half rations for 48 days, and the horses for thirty two, for the last twenty-six of which they had no grain whatsoever and had subsisted on such green forage and grass as had been locally procured. The troops and followers had been on half rations for twenty-eight days. Though the head of the Army of the Indus was at Kandhar, its tail was not yet clear of the Khojak.

Hough has stated that : “It is quite impossible to complete the losses of men, animals and stores, but the camel casualties totalled about 30,000 dead between November, 1838 and December, 1839, and the great majority of these were lost between the river Indus and Kandhar. The cavalry was now definitely unfit for service.”

“This was for an army of 13,000 combatants in about a year. The Bengal columns lost about one horse in seven during the march. Hundreds of followers had been murdered by raiders, and hundred more had been captured by the raiders and many hundreds must have died of disease, but no exact figures”—says Hough—“can be supplied. Such was the toll of the deserts of upper Sind and Baluchistan Passes !”

IV

Kandhar to Kabul, 27th June to 6th August, 1839.

There was only 2 days half rations in hand when the Headquarters arrived at Kandhar. There was no grain for

horses. Luckily there was plenty of lucerne and good grass locally procureable. It was decided to rest and provided good food which were essential to men and beast to re-cuperate. The army, therefore, settled into camps all round the city, and the camels were sent out to graze at a distance under escort. However, the scale of half rations was—still the order of the day. As already stated when the convoy supposed to be carrying 8,000 maunds of grain loaded on 2,000 camels arrived at Kandhar on 7th of May, it carried under one-fifth of its grain—about 1,600 maunds. This was a painful news. The Commander-in-Chief had orders “not to move forward till he had six weeks’ full rations in hand for the troops who were to advance to Kabul, and six month’s for those who were to stay behind.”

So the army had to wait at Kandhar for 2 months till the standing crops were harvested. By the middle of June local grain was beginning to come in. Havelock has stated that “as the grain was not coming fast enough to allow the half rations being increased to a full allowance. The Commissariat persevered, however, in collecting grain with great deligence and success, and caused it to be ground at the numerous miles which are turned by the river Arghandab. The money was also short. The army lacked cash enough to buy the grain which they so badly needed and which was at last coming into market. Loans were raised locally at 6 percent.....”

A convoy from India 22 lakhs of rupees was brought by a convoy. This was, however, insufficient. Hough has stated on 17th of June, 1839 that “.....The army was actually in the inominious position of a debtor beset by a bailiff. Until we had completed our purchases we could not move; the people of Kandhar, did not accept the bills on India. At last, on 23rd June, a convoy with 20,000 maunds of grain in the charge of a Lohani merchant arrived, and another 10 lakhs of rupees came in from India on 23rd June.” Fortescue has stated that: “Once again the Commander-in-Chief had no

option but to push forward, even though he was not able to take with him adequate rations for his force. Indeed, he had transport enough only for five week's food. So leaving behind much of his artillery, two battalions, and a cavalry regiment, Keane set forth on 27th June for Kabul. Lack of transport alone prevented him from taking with him any of the 20,000 maunds delivered by the Lohani Convoy."

Supplies proved to be obtainable in some quantity on the line of march, and on 16th July the combatants' rations was increased from 1 lb. to $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of atta and that of followers from $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. to 1 lb.

"On 21st July Ghazni was reached, and on the following day it was taken by storm with a loss of only 17 killed" says Hough. "Immense stores of grain and flour were captured: 79,000 lb. flour, over 350,000 lb. wheat, 74,000 lb. barley, 3,500 lbs. peas and 57,000 lb. bhoosa. Twelve hundred horses were also captured but of these only 800 were unwounded and only 39 were fit to be drafted into cavalry. Some cattle and 300 camels were also seized."

By this successful feat of arms, at a trifling cost, more food, moral had been restored. All privation was now at an end, provisions were freely and cheaply obtainable in the open market. On 3rd of August Cureton was sent ahead to Kabul with a small cavalry detachment accompanied by Lieutenant Simpson.

"Plenty new reigns in our Camps" wrote Havelock. "Their bazars are well supplied with grain of various kinds by dealers who flock to them from the city, bringing with them asses and stout ponies loaded with peaches, apples, pears, grapes, and melons.....These exquisite fruits are purchased by our soldiers and followers for the smallest piece of coin. Repletion is now the only evil which they have to dread."

"Relaxation in the shape of investitures, race meetings

and the like followed. The admission to hospital and the death-rate, which had been appallingly high throughout April to July, began to drop, and by September, 1839, were again normal." When the British occupied Kabul, Dost Muhammad surrendered himself to the British who was deported to Calcutta, Shah Shuja was proclaimed Amir and installed on the throne of Afghanistan.

The Force marched back while the Commissariat and transport of the Afghan problems, though exhaustively were never solved—as a matter of policy and for financial reasons. These problems became a chronic sore till 1916 when complete change over came—to slide back once the First World War was over.

V

Mistakes oft Repeated

(i) Only some of the 'oft repeated' mistakes will be briefly discussed. The glaring one being, the lack of liaison between the Government of Bengal and Bombay, with the attendant failures of the Supreme Government and the Commanders-in-Chief Headquarters to co-ordinate the planning.

(ii) The absence of any intelligence report, either by the political department, military, or submitted by British residents, or traders in Sind, was not available for the guidance of the Force Commander and his staff. The Campaign was a leap in the dark as regards, local resources, climate, nature of the road, obstacles to be crossed and the political feelings of the local chiefs (Khans, Amirs) and the tribesmen. Lack of reliable information on each and every one of these circumstances however, had a direct and very important influence on the Commissariat Department.

(iii) The sad state of relations between soldiers and states-

men were exemplified by Macnoughton and General Cotton—transport and supplies as the Chief bone of contention.

(iv) The diarchy which resulted due the stocking of the advance supply Depots by the Political Officers with Supplies and provision of transport.

(v) Lack of co-operation between the two Presidency Governments and the failure of the co-ordinating authority to fulfil its functions and the failure of military intelligence reports led to false hopes being held by the Commissariat Department who was left in the lurch. It is hardly necessary to stress the benefit that would have been derived from a reliable intelligence system which if it had been collected, collated and disseminated various reports which would have saved lives, time and misery, which the Army of Indus had to go through—unnecessarily. It is considered that the intelligence system of army operating in a country capable of being disrupted by political faction and intrigue must surely be strong enough to stand by itself in the hour of need. Too great a dependence on purely one source of information, however, excellent, may lead to a breakdown of arrangements at a most critical moment.

(vi) The absence of General Keane from the larger and more advanced portion of his command deprived him the opportunity to appreciate the situation as regards logistics more truly and in time; and much of delay, bickering and makeshift of January, 1839, would not have occurred.

If Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna's advance party 1023 A.C. was able to collect 2,00,000 camels to carry extra water, fodder for his animals and supplies at UCH in Sind, it is not understood why did the Political Department failed to get either beasts of burden or supplies for a force much smaller than that of the Sultan? The greatest sin of the Political Department was wishful thinking and leaving matters to the last moment

to solve itself. But this lack of judgement, I saw to occur, in the First World War 1914-18 and even in 1936-39 War in Waziristan.

(vii) General Cotton cannot escape sharing the burden of neglect of duty. He arrived ahead of the force at Quetta on about 27 March and stayed there till 6th April, and yet, he, it seems, neither made personnel reconaissance of Khojak Pass, nor he ordered one to be carried out by his cavalry and Commissariat staff, which would have enabled him to deal with the obstacles in the Pass, such as, some narrow defiles etc. could have been broadened and tracks improved. As a matter of fact there are many other side tracks which are fit for infantry and pack transport in addition to the main Pass. But no one made search for them.

(viii) Another deplorable occasion might not have occurred, (*i.e.* insubordination among men and chaos in supplies and transport would not have occurred) ; had General Keane taken over his Command at Shikarpur—a natural thing to do. His orders to advance 24 hours after his arrival at Quetta and that too, without a warning order—made the situation most critical as regards arrangement of loading up reserve supplies etc. Luck favoured this bold General. Napoleon had done it more than once but—*i.e.* issue of sudden and at short notice orders for move to his subordinates, but they had become accustomed to hear such sudden orders and remained prepared for it. This custom was not in vogue in the British Army in 1839.

(ix) Knowing fully well the scarcity of transport and food, both General Cotton and General Keane, took no effective measures to lay down scale of kit for officers, their families, servants, private load carrying animals for officers' tents or messes. They could have restricted the number of followers who could have been left at Shikarpur or Hyderabad to wait here till the columns returned. Instead, they allowed these

wretched men and animals to accompany the force and to die on the line of march or in the Camps.

(x) The excuse that there was not enough time for grazing for the animals, or the camel thorn, or LANA was dry—how the magnitude of ignorance of the officers commanding about the climate, or the ripening of the crops, or grass! Commissariat Officers should have planned to meet such eventualities. The staff should have approached to change the time of start from a Camp, so as to allow enough time being made available for grazing, especially when there was, neither adequate grain, nor fodder for stall feeding.

(xi) Lastly, the Commissariat Department was given the then dirty end of the stick. Much of the practical difficulty that attended the military execution of the task devolved upon the Commissariat, who withstood the burnt of it exceedingly well and with credit.

VI

But Shah Shuja was not popular with the Afghans and Prince Akbar Khan, the eldest son of Dost Muhammad, took advantage of the withdrawal of British troops to start a revolution. The Political Agent was murdered, Shah Shuja suffered the same fate and the token British force had to beat a disastrous retreat. One man alone, Dr. Brydon succeeded in reaching Jalalabad with the news of the dreadful disaster that had overtaken his countrymen. The total extermination of the army led to the recall of Lord Auckland and to the appointment of Lord Ellenborough. The First Afghan War was nothing but a reckless sacrifice of men, money and material, for, by a strange irony of fate, the British after recapturing Kabul, afterwards agreed to Dost Muhammad's resuming the throne of Afghanistan.

Lastly, it seems, that the Government of India, (or the Directors in London), was not experienced enough in those

mazes, and on the whole political situation was not yet suitable, war was not yet ripe—yet Afghanistan was invaded without proper intelligence report either, on political situation, or on military preparedness, such as, resources of the country terrain, climate. A shrewd observer of things said: "I am certainly of opinion, that it is better to be too impetuous than too cautious, for fortune is a woman, and whoever wishes to render subservient, must beat and buffet her; indeed, we see that she lets herself to be mastered by such man, rather than by those who take her coolly." And for this reason the Indian Government gambled with this adventure.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PUNJAB

By conquest is here meant the subjugation of a country by force of arms. We group together these events as these took place under the expansionist policy of the East India Company. The war with the Amirs of Sind was fought during Lord Ellenborough's administration and it was outgrowth of the First Afghan War. In spite of treaty obligations, the British had made use of, during Afghan War, the country's resources, the rivers and the roads of the Sind for purposes of military transport; this naturally alienated the good will of the Amirs of Sind and the Sikhs in Punjab.

Furthermore, after the Afghan contest had come to an end, the British took advantage of the displeasure which the Amirs of Sind had manifested, to accuse them of hostility to the British. Then Sir Charles Napier was sent to Sind and was vested with full civil and military authority. Both British historians Smith and Gense have stated that: "His Ellenboroughs high-handedness and open contempt of all treaty obligations had the desired effect; he made war inevitable." After the defeat of the forces of the Amirs, Sind was annexed, and the Amirs exiled. Outram went to London, and pleaded cause of Amirs with the Home authorities. But all his pleadings were spent in vain. The Home authorities, though aware of the injustice that had been done, were of opinion that "the mischief of retaining was less than the mischief of abandoning Sind". The state of Gwalior met the same fate in 1843 and also the Punjab due to dissensions after the death of their rulers Daulat Rai Sindia and Maharaja of the Punjab.

The Scindo Camel Baggage-Corps.

However, we will restrict our comments on Commissariat, especially the Scinde Camel Corps, as described by Brigadier Bullock; vide Army Service Corps, Vol. I, which he has written under Caption, "A FORGOTTEN EXPERIMENT", which deserves our attention and consideration. He states: Being determined to cut down the baggage of the Indian Army, I must begin with myself; it will be a job, but shall be done if I live". declared Sir Charles Napier as soon as he landed in India in 1841. But though, like other commanders before and afterwards, he tried to stop overloading and to limit the amount of baggage taken into the field, he does not seem to have taken any active steps towards the formation of a transport corps till after his Sind campaign. About the end of July, 1843, he wrote in his Journal: "I am forming a fighting camel corps, and I have long since proposed to form the 'Army Baggage into a regular Corps' able to manœuvre, as well as, army, and if necessary, defend itself". One of his biographers, W. N. Bruce, in reproducing this passage remarks: "it was curious coincidence that the letters of Napier asking leave to form a camel corps and of Lord Ellenborough (the Governor-General) suggesting that he should do so, crossed each other. Both had it probably in their minds to imitate Napoleon's dromedary corps' in Egypt; but the organization of the Sind Camel Corps was entirely Napier's own".

Whether the Corps that Napier asked leave to raise was the "FIGHTING" Scinde Camel Corps, or a baggage-Corps, and which description of Corps Ellenborough suggested, should be formed, is not clear. Bruce does not give the latter, and we have not been able to trace the correspondence. But there can be little doubt that at this time it was the fighting corps that Napier had immediately in mind, with the baggage corps as a future possibility. This "FIGHTING" Scinde Camel Corps

was a Unit entirely distinct from the baggage-corps and still exists under another name as an infantry battalion of the Indian Army". (Probably Brigadier is referring to Bikanir and Jasilmir Camel Corps. They exist even today 1970 in Bharat—editor—Rangrut).

"The story of Napier's Scinde Camel Baggage Corps lies embedded partly in a series of controversial pamphlets, most of which may be found in the India Office Library, and partly in casual passages in accounts of the Sikh Wars and of Sind. As a consequence this experimental unit has fallen unmerited oblivion. It receives no mention in the new and admirable history of the Bombay Army by Sir Patrick Cadell, and the few mentions of it in print elsewhere confuse it, as often as not, with the "FIGHTING SCINDE CAMEL CORPS". The account which follows, though it has many gaps, may serve as some recorded of Napier's conception of the Indian transport problem of a century ago and of his attempt to solve it. The importance of the Scinde Camel Baggage Corps lies not in what it actually did or not, but in the fact it inspired many subsequent experiments in army transport, and was the prototype of the British Land Transport Corps in the Persian War 1856-57 and the transport in Abyssinia in 1868....."

".....We will confine ourselves to summarizing Napier's reasons for considering that reform was necessary, and his proposals, and how he tried to carry them into effect; also noticing Burton's principal criticism of these proposals so far as they were not adequately met by McMurdo's (Napier's son-in-Law, who served on Napier's staff. He commanded the Land Transport Corps in Crimea, later a General and Colonel Commandant of the Military Train), reply:

"Napier's proposals can be very briefly put :—

(i) firstly, camel drivers needed discipline and protection, so should be enlisted, armed and drilled,

"(ii) and secondly, the overloading of transport animals was a great and prevalent evil and must be stopped."

The pamphlets suggest that the arming and drilling of drivers was an entirely new and revolutionary idea of Napier's but we have discovered that an identical proposal had been put forward officially only two years before to Lord Ellenborough, the previous Governor-General, by Major General Sir William Nott of the Company's service and of great Afghan renown. If this be a coincidence, it is a remarkable one. If, on the other hand, Napier had some knowledge of Nott's memorandum, it is difficult to understand why he did not acknowledge the source of his inspiration, and his proposals would undoubtedly have carried more weight, had it been known that they were supported by another successful General of far greater Indian experience. We have seen that in 1843 Napier may have had some correspondence" with Lord Ellenborough on the subject, and if the suggestion came from the latter, it is far more likely to have originated in Nott's memorandum than in Napoleon's dromederies.

Comments

Brigadier Bullock, it seems, has been too harsh an McMurdo, because he was Napier's son-in-law. I (Rangrut) also do not agree that Nott's memorandum had deeper impression than what he witnessed, or heard or read about Napoleon's dromedaries ! It is a fact that Napoleon was the bitterest and dreaded enemy of the Britain, but his talents as a general was admired and is still being admired by the British Generals. I have not as yet found one, who condemned the ideas of Napoleon in the field of strategy, tactics and administration (logistics). It is for this reason, it is intended to write—though very briefly on Napoleon's war in Egypt and Syria from logistic point of view. Both Napier and Ellenborough had hated their bitterest enemy and at the same time they revered him as the greatest cotemporary general and as a leader.

Moreover, the British being conservative by heritage, it is hard for me to believe, that the view of a noted General in the Company's service, would have swayed the ideas of a General in the King's Royal Army—a nobleman and a distinguished veteran of many campaigns. However, there is the other side of the picture. "Lord Ellenborough on taking over as Governor-General allowed Generals Nott and Pollock", says historian GENSE "a free hand in dealing with the Afghan situation. Kabul was recaptured and part of city was destroyed by the way of reprisal. Then the British forces withdrew from Afghan 'HORNEST'S NEST'. Thus it came about that the First Afghan war was nothing but a reckless sacrifice of money and men ; for by strange irony of fate, the English afterwards agreed Dost Muhammad's resuming the throne of Afghanistan....."

II

Sir William Nott's Memorandum

General Nott's paper is of very great interest, not only as first recorded suggestion that the arming and drilling of transport drivers, coupled with the preventions of overloading, might be a solution of the Pakistan transport problem, but also as a dispassionate and balanced view of Commissariat work in the First Afghan War. For these reasons was reproduce it here in full.

Lord Ellenborough, when at Firozpur welcoming the armies returning from Afghanistan, addressed Nott's as follows on 28th December, 1842 :—

"I shall be much obliged to you if you will prepare a Memorandum for me upon the carriage Department, showing the defects of the present want of system, and the alterations you would think it advisable to make with a view of efficiency. It is, I think, a question whether the carriage Department should not be distinct from the Commissariat"

Nott then prepared the following paper which, as printed by Steequehor bears no date, but which must have been written at the beginning of 1843 :—

“1. The question of providing carriage for the wants of an Army taking the field in India, and of the best means of rendering the resources of the country available for this object, seems an exceedingly difficult one. To be enabled to offer an opinion on the subject, which would be really valuable to Govt. a familiarity with statistical details, and an intimate knowledge of the machinery and working of the existing system of supply in all its branches is required, which few officers have an opportunity of acquiring. On such knowledge alone can a comprehensive practical view of the subject can be founded.

“2. The organisation of an establishment which for all contingencies of soil, climate and facilities of transport, shall be best adapted to receive efficiency and economy to the state, in providing carriage for the troops, when employed either within its territories or beyond its frontier, is but a part of the above question. In commenting on this part, it is probable that views founded on observations made in a few localities, may not bear the test of general application to operations in the field, referred to the numerous provinces, or the several frontier states of our Indian Empire.

“3. But there are many officers who have had opportunities of making remarks on the march of our armies, and on the system now adopted for supplying them with carriage. The professional interests of some of them have been so deeply affected by the efficiency or otherwise of the means of transport at their command, that their comments on the system in force for supplying and maintaining these means may not be without value. It is probable that the inconveniences felt will be prominently presented, while the remedies proposed may

often be found adapted merely to circumstances of time and case, but impracticable as forming part of a general system. Still, by collecting opinions from these sources, facts may be elicited which, placed in the hands of those who have made the subject particularly their study, may lead to some improvements and increased efficiency in the working of the existing system.

"4. It is under a feeling of imperfect acquaintance with the subject which has prompted the foregoing paragraphs, that the following remarks are penned. They relate principally to the system as it bore on the carriage supplied to the armies lately employed in Afghanistan.

"5. The inadequacy of the means of transport and command in Afghanistan is not fair by chargeable to the system of supply obtaining in the Commissariat Department. The inconvenience thus sustained arose from our carrying on military operations in a country the resources of which, from the general hostility of its inhabitants, were looked up from us, while the nearest sources of supply over which we could exercise efficient control, lay at a distance of 600 miles. But when the means of maintaining and preserving those means may perhaps be attributed to due to the want of strength in the system established.

"6. The supply of cattle for the munitions and baggage of the army in Afghanistan rested solely with the Commissariat Department. A question is raised as to how far it would be desirable or expedient to separate the Commissariat from the carriage Department of our army, with the view of giving increased efficiency to the latter, by placing it under the control of a separate establishment.

"7. It may be observed that any such division of the Departments would involve also a division of responsibility. The Commissariat would in such case be dependent upon the carriage Department for its means of transport, the carriage

Department would look to the Commissariat for its means of subsistence. If, to guard against this, the Departments were made altogether independent of each other, their respective agents would meet in the market and in their competition the interests of the State might be overlooked. In addition to the difficulty of fixing responsibility, the Commanding Officer would have an additional department to watch over and a separate channel through which his orders for the efficient equipment of his force must be conveyed. These disadvantages would probably more than counterbalance the contemplated advantage of increased efficiency that might result from withdrawing the charge of the cattle attached to an army from the Commissariat Department.

“8. One Department of supply for all the wants of an army would seem the preferable system. Its executive establishment may be strengthened in particular branches to any extent thought necessary, and thus if that branch to which the provision and charge of public cattle is now committed be modified and improved without separating from the Commissariat Department.

“9. Next to the great evils immediately attributable to the necessity of attacking an enormous proportion of carriage cattle to troops in all their marches in Afghanistan (a necessity arising from causes which it would be irrelevant to the object of these remarks to discuss), the inconvenience experienced in maintaining our means of transport in efficient order may be mentioned. Our failure in this important matter seems traceable principally to two causes :

1st, Want of proper supervision and attention in the care and feeding of the cattle.

2nd, Overloading and improperly loading the cattle.

“10. The first of these was, it is believed owing to the

want of a sufficient number of officers and subordinate European overseers, to whom the duty of watching over the condition of the cattle should have been solely and specially confided. The second arose in a great measure from circumstances beyond the control of the Commissariat Department”.

“11. Details regarding the want of proper attention to the feeding of the proper cattle (camels are particularly referred to) seems unnecessary. It is assumed as a fact beyond dispute, that the mortality and loss of condition among camels, the property of Government, were proportionately much greater than among those belonging to individuals, for the keep of which far less liberal provision was made. The fact is conclusive as by a want of attention, which might have been received by a greater degree of European supervision. The cattle employed with the army in Afghanistan was so great as to induce a belief that, had a Commissioned Commissariat Officer, assisted by European Overseers, been attached to every brigade, for the sole purpose, of seeing the Government cattle properly fed, duly attended to, and not overladen, great increased efficiency obtained. The charges for feeding public cattle are now, it is believed, almost entirely in the hands of grain and forage are allowed for their support, which may not always be furnished; efficient check must at all events be difficult, and the duty therefore, open to abuse.

“12. The Commissariat Officers in Afghanistan had a variety of duties to attend to, many of which related to accounts and other official details, and it was almost impossible that they could devote that degree of personal attention to the public cattle under their charge which would have ensured their being maintained in good working condition. In an Indian Cantonment the charge of the public cattle is comparatively easy, but in a camp, where the cattle are distributed among regiments, and on a line of march in Afghanistan, where the baggage of an army arrives in sections, and at all hours,

the difficulty of looking after them is vastly increased.

"13. On occasions, therefore, where large masses of public cattle are collected for employment with armies in the field, it may be worthy of consideration whether officers of the Commissariat Department might not be specially appointed to the charge of the carriage of the army, and held directly responsible for the feeding and condition of the public cattle. It is not a mere compiler of accounts that is required for duties of this nature, but one who should constantly be on the alert, who should look after his charge in person, and by his own activity compel a corresponding attention to their duty on the part of his assistants.

"14. The overloading of camels in Afghanistan was a great evil; it arose from disposition of the Indian soldiery and camp-follower to accumulate property of different descriptions, and to carry it with them on the line of march, on the cattle furnished by Government, for hire, or otherwise.

"15. This disposition on the part of native troops is so notorious that even in India, the proprietors of carriage kept purposely for hire will not voluntarily engage their cattle to sepahies, and the necessary amount of carriage required for the march of troops is rarely procured, save through the interference of the Civil power.

"16. In Afghanistan, camels were furnished for the conveyance of private baggage by the Commissariat Department on certain stipulated conditions. The cattle thus supplied were generally the property of the Government. It may be imagined that of the total number of cattle accompany our armies, but a small private baggage. But as the cattle made over to the troops failed or became weakened from the effects of overloading they were exchanged for great proportion of the casualties that occurred among the public cattle may be referred to the number employed in the conveyance of private baggage.

"17. All the burthens of cattle employed exclusively in the carriage of public property, whether provisions camp equipage, ammunition or other military equipments, may be easily and strictly regulated; this is also stipulated in the case of private baggage; but although it is the duty of commanding officers to guard against the overloading of public cattle by the troops, their vigilance is constantly evaded, and should Government be again an any occassion compelled to take on themselves the provision of cattle for the private carriage either of officers or men, some very stringent regulations will be needed to prevent an abuse of the indulgence.

"18. It may be asked why on any occassion Government should interfere in the provision of carriage for baggage of troops merely of a private nature. A difficulty on this question has always existed; but it has been found that troops cannot move at short notice without some assistance being furnished by Government, and unpleasant consequences have more than once ensued where this aid was, or was believed to be withheld. It is not the less desirable that troops should be encouraged as much as possible to make arrangements for the conveyance of their own baggage; but the Government has, against the advice of its most experienced officers, weakened the influence it could formerly exercise over its Indian army, and the provision of carriage for private baggage may be expected to continue a troublesome question.

"19. Great care should be observed in loading cattle; it is believed that sufficient care was not, and perhaps could not from circumstances, be observed throughout our late campaign. The proportion of attendants procurable for our public cattle was too small and many of these servants were inexperienced in the charge. In some regiments the sepahies were obliged to attend and load their own camels; a practise which if general would detract from the efficiency of the army, and which could only have been winked at a temporary measure, and one of absolute necessity.

"20. For foreign expeditions, and particularly in a country like Afghanistan, where the marauding habits of the population are so well known, it might be expedient to enlist, organise in sections, and to arm with weapons of native manufacture the camel-drivers. It is probable that, had such been the case during our recent military operations, the camel-men would on many occasions when attached by small bodies of Afghans, have been able to protect their persons and the property entrusted to their charge till assistance was rendered to them. The bunjarrahs of India and the Sohanees of Afghanistan at all times travel armed, and prepared to resist aggression either against themselves or their property, and even in military operations within our provinces it might be found advantageous occasionally to arm the attendants on public cattle ; but, on the other hand, it should be stated that this class of camp-followers is notoriously addicted to plunder, and to place arms in their hands would be, to a certain extent, to facilitate and encourage this propensity.

"21. As already observed, the foregoing remarks are intended to apply peculiarly to our recent movements in Afghanistan. Very great difficulty was in that country experienced in procuring carriage, but the demands made were greater than has even before been the case, or than may ever occur again should an army again enter Afghanistan from India, changes in the system of carrying on the war must, to ensure success, be made which changes would most naturally effect the Department of supply.

"22. It would not be fair to judge any portion of the existing system of supply, framed and organised as it has been for operations conducted in Hindustan, or in those countries adjacent to it, where water carriage was available for the transport of all munitions of war, because the Commissariat was unable to meet enormous and exhausting calls made on it for carriage in Afghanistan. Is the existing system will adapted

for supplying carriage to armies moving in India, or in the directions either of Punjab or of Nepal? And do the records of our campaign in Nepal in 1814, or of the Mahratta War in 1817-1819 prove that the system of supplying cattle then obtaining and which it is believed, with some modifications based on experience, still obtains, was inefficient. If so the necessity of an alteration of system may be considered as established, not otherwise.

“23. The contract system of carriage has always been extensively employed in India and to this mode of conveying supplies, the partialities of the old officers of the Indian army must be expected to learn, as to its efficient aid many of the early and splendid successes of the army may be attributed. The question of comparative expense between the system of obtaining cattle for public purposes on contract or by purchase has doubtless been instituted, and to the result of that inquiry the organisation of our existing establishments is probably owing. Constituted as our army at present is, it would be unwise to trust entirely to contract for its carriage and it must be desirable to maintain all establishments actually kept up on the most efficient footing; but at the same time, if as seems probable, the influential men among the Buujarrah and Rahbarree carriers, who have often rendered such essential service to the state, still exist, it would perhaps be of importance to perpetuate to connexion, and to direct the officers of the Commissariat Department, if this is not already the case, to keep up occasional communications with them to prevent them from falling altogether under the influence of wealthy Indian contractors, and to secure, by any acts of consideration it may be thought fit to grant, their attachment to their best and surest friends, the British Government.

3. Napier Raises a Baggage-Corps.

Only two years after Nott submitted the foregoing memo-

random, Napier raised the Scinde Camel Baggage-Corps. In his pamphlet (1849) Napier summarized "THE ADVANTAGES OF A BAGGAGE-CORPS", and before we go into details, of its organization it may be advisable to see what Napier had in mind. The words that follow are largely his own.

"1. By being well looked after, the animals are properly loaded, and consequently are strong and able to move much more rapidly than hired camels.

"2. They fall in with regularity, they manoeuvre, they are manageable, they obey a word of command, obstacles on the line of march are passed as rapidly as possible. If any accident should occur, then help is at hand, for all people and animals and things are in their proper places ready to assist.

3. Each division of the corps being dressed in distinctive colour, thus every driver can find his own place quickly. The troops also know by this colour the division which is carrying their baggage, and if a column of troops be detached its baggage can at once be found and separated.

4. Every man, being armed and under the command of officers and non-commissioned Officers, can defend himself and his beast.

5. Being a soldier and not a camel-man hired for the campaign, he neither deserts nor robs. He is, like every soldier regularly paid, full of "esprit-de-corps" and looking to his pension. A pension is essential as the private of the Baggage-Corps is entrusted with valuable property; he has higher duties than any other soldier and they require more experience and reflection than an ordinary soldier needs.

6. If attached the baggage camels kneel in squares, heads towards the centre, forming a "LIVING FORT". The men

fire from between the camels, which have their legs strapped and noses tied. In this position no horsemen could reach far enough with his sabre to cut down the men inside. The baggage on the camels' backs also affords considerable protection against the fire of matchlock-men. The camp followers, who are generally armed, being marshalled under the orders of the Baggage-Corps Officers, would support the fire of the camelmen and be too powerful for irregular troops without artillery to attack with much hope of success. In India almost every servant carries his master's double-barrelled gun and knows how to use it."

Napier's intention was that in peace-time the Baggage-Corps should have about as many camels as the Commissariat previously had on its establishment. The corps would serve as a nucleus capable of easy expansion in war by the simple method of adding three or four newly-enlisted drivers, each with a hired, or newly-bought camels, to each regular driver and camel. The regular driver would guide, guard and direct the new recruits, who could rapidly acquire a sense of discipline. "A drilled driver leading average 3 or 4 camels would move in any direction by word of command, while the undrilled drivers behind him could not do otherwise than follow their leader."

Accompanying the innovation of armed and drilled transport drivers was insistence upon the necessity of preventing overloading. All camels were to be classified either as weak, or strong, and each was to carry round its neck as engraved brass plate showing its classification maximum load, letter and number, and divisional colour.

S T R O N G
TO CARRY 300 LBS. ONLY

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Camel Corps raised

When first raised the Scinde Camel Baggage-Corps consisted 1,800 enlisted privates and as many camels. The non-commissioned officers of the Corps were partly drawn from the existing Commissariat Jamadars and Dafadars of camels, and partly transferred from the Line. The men were armed with permission fuzees—old flint—lock muskets cut down—and their account rements were made up from unserviceable lots in stores.

Status and Pay

The rank and file were looked upon as of exactly the same status in every respect as their comrades of the cavalry and infantry. They had to bear the cost of their own uniforms, and the pay of a private was Rs. 8 monthly, said to have been equivalent to Rs. 4 or Rs. 5 in Bengal, where lower rate prevailed.

The Corps was composed of three divisions, each consisting of 1 quartermaster and 1 sergeant, with the following Indians :

- 3 Subedars
- 12 Jamadars
- 12 Havildars
- 36 Naiks
- 600 Privates
- 1 Lantern-bearers
- 1 Armourer
- 1 Carpenter
- 1 Mochi
- 6 Pakhalis
- 1 Bellow-boy
- 1 Mahout
- 1 Coolie

Each division was divided into three companies, each comprising :

1 Subedar
 4 Jamadars
 4 Havildars
 12 Naiks
 200 Privates

The detailed composition as at 1st May, 1846, was as follows :

Europeans	Monthly cost	Monthly cost
1 Commandant	850	850
1 Quartermaster	200	200
2 do	130	130
3 Sergeants	50	150
Indians	Monthly cost	Monthly cost
9 Subedars	40	360
36 Jamadars	30	1,080
36 Havildars	20	720
108 Naiks	15	1,620
1,800 Privates	8	14,400
3 Lantern-bearers	10	30

		19,670

Medical Establishment

	Monthly cost	Monthly cost
1 European Assistant Surgeon	450	450
1 First Hospital Assistant	30	30
2 Second do do	20	40
2 Apprentices	10	20
3 Camel Doctors	20	60
2 Bearers	6	12
		<hr/>
		612
		<hr/>

Staff	Monthly cost	Monthly cost
1 Native adjutant	35	35
1 Havildar Major	25	25
9 Pay Orderlies	5	45
1 Quartermaster Havildar	25	25
1 Munshi	30	30
Office Tentage	30	30
3 Armourers	15	45
3 Carpenters	20	60
3 Mochies	15	45
18 Pakhalies	12	216
3 Bellow-boys	5	15
Allowance for charcoal	21	21
Office Establishment	80	80
Stationery	60	60
		<hr/>
		732
		<hr/>

Elephant Establishment	Monthly cost	Monthly cost
1 Jcmadar	12	12
4 Mahouts	10	40
4 Collies	8	32
		48
Total cost per month for pay, etc.		Rs. 21,098

The only official documents which have been traced regarding the sanction for the raising of the Baggage Corps are the following: "on 19th December, 1845, the Government of India wrote to the Court of Directors: "We have the honour to report our having sanctioned the establishment of Baggage Camel Corps that had been raised in Scinde at a total cost of Rs, 21,154 *per mensem*". The court of Directors wrote to India on 22nd July, 1846, acknowledging and formally confirming this. In a marginal note it is added: "An expensive arrangement of this nature appears to have been necessary to provide for sudden and rapid movement in the Hills on the frontier of Scinde. "There is also a pencil note in a probably contemporary hand: 'An Expenditure of £ 27,384 per annum ! !

The anonymous author of the 1852 pamphlet gives an account of the raising of the Baggage-Corps which we reproduce in default of any other; but in view of the partisan nature of the book it should be read with reserve. "The Scinde Baggage Corps was first proposed about the month of August 1843," he writes "in consequence of an alarm, a number of camels said to be required to move the troops even in Sind—where abundant supplies existed in every part of the province—where the inhabitants were always willing to sell those supplies—and where the enemy never attempted to prevent provisions reaching the army. The first move in the matter was to assemble a special committee of three officers supposed to be best acqu-

aunted with the subject in hand. Before this committee with the subject in hand, the ideas of the Government of Scinde were laid, and it was directed to devise the best means for carrying them into practical effect: The committee sat long, and evidently laboured much for hundreds of returns of all kinds were called for from every department, regiment, and even company in the army; there was nothing going on throughout the camp but weighing and measuring every article of kit carried by officer and men, or for their use public or private; nothing escaped, from a tent to a tooth brush.

“The labours of the Committee were at last brought to a close, but the result never transpired, the proceedings were locked up, and nothing was heard of them afterwards. The nature at general tendency may, however, be shrewdly guessed at *for the Baggage-Corps was not mentioned again for nearly two years*, during the hill campaign of 1845, the Commissariat arrangement proved a failure owing to a series of errors! Operations were in consequence suspended ere they were well begun and remained so far a month or more. (It appeared that it had been forgotten that money was necessary to carry on war and a day or two after the commencement of the “CAMPAIGN” the discovery was suddenly made that both the military treasure chest and the collector’s treasury was empty). This failure was ascribed to the want of a baggage corps, was ordered by the Government of India. The existance of the Baggage Corps now commenced in good earnest: a committee was assembled to arrange the details, and the strength of new corps was fixed at 1,800 camels and 1,800 private soldiers with a due proportion of officers, European and Indian, etc.”

Not much progress seems to have been made by the end of the year, 1845, when, on 24th December, orders were received to concentrate a large portion of the Bombay Army in Upper Sind to support the Bengal troops against Ranjit Singh. At the date, according to Napier himself, none of the

officers, non-commissioned officers or men had ever before seen each other. All had been hastily drawn from regiment of the line, and knew nothing of their new duties. The few Government camels, which the corps had, were many of them just bought, and most of those on the strength of the Corps were therefore, hired. In fact, "it was quite unorganised and its commander, the lamented Major Jameson, absolutely formed his corps on the march."

IV

Napoleon in Egypt and Syria 1798-99

I may be justly accused, like many other authors, who like me, have written many volumes on the organization and administration i.e. where should such a student being to enter on the trackless expanse before him?—And it must be remembered that reading is a small part of the labour compared with the exertion of thought necessary to perceive and generalise the facts. It is not to be wondered at, then, that when in the past no other inducement, or encouragement was offered to the student of the administration of Islamic Art-of-War, that his own desire for knowledge, the efforts of those who wished to accomplish themselves in the records and theory of the Islamic Military history and the Art-of-War, were, neither very numerous, nor very fruitful. The task of reading all works of authority on a single military epoch is very formidable when most of such works are not in the language we understand.

However, when anyone—and that any one, is a retired soidier, takes up a pen to warn the olympic gods and the young generation, he meets with a retort; "Oh! he is only a retired soldier"—and pushed aside with a shrug of shoulders: Difficulty arises that generals have been accused in the past that they lack interest, foresight and enterprise. No military writer can fail to criticise if he is to get at the truth. He must start with an analysis and then, by discussions of the facts and motives that

he has discovered, pass on to criticism. From that point, he is to devise a better way of doing things, both in the present and the future. But this is where he signs a death warrant to his career as a soldier. Officers of today join the armed forces for a career and a living, and have no private income with which to protect their livelihood and provide for their families. Little wonder, that many of them cling pathetically to the trimming of the past and thus justify their existence by remaining "YESMEN". However, those who took the bold step—they then use retirement as an opportunity for reflections which they pass on to serve the nations.

"Examples from history", wrote Clausevitz long ago, "make every thing clear, and furnish the best description of proof in the empirical science. This applies with more force to the Art-of-war than to any other, for in addition to it, the Principles, the human element, is a constant factor."

Why have I selected Napoleon's war in 1798-1798 for study?

- (a) To enable the readers to solve for themselves the Napier-Nott-Ellenborough contraveray of Baggage Camel Corps.
- (b) How did Napoleon conceive the idea of dromedry corps?
- (c) Why did not the British think about the Camel Corps ?

Because—when the British defeated the Muslim armies who had become then no more than a rabble—on different battle-fields (on land and sea) and founded colonial empires; they set for themselves the task of keeping the Muslims suffering from an inferiority complex in an acute form by keeping them ignorant of their glorious past, by distorting history, and presenting some of the principles of the Islamic Pattern of war as their own. As historian George Santayana has stated: "History is always written wrong, and so always needs to be re-written." Hence this humble start.

The British changed not only the Islamic Pattern-of-War, but also through their agents, (Officers in service of Indian rulers), their organisation and their system of logistics. The armies of these Indian rulers became immobile and unmanoeuvrable. The languages, such as, Persian and Urdu were suppressed in India by the British to make things more complicated than ever.

I hope, through narrating Napoleon's war, I would be able not only to shake off the inferiority complex of the Muslims but to encourage them to study Islamic history. Lord Rosebury who was British Foreign Secretary in 1888 and later on became British Prime Minister, has written in his book, "Napoleon—the Last Phase."

"Briefly, Napoleon's real learning seems to be to Mohamet-ism (Islam).....Mohametanism, on the other hand is more simple, and Napoleon characteristically adds: 'is superior to Christianity and that it conquered half the world in ten years, while christianity took three hundred years to establish...Mohametism to be the most beautiful of all religions. And Napoleon often said: "We Mohametans"—while addressing his French soldiers.

Historian Colonel Vachee (French) has stated in his book "NAPOLEON AT WORK"....."Napoleon was a keen student of history.....The Emperor spent his life in his study. One may say, that all other circumstances of his life were merely digressions." Colonel Vachee adds: ".....The administrative measures which the maintenance of any army necessitate, form part of the art-of-war, 'no less important' and often more difficult than arrangements concerning operations at the front. They were also the object of Napoleon's constant meditations. Not only, as is advisable, did he himself draw up the main lines which must be clearly connected with strategical combinations, but in orders dictated either to his Chief of the Staff, or the General Commissary of Stores of the Army, he

fixed details of them. He depended upon no one for the choice of the sites for the big depots, arsenals, hospitals, storehouses and military bakehousesMarshall Berthier was awaiting him. He, first of all, brought his attention to bear on the question of provision, and saw if his (Napoleon's) orders on the subject had been executed... .."

In his book 'NAPOLEON AS A GENERAL' (two volumes) Count Yorek Von Wartenburg of the Prussian Army, has stated: ".....The principles, few but great, which (Napoleon) thereby formulated and obeyed, are the following:the principle of keeping one's own Communications open.....I entered upon this enterprise, (conquest of Egypt and Syria) though it seemed to me sufficiently foolhardy; in this as in thousand other circumstances the want of prudence will be assuredly compensated for by boldness of execution and 'Fortune' will probably once more crown with success endeavours, which cool reason, would never have dreamt of.....All the great generals of antiquity, as well as, those who have since, worthily followed in their footsteps, accomplished their great deeds only by obeying the rules and principles of the art, i.e. by the correctness of their combinations and a careful balancing of "MEANS AND RESULTS, EFFORTS AND OBSTACLES" They have been successful only by adapting themselves to the rules....."

It is considered that we would not be wrong to infer from the above few references that Napoleon had made a deep study of the campaigns successfully fought by Muslim generals in Africa and Syria. His piercing eyes must have noted the causes of unbroken victories by generals such as, Amr bin As, Khalid-bin-Walid and Sultan Salah-ud-Din Ayubi, before he planned to conquer Egypt. "At first, the Command of an army to invade England was entrusted to him," Says Count Wartenburg, "but a personal examination of the position of affairs soon caused him to reject this project entirely, and his unquestionable

desire for action sought another outlet. My glory is already at an end ; there is not enough of it in this little Europe ! must go to the East ; all great glory comes from there. Indeed, to the East his locks had long been directed ; to that land which inflamed his imagination with its wonders. Already during the negotiations with Austria at Passeriano, he had said ; "Europe is a moleheap ; only in the East have there been great empires and great cataclysms....."

"On 19th May, 1798, Napoleon set sail from Toulon on board the Orient, and on the 1st July he arrived before Alexandria. Here he was informed that Nelson, who was eagerly searching the Mediterranean for him, had likewise been off this town on the 28th June, but having, contrary to his expectations, not found the French there, had departed immediately for Syria. Astonished at his good luck, Napoleon determined to commence the landing of his troops at once, in spite of the high sea and the distance that lay from the shore. Bruey's advice to the contrary, he set aside with the words : "Admiral, we have no time to lose. Fortune gives me only three days; if I do not make the most of them, we are lost".

The army at that time constituted :

- (1) Kleber's Division : 2nd Light Infantry, 25th, 75th demi-brigades of the Line.
- (2) Desaix's Division : 21st Light Infantry, 61st, 88th demi-brigades of the Line.
- (3) Bon's Division : 4th Light Infantry, 18th, 32nd demi-brigades of the Line.
- (4) Menon's Division : 22nd Light Infantry, 13th, 69th demi-brigades of the Line.
- (5) Reymier's Division : 9th, 85th, demi-brigades of the Line.

Each Division numbered 4,500 men ; the cavalry Division under Dumes 4,000 sabres ; the artillery reserve 3,000 men. Besides the above commanders, other many very capable and distinguished officers were under his orders (attached to his staff) who afterwards acquired highest military glory : Murat, Zanneş, Rampon, Junot, Marmont, Davont, Friant, Belliard, Lanusse, Vial, Caffarelli, Duroe, Dessieres Rapp ; whom he employed raising new units, such as, Negro (Sudanese) Divisions etc.

The landing commenced in the evening and continued during the whole night 4,000 men of the divisions of (1) Men-son, (2) Klebar, and (3) Bon, were on shore in the Bay of Mafabout. With these troops Napoleon himself set off immediately, at three o'clock in the morning. Raynier was ordered to see the landing of the rest of the Troops, which was concluded by nightfall on 3rd July. In the meantime Napoleon had reached Alexandria on 2nd July. Napoleon formulated the following rule to guide his strategy under these new conditions : "My task will here consist in keeping all my extraordinary resources hidden, and using them only when I have to engage great masses ; they will then be all the more telling."

On 5th July the divisions of the army were set in motion. on 7th July Napoleon reached Damanhur. "This first march had given the French soldiers a sufficient foretaste of those exertions, privations and sufferings which this enterprise was to entail on them in such rich measure, that soon there was no one, with the exception of the Commander-in-Chief, but longed with all his soul to quit the country and cursed the campaign. He alone remained unmoved by all the terrors of the climate, being only concerned about the glory he would gain; and at a time when men had begun to commit suicide to escape from their present misery, he tapped the chief of his staff contentedly on the shoulder, and said: "Well, Bertheir here we are at last," says Count Wartenburg.

Imperial Headquarters.

Before continuing our examination of war in the East, we propose to examine the Imperial Headquarters. Imperial Headquarters comprised two quite distinct departments: (a) Napoleon's military household (b) Headquarters.

(a) The military household was composed of those whom Napoleon had immediately about him, and of the staff in attendance about him and of the staff in attendance on him: grand officers, generals, aides-de-camp, orderly officers, secretaries, dignitaries and court employees.

(b) Headquarters of the Grand Army, Berthier—Chief of Staff at one and at the same time Vice-Constable, Minister of war and Master of Hounds.

The Offices of the Chief of Staff, which were also called the "CABINET OF THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF. Some of notable Officers: (a) The Minister Director of Army Administration (b) The Commissary of Stores. (c) The heads of the Departments (d) The Paymaster-General (e) Receiver General of Public Taxes, (f) An Officer was responsible for "the movement of troops"—which meant all the Emperor's orders concerning movements, the sending out of orders to marshals, heads of departments, the writing out of orders concerning new organisations, etc. (g) Outside the cabinet, the Chief of the Staff had near him a certain number of generals and superior officers who were personally attached to him. Unlike the Cabinet, the staff of the Chief of Staff constituted only of Officers. There were three assistant Chiefs of the Staff as under:

(a) The first Assistant Chief of the Staff bore the title of 'Chief of General Staff'. He was in direct correspondence with the Chief of Staff of the Army Corp. He organized the communications and rear of the army—the work of troops, detachments of recruits, convoys and evacuations.

(b) The Second Assistant Chief of Staff was incharge of Camps, marches and Cantonments. His duties were clearly set forth in the following letter addressed from Boulogne by Berthier to Major General Dumas :

“.....I beg to inform you, General, that the Emperor has chosen for employment on the General Staff of the Grand Army immediately under my orders as Chief-of-Staff and with the title of Assistant Chief-of-the-Staff, Quartermaster of the Army. Under your orders will be an Adjutant-Major and four assistants:.....” Marshall Berthier.

In another letter by Berthier wrote : “I beg you, General, to find me immediately a route for Marshal Murat, who is leaving Stuttgart to Goettingen. See if that can be done in a day’s march. Find me route for Marshal Ney from Stuttgart to Heidenheim.....Trace another route for Marshal.....Marke on the map, in accordance with your knowledge of the country, the day’s marches.....”

I desire General Dumas to hand this work in half an hour.....”

Napoleon possessed detailed information in his note-book ‘foreign armies’, about the armies in Europe about composition, as well as, about the movements of foreign armies and a resume of them with a detailed report. Whilst on campaign Napoleon ate sparingly and drank little. Napoleon said to Count Zas Casses : “The fate of a battle, is the result of a moment, of a thought, you approach with various combinations, you mingle, you fight for a certain time, the decisive moment comes, a moral spark is generated, and the smallest reserve accomplishes the end.” Napoleon’s wars were bold but methodical. His superiority in the seclusion of his study, in his labours with compass and map, was no less great and in this consists his importance in the study of art-of-war.

How did the idea of camel corps struck to his mind? Just as the Physician, who desires to influence the living human organism by his remedies, must begin by dissecting the parts of the dead organism and studying the principles and the composition of the individual parts, in order to recognize the vital functions of the whole, so it is in with the art of war. No one has ever maintained, with respect to medical Science, that theoretical study is useless, and that a physician could at once begin with practice; indeed whoever did so, would be considered a bungler; and yet as regards the art of war, people are to be found who declare theoretical to be hurtful. In medical science, although every individual case of sickness has its special features, yet may be treated according to general rules, so also in the art-of-war, although every situation may offer something new, yet, after all will fall under general rules. Finally, as only that physician is a true master of his art, who, having all the general rules entirely in his grasp; employs them not with slavish uniformity, but modifies them according to the nature of each individual case, so only that military leader will attain to perfection in the art-of-war, who, while fully acquainted with the domain of theory—through study of military history and geography—employs its principles according to the nature of the given case. The rational employment of general principles marks the difference between the genius of the true artist and the lack of freedom of the mechanic, who dominated by rigid rules, and the bungler, who despises all rules and denies their justification. But, above all, Napoleon's importance in the history of war lies in his originality. Men's passions decide their fate, they themselves are the result of their individual position. Every soldier will appreciate the justice of his own words: "I aimed at the empire of the world; who in my place would not have done the same."

Moreover, the fact that the Islamic Military History is replete with interest in grand strategy, strategy, tactics, as

well as, logistic, drew keen interest of Napoleans. Again Islamic history was second to none in moving incident of gallantry, chivalry and mobile warfare. Islamic history had presented the life history of young cavalry general, such as Amr bin As, Khalid-bin-Walid, the Mohammad bin-Qasim and Tariq, who had achieved on the peak of fame which Napoleon had eye conquer. But Napoleon's imagination led him astray as he became brutal, a butcher even worse than Changiz Khan, as we shall witness. Miot, Mem, historian has stated: "In Egypt, I (Napoleon) saw myself freed from the fetters and constraints of civilization; I dreamt all sorts of things and saw the means of carrying out what I had dreamt.....I should have attacked the British Empire in India and restored my connection with old Europe by that conquest. The time spent in Egypt was indeed the happiest of my life, for it was the most ideal."

Egypt stood at that time nominally under the suzerainty of Turkey, but it was actually ruled by the warlike caste of Mamalukes, whose capital was Cairo. At Damanhur, Napoleon assembled his army which place he left on 9th and reached Ramanieh on 10th of July. Turkish bay, Murad, the most powerful bay (general) of Egypt, hastily collected army, mostly cavalry, upon the news of the landing of the French. Mamaluke's attack was repulsed but major part of the defeated managed to get away towards Cairo, and on 12th the French reached Minieh Salamch. Murad's Army and the French met at Schebreket but after a very hard fight the Egyptian army retreated the Cairo. The Egyptian army was beaten but not yet annihilated. Napoleon christened it "the battle of Schebreiss", as he said: "This day, I familiarized myself with my enemy's mode of fighting." He realised that he was short of cavalry and he needed transport which could carry his infantry not during hard and hot marches but also during pursuit of the defeated enemy.

On 21st Napoleon continued his march up the Nile, and

in sight of Cairo met the main force of the Memaluke's near Embabeh. But Napoleon, being new acquainted with effectiveness of their mode of fighting and formations, did not await their attack but attacked them before they were ready. The enemy was routed and Cairo was occupied on 22nd. However, Mamlukes under Murad, managed to break of the fight, dispersed and reformed in upper Nile. A part of defeated army under Ibrahim Pasha retreated to Belbesis and Salahieh. On 24th July Napoleon moved his headquarters to Cairo and he sent various detachments to subdue and secure the country occupied. "War contributions were levied, arms confiscated, punishments decreed and mercilessly enforced" says Menon; "for the Turks can only be ruled by the greatest severity, every day five, or six heads were cut off in the streets of Cairo by my (Napoleon) orders. Up till now we have been forced to be lenient with them, in order to wipe out the reputation of terror which preceded us; but now, on the contrary, we must make these tribes obey, and they only obey where they fear. "It was now Napoleon's intention to hunt Ibrahim and Murad. As General Reynier was defeated by Ibrahim on 3rd August, he, therefore, started himself on 7th August. Napoleon reached Bebeiss, where he found Ibrahim—who retreated to Salahich. Napoleon hurried to Salahich, only to find that Ibrahim had retreated to Syria by disappearing in the desert.

Napoleon decided to make Salahich a depot. He ordered it to be fortified and left General Reynier to carry out his orders. He sent General Dugua to Manssurah, while he himself immediately returned to Cairo with the rest of his troops. It was here, that he heard the news of the destruction of the French Fleet at Aboukir except the Naval Flotilla, which had accompanied him. It was serious blow, especially, when grumbling and mutinous words were being expressed by troops who hated the shelterless, waterless, and most unhealthy terrain of the battlefield. Of course, he understood what

a terrible impression this stroke (naval) must make upon his army, already so disheartened by the regours of climate and terrain; but he only felt the increased necessity of meeting the frowns of fate and the dejection of his men with firmness. Both leaders and men now began to feel more than ever, that the future safety of the army depended solely on this man of genius—Napolean—who set Fate at defiance.

However, he had already won over Mamalukes on his side and he had already recruited 5,500 Negroes (Suddeness) when he mounted on dromedaries, armed them with muskets and drilled them on his French pattern of the art-of-war. Each dromedary was to carry one French soldier in addition to his own negio rider. In addition he had engaged a Baggage Camel Crops, whose drivers were armed with Muskets instead of bows and arrows. Morveover, he changed the shape of "MAJHWAZAH" used by Amr bin As from circular to oblong to make the defenders' fire more effective. These measures were taken to make the French more mobile.

Napolean was not unaware that the news of Aboukir brought about an immediate change of feelings in Egypt; the whole population, besides the Mamaluke beys, Murad and Ibrahim, were inspired with new hopes of being able to get rid of the French. Napolean wrote to Berthier: "You will order General Desair to attack Murad Bey whenever and wherever, he may find him....." Desair met Murad on 7th October at Sediman and inflicted a decisive defeat on him. Again and again Napolean sent punitive columns and ordered them to cut off the heads of all who were caught redhanded. Let them be led this night to the banks of the Nile, between Bulok and old Cairo, let their headless trunks be thrown into the river. Every night we cut off some thirty heads, especially of ring leaders; this will, I think, be a lesson to them....." This letter dated 27th October was addressed to Reynier.

Having established his authority in Egypt, Napolean pro-

ceeded to Syria, as he had heard that one Turkish army was collecting in Syria, under the Chief Command of Achmed Pasha, surnamed 'DJEZZAR' (butcher) on account of his cruelty; another Turkish Army was assembling at Roddes, to land in Lower Egypt; and the operations were to be supported by an English fleet. An English fleet had blockaded Alexandria. On 26th December Napoleon arrived in person at Suez. By 10th May, 1799, he had conquered Gaza, El Arish, Jaffa and besieged Acre. Napoleon wrote to Marmont on 9th March: "The Capture of Jaffa has been a brilliant affair; 4000 of the best troops of Djeddar and the best gunners of Constantinople had to be put to sword....."

Napoleon had to return to Egypt as, plagues was raging in his army; from Egypt news was continually arriving of fresh troubles have broken out, and the landing of a Turkish army in Lower Egypt. On 17th May, Napoleon issued a proclamation to his army in which he announced its approaching return to Egypt. He entered Cairo with his divisions(3) on 14th June, having traverse 300 miles, without reckoning detours, a performance he completed on twenty-sixth day of his start—all due to improved logistics. During this period he fought many battles, in a most trying climate, without proper roads, and considering the continual struggle with want of water and stores, with sickness and with the desert.

Once more at Cairo, Napoleon again occupied himself with administration of the country and the organization of his army. Meanwhile, he reported to the Directory his losses at 5344 men and asked for reinforcements. He wrote to General Desaix on 22nd June, at Cairo: "I should like, citizen—general, to purchase 2,000 or 3,000 negroes, above sixteen years, and put about 100 of them into each battalion"—for the obvious to make up for losses. Apparently, he reported to Directory a considerable number of sick and wounded, on whose recovery Napoleon reckoned, His plan of incorporating Negroes in his army shown very distinctly the valued numbers in warfare and

to build up the morale of the local population that the Negroes were treated fairly and with equity.

Desaix kept on chasing Murad till the latter retired into the desert. Napoleon sent a small detachment towards the Pyramids on 14th July to reconnoitre. He was intending to join this detachment himself, when he received news from Marmont that a Turkish fleet, apparently with land forces on board, had appeared in the roadstead of Aboukir. He at first cleared Murad who was in the vicinity of Pyramids of Gizeh; with characteristic rapidity of resolve. Napoleon now formed plan of throwing himself on the invading army, and carried this project into execution without delay for Lower Egypt with 6,000 men in all.

Meanwhile, the Turkish Army, 12,000 men had affected their landing at Aboukir and seized this fortified place on 15th July; and entrenched itself immediately on the peninsula. Napoleon realized that the enemy had no intention of undertaking anything against Alexandria. Napoleon himself hastening on in front of the army, arrived in the evening of 23rd July. He immediately sent orders to his army to joint him. It was a regular Napoleonic battle, a battle which annihilated the enemy. On 27th July in front of Aboukir, he wrote triumphantly to Dugua: "The general staff will have informed you of the result of the battle of Aboukir: it was one of the finest I ever saw, not a man escaped of the enemy army which had landed."

Napoleon was back in Cairo. But his resolve to leave Egypt without delay was already taken. Immediately, on the 18th August, Napoleon left Cairo, went to Alexandria, sent from there orders to General Kleber to assume Chief Command of the army, and he himself set sail on the 23rd August, at five O'clock in the morning, on board the frigate "MUIRON" accompanied by Berthier, Murat, Zannes and Marmont. He landed at Frejus on 9th October. Indeed it is exactly courage in conceiving assurance of success, and resolution in exe-

cution, which ensure the happy issue of a project. We have seen that the generals of the Company classified the Indian soldiers as second class in status and in fixing the scale of rations and treated their families as "FOLLOWERS". This classification was resented by the Indians, no wonder, there were desertion and mutinies. Napoleon treated the Negro soldiers equals to his French soldiers and the Mambekes were included in the Staff of Imperial Headquarters. The most significant point from the Corps point of view was the inclusion of the Minister Director of the Army Administration, and the Commissary of stores were part of the Imperial Headquarters. They had direct access with the Minister of War and Chief of the Staff, Berthier, as stated by the historians took great interest in administration and went so far as occasionally to personally select the sites of depots.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST SIKH WAR

THE FIRST SIKH WAR, Was fought during the administration of Lord Hardinge. The Sikhs were defeated at Mudki, Ferozeshah and Sebraon. By the "PEACE OF LAHORE", the Jullandhar Doab was annexed ; a British force was stationed at Mianmir (Lahore Cantt.) and the Sikh rulers had to pay an indemnity of half a million sterling.

The Second Sikh War, 1846-49

Shortly after Lord Dalhousie's arrival in India, the British were once more at war with the Sikhs. The British Resident pressed for demands of payment of revenue and used high-handed methods. Diwan Mulraj, the Governor of Multan very seriously resented the attitude of the Resident. Mulraj proclaimed a religious war against the British and at once made himself the master of situation. The Government of India was though taken by complete surprise, but she decided to besiege Multan. However, when situation became very unfavourable to the British, the siege had to be raised and British troops and British political Officers were hastily withdrawn from the Punjab. This temporary evacuation of the Punjab by the British confirmed the Sikhs in their belief that they would be able to drive out the British. Accordingly, the latter made extensive preparations. Dalhousie said : "the Sikhs has called for war, and they shall have it with a vengeance." The British in the initial stages committed quite a few blunders in strategic and in administrative planning but once they found their

fect, they soon got on top of the Sikhs who were badly ridden by dissensions. In spite of it, the Sikhs managed to fight a drawn battle, at Chilianwala, which made the dissension amongst the Sikh leaders from bad to worse. But General Gough very soon staged counterattack and defeated the Sikhs, while they were busy celebrating their Victory at Chilianwala and quarrelling amongst themselves. But this battle at Chilianwala caused general concentration in United Kingdom, for the British lost more than two thousand officers and men. Accordingly, the Home authorities decided to recall General Gough, appointing Sir Charles Napier his successor. But before the orders of the Home authorities reached India, General Gough made good his military reputation by the Victory of Gujrat, in which the Sikh army was practically wiped out and by which the war came to end and the Punjab was annexed to the British domain.

Strategical Planning—1st Sikh War

For at least a year before it actually came to pass, it seem to have been clear to the Government of India that it was only a matter of time before one or other of the factions at Lahore would "decide to project an army across the border and march on Delhi". On the Sutlej itself the British had established cantonments at Ferozpur, with a garrison of 7,000, and at Ludhiana, held by about 5,000 troops, opposite the Sikh Fort of Phillaur on the other side of the river. The rest of the frontier force lay much further back. At Ambala, more than 150 miles from Ferozpur, about 8,000 troops were contained; three battalions were in Simla Hills; the reserve, 9,000 strong, was at Meerut; and the seige train and reserve ammunition were kept at Delhi. There were also irregular units at Hansi and Dheradun. The military problem confronting the British was to concentrate on the river Sutlej as many as possible of these troops in the shortest possible time, and to drive back across the river any invading Sikhs.

Commissariat Policy

The contemporary Commissariat policy of the Government of India was that permanent transport was maintained on a scale sufficient only for moving camp equipment, musket, ammunition, troop, stores and hospital equipment. For every other purpose in peace and war, it was necessary to procure transport in the open market, either through a contractor or, if one was not forthcoming, or failed to fulfil his engagement; by a requisition upon civil officials—which would not necessarily be met. In any case, it “MEANT DELAY.”

As regards supplies, twenty days' reserve was held at Frontier cantonments, but there was no means (cash or agencies) of replenishing, or increasing it save by local purchase through Indian agents, or by bringing forward more grain on hired transport—if both were procurable—from markets, or stocks behind the theatre of operations—at great delay and expense. The drawbacks of this system are obvious. It was a penny wise and pound foolish policy.

Again, the British forces on the frontier had been increased by each successive Governor-General—as every one of them was anxious to show more and more conquests than his predecessors. Up to 1838 the troops totalled little more than 1,500, Auckland increased this to 8,000 by enlarging Ludhiana and creating Ferozpur. Ellenborough formed new cantonments at Simla, Ambala, Kasauli, bringing the total to 18,000. Hardinge increased it to 40,000. Hardinge said on 23rd January 1845, “we shall have 500 elephants in the course of summer between Cawnpore and Sutlej, 7,000 camels exclusive of tatoes (ponies) and hackeries, (bullock-carts)”. This concentration of transport was effected by withdrawing animals from stations in Lower Bengal and elsewhere, whence they could be spared.

On 24th October, 1845, Hardinge wrote to Gough: “On or before 12th November arrangements will have been made by

which the Commissariat Department will be prepared to equip nearly two-third of the force at, and in advance of Meerut, with the necessary means of marching at the shortest notice I do not anticipate the probability of any emergencies arising which can require the army to take fields this autumn I have deemed it advisable to be prepared with the means of movement and as it is desirable that the arrangements should be made "on the most economical scale, the whole will be hired at the halting rates"

But all other preparations which entailed expenses, such as the movement of troops and establishment of advanced supply depot seems to have been vetoed by Hardinge on political grounds;

As late as 2nd December, less than a week before the Sikh Vanguard crossed the Sutlej, Hardinge decided—it appears with Gough's concurrence—to postpone any change in the distribution of troops. However, the Governor-General asked Deputy Commissary General, how soon he could establish depots every 20 miles along the route from Karnal to Ferozpur, nearly 200 miles, to ration the Meerut Column (19,000 strong) so that it might move with as little transport as possible? When he was told that it might be done in six weeks—Hardinge was much incensed, doubtless realizing that he had left matters for too late and that depots should have been established long before Meerut column moved and rejoined that the work must be accomplished in five days!

On 11th December the main body of the Sikh Army crossed the Sutlej, and Ambala column marched the next day. The reserve left Meerut in echelons on various days from 10th to 16th December. On the 13th December war was formally declared by the Governor-General.

Similar and even worse error in strategical planning by withholding the concentration of troops till it was nearly too

late—for the so-called political reasons though in fact it was economic reasons *i.e.* for saving money on preparation for war and in its execution! Fortune helped the British, as dissensions among the Indian princes and Sikh Leaders became from bad to worse during this period.

I

The Work Of Commissariat In The Sikh War.

“The Baggage Corps played an important part in the movement of Bombay Presidency troops from Karachi and Upper Sind to Multan, and, eventually; Peshawar; during 1848-49. The details of this concentration are somewhat complicated and can only be summarized here. The command of the Bombay columns after some indecision, was assigned to Brigadier, the Hon'ble Henry Dundas (later the third Viscount Melvie), most of whose troops marched in three echelons from Rohri on 25th, 28th and 30th November, 1848, and after closing up, reached the camp before Multan 21st December. The battering train had preceded them by four days, and detachments, together with the “Indus Flotilla of the Indian Navy (nine streamers and three flats, moved independently.

Two divisions of the Scinde Camel Baggage Corps, stationed at Jerrak and Hyderabad, had moved to Karachi and conveyed “the baggage of European and Indian troops without loss, or injury thence to Rohri by the usual marches (500 miles) but without halts.” It should be noted that the Corps at the beginning of the concentration of the column possessed only 1,800 camels sufficient for a force of about 3000 combatants. Two thousand more soldiers, with proportionate quantity of guns, equipment and followers, entered Sind from other parts of the Bombay Presidency. The Baggage-Corps (Camels) were increased by 12,000 *i.e.* total 30,000. They were speedily equipped and organized; and by their use the troops with all their impediments, including a siege-train and two months supplies,

were moved over the 320 miles to Rohri in forty-two days. The hired camels were procured at Rohri and placed under the officers of the Corps, the rules and regulations of which were applicable to them; and when the troops were ready to march, an ample supply from the Baggage-Corps was issued to all arms including the Commissariat, Engineer, Ordnance and Medical Departments with both brigades. On arrival at Multan, the duties performed were various, *i.e.* several thousands of camels were sent to and brought stores from the streamers and bunders (ports) on the river Indus, and Commissariat supplies from the country (local purchase) in rear of the operations from beyond the Gharra river.

“On the advance and during the operations connected therewith, on the 27th December, 1848, to the assault of the city of Multan, detachments of the Scinde Camel Baggage-Corps accompanied the troops with spare ammunition, and were well up when required. They were also employed during the entire siege up to the time of the surrender of the Fort, *i.e.* carrying shot, shell, ammunition, rations for the man, etc. to batteries and posts whenever required; and on these occasions Captain Manghan, Commandant of the Camel Corps work, as well as, of men was very favourably reported by the General Commanding that “the Camelmén were frequently exposed to heavy fire of the enemy from the walls.”

The fortress of the Multan fell on 22nd January, 1849, and within a few days, the British forces were on the move towards the Northern Punjab. The first portion of the Bengal column marched on 27th January, the second on the 30th, and on 2nd February, the Bombay troops set off by forced marches under Brigadier Dundas; their strength being about 2,200 Europeans, and 2,400 Indian Combatants. The Baggage-Corps took only the pick of its camels, leaving 500 sick and maimed, behind at Multan. “Previous to resuming the march to join the army under Lord Gough; Park and everything belonging

to it, was removed into the Fort with the least possible delay and without the smallest loss," wrote Dundas on 1st June 1850 to the Adjutant-General of the Bombay Army. "The baggage of the Division and stores of all departments were conveyed eighteen marches to the Commander-in-Chief's camp, the last two days comprising 51 miles and the passage of the Chenab. The animals remained laden the whole of the two following days (the latter being the battle of Gujrat, 22nd February, 1849) and marched next to Jhelum. The passage of the river was extremely difficult, and the elephants too few to be of any material assistance. The camels, therefore, necessarily carried their loads through the streams, five in number, and only a trifling loss was sustained. With the exception of the time necessary to receive the submission of the Sikh Army, the rapid march was continued to the neighbourhood of the city of Peshawar, and a distance of about 1,100 miles was accomplished from Karachi.

"Major Blood, Commanding 3rd Troop Bombay Horse Artillery, who has completed this entire distance with camels and men of the Scinde Camel Baggage-Corps, (and those alone from Karachi to Rohri) reports that in that part of the march his baggage was admirably conveyed, and although hired camels were substituted to the extent of two-thirds from Rohri to Peshawar, he has sustained no loss of any sort, public or private, during the entire march."

The Baggage-Corps remained at Peshawar for some time, but its headquarters appears to have arrived at Karachi on 11th April, 1850. At this time reports were called for regarding the working of the Corps, and as to the desirability of retaining it in the service. ".....Reviewing the whole of the services performed by the Scinde Camel Baggage-Corps during the Campaign. I am of the opinion that should it be the intention of the Government to keep up that Corps, to make it efficient, it should be greatly remodelled, and an adjutant

(also performing the duties of quartermaster and paymaster) be appointed to assist the commanding officer, who has to furnish all the papers connected with a regular corps besides those of his own, thereby entailing an immensity of extra work.....”

Three Officers of the Bombay Commissariat Department were also asked to give their opinions. Captain R. Shaw, Assistant Commissary-General stated that : “.....he considered that the performance of the Baggage-Corps with the hired Camels attached to it, were very creditable.....but that the same, or a greater result ‘commensurate with expense’, would have been obtained under the same commanding officer, had the organization of the Baggage-Corps been entirely different, and had it simply existed as an extensive ‘PERMANENT’ establishment, divested of its half military character.” He doubted whether it added to efficiency, commensurately with expense..... “to give a man to each camel armed with a musket and bayonet and clad in a stiff uniform.....”

Comments on opinions

Captain Vicent emphasized the advantage accruing from a permanent establishment of transport as opposed to temporary drivers and animals (hired for the occasion). He deprecated the quasi-military character of the Baggage-Corps as leading to unnecessary expense and tending to divert the attention of the men from what should be their first care—animal management.

Lieutenant Dunsterville, who only saw the work of the Corps at Multan, remarked that “there could be no doubt as to the utility of Baggage-Corps which always brought up baggage regularly and punctually”. Both Dunsterville and Captain Shaw, however, suggested that the status, organization and composition, should be in effect—a Silladar Camel Corps, like the Irregular Indian Cavalry regiments, *i.e.* Silladar cavalry

regiments. They further opined that : "on the march, on the whole, camels of the Force should be under the Command of a Baggage Master assisted by Camel Sergeants (British), of whom there should be one to each brigade.....the sarwans should be armed with either matchlock or sword, generally both, and they, with regimental rearguards, would be quite sufficient protection.....On reaching camp the power of the Baggage Master ceases, and the camels of each brigade, public, hired or private, should be under the Brigade Commissariat Officers....."

It is considered that the contradictory nature of the reports have been noticed, *i.e.* both Dunsterville and Shaw desired it to be a purely load carrying organization on the basis of expense, and yet, in the same breath they wished it to armed, and organized like Irregular (Silladar) Cavalry regiments. Thirdly, they recommend extra staff of a Baggage Master and Sergeants who would be employed on the line of march only. The reports make obvious that the matter had not been seriously considered from administrative, tactical use and the financial obligations, if their suggestion were to be approved by the higher authorities.

"The Military Board at Bombay forwarded these papers on 12th July 1850 to Lord Falkland, the Governor, saying that..... "they entirely concurred in the opinion expressed by the Commissariat officers—that, though the Baggage-Corps had rendered good service in the Punjab Campaign, a like result might have been obtained at far less expense by the employment of 'an ordinary permanent establishment of cattle'. The Board, therefore, considered that the Corps had been needlessly expensive." Nothing was decided for a considerable period, and in February 1851, the Government had asked to be informed as soon as possible whether the Corps was to be maintained or abolished ?

The Governor-General added : "All admit that the Corps

is sufficient for the purpose it was intended to serve ; but that it is no longer necessary for service in Scind, while the same efficiency for the conveyance of baggage of an army may be obtained as fully by other means and at a much less cost." This report drew a decision from the Court of Directors on 18th June, 1851 : "Such being the case, we can have no hesitation in giving you our authority for disbanding the Corps."

So ended the fate of Sir Charles Napier's 'pet project', an experiment not without much value during its continuance. It was killed by intrigue of the serving officers both British and Indian—as I made out from contemporary witness's who made statements to me, as they felt that a permanent Baggage Corps would have denied them the comfort they had so far enjoyed, *i.e.*, they would not be allowed their personal kit as they wished, but it would have been cut down to a laid down scale. The Indian Officers felt that they would not have been allowed to take their families with them, on the line of march, or on reactive service. I heard from them that the 'BANJA'RA', the 'BEOPA'RI' and the 'BANIA' had been most active opponents of a Baggage Corps—as they would lose their living. The Commanding Generals and the Commanding Officers were very greatly under the influence of these traders. I witnessed it too—though for few years. The power that the bania (contractor) wielded in Silladar regiments pre-First World War. However, the Royal Army Service Corps had adopted the right course of progress and modernization of their Supply and Transport Services. While the Government of India desired everything to progress on "No-expense basis", the War Office placed the efficiency of machine for conducting operation on "Speed and Security basis".

II

The Second Sikh War

The main operations of the Punjab Campaign, commonly

known as, the Second Sikh War, were fought around Grand Trunk Road, Lahore-Rawalpindi axis. The war began when General Gough's army crossed the Sutlej on 9th November, 1848. But it had become evident in May, 1848 that the clash of arms with the Sikhs was inevitable. We can, therefore, say that the precautionary period was from May to October—6 months period, which was ample time to mobilize and concentrate the forces according to the plan of operation. However, the opportunity was wasted away. In this connection, it is essential to recall that there were very serious difference of opinion on planning and execution of war between the Governor-General 36 years old Dalhousie, and 69 years old Veteran General Gough—the Commander-in-Chief. The natural consequence of it, the Vacillation in policy in matters of defence. After Victory in the First Sikh war a considerable reduction of forces in infantry took place. The axe however fell very heavy on the transport and Commissariat as all transport and Commissariat required for the transport use of the sepoy troops was disbanded, even at the frontier stations—

—who thereby became immobile for operational purposes.

On 11th May, 1848 after the conquest of Multan, Gough despatched a detailed statement of measures which he advised about operational matters, particularly administrative matters, such as, the collection of supplies and means of transport—logistics. Dalhousie while rejecting the advice added: "No expense could be incurred for the actual movement of the troops until the arrival of the cold season, and for provisions until the rains were over....." However, when Gough continued to press for his demand, Dalhousie stood ground and stated... "No expense in preparation for war was to be incurred until it can no longer be avoided....." In spite of depressing reports from the British Resident in Lahore, Dalhousie did not give in to Gough. Even during the middle of September, Dalhousie expressed his doubt whether war was inevitable, and he declined to increase the army, and sanctioned only a small concentration of troops on the frontier stations.

On 30th September, Dalhousie gave way, and approved 1,500 extra sowers and sepoy being enlisted, and also the movements of reinforcements from Bombay and Sind. By the middle of October, Gough was told that the Government of India approved not only of the reduction of Multan garrison (as suggested by Gough) but also of an invasion of the Punjab. Historian Lee Warner, has stated in 'LIFE OF LORD DALHOUSIE', that Dalhousie wrote to a friend on 13th October that: "Our Commissariat is in a fearful backward state; not a week's supplies at Ferozpur, although since last May I have been both publicly and privately urging on the subject. Lord Dalhousie is a young man, his blood is very hot, and he speaks of walking over everything. But to walk we must eat..."

Gough having crossed the river Sutlej on 9th November 1848, reached Lahore on the 13th November at the head of 20,000 troops. 3 days later he crossed Ravi and advanced to Ramanager on the Chenab and 8th December Gough and the rest of the army (less advanced guard) crossed Chenab. According to "Private letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie"; "..... Gough moved his whole army from Ferozpur to the Chenab when Commissariat and other departmental arrangements were incomplete, and in spite of remonstrances from the heads of departments. The supplies he expected in the country totally failed him--at one time they had only four day's supply at his command, and on 24th November he wrote that his army was in a 'MOST CRITICAL POSITION'. On 7th December, 1848, Dalhousie wrote to the Duke of Wellington, that: "The Commander-in-Chief insisted on advancing his whole army from Ferozpur before his Commissariat arrangements were complete. The supplies which were promised to him across the Ravi failed him....." However, critical study of facts goes far to prove, that Dalhousie—being the boss—was trying to pass on the baby, and that in fact, it was Dalhousie who had prevented Gough to get on with Supplies and transport due to his unwise policy of "NO EXPENSE SHOULD BE

INCURRED UNTIL IT CAN NO LONGER BE AVOIDED” and that he did neither consider war imminent, nor inevitable. Once again the intelligence report of the political Officers on resources proved misleading and wrong. Moreover, the Political Department repeated their blunder of living on false hopes— or wishful thinking about the availability of supplies in an invaded (enemy) country. The fact that Commissariat was able to maintain the force during its advance of about 100 miles in a month with continuous fighting, especially when compared with First Sikh War, shows good work on the part of Commissariate. It should be noted that inspite of repeated representations to Dalhousie by Gough on preparation for war which was rejected by Dalhousie, eventually, Gough was forced to fight a war which was forced on him by the enemy who had invaded the British territory. Again due to the fact, that Gough was very short of transport and the Sikh general did not stand to fight a war, forced Gough not to let the enemy retire unmolested.

Historian Burton has stated : “Commissariat arrangements were certainly defective for apparently the men had no meal till next day, 36 hours or more, after they had left camp at Ramnager” Lawrence Archer has stated in the “Commentaries on the Punjab Campaign”, (and he had taken part in the campaign) that : “he tasted nothing until long after the arrival of the troops, about 6. p.m. at the ford of Wazirabad, when a piece of CHUPATTI, was all that he and his companions could manage to procure after a protracted march of 25 miles”. But Thackwell states : “the men had taken the advantage devoted to reconaissance of the fords, to enjoy a meal. I can find no evidence of neglect on the part of the Commissariat, though some regimental quartermasters, may have been to blame”..... Yet, Dalhousie’s report to London on 22nd December, 1848 as quoted by Burton states : “Being satisfied that in any intended advance which H.E. might attempt to make, he would experience very great difficulty in procuring supplies

for the army, I requested H E. on No consideration to advancebeyond Chenab."

My "Rangrut" grand parents who took part in this campaign stated that: "they experienced great difficulty in purchasing articles of food during the march. Moreover, their personal baggage and number of private servants was cut down dratically which made our march uncomfortable. As the Sikhs before they retired looted the bazars and local markets and grain mandis, we therefore, faced hardship and in purchasing supplies."

It is difficult to get at the truth of the matter, but Gough's biographer Rait summarized the situation, that ".....the Commissariat Department had done its best, but utterly unprepared as it was in spite of Lord Gough's representation—when war broke out, it failed to keep with the 'SPEED' of the Commander-in.Chief's movement to the Chenab....." By 'SPEED' he meant a net advance of 100 miles in a month in addition to fighting battles all the time. Gough gave vent to his resentment by inserting in an official despatch, a reference to his unheeded protests against the refusal of the Government to sanction preparations, especially with regard to the Commissariat and this led to a rebuke by Dalhousie and an estrangement between the two leaders.

The ill feeling showed itself in their private, as well as, official correspondence judging by the printed extracts, in which we find many unusually blunt criticism by a Governor-General of a Commander-in-Chief and vice versa ; Delhousie being the least moderate in his comments. For example, he takes exception to the bad example which, he says, Gough set the army in the matter of reducing impediment. He had "enormous superflous baggage double set of tents, the whole Headquarters Departments records, and printing presses, which he promised to send away, but never did", Extract from Private letters. The Governor-General also retaliated by

refusing to sanction Gough's proposal to direct the Commissioners to issue grain "on payment to the private servants and followers at 16 seers to the rupee, while the market price was 7 seers ; such a measure would, of course, have attracted yet more unless months to the army in the field" ; stated in Private letters.

On 13th January, 1849 Gough advanced and fought a bloody battle at Chillianwala which the Sikhs considered a Victory. They withdrew towards Jhelum to celebrate their victory. Many relations of mine (Rangrut) who had taken part in this war, always described it as 'Signal Victory'. The lull in fighting due to inactivity of the Sikh army enabled Gough to re-organize his army. In the meantime, the Multan Column arrived at the entrenched Camp of Gough at Chillianwala. On 21st February, Gough marched out of camp and surprised the Sikh Army at Gujrat and won a decisive Victory. He crossed the river Jhelum on 28th February in pursuit of the disorderly retreating Sikh army, who finally laid down their arms at Manikyala near a Buddhist stupa on the Grand Trunk Road on 10th March. Gough pressed on and forced the rest of the Sikh army at Sohan Nallah near Rawalpindi 14th March, 1849. The annexation of the Punjab followed.

The Second Sikh War demonstrated that the precautionary period was wasted by the Government of India due to either their false economic policy, or poor intelligence reports as regards the political situation in the Sikh Camp. The top civilian head of the state did not allow the Commander-in-Chief to make necessary preparation in supplies and transport. The unfortunate part is, that the Governor-General very wrongly blamed the Commander-in-Chief for the setback the British army had to face in the initial stages of war, and in fact, the British very nearly lost the war. But the pages of the history of India were definitely altered more due to the wishful thinking and bad judgement on the part of Sikh leaders

who were ridden with dissension than any other cause. It also illustrates what misfortune can be brought on the country when the top civilians and soldiers disagree.

III

The Second Burma War.

Lord Dalhousie, encouraged by victory in the Punjab, did not wait long to put into operation very seriously his expansionist policy of the Empire. This time it was in the annexation of Burma. Excuses can invariably be found for an aggression as a cover for an invasion. The world powers have named it in the modern time as "PRE-EMPTIVE STRATEGY", which has so far had been termed as Carlylian strategy.

According to Sir William Lee Warner, the official biographer of the Marquess of Dalhousie: "Lord Dalhousie thought of everything, and provided before hand for every contingency. He furnished the force with perfect medical equipment and by storing at Amhurst an abundant supply of fresh meat and other necessaries, effectually guarded against any repetition of the scarcity of food which had decimated the troops in 1824. In lieu of the sailing Vessel, which during the monsoon in those days could not communicated even with Calcutta under four months, he placed a fleet of streamers "UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE GENERAL." The rich provinces of Arakan and Tenasserine, now under British, were bidden to hold their resources at the disposal of the military authorities. Twenty ships were employed in carrying from Moulmein to Rangoon 3,000 tons of wood, cut by size by Chinese carpenters, for the ready construction of seventy-one barracks at Rangoon and Prome, with rafters, mats, rattans and similar material gathered from Mergui and Tavoy under the orders of Colonel Bogle, Commissioner in the Tenasserim province. So promptly was this measure carried out that the first shiploads of this material arrived in April before the ground was ready for the construction of the barracks, while a large quantity bullocks and abun-

dance of other meat ensured the issue of fresh ration on the 21st of April, 1852, seven days after taking of Rangoon, and thereafter salt rations were only needed twice a week. For the sick and wounded, ranges of hospitals were constructed at Amherst, with a sufficient number of streamers to convey patients thither as occasion might require. A careful check was imposed on the supply of spirits to the troops.....”

Before we proceed further, we wish to draw attention of the readers to these points :—

(a) The Government of India (Dalhousie) decided to begin hostilities against the king of Ava “IN DEFAULT OF HIS SATISFIED CERTAIN BRITISH DEMANDS ; which he made to the King.

(b) Dalhousie was very stingy in fact to the extreme, when Gough sought permission to make administrative arrangement during the precautionary period, even when it had become evidently clear that a Second Sikh War was inevitable —but this time he was generous and lavish.

(c) Instead of learning lessons from the past history of wars in Afghanistan, Sind and the First Sikh War, he was acting as a reactionary. Some of contemporary Indian soldiers—who fought for the British, or against them as allies of the Sikhs told me (Rangrut) that there was belief that the Governor-General (Dalhousie) and the Commander-in-Chief (Gough) were not at all on good terms. The fact that Dalhousie must have sought for a replacement for Gough much before the start of Second Sikh War, is evident from the fact that sanction came in just when Gough met a temporary set back at Chillianwala. We have inferred it, as during that period communication between Calcutta and London was not rapid. It took many weeks before replies to the messages sent from Calcutta to London, could reach back at Calcutta. Now Dalhousie did not stick to his policy—“NO EXPENSE COULD

BE INCURRED.....FOR TROOPS OR PROVISION UNTIL THE RAINS WERE OVER.”

However, if Dalhousie had learnt his lesson of committing an Himalayan administrative blunder prior to and during the Second Sikh War, is a very consoling factor for the underdog who was blamed for any error or disaster that occurred. “IT IS YOUR FAULT.....YOU SHOULD HAVE BEEN CAREFUL”. has oft been repeated by the Olympic gods to their underdogs:

Dalhousie chose seventy year old General, Godwin, a veteran of First Burma War as Commander-in-Chief of this expedition. The expedition was once again a joint concern of Bengal and Madras armies, each of whom found its Commissariat. First Martaban fell on 5th of April and then Rangoon on 14th of April, 1852. The result of preliminary operation had been to place the whole seaboard in British hands with only trifling loss, and to give them effective control of the greater part of trade and food supplies of the Burmese. Local supplies poured into Rangoon from the beginning, and the Commissariat and medical arrangements were so good that “the incident of sickness was less than in many cantonments in India.”

Dalhousie himself visited Rangoon at the end of July and held long consultation on the spot with Godwin, whose plan was to advance in November with large reinforcements of men, 300 elephants and other transport from India; and to spend the rainy season of 1853 at Amarapura, the enemy's capital. Dalhousie was against any such move. His principal objections were; “the enormous cost of the proposed operations and the fact that even if he subdued Upper Burma he was in no position to hold and administer it. He had further cogent objections on military grounds to Godwin's plans. Once our columns left the rivers, we would have to utilize imported transport, for the Burmese cattle were of little use. Local supplies could not be relied on and would in all probability be non-existent, for the retiring Burmese army would lay waste the country and destroy

all that they could not carry away. Communication between land and water would be difficult to maintain, and enough boats for the flotillas could not be collected locally..."

Godwin yielded to these representations and agreed to a modified plan of campaign. Operation were to be re-opened in mid-September, when the Irrawaddy water would be higher. Enough boats were available to put 2,500 men into Prome, who could hold their own until reinforced with Rangoon, and with Pegu in our hands, no further advance would be necessary on military grounds.

On 9th November, 1858, Prome was taken and within a week the Burmese Commander-in-Chief surrendered. Next Pegu fell on 21st November. Advance further north in the country was given up as there was "NOT ENOUGH TRANSPORT" to carry out the operation which demanded more transport should be brought from India at a great expense of money. When plans for the conquest were submitted, this very essential point was omitted. After the usual difficulties inherent in diplomatic negotiations, with the Burmese, territory up to and including Pegu was annexed by a proclamation, on 20th December, 1852.

IV

Comments

It should be recalled that Dalhousie's father had been a Commander-in-Chief in India. Due to the blunders he, (Dalhousie) had committed in the Second Sikh War, when he was the Governor-General of India, forced him to study the faults committed by the statesmen and the soldiers during the First Burmese War; it seems, had forced him to realize that for a success in War, unity of purpose should exist between the statesmen and the soldiers, particularly the head of State and the Commander-in-Chief. However, now as the Head of the State—Dalhousie, very obviously, had made a deep study of the

demands that the new adventure would make in money and logistics. Money—"no expense"—"EXCEPT WHEN IT WAS CONSIDERED VITAL"—but even then, the sanction for it had to be obtained from the Board in London. This needed time and meant delay which could only be saved by deep study and through trained military imagination which planning for war is a must for head of a state. It is obvious that for Burma War, Dalhousie had planned well in advance and had obtained "go ahead" from London well in time.

Before we proceed further, it is considered necessary that we understand the term, (a) annexation, (b) Lapse,—

By "ANNEXATION" is here meant the deposition of an Indian prince owing to his inability to rule by the British Government in India.

By "LAPSE" is here meant the annexation of a state territory by the British Government in India, in the case of its ruler dying without the direct heir. In English law, a private estate "LAPSES" or becomes the property of the "British Government", if no heir can be traced and if the proprietor has died intestate. Dalhousie applied this principle to the states of native princes—as it suited best the British—and he refused to acknowledge their 'adopted heirs' as their successors.

It would, however, be a mistake to believe that Dalhousie was the first "TO DISCOVER" this and to apply this doctrine—because it was first applied by Clive mercilessly; Dalhousie revived it with Vigour, which it seemed to have lost lately. The great change, that was brought—was that an adapted heir could not succeed without the assent of the Government of India, though it is correct and justified under Hindu law or Muslim customary law. It enabled the British to pick and choose the man who would owe his allegiance to the British rather than his own country and her people. Accord-

dingly, any ruler who did not slavishly follow the directions of the British Resident, could be deposed being incapable. The states, that were annexed by Dalhousie were : Nagpur, Jhansi, Stara, Oudh and four other smaller states. Dalhousie's administration may, therefore, be summed up into two words :

“AGGRANDISEMENT AND LUST FOR
EXPANSION.”

“JUST RIGHTS ?” wrote Carlyle, “what are rights never so just, which you cannot make valid ? The world is full of such. If you have rights and can assert them into facts, do it, that is worth doing.” Gibbon added to it : “Those who refuse the sword, must renounce the sceptre”—because, Monk's exclamation, in 1665 in regards to the motives for war was : “What matters this or that reason ? What we want is more trade which the Dutch now have” goes far to show that the series of wars by the British in the East and West, were due to lust for power, wealth and more trade, which others possessed then. War nevertheless is believed to be the most terrible of evils, and too often merely a savage attempt to gain better conditions, or at least a symptom of grave social defects ; for even successful, war is said to involve the birth of passions and an expenditure of life and of national resources. War, then, has been a great and persistent fact in the world's history.

CHAPTER IX

THE MUTINY OF 1857—.....?

“A Spark to Kindle a Blaze”

The word ‘Mutiny’ is a misnomer. It was a war of Independence which began at first only through rebellion of armed forces. Even at a very early date, *i.e.*, 1764 Bengal Sepoy rebelled for higher pay and gratuities. In 1766 the European Officers of the Company’s Army had combined together with the Sepoys in protest against the withdrawal of *bhatta*, which they considered as part of their dues. Fresh crop of rebellions among the Company’s Army broke out in Madras Army in 1806. In 1809 European Officers of the Madras Army mutined. In 1824 rebellion broke out in Bengal Sepoys at Barrackpur. There were other minor rebellions also.

Reforms of 1796

By 1824, the unsatisfactory nature of the so-called ‘Reforms of 1796’ among the army, was acknowledged and the organization which had been in force before that date, was restored. The troops rebelled, became, the Reorganization of the Indian troops of the Company which took place in 1796, struck a blow in two directions. At this time, the British and Indian Officers of the Company, and Indian troops were selected as targets from among officers of the European regiments, with the increase in the strength of the Indian forces in all these Presidencies, the British officer in Indian units, had become a factor of recognised importance, so was his counterpart the Indian Officer who actually led the troops

in the field and command them in peace time. Both had become a power in the land, for example, Clive and Hyderali. However, these commanders, British or Indian, held no rank which was recognised in the King's Imperial Army; with the result that they continually found themselves in position of subordinate to those of Younger Officers of the King's troops. The implied inferiority was resented, and it is not surprising that these officers began to assert their rights of seniority in rank and service and to demand equality of treatment. It is a sad commentry, that the British hawks tried this policy again and again in India even after the so-called Reforms of 1919 and Indianisation, to slow down the pace of Indianisation from 1919-1947. Of course, in 1783, it was directed against both Commanders of Sepoy Units—both British and Indian. The numbers of the latter very naturally had increased and was increasing daily, as the expansionist policy of the British hawks in India was being implied. Again in 1824, for the first time, we find mentioned local units and irregular cavalry regiments—later on known as 'Silladar-system', a more or less accurate copy of the system which was employed by the Indian rulers of the states. The Silladar-cavalry system was finally abolished in 1921.

The rulers of native states, with whom the Company's Army had so long been in conflict, had generally favoured the employment of large bodies of native horsemen; and the mounted soldier may be regarded as the indigenous to and indeed characteristic of the country. It was very much cheaper to maintain, than the regular cavalry units. It is curious to find, therefore, that the Company was so slow to develop the cavalry arms when such excellent material was readily available. But the essential difference between regular and irregular cavalry regiments did not, however, consist solely in the particular system, as the important difference lay in the fact, that in the irregular corps the establishment of British Officers was very low. There was a British Commander of two to three

cavalry regiments, with one British Officer as adjutant and two sergeants for administrative work, while each of these Silladar cavalry regiment was commanded by an Indian Officer and all squadron commanders were also Indians. However, this was altered in 1796 and proportion of British Officers was increased. In spite of great opposition to these reforms of 1796—..... in 1824, one of the most conspicuous defects of the 1796 organisation—high proportion of British Officers to Indian ranks was allowed to continue. The opposition kept on smouldering and burst into flames in 1856.

From earliest times there were examples of the employment of the units of one Presidency army in what may be regarded as outside the proper sphere of action of another Presidency army. But the liability, was only accepted in time of war and extra pay and bhatta (Separation allowance or D.A.) was paid. But when with his assistance this army from other Presidency new territory had been pacified and annexed to the territories of the company, the sepoy resented the withdrawal of the field service concessions bhatta (or batta) and insisted that these concessions were still due to him if he was called upon to serve outside his own Presidency area in what appeared to him to be foreign territory. The result was that service in the newly acquired territories—especially those where living was costly, or where he was separated from his family, was not merely unpopular, but caused serious discontent. The difficulty was further complicated by the idiosyncracies of Presidency armies themselves. For example, the Bengal army consisted on class battalions composed of men of high costs; the units of the Madras and Bombay armies were of mixed classes of lower castes. Again the separation of families and that the sepoys were asked to pay for the journeys of their families on relief—caused discontentment. The official version was that the ostensible cause of the so-called Mutiny was the introduction of cartridges greased with cow's and pig's fat, so that when the sepoys

were ordered to bite by their teeth the end off the cartridge ; they were filled with dismay.....” The fact is, that the Indian had already become familiar with rebellions and insurrections to press in their demand for justice. The contemporary witnesses with whom the author discussed the affair—observed that it was a chain of broken promises and false accusations that were laid at the doorsteps of the helpless victims who had fallen prey to the British hierarchy during company’s rule and their Indian stooges, were some of the main causes of insurrections. The policy on economy of the company’s Board of Directors invariably far exceeded by the British officers in India—who were anxious to get rich by fair means, or foul.

Again, the stories, such as, Black Hole, Cherrichora case, and the Rani of Jhansi, were fabricated or allowed to become big due to ‘Lapse’ as an excuse to mislead the British public and to justify their looting of Indians. This clique of British officials had, therefore, justified their so-called reprisals for acts of these atrocities based on the fables propagated in Britain.

Lord Dalhousie was succeeded by Lord Canning in 1856. He reached at a time when the distrust with which Indians and British viewed each other, had already assumed the proportions of a bridgeless abyss, as English historians Conningham and Gense state : “.....because a certain clique among the European community who openly advocated a policy of reprisals. Fortunately, Lord Canning realised that reprisals would have been followed by greater discontent, and that discontent would have led to fresh outbreaks of rebellion. Accordingly he adopted a policy of conciliation. The doctrine of lapse and annexation came to an end. Canning also introduced various reforms—military, financial, judicial and legislative.”

It should be recalled that the rebellion amongst the Indian soldiers in 1857 was nothing new. There had been many mutinies, but they were on a limited scale, so they were

easily suppressed by the Presidency by disbandment of the dissatisfied soldiers. However, the contacts between the three Presidency armies during wars, such as, Afghanistan, the Burma, and their stay during the period of pacification, enabled the soldiers of the various parts of India to compare notes regarding the terms of service in each Presidency Army. They quite naturally were most unhappy that while a pound of meat for the British troops and free rations was a 'MUST' either in peace, or war, thousands of Indian Sepoys, followers and civilians died of starvation on the field, because they could not afford to buy enough food to keep their body and soul. Another unforgettable factor, was, that the sepoy had to pay for his own meal out of his most meagre monthly pay but also he had to grind the grain with a handmill, before he could cook his meal after a hard day's march or hard fighting. If his family accompanied him, the grinding and cooking was done by his wife. The author, as a 'Silladar', experienced at least some of these hardships and insults during peace and war.

This maltreatment of Indian sepoy--even on field service, such as, the First Afghan War, did a great deal to ignite the spark to kindle a blaze. In the East a victory is soon forgotten but the slightest disaster, or an insult, is exaggerated and remembered. Many hundred mutilated and crippled "CAMP-FOLLOWERS", as defined by the official records, were in fact the Indian civilian official, contractors, supply and transport agents and private servants of British Officers and sepoy and (military) Indian Officers accompanied the return march to India of Pollock's victories forces to tell the tales of horros inhuman treatment as regards themselves and others who never returned. On reaching they were discharged and sent to their homes and throughout the land they spread news and thus sowing the first tares of rebellion.

The Muslims and the Brahmins were charged with fana-

ticism. By this time the Indian Chiefs and the Hindu Princes, such as, the Mahratta Court and the Sikhs, were now awake from their slumber. The Gowalior Army had 30,000 men, mainly composed of Brahmin and Rajput with a numerous artillery. The Khalsa Army numbered 70,000 soldiers and 300 guns; and there were others, but dissensions among them made it impossible for them to form a co-ordinated plan of action. But to analyse the evidence in these pages, and to state fully the conclusions founded on them, would expand this chapter into many volumes.

Finally, I quote a paragraph from official documents so to enable the readers to make up their minds and as a food for thought :

“.....The sepoy objected to annexations, because each new province added to the empire widened his sphere of service.....as each new province was added, the cry arose for “NEW TROOPS”. It is too often forgotten that it is possible to arm and discipline too many native troops, which may become source of “DIFFICULTY AND DANGER”—costly in themselves and doubly costly when they “MUST BE WATCHED BY EUROPEAN REGIMENTS”. The Bengal army was gradually increased, while the European force gradually decreased. At the close of Lord Dalhousie’s rule, the Native Army was 2,33,000 while the European force numbered 45,322. Lord Dalhousie saw—what General Gough had so urgently pressed upon the Government some years before—“that this relative proportion of British to native troops dangerously small. On the 28th of February, the last day he presided at the Council of India, he laid down nine minutes containing his views and proposals on military subjects. In these minutes he insisted on the EUROPEAN FORCE as essential element of our (British) strength and advocated “an increase in our European and a substantial decrease in our Native Army.”

“..... The Native Officers made a blunder when they waited on the Moghul Emperor (only in name) in the Imperial Hall of Special Audience (Dewan-i-Khas) and ‘promised to establish his rule throughout the whole country.’ The great Hindu Chief had no incentive to restore the paramount power of the Moghul Caesars.”

“..... The Mutiny revealed to us the advantage of native states as (to use the words of Lord Canning) ‘breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise has swept over us in one great wave..... The Mutiny was not attributable to any external conspiracy whatever..... The Moghal Palaces had been ransacked, and yet no trace of such a detailed plan was found.”

I

The Commissariat 1857

“Lucknow has been known as ‘Paris of India’—for its being the alma mater of refined Indian Culture, for her poets, for its palaces, gardens and mosques, set in a vast jungle of main streets and straggling suburbs. But in 1856 its Indian army was the first one to go up in revolt for its survival. And the general background to the events of the latter half of 1857—the decadent kingdom of Oudh, newly annexed to the Company’s territories. Henry Lawrence, its newer Chief Commissioner, ripening fast, alike for the human glory which he was soon to attain and for that sublimer change which so quickly awaited him—belongs to the history not of Commissariat but of the World..... But the story of the siege affords a striking example of how doubts and difficulties as to the supplies and transport may arise and influence the history not only of armies but even of nations.....”
Brigadier Bullock.

The Precautionary Period, 1st May to 30th June, 1850

Extracts from Lawrence of Lucknow by J. L. Morrison :

"The garrison of Lucknow at the outset of the Indian Mutiny was, in the manner of its disposition, typical of the layout of the capital as a whole, for it was a dispersed amongst the barracks, '.....spread out under purely peace conditions and haphazard', while the proportion of Indian to European soldiers was 7,000 to 750. Lawrence, 'started at the reckless lack of system', eagerly set himself to remedy its more obvious defects, his hands strengthened by his investiture on 18th of May with full military authority and the rank of Brigadier-General."

The Policy

"The first signs of dissatisfaction had appeared early in April, and the first overt acts of Mutiny followed on 1st May. It is clear that from the beginning Lawrence was prepared for the worst to happen, and that the Mutiny of an irregular unit on 2nd May, did not take him by surprise. Beset by dangers and difficulties, he never failed to realize that, whatever their outcome, he must hold on Lucknow. He knew the enormous moral effect on India of unflinching resistance, and no surrender was his policy from the first. Talk of retirement to Cawnpore, to one, who remembered vividly events at Kabul in 1841-42, seemed criminally foolish, and even if it had not been foolish, he had nothing like Elphinstone's for ensuring a safe retreat. As a practicable military movement, a withdrawal with all the white population from Lucknow, was impossible at any before Colin Campbell accomplished the feat, under great difficulties, although at the head of a strong army. It is also clear that the Chief Commissioner regarded such a retreat, even if possible, as certain to have the worst possible effect on the rest of India."

"Henry Lawrence, then, foresaw that he would have to undergo an arduous and perhaps protracted siege. His first problem was to select the defensive position best suited to his small force of Europeans, supported if they were fortunate,

by a remnant of loyal sepoys, and committed to the protection of about six hundred European and Eurasian non-combatants—old men, women and children. Should it come to a close siege, the Residency was selected as the sole point to be held, whilst as a provisional second point of resistance the Machi Bhawan, an old and somewhat dilapidated 'NAWAB Fort', not far from the Residency, was to be cleared and strengthened. These two positions commanded the city in some small degree, though their field of fire was indeed wretched enough; the Residency alone would be too cramped for health, so the medical officers warned Lawrence. Thus the work on the Machi Bhawan was begun on the 17th May, in the hope that it might serve to overcome the city; and about a week later, on 23rd May, the fortification of the Residency was put in hand with much resolution. "The task of provisioning of two 'STRONG-POINTS' in no respect lagged behind the work of fortification. The single Commissariat officer of the garrison was Lieutenant Thomas James of the 2nd Bengal Native Infantry Grenadier, who had been appointed Sub-Assistant Commissary-General at Lucknow on 24th October, 1856. To him and his willing coadjutors, the Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow, Simon Nicholson Martin of the Bengal Civil Service, and Captain John William Carnegie of the 15th Bengal Native Infantry, Commandant of the Oudh Police, fell the brunt of the task of laying in vast stores of grain and all other locally obtainable supplies.

".....With the assistance of minor civil officials, the steps taken towards this end were both early and effectual. In the absence of official statistics, which do not exist and which in all probability were never compiled at the time in the stress of work, it is not possible to give particulars of the quantities and of the dates on which they were brought in; but there is some ground for believing that supply precautionary measures preceded even fortification and that stores began to be collected quite early in the month of May. By the time

buildings in the Residency and the Machi Bhawan were allotted as warehouses, the supplies were pouring in. 'On 26th May', says an eye witness (Hutchinson in his Narrative of the Mutinies in Oudh), 'one incessant stream of store-carts conveying grain supplies, ammunition of war, etc. lined the principal streets, the utmost energies of the Commissariat Department were taxed by Sir Henry Lawrence, who fully appreciated, the possibility of a long siege'. At the Residency, the Church was set aside as a store for grain and ghee, and was gutted of all its furniture: pews, pulpit and all were torn out and sacks of wheat piled high to the roof, whilst the officer who was entrusted with superintending the stocking took up his quarters in the Vestry. The rackets court was filled with bhoosa, fodder for the gun bullocks; whilst into the large plunge-bath, beneath the Residency banquetting-hall, was poured a vast quantity of wheat by civil officials. Large stocks of fire-wood and charcoal were soon to be seen; and 10 June a consignment of 110 hogsheads of rum and porter arrived, doubtless by water, from Cawnpore. Both James and Martin spent their entire days on horseback urging the sluggish 'BANNIAS' to send in their grain; and civil officials high and low tied with one another in their efforts to sell the steady stream.' Whenever any rich Indian offered his services, Sir Henry used to take him at his word and tell him to send in grain."

Civilian Officials as Stockbrokers

Whilst Martin R. Gubbins, Bengal Civil Service, the Financial Commissioner, made over a large stock of hay collected by him during the preceding year. The intake was increased towards the end of the first week in June by the transfer to the Residency of a quantity of supplies from the Machi Bhawan: 'Large quantities of shot, shell, gunpowder, stores of food, beer and porter, and several guns'. Meanwhile officers' messes and private individuals were getting together their own stocks, in some instances of considerable propor-

tions—Gubbins had 500 maunds of wheat, 100 maunds of grain, 30 maunds of dhal, a large supply of ghee and rice, 5 maunds of soft sugar and a maund of tobacco. The expediency of commandeering private stocks and morality of private hoarding never seem to have been considered.....A column of 200 Europeans and four guns were employed on the work of gathering provisions.....”

“Though Lawrence was not satisfied with the results achieved.....he wrote on 12th June : ‘We have no hay, and not much bhoosa, and not even enough grain.....’ But on 21st June the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General noted in his diary that the difficulty of procuring all kinds of grain was daily increasing. Still, by 24th June the racket court was full of bhoosa and accordingly thatched.....on the following day, for vast quantities of grain were brought in. On this date the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General noted that they were ‘supposed to have nearly three months’ supply of provisions now stored.....”

“.....And events were marching very rapidly now on 26th June the Cawnpore garrison surrendered, and was massacred on the following day; on 28th June in the evening these news reached Lucknow.” The Oudh Mutineers were massing to the north-east, and on the 29th Lawrence wrote that he expected to be besieged in two or three days. On 30th June he fought the disastrous action of CHINHAT, at which James was severely wounded by a bullet through the knee. At one o’clock that afternoon a round shot crashed through the upper storey of the Residency, and the siege of Lucknow had begun.

“The Machi Bhawan was evacuated and blown up shortly after midnight of the 30th June/1st July. Its garrison made its way safely to the Residency enclosure, which then contained just under 3,000 persons, of whom rather more than half were capable of bearing arms.” Almost the first casualty

was Lawrence, who was mortally wounded early on 2nd July and died forty-eight hours later. To his previously-chosen successor as Chief Commissioner, Major Banks, he dictated his last orders, which have been preserved. They closed with the infection: "Take an immediate inventory of all supplies and food, etc. Take daily average of daily expenditure."

"The supply situation was indeed anxious enough. The head of the Commissariat had most unfortunately received a severe wound at Chinkot, which effectually deprived them of his valuable aid," says Gubbins. "His office was all broken up: his 'gomashtas' (travelling agents) and babus (clerks) were not with us, and the officers appointed to assist him were new hands. Besides all this, the first stores opened were approachable only by one of the most exposed roads, and very many of the camp followers preferred going without food to the chance of being shot. Some did not know where to apply, so that for three or four days, many went without rations, and this is no small degree added to the number of desertions. Owing to these desertions, the Commissariat and battery bullocks had no attendants and went wandering all over the place looking for food: they tumbled into wells, were shot down in numbers by the enemy, and added greatly to the labour which fell on the garrison, as fatigue parties of civilians and officers; after being in the defence all day, repelling the enemy's attack, were often employed six and seven hours burying cattle killed during the day, which, from the excessive heat, became offensive in a few hours. The artillery and other horses were everywhere to be seen loose, fighting and tearing at one another, driven mad from want of food and water; the garrison being too busily engaged in the trenches to be able to secure them," says Wilson, the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.

"Lawrence's dying injunctions were promptly acted upon, and the chaos was steadily reduced to order.....On 4th July

orders were issued that the Commissariat should immediately submit lists of stores, stating how long the stock of each article was expected to last. Returns of the estimated daily expenditure were called for from the Commissariat officers on whom strict vigilance over the public stores was enjoined..... On 5th of July saw a heavy fall of rain, first sign of the monsoon, which was eagerly awaited by the garrison; but which added to the anxieties of the Commissariat, since two days later, it caused the collapse of one of the walls of the racket court and the exposure to the rain of a quantity of the bhoosa stored therein.....”

Rations were thenceforth issued not from the Church but from a more sheltered building with effect from 11th July, and a scale was fixed—British: 1 lb. meat and 1 lb. flour (or rice in lieu), with some salt. British women got three-quarters of rations and children half. I can find no official record of the Indian ration at this time but the contemporary witnesses told the author that they were issued only grain half the scale of the British Combatants, and few ounce of Dhal. Meat, if available, was invariably half the scale of the British. But the Indian soldiers had to pay for the rations they received, at the rates fixed by Commissariat. They had to grind the grain by hand mills.

“.....As flour was running short, hand mills, of which the Commissariat had prudently laid in supply, were set up, and soon about 20 maunds of coarse flour (really atta) were being turned out daily from 25 or 30 of these. The quality of this atta, however, gave rise to much complaint.....”

Why was bread not baked?Was it due to ignorance of how to make it, or due to lack of some essential ingredients? Martin Gubbins has a pertinent but provoking passage in reply to it: ‘I do not know why we never succeeded in making bread during the siege, for yeast would no doubt have been procurable, and no one was before acquainted with

it, the cooks could have taught us the art of making bread.' (It is inconceivable that amongst three thousand white persons within the Residency, including as they did many soldiers' wives, and officers' servants, not one knew how to make it? Yeast can also be made from plantains—which should have been available locally. In Bengal and Oudh at this period bread was leavened by being kneaded with the juice of the date palm, which ferments immediately after being drawn from the tree. It is cent per cent hygienic. One is forced to the conclusion that the lack of bread was due rather to want of resourcefulness than of resources—or due to lethargy!)

".....On 21st July Major Banks was killed, and the Chief civil and military Command passed to Brigadier Inglis. It was decided that instead of Gubbins acting as Chief Commissioner, full control ought to be vested in the military Commander.On the night of 15th August, Angad, the ex-Indian Sepoybrought in a letter dated 4th August addressed to Gubbins by the Assistant Quartermaster-General of Havelock's force. It read: "We march tomorrow morning for Lucknow, having been reinforced. We shall push on as speedily as possible. We hope to reach you in four days at furthest. You must aid us in every way, even to cutting your way out, if we can't force".....Gubbins, therefore, felt it important that the reply, of which Angad was to be the bearer, should be clear exposition of our state and circumstances on which General Havelock at Cawnpore might form a just plan for our relief. However, it was not for Gubbins, but for Inglis to reply, and his despatch, after pointing out the impossibility of cutting his way out, concluded with the following passages: ".....In consequence of the news received, I shall soon put the force on half rations, unless I heard again from you. Our provisions will last us till then about the 10th September.

If you hope to save this force, no time must be lost in pushing forward. We are daily being attacked by the enemy, who are within a few yards of our defences. Their mines have

already weakened our post; and I have every reason to believe they are carrying on others. Their 18th-pounders are within 150 yards of some of our batteries, and from their position, and our inability to form working parties, we cannot reply to them and consequently the damage done hourly is very great. My strength now in Europeans is 350, and about 300 Indians, and the men are dreadfully harassed and owing to part of the Residency having been brought down by roundshot, many are without shelter. Our Indian force having been assured, on Colonel Tytler's authority, of your near approach, some twenty five days ago, are naturally losing confidence, and if they leave us I do not see how the defences can be manned?".....

".....The letter was, therefore, sent off by Anged on the night of 16th August and reached Havelock by 29th August....." In the light of the facts as they are now known there can be no doubt that, on the contrary, in this letter he entirely misrepresented the supply position. What happened seems to have been this. About the end of the first week of the siege the Commissariat had duly informed the staff of the stocks in hand; and the staff, comparing these with the strength of the garrison, had computed by rule-of-thumb how long the supplies would last.....the situation was not reviewed periodically by either the staff, or the Department. Nor, when Inglis's letter of 16th August was being drafted, did the staff consult the Commissariat; they relied rather on their own knowledge, without realizing its imperfection, and consequently they misinformed the Brigadier".

"It has, however, been alleged that even if the Commissariat had been consulted by the staff on this occasion, the Department was not fully aware of the stocks actually held in the Residency; and in support of this contention the plung-bath story is brought forward. This must be discussed now," Says Brigadier Bullock, "out of its Chronological place, in order that it may be dismissed under some of the prin-

cipal buildings in the Residency enclosures were cellars, known as taihkhanā. (cool-vaults) to which resort was sometime had in the hot weather. The damp caused by the proximity of the river Gumti would in most cases render these vaults unsuitable for the storage of supplies; but under the detached banqueting hall was a large dry plunge-bath, necessarily as watertight as possible, and into this a vast quantity of grain had been poured during the precautionary period. The story goes, that this had been independently collected by civil officials, and that the military authorities had no knowledge of it. (A variant Version is that it was overlooked in the confusion of the first few days of the siege and never brought to mind; whilst yet a third tale is that "when the siege commenced, officers were appointed to superintend under James, the control and distribution of rations, but it was impossible for them to know without the records of the subordinate officials—who had deserted—the location and quantity of the food secured; and they had not the leisure to make accurate inventory. Lastly, we are told, it was not till the arrival of Napier (afterwards Field Marshal, Lord). Deputy Quartermaster of the first relieving force, on 1st October that this vast hidden store was discovered!")

".....It may at once be stated", adds Brigadier Bullock, "that investigation does not bear out his picturesque story, nor in itself does it stand examination. It is inconceivable that such huge stocks could be brought into the Residency enclosure and stacked in one of the most prominent buildings without the fact being known to and remembered by any one of the three thousand people in the garrison? The storehouse was no "SECRET VAULT"; taihkhanas were the rule, rather than the exception, and this, one was not a private apartment, but a semi-public resort. And what would be difficulty in measuring and computing contents of a swimming bath? As for Napier's investigation, the truth of that is soon told. He expected to have to order a stocktaking, but at once

found that none was necessary. The Commissariat Officers knew exactly where all their stocks were, and pointed them out. A more likely explanation is, that the grain in the plunge-bath may have been omitted from the return submitted by the Commissariat at the beginning of July, and was consequently left out of account by the staff, thereafter since they were ignorant of its existence. Such an omission might well have occurred, in James's absence, during the first confused week; and, since new returns of stocks were apparently not rendered, the error was perpetuated so far as the staff was concerned. Finally, quite apart from the reserves in the plunge-bath, there was grain enough and to spare for a protracted siege, as events were to prove and as will be seen hereafter. The "PLUNGE-BATH" story may thus be set down as a myth....."

It is considered, that an incident that happened in Waziristan Operation in 1937 may be added, to portray how ignorant sometimes the staff are about logistics? Under the Indianization Scheme I had accepted a transfer to the Indian Army Service Corps in 1936. It is a sad commentary to make, that my transfer to corps under special privileges did not prove popular in the Corps. I had, therefore, more than dozen postings before I found myself commanding a retail issue section in an Advanced Field Supply Depot at Garrison, normally a subaltern's Command in India. It was decided to advance on 21st May to destroy Faqir of Ipi's stronghold. However, rain fell during the evening and some rations were lost but the staff of Force Headquarters hurriedly reported that "One days' supplies for the whole striking column had been destroyed by rain and that the mountain tracks had become impossible. The advance had been postponed till next day". And similar incident of rain happened on next day. The staff hurriedly assumed that the damage to the tracks and the loss of rations had again occurred. They cancelled the advance on 23rd May and when rain again fell on 23rd May, the Force H.Q. sent a signal to Army

headquarters that the advance had again been postponed "due to loss of supplies, not enough reserve supplies at the Advance Field Depot and the tracks had been affected and were impassable." Just at that time I was smelling like a hound to get advance information from my Commander, but as I was going past the Force Headquarter, the General Officer Commanding the force, under whom I had served in Probyn's Horse for several years, called me. He seemed very cross and angry; as he said: "You 'Rice Corps' have let me down....." Luckily, both the Brigadier General staff and the Assistant Quarter Master General of the Force were present—probably discussing future plan. Briefly, when I was told the reasons for his annoyance, then I submitted that neither any body had asked me for report about ration situation in or I had been consulted. I further submitted that, in fact we had adequate stocks of supplies. In any case, I stressed the point, that the column would be moving out only for 4 days, if necessary, they could live on hard scale—which was not unusual. As regards the tracks, I submitted that we need not always unnecessarily wade in the mullahs—the usual hill tracks—but we could move along the spur which would take the transport in lesser time....." I shall discuss it more fully at an appropriate place as the column moved out as planned and returned succesful, but I mention to press the point that it is vital that the officers of the Corps should be consulted before the general staff report to the higher authorities what was, or could be critical situation of logistics. The incident discussed by Brigadier Bullock, happened in 1857; but it was repeated again in 1937. Hitler repeated it in May 1940, when he allowed the British Expeditionary Force to cross the English Channel unmolested and unscathed—to fight an other war—when the Allies defeated Hitler.

What Was The True Position On The August 1857 ?

".....Of grain, as we shall see, there were enough—apart

from the plunge-bath store—to feed the existing garrison for many months”. Says Kaye. “Cattle despite much wastage, though insufficient to maintain the British full pound a day ration for much longer, were still plentiful enough to provide not liberal siege ration. Fodder had to be used carefully, but ghi, like gram, was plentiful abundant. The public supplies of tabacco, tea and coffee were exhausted, or nearly so; and the substitutes must have pulled on the garrison, good-humoured they were; but there were luxuries rather than necessaries. The stock of rum, though described as “VERY SMALL”, lasted out the siege when ration was later reduced to one diachm a day, and there was still some porter. The fact is that, presumably owing to the popular expectations of a short siege, no serious attempt had been made to husband resources. In the continuous stress of active resistance and in the hope that the relief column was daily coming nearer, Lawrence’s dying advice was fading away from the memories of the garrison. And there were fewer mouths to feed, to; we have seen Inglis’s statement that only 350 out of his 750 Europeans were effective, and of the sepoy 300 out of 700,

“The effect of the unintentional but grave misstatement in Inglis’s letter of 16th August was two-fold. So far as the Residency garrison was concerned. it was some respects beneficial, whilst in respect of the relieving force it was very much the reverse’ Let us deal first with the garrison. After dispatching his letter, Brigadier Inglis and his staff seem at last to have realized that relief was not immediately at hand, and that shorter commons would have to be the order of the day. Thus for there had been no deliberate administrative reduction. Some commodities had run out, (more due to negligence) and the ration scale was the poorer for their absence; but the pound a day of meat and coarse flour (atta) had been issued regularly ever since the battle of Chinhut. Even so, some days passed before any change was made; but on 25th of August the meat ration was cut down to 12 oz instead of 1 lb, for combatants,

and half rations for women and children. Flour was henceforward more stringently controlled, and non-combatants, who had time to grind it, received grain instead. But the rum ration was not reduced till 18th September; and the possibility of eating horseflesh was undreamt of—on 3rd September, for instance, sixteen wounded horses were turned out of the entrenchment.....”

“Havelock’s reply to the letter of 16th of August was brought into the Residency by Angad at midnight on 29/30th of August. “Sir Colin Campbell..... promises me fresh troops”, Havelock said; “and you will be my first care. Reinforcements may reach me in from 20 to 25 days, I will prepare everything for a march of Lucknow.” Inglis replied on 1st September that rations had been reduced, and this, together with the reduction of the garrison from casualties, would enable him to hold out till 20 or 25 September. “Some stores we have been run out for the last fifteen days, and many other will be expended before the above date.” He concluded by warning Havelock that the garrison, weak physically and in numbers, might not be able to withstand a determined assault.....”

“.....There can be little doubt that it was due to the contents of these two communications from Inglis, to the virtual exclusion of other influences, that Havelock made his desperate second attempt to relieve the Residency. After having been forced to withdraw back across the Ganges into Cawnpore on 13th of August, he would have awaited reinforcements substantial enough to ensure complete success, had he not believed that the Lucknow garrison would assuredly be destroyed by starvation, or by the enemy, unless he reached it by the end of the month. He expected to find the inhabitants of the Residency almost prostrate with hunger, and planned, therefore, to bring them forty days’ rations and transport for the evacuation of the sick, women and children. But owing to his hasty advance with an insufficient force, he was

unable to 'RELIEVE' Lucknow; instead, he throw into it 2,700 men (but not a single baker) and some gun bullocks. All the longed for tea, Coffee, sugar, rum, wine, spirits, tobacco, Chloroform and other medical stores had to be left behind at the Alambagh, four miles outside, with most of the cattle, for which incidently there was no fodder. For the prematurity of this advance, which cost Havelock about 200 killed and 350 wounded, the lack of liaison between the staff and Commissariat in the Residency must to a large extent be held accountable. Had Thomas James (i/c Commissariat) been called into conference on 16th of August, there would in all probability have been a different story to tell."

The Blockade—26th September to November 1857.

We have to skip over at least some tactical events, though very important and interesting, due to keeping our purpose in view—the story of Commissariat. The Chief Command on and from 26th September reverted to General Sir James Outram. When he arrived at Cawnpore with reinforcement for Havelock on 15th September, he had waived his right to command by virtue of his seniority, and had accompanied the "relieving" force as a volunteer trooper.

Both Outram and Havelock were under the impression that the garrison was on the point of starvation. As soon as they entered the Residency, it was evident that things were by no means so bad as all that. Their first thought was to carry out with the least possible delay, their purpose of evacuating the garrison. They had hoped that their arrival at the head of the force would lead to a reaction of public opinion in the city of Lucknow in favour of the British, such as, had taken place elsewhere during the Campaign in similar circumstances; and they expected also that in such an improved atmosphere, transport for the evacuation of sick of the women, children and invalids, would be procurable locally. Outram, therefore,

asked Gubbins, as chief civil functionary, "to open the communications with the people in the city, with a view to obtain necessary carriage in order to abandon the entrenched Residency."

When the real state of things had become known; *i.e.*, the impossibility of obtaining a single bullock or cart from outside had been learnt, on 30th of September, Outram telegraphed as follows to the Governor-General: "My hopes of a reaction in the city are disappointed: the insurgent sepoys have inspired such terror amongst all classes, and maintain so strict a watch beyond our picquets, that we have not been able to communicate with one single inhabitant of Lucknow since our arrival. Nothing but a strong demonstration of our power will be of any avail."

Outram also sent his application of situation on 30th September to General Colin Campbell, the Commander-in-Chief: "It was the urgent desire of the Government that the garrison should be relieved, and the women and children amounting to upwards of 470 souls withdrawn. The army of the enemy has been beaten in the open without difficulty. The resistance was most obstinate in the suburbs, and at great sacrifice, the troops forced their way to the garrison in Lucknow. The sick and wounded had been left with the baggage in the strong enclosure, called Alambagh, five miles from the Lucknow entrenchment."

"In considering the heavy loss at which we forced our way through the enemy, it was evident there could be no possible hope of carrying off the sick, wounded, women and children—amounting to not less than 1,500 souls, including those of both forces. Want of carriage alone rendered the transport through five miles of disputed suburb an impossibility."

"There remained but two alternatives. One, to reinforce

the Lucknow garrison with 300 men, and leaving everything behind to retire immediately with the remains of the infantry upon Alambagh, thereby leaving the garrison in a worse state than we found it, by the addition to the numbers they had to feed, of the great amount of our wounded, and of the 300 soldiers, who would barely have sufficed to afford the additional protection that would have been required—without adding such strength as would have enabled them to make an active defence, to repel attacks by sorties, or to prevent the enemy occupying the whole of their position. At the same time, it would have been impossible for any smaller force than the remainder of our troop, diminished by those 300 men, to have any hope of making good their way back ; and that without any serious loss.

“I, therefore, adopted the second alternative—*viz.* to remain in Lucknow with my whole force—as the only mode of offering reasonable hope of securing safety of this force, to retain sufficient strength to enforce supply of provisions should they not open to us voluntarily, and to maintain ourselves even at reduced rations until reinforcements advance our relief.....”

Once the decision to remain in Lucknow was taken, no time was lost in putting matters right. The original entrenchment was too cramped and too commanded by the enemy to be suitable for occupation by the whole increased force. By sorties and forays, the perimetre was straightened and improved. In respect of Commissariat affairs, Outram's action were equally prompt and decisive. On 1st October Colonel Robert Napier, Outram's Chief Staff Officer, came in from the Chater Manzil and made it first business to inspect the various stores.

“He had expected to have a search, but he found that no search was necessary,” Says James Innes. “The Commissariat

Officers in charge of the supplies knew where all the stock was, and pointed it out. Instead of its being exhausted, there was ample supply for all for some time to come: the mist on the subject was thus cleared off at once on proper inquiry being instituted. Those Officers—*viz.* James and his assistants—had never known or surmised the false impression that had been conveyed to Havelock and Outram, nor had they ever given or been asked for any returns on which it might have been based.”

From this time onward Outram was able to banish from his mind the starvation bogey, by which, it seems to have been haunted ever since he had received Inglis's letter on 24th August. He wrote to Cawnpore on 7th October: “Still no communication with town, and little prospect of procuring provisions; the neighbouring streets, into which we have made sorties at much cost of life, contained nothing..... We have grain, and gun bullocks and horses, on which we may subsist a month, I hope; but nothing else.” And again on 11th October he said: By the strictest scrutiny it is ascertained that our present rate—*i.e.*, three quarters rations for the Europeans and half for the Indians—our grain, allowing it to be all good, will last only to 6th November, our meat not so long. Rice will be cut in four days. Unless, therefore, the Delhi troops came to our reserve—Delhi had fallen on 14th September—we must starve.....” And on 21st October Outram wrote: “Our food, upon a very reduced allowance indeed, may possibly last until 20th November, but we should have no bullocks to move our guns.” And finally on 28th October, he wrote: “We can manage to screw on, if absolutely necessary, till near the end of November, on further reduced rations.....”

Nearly a year later, Outram, looking back on the event of this time, wrote: “I, certainly was much ‘deceived’ as to the quantity of grain, but there was no doubt the few

remaining gun-bullocks would not suffice, and I was fully prepared to eke out the time by eating our starving horses.....”

It seems that the poor state of the health of the garrison had started to tell on the nerves of Outram. This is the earliest and almost the only reference traced to the possibility of eating horseflesh; which was eaten in Britain during the World War II. However, the Mongols considered the horseflesh a delicacy—in the court of Changez Khan and his successors. Gubbins has stated that though Outram on more than one occasion considered giving orders for the use of horseflesh, yet the horses were preserved.

It is a coincidence, that though Inglis had mistakenly stated that “he could hold out till about 25th September at latest.” Havelock reinforced him—though at great cost of life. In Outram’s case, he intentionally repeated Inglis’s misstatement and he was reinforced by General Colin Campbell three days before the fixed date—*i.e.* 20th November—again at heavy cost of life; about 12 per cent of his force.

For the second time, the supply situation had been the dominant consideration. But, there were hardly any ground for using the term ‘DECEIT’ by such an eminent General, as he very well knew the correct supply situation. I have already stated my own (AUTHOR’S) experience, when a very successful general was misinformed by his own H. Q. staff who tried to pass on the baby on to the “supply and transport”. It was very fortunate that I reached the place—though by chance, at the time to enlighten the Commanding General whom I happen to know very well, and who, I knew would like to know the truth. It caused lot of heart burning but all is well that ends well.

Why did Outram repeated Inglis’ tactics ?

In support of it one night state, that, in War, as in

every contest involving a struggle of physical powers, as well as, of moral and mental forces which support them, the course of operations must often be regulated by considerations which are not strict military. Or, as Hitler has stated : "What is war but cunning, deception, delusion....." Again as General Aston has stated : ".....But military supreme authorities, like other human beings, are fallible."

When, at last the garrison marched out of Residency on 22nd November, they took with them rations till the end of the month, as well as 160,000 lb. of grain and even some wheat was left behind and abandoned in the Residency!

A citation

Brigadier Inglis in his despatch to the Government of India on 26th September, 1857, the day after the arrival of Havelock wrote : "Lieutenant James, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, was severely wounded by a shot through the knee at Chinkot, notwithstanding which he refused to go upon the sick list, and carried on his most trying duties throughout the siege. It is not too much to say that the garrison owe their lives to the exertion and firmness of this officer. Before the struggle he was ever in the saddle getting in supplies, and his untiring vigilance in their distribution after our difficulties had begun prevented a waste which otherwise, long before the expiration of 87 days, might have annihilated the force by the slow process of starvation."

CHAPTER X

IN RETROSPECT

Campaigns which had been fought on different terrain, under different climates, and political situations have been presented to the reader as 'a food for thought' so as to enable him to make his own decisions as regards what was lacking !

The precautionary period before the wars, with the exception of Nepal war, was not properly utilized for the preparation of intelligence reports both political and military. In any case, the areas where these battles were fought had been overrun by many Muslim Kings. History has failed to record that in any of these campaigns starting with Mohd-bin-Qasim to Nadir Shah of Persia, these armies ever ran short of food or water. When Sultan Mahmud of Gazna decided to invade Somnath Temple, 1023 A-C in Gujrat, India, his advance guard purchased 1,00,000 camels at Utch, Bahawalpur, and fitted them with leather pakhals to carry only water before he undertook to cross and recross the Rajistan and Sind deserts. The General Commanders of the British expeditionary forces during these Campaigns were completely in the dark about the resources of the country. It is obvious that they did not study military history of the Islamic period. The British Commanders could get no camels, food, grain and fodder in Bahawalpur where Sultan got what he wanted for horses and men.

Military history must be studied, because it gives the explanation of many of the great cataclysms which break up the annals of the world into separate epochs. Military events, effect the history of the world in cataclysmic fashion they have, as a rule, resulted from the appearance of the heroic individual figures, and his resourcefulness.

It has been said in defence of the failure of poor intelligence reports submitted by the British political Agents, who were made responsible to arrange needs of the Commissariat, had no military background. This has brought an important point that the directing classes in any country and nation should have a certain knowledge of the history of the Art-of-War, just as they ought also to be instructed in economic or constitutional history. What touches all in the business of all, and it is no more right to hand over the study of military history to professional soldiers alone than it would be to permit no one but lawyers to touch constitutional history. Till some such general knowledge exists, it is open to any person, military, or civilian, to pontificate upon one of the necessary functions of the state, without being recognised at once as a crank, or a sciolist by the audience he is addressing. It is not the soldier alone who should know the outlines of the past history of his art. The ignorance on the needs of the military on the part of the political Department did not occur only in the wars under discussion, but it continued. The author witnessed it in both World wars and in many Frontier Campaigns in the twentieth century.

Again, a day well spent in the precautionary period may avert a month of desperate hardship later, and no supplies can be seemingly too trivial, too unpalatable, or too costly in whilst there is yet time.

Secondly, if in the hurry of collecting supplies i. e. before the Siege of the Residency, it has not been possible to maintain an accurate check of the intake, not an instant must be lost in remedying the omission, and returns of stocks and expenditure, even if not called for by orders and not authorized by precedent or custom, must be rendered to the staff, but this, it seems was not done: at least the higher authorities were ignorant. Reports and returns, unpopular and even reviled in peace, become of vital importance in War. This can be done and has been done.

for example, the Pakistani ladies at Karachi who at the time of Partition-1947 received at an average of three to four thousand refugees a day, kept account of stores and supplies they received from the Army Service Corps, or the Red Cross etc, at a time that Pakistan was facing a crisis of greatest magnitude. There were hundreds of ladies in the Residency who could have been employed to help the Commissariat staff. The ladies in U.K. carried out these duties most efficiently during the Battle of Britain in 1940.

The Commander must take his Chief supply and transport officer (A.S.C.) closer to him as a brother officer, and if that officer be not ordered to attend a conference, he must find a way to be there if he cannot surmounted an obstacle, he must try his best to go round it. As stated, I myself found this latter method very fruitful during the 1936-38 Waziristan campaign. One should remedy such faults in time not to save one's own skin, but to save a serious calamity even at the risk of a rebuff!

Improvisation and experiment of every kind must be fostered not only by all Army service Corp officers but all officers and men of all services-poor quality bread and horseflesh are a great deal better than no bread and meat at all. Machines get broken, jammed but the army marches on its belly.

Thirdly-but always, the tendency of besieged garrisons, perfectly natural, under strain of a close siege, to underestimate their limits of resistance must not be forgotten; if "WOLF" be cried too soon, or too often, the relieving force may push on faster than their situation warrants as was the case during the first relief effort, when due to the fact that weak relieving force, which was only available, was employed and consequently they suffered heavy casualties and the net result was delay if not a disaster.

Still the predominant factor of our fate lies in our own leadership. "Man's passions decide their fate, they themselves are

the result of their individual positions"-says Ranke. It is true, circumstances block many path for us, which in accordance, with our nature and gifts we might persue, yet there ever remains to us a choice of many directions; directions, we are not inevitably compelled by fate to follow one, and only one road; and even in my (Rangrut's) career, we may note many a parting of ways-cavalry, infantry and the Indian Army Service Corps, on occasions where he had the unfettered opportunity of framing his own future-to stay on in a cavalry regiment raised by his own grandfather, where his father had served for over 40 years and where he had also served for 21 years-when he accepted a transfer!

But when we judge a man, it is well to denote periods. Man modifies with circumstances and time. Like Napoleon, Berthier did not escape this general rule. "From 1805 his activity began to decline, and he contributed to the spoiling by substituting egoism in the hearts of his officers for the enthusiasm of glory," says Standhal in 'Viede Napoleon.' "On 2nd July, 1812, the Emperor wrote to the Chief of the Staff (Berthier): "The staff is organized in such a manner that nothing is forseen". This was not the case with the staff of the Army in India during the period under discussion.

But in examining the part taken by Napoleon in the work of the staff it was indispensable to establish clearly the situation of the Chief of the Staff as regards the Emperor "The administrative measures which the maintenance of an army necessitate form a part of the art of war no less important and often more difficult, than arrangements concerning operations at the front". Says French historian Vachee in "Napoleon at Work". "They wre also the object of Napoleon's constant meditation. Not only, as isadvisable, did he himself draw up the main lines which must be closely connected with the strategical combinations, but in orders dictated either to the Staff, or "the General Commissary of stores

of the army, he fixed the details of them. He depended upon no one for the choice of the sites for the big depots, arsenals, hospitals, storehouses, and military bake houses. He was his own director of marches, and encroached, even often, on the departments of inferior authorities by issuing orders dealing with the smallest details."

This manner of commanding cannot be given as a model. How many men, even chosen from the flower of an army and in the greatest vigour of manhood, would be capable of successfully copying Napoleon's career? Nevertheless from a military point of view, this concentration in Command enabled Napoleon to reduce to the minimum the blank time between the arrival at a decision and the setting in movements of troops. This economy of time, of great importance in all branches of human industry, is an essential condition of success in war. To seek to attain it by Napoleon's methods would be rash; we must aim at it, whilst respecting the essential principles of division of labour and economy of strength, by a methodical organization of the working staff.

However, it should be noted that Napoleon invariably kept his Commissary-General along with his Chief of the staff and that he never forgot "MILITARY BAKE HOUSES" wherever he went. Consequently his army did not suffer from stomach ailments.

".....During his sojourn to Mayence, Napoleon displayed prodigious activity....." Says Vachee, "Questions relating to the organization of the army, supplies of flour and provisions, the organization of the general defence of the empire.....were the object of numerous notes, letters and instructions, dated from Mayence.....continuing his journey, reached his Wurzburg headquarters at ten O'clock at night. Berthier was awaiting him. He first of all brought his attention to bear on the question of provisions, and saw if his orders on that subject had been executed".

Historian Jomini says : "A good staff can force many errors in war, and many errors were Committed at that time under discussion in consequence of "incomplete reconnaissances" and orders either badly drawn up, or badly transmitted. Every one must remain within the boundaries of his duties, otherwise everything will be confusion"

"But military supreme authorities, like other human beings, are falliable".

But how is this knowledge acquired ?

The only keys are a thoughtful study of the past, a receptive mind in the present, and when the occasion comes, a patient understanding of each other's difficulties.

The politician, who has to persuade and confute, must keep an open and flexible mind, accustomed to criticism and argument ; the mind of the soldier, who commands and obeys without question, is apt to be fixed, drilled, and attached to definite rules. I will not take the comparison further : that each should understand the other better, is essential for the conduct of modern war. The soldier is apt to disregard or underate the statemen's difficulties.

Military history is a flesh and blood affair, not a matter of diagrams and formulas or of rules, not a conflict of machines only but of men who direct or drive them. The man is the first weapon of battle ; let us then study the soldier in battle, for it is he who brings reality to it. Only study of the past can give us a sense of reality, and show us how the soldier will fight in the future. Read and re-read Islamic Military History and-'Hadis' traditions !

A general (a leader,) must keep strict, though not necessary stern, discipline. He should give praise where praise is due, ungrudgingly, by word of mouth or written order. He should never indulge in sarcasm which is being clever at someone else's expense,


and always offends. He should tell his soldier the truth, save when absolutely necessary to conceal plans etc. The officials in Residency did not do so. To sum up, the relationship between a general and his troops is very much like that between the rider and his horse. The horse must be controlled and disciplined, and yet encouraged : he should according to an old hunting maxim, be cared for in stable as if he was worth one lac of rupees, and ridden in the field as if he was not worth one rupee ! And the horse knows not only by his own comfort whether he is being ridden well or badly, but he knows his rider is bold or frightened, determined, or hesitating. A general must drive his men at times. A general may succeed for sometime in persuading his superiors that he is a good commander, he will never persuade his army that he is a good commander unless he has the real qualities of one.

Read and re-Read the life of the Holy Prophet and the lives of the Khulafai-Rashidin-Abu Bakar, Umar, Usman and Ali. All military genius and the finest leaders of men the world has ever seen ! They directed their operations from a most barren country, ill equipped army yet they conquered almost the half of civilized world in 30 years which took the Christians to dominate in more than 300 years !

Rangrut.

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ERATTA

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
1	16	French the	French and the
6	14	Warrin	Warren
7	4	It	In
	20	expences	expenses
8	4	By the way	By way
	9	that became	who became
	9	of Council	of the Council
11	8	beopuri	beoparis
	27	The Maquis	The Marquis
14	12	This latter	The latter
	23	Carnatie	Carnatic
15	19	nungery	hungry
16	27	seen	seem
17	7	Indiaa	Indian
	22	Wellesly	Wellesley
	32	Grain, an	Grain, and
	33	who ikewise	who likewise
	34	'Follower	'Followers
20	20	system	the system
	21	In the Southern	In Southern
21	5	Cornwalis	Cornwallis
	7	become	became

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
22	21	mal-adminstration	mal-administration
23	3	and English	and the English
	5	Sutlaj	Sutlej
	31	its bally".	its belly",
24	16	an improved	an improved and
27	30	Agents were	Agents accounts were
	30	befor	before
30	27	either their	either on their
	34	Speclal	Special
31	14	area	the area
	19	and liquer.....procurable?	and liquer are procurable and to what extent ?
	30	it is	it was
32	9	interest of	interest to
35	19	troops can	troops could
	29	Only, when under	Only, under
36	10	curtail in	curtail it
	25/26	saving.....rupees	savings of $5\frac{3}{4}$ lakhs of rupees for the three divisions during the four months.
40	10	durihg	during
	30	hird	hired
43	19	going the overseas,	going overseas,
44	5	with the (i)	the (i)
45	5	there of	thereof
	22	in fact, he remained	in fact, remained
	28	country	country

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
	29	cventually	eventually
46	7	even	Even
	20	logistices	logistics
	27	can be	that can be
47	7	moonsoon	monsoon
	25	citraus	citrus
49	4	had made in	made an
	10	Havelook,	Havelock
	22	by the sea	by sea
50	2	shirmishing	skirmishing
	22	and with about	and about
	27	also a	also of a
51	14	The meritime	The maritime
	15	Folotilla	Flotilla
53	12	he landed	landed
		but he was	but was
	18	dircct	direct
	27	cleare	clear
54	15	down	dawn
55	2	casualtles	casualties
56	5	raw frohqam"	withdraw from
	17	and he went	and went
	18	new peace proposals	and proposals
	23	rranged	arranged
57	24	incursious	incursions
58	11	only by the enemy	only by enemy
	23	looked for ahead	looked far ahead

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
62	4	Sutlaj	Sutlej
	7	over Oudth	over Oudh
	7	remain of	remains of
	32	could Sha	could Shah
63	12	At brigade	A brigade
	14	much to Firozpur	march to Firozpur
	20	deminshed	diminished
65	3	Macnaghten of	MacNaghten
	5	Alesander	Alexander
	10	a various	at various
66	14	not by the	not the
	23	colloeted	collected
	24	Willonghby	Willoughby
	27	taken this	takes this
67	31	minors	miners
69	16	Firozpnr	Firozpur
70	6	The vexations	The vexatious
	28	Commnder-in-Chief	Commander-in-Chief
71	2	thet ransport	the transport
72	9	Major Persons	Major Parsons
	21	contigent	contingent
	30	could committed	could be committed
73	22	Macnaghten	Macnaughton
	29	or the sake	or for the sake
74	3	banja'ris	banja'ras
	9	of fact	of the fact
	28	whom they	who they

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
75	12	Macaghten	Macnaghten
76	23	except some	except for some
	24	The irregation	The irrigation
77	5	enteredc	entered
	8	in proverbial	is proverbial
	12/13	attacking, looting	attacking and looting
79	21	veciferating	vociferating
80	2	tookst thau	tookst thou
82	11	The s ory	The story
	26	failed tg	failed to
83	15	weightey	weighty
	17	to be pursuad	to be pursued
84	27	and fiour	and flour
85	15	antipethy	antipathy
	20	Sikarpur	Shikarpur
	27	crops ready	crops were ready
87	18	(6th April), wrote	(6th April), he wrote
88	13	of these	of those
	15	whom the	whom she
	19	cost, but the	cost, the
89	15	on factitious	on fictitious
	30	the echolons	the echelons
90	31	Field	Field
91	12	lents	tents
	33	declare	declared
92	28	IV	CHAPTER VI
93	20	deligence	diligence

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
93	29	inominious	ignominious
94	12	Ou 21st July	On 21st July
	23	3rd Augast	3rd August
	26	"Plenty new	"Plenty now
96	1	Macnoghton	Macnaghton
	3	due the	due to the
	28	water fodder	water and fodder
97	1	I saw	I witnessed
99	10	cooly	coolly
100	5	expantionist	expansionist
	22	pleaded	pleaded the
	24	were pent	were spent
	27	of abanding	of abandoning
	28	disentions	dissensions
101	2	on Commissariat	on the Commissariat
	5	under Caption	under the caption
	17	as army	as the army
	29	latter, and	letter and
102	27	McMurdo's (Napier's	McMurdo's reply
	30	Military Train), reply	(Napier's Military Train).
103	19	dromederies	dromedaries
	30	(logistics)	(logistics)
104	3	the Company,s	the Company's
	14	agreed Dost	agreed to Dost
	23	reason was	reason we
	25	addressed Nott's	address Nott
106	17	were looked	were locked
196			

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
107	15	would seen	would seem
108	20	are now	are low
110	12	ocassion	occasion
	13	should interfere	should interfere
	32	a p actise	a practise
111	34	will adapted	well adapted
112	22	Bunjarrah and	Bunjarrah and
113	4	what Nap er	what Napier
120	13	being	begin to
	27	soidier,	soldier,
121	17	1798-1798	1798-99
	20	controveray	controversy
123	12	Egppt and	Egypt and
124	5	whiah inflamed	which inflamed
	5	with it	with its
	7	moleneap	moleheap
	9	Toulen on	Toulon on
	12	Mediterraneen	Mediterranean
125	7	whom he	who he
	14	Raynier was	Rainier was
	27	but longed	who longed
127	3	Boulogue by	Boulogne by
	32	of art	of the art
128	1	struck to his	struck his
	6	it is in with	it is with
	9	being with	be with
	10	bunglar	bungler

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
128	13	has it	has its
	15	yet, after	yet they
	20	attain to perfection	attain perfection
	26	who dominated	who is dominated
	35	replite	replete
129	1	Napoleans	Napolean
	6	achieved on the	achieved the
	7	eye conquer.	eye to conquer.
	8	astay	astray as
	9	Miot, Mem	Miot Mem
	22	poweaful	powerful
	23	collected army	collected the army
	23	defeated	defeated army
27	retreated the Cairo	retreated Cairo	
130	1	the Memaluke's	the Mamaluke's
	2	being new	being now
	23	to Salahich	to Salahieh
	32	was serious	was a serious
131	9	(Suddenss)	(Sudanese)
	24	Desair to	{Desaix to
	25	Desair met	Desaix met
132	13	plagues was	plague was
	35	shown very distinctly	show very distinctly that
133	9	the vilcinity	the vicinity
	10	characteritic	characteristic
	27	imr ediatly,	immediately,
	29	Chief Commond	Chief Command

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
134	7	equals to	equal to
	7	the Mambekes	the Mamalukes
135	5	Sikh rules	Sikh ruler
	10	for demands of	demands for
136	4	ths Sikh	the Sikh
137	22	1,5000	1,500
138	3	Mecrut	Meerut
	29	in eachelons	in echelons
139	10	, , ; ;	delete all
	22	oned a	oned at
	28	soldler	soldier
140	1	320 miies	320 miles
145	2	axis. The	axis. Though the
	4	1848. But it	1848, it
	13	it, the Vacillation	it, vacillation
	13	policy in	policy and in
146	16	3 days	three days
	16	and 8th	and on 8th
	35	unwlse	unwise
147	11	Commissariate	Commissariat
148	6	beggage	baggage
	7	dratically	drastically
	25	a Governor-	the Governor-
	27	a Commander-	the Commander-
149	5	more unless	more unless
150	21	communicated	communicate
151	21	of contemporary	of the contemporary

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
	25	at ali on	at all on
152	28	Uper	Upper
153	11	1853	1852
	15	demanded more	demanded that more
	29	seems, had	seems, those blunders had
154	7	for head	for a head
	9	obtained "go	obtained the "go
	20	inestate	intestate
	31	In enabled	It enabled
156	10	mutined	mutinied
157	1	command	commanded
159	4/5	witnssses	witnesses
160	30	horros	horror
	33	news and thus	news thus
161	2	awoke	awake
163	26	any before	any time before
165	18	and 10 June	and on 10th June
	32	La ge	Large
166	18	now on	now, on
167	24	officeas ;	officers,
168	31	pertineat	pertinent
170	27	on thhir	on their
172	32	on next	on the next
173	14	in or	nor
	19	unusuall	unusual
	20	mullah	nullahs

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
174	9	there	they
	16	active	active
	23	was some	was in some
	29	Thus for	Thus far
176	1	throw	threw
178	1	leaving	leave
179	3	came	come
180	27	whom	who
	32	one night	one might
182	6	preparatio	preparation
184	12	surmounted	surmount

