



*"O ye who believe! Take your Precautions"*

*"And if the enemy incline to peace thou also incline to it"*

*The Quran*

*"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" Historian Santoyana.*



## THE MYSTERY OF DEBACLE OF PAKISTAN 1971

### AND MYTH OF EXPLOITATION SINCE 1947

### AND SECRET OF THE COVERT WAR - UNMASKED

What Policies were followed by the belligerents since 1947?

Who formulated the Strategic plans since 1947?

Who pulled the Strings behind the scene?

Who Finished the job? To whom went the fruits of victory?

Why did Pakistan lose the battles? Could it have been avoided?

Eyes on the Future

The Islamic Ideology on War, Series.

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By Rangrut

[ Major General (Rtd.)  
MOHD. AKBAR KHAN  
PAK. ARMY No. 1 ]


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*Photo of the Meeting of Generals Commanding of Indo-Pak Forces in Kashmir War 1948 for plotting on the map, the actual position held by Indo-Pak Forces.*

Major General Mohammad Akbar Khan was born in April, 1895. His father, Major Khan Bahadur Raja Fazal Dad Khan, Sardar Bahadur O.B.E., O.B.I. had won distinction on the battle-field and it was destined that his six sons should follow in his foot-steps.

On reaching manhood, Mohd. Akbar Khan joined in ranks in Probyn Horse and, before his retirement after 38 years meritorious field service, he had won many distinctions. To-day, in the National Gallery in London, his portraite hangs among those whose war veteranscourage and service on the battle-field is thus rewarded.

In the first World War he won special distinction for gallantry and leadership by being granted the King's Commission, the first occasion that an Indian officer (since at that time the Subcontinent was all Indian) had been awarded British Commission. It is of interest to note that throughout his early army career he remained in the same unit, a departure for the first time from traditional military practice. Pre-partition Akbar was 'aid' to Prince of Wales, and the Duke of Canaught. He had many important General staff and command appointments. He was the first Indian to command Army Area and latter on an Army (I) Corps. He succeeded H.M. the King as Colonel Commandant of Royal Pakistan Army Service Corps. On partition of India, Akbar was apponted 'General Aide' to the Quiad-e-Azam whose confidence he had won since 1921. Akbar had also won the confidence of many other Muslim and non-Muslim top nanking, India leaders.

Major General Akbar Khan took to pen and paper on his retirement and his Urdu and English publications—53, so far have been received with acclamation. His books, have proven best sellers, and are being translated into Chinese, Indonesian and in ARABIC by Sh. Ibrahimi, the great leader of TUNIS, MOROCO and ALGERIA where he has 370 madrasas and also by Azam Bey of ALAZHAR University Shaikh-ul-Husiani Mufti-i-Azam and many requests for its translation urdu are being considered.

## PREFACE

“And cover not truth with falsehood and hide not the truth when ye know”. Quran (2 : 42).

“Allah’s purpose is to refine the fateful through trial and to effect those who deny truth”. The Quran (3 : 141)

### Background of prejudice

Much has been said and written in the press about 1970-71 conflict. Many observers and audiences have already taken their positions on the conflict and some have been very vocal in expressing their sympathies with one party or the other. I can not pretend to be able to bring about any change attitudes now by few things which I am going to say. But it is just possible that as a person who has been, since 1912, a close witness of many upheavals in the sub-continent, and also witnessed how they were dealt, or put down by the British and other Governments.

*‘War may be science, or an art, but its reporting is mainly a dodge’.* As the operational portion of this book is based mainly on press reports of both Western and Eastern papers, therefore there might be quite a number of errors in this book,

although we have done our best to read between the lines with the aid of '*trained military imagination*'. Moreover, I was fortunate enough to know some Bengali leaders who were good enough to speak to me freely pre-partition and post-partition days, these discussions have acted as a hindsight which has enabled me to discriminate as well as, read between the lines of press reports about the Myth of exploitation and the mystery of debacle 1971. Historian George Santayan has said: '*History is always written wrong, and so needs to be re-written*'. Hence this effort to present events as I witnessed them.

There may yet be facts which were, either not known at all, or only partially known to the world, and facts upon which world understanding about the '*Emergence of Pakistan*', as well as about the Liberation Movement of the Bengali Muslims, may as yet be wrongly oriented or presented in a distorted form. In the interest of all involved in the current conflict 1970-1972 and the world at large, I take this first opportune time to place my views at the disposal of others, especially, since the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has pronounced freedom of press and expression of thought—so essential for the good of the nation.

The British Government, who is reputed to be mother of democracy, had offered moral and liberal, material and diplomatic support to the Nigerian Government to put down Secession Movement led by Colonel Ajuko and it was also supported by many Western countries. Again Britain is using force to quell Secession Movement in Ulster by the I. R. A.—sister organisation of Mukti Bahini. However in the case

of Rhodesia, the attitude of White Hall is queer and of double standard—to say the least of it.

### The Myth and the Mystery

Again Soviet Union did show neither mercy nor least amount of fair play when the Soviet tanks shot down mercilessly the people of Hungary or Czechoslovakia — although they had not declared 'Secession' from the communist bloc—but demanded only 'freedom of Speech' and 'partial liberty'. Again Bharat continues to shoot down the Kashmiris, the Nagas, the Mizos as well as the Naxilites in West Bengal. What are the ulterior motives of this anti-Pakistan alliance which supported Mr. Mujib in his 'Secessionist Movement' morally, materially, politically and economically ?

Seldom these pro-Mujib powers have ever raised even their little finger against the heinous killings, rape, murder by the Mukti Bahinis in the past i.e., since 1952, 1954, 1969, 1970, 1971—and even now 1972. Why have they failed to draw World attention to it either in the past or now ? Where are the humanitarian sympathies for the minorities in so called Bangladesh of these humanitarians ?

Those versions upon which most patrons of Mujib have relied on to mobilize feeling against the Pakistan Government is, that 'quelling of Secession Movement would be the immediate forerunner of the civil war'—hence covert wanton aggression by Bharat was an inevitable outcome of the so called massacre of Bengalis by Pakistani troops ; but they have never mentioned that only necessary steps were taken by Pak Government to counter or stop the massacre of

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of innocent Bhartis, non-Bengalis and other peace loving Bengalis by Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan. The attempt by Mr. Mujib and his supporters (Bharat, Soviet and Britain) to take East Pakistan province out of Pakistan by military means, they agree, is according justifiable and the so called Bangladesh, are therefore entitled to world sympathy and and support ! But :

- (1) Who started the massacre ?
- (2) Who was defending Law and order ?
- (3) Who had exploited whom ?
- (4) Who created the Myth ?
- (5) Who invented this mysterv ?

This illusion is, at least some, I shall here try to correct. We may also be able to witness what is happening there now ? Was Mr. Mujib the sole spokesman of East Pakistan before secession or has he now been able to control the affairs in Bengladesh—whose sole spokesman he claims to be ? Someone, I hope will one day assemble the full story of crisis in East Pakistan. It appears to me, that it will be a stirring story as foolhardism, lack of love of his country, devoid of humanism of those who claim to be supporters of it ! Never in the history of man made resistance and twisting of facts and an unchecked foreign intervention in a neighbouring country was displayed by so many powers. Why ?

Why Mr. Mujib, if so loved and a popular leader must keep three Indian Divisions or more today—December 1972—to rule over his devoted subjects ?

What I have endeavoured to do in this book is to recons-

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tract from published sources, from meeting with Bengali leaders before and during exile and neutral visitors pre and post Secession Movement! The pity is, that after the nation-sterling events in 1952, 1954 and in 1970 and even after March 1971, no serious attempt was made by Pakistan ruling juntas, or the politicians since 1950, or the central civil servants, or the General, Admirals and the Air Marshals to publically announce the real cause of the ills. Let us use the historical hindsight and see, who contributed and how much to bring the country in this state of utter chaos, we find it in 1972, so as to enable us to put our house what is left of it, in order.

An administration which lulls its people, commander, or leaders with false hopes, suddenly disintegrates. Hymns of praise were sure about the nation's defence and its weaponry pre-debacle—but was it really so? Of course, there is no need to fall back on a Western press critic's cruel diagnosis, i.e. "Every-thing was fake, fake army, fake politics, fake propaganda, fake literature, fake credits—agriculture, industry, trade etc., even fake courtosans. To tell the truth was immoral...."

War is proverbially full of mischances and it is easy to make war on paper but the implementation of a plan on the battlefield is most difficult and full of pitfall, which can be solved only through trained imagination and study of the situation on the spot—the field of operations. How far did Pakistan G.H.Q. follow this principle?

It may also be pointed out that while planning for the security of his home country i.e. in the field of strategy

diplomacy or psychology, a Muslim strategist must view as if the *'entire mankind were but one community'*. The Quran (10: 19) Did we observe it?

Supreme over confidence in its own excellence in her national security in the eighteenth century led to the collapse of Muslim (Moghal) Empire in India—over three hundred years ago. But the Muslim Ottoman Turkish Empire did not learn lesson, or noticed the cause even from her own humiliating defeats in 1910-11 in Tripoli and Bulkan Wars—let alone—from the downfall of the Moghal Empire in India.

It is but natural, that invariably victories should be commemorated than defeats. But it is very dangerous practice not to critically study the cause of one's own defeat—for victories are often deceiving, whether defeats always contain lessons to eradicate the faults and evils that caused defeats and humiliation to the nation. Is it too late now for us—Pakistanis—should have asked ourselves after war in Kashmir in 1948, 1965 wars and now in 1971? Hence this effort is vital i.e. need of presenting this book as a food for thought.

We tend to forget that diplomacy and its tools is but one of the many instruments of strategy. And strategy is diplomacy's elder sister. The story of 1971 war, I have in mind, must not tell us merely, when and where of things; it must also tell us the *'why'* and *'whence'* and *'whither'* of things. To such a history we may turn not merely to discover, *'when'*, and *'where'* and *'why'* against whom the strategic war was fought but also what fighting meant to these generations. we have failed to grasp these truths largely because our

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understanding of strategy, diplomacy and politics remain conditioned by its role in earlier era of British history—the British halcyon period of nineteenth and twentieth centuries when diplomacy was largely a matter of communications and negotiations based on ‘*gun boat policy*’.

It should be always remembered that prosperity and money will not command success in war. The welfare and existence of an Armed Force are, as has been in the past, intimately connected with the maintenance of free communication with its bases. The security of the lines of communication is therefore, of the first importance. No adequate provision for it in 1971 war had been made. The enemy in these days can drop ‘*fifth columnists*’, and guerilla by air. Air bombing can also paralyse the lines of communication, such as, bridges, railway stations—which the Indian Armed Forces did try in both wings.

**The cause of our defeats in 1971.**

“No nation can ever renounce the struggle for the cause of God (Jihad) without suffering ignominy and humiliation dispensed to them”. Caliph Abu Bakr)

I also quote Quaid-i-Azam in support of my contention that we Muslims must study Quran, Hadith and history to enable us to carry out our role :

“...I could not be leading a religious life unless I identified with whole of the mankind, and that I could not

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be unless I took part in politics. The gamut of man's activities today constitutes an individual whole. You can not divide social, economic, political, military and purely religious work into watertight compartments. Every one, except those who are ignorant, knows that Quran is the general code of Muslims, a religious, social, civil, commercial, military and judicial code..."

History serves us best when we seek to make some kind of useful out of myriad of facts and factors. We must not force pattern, of course ; but my hope is to find one that does no scholarship and have positive value. Let us then see what can we make out of this event !

Freeze of secrecy has begun to melt away. U.N.O. has bowd down to the forces of evil, or carrot and stick policy, or bribery, or corruption of super powers. Let us return to reality that in the Indian sub-continent, Middle East and Far East, the super powers are deliberately maintaining a situation under their agreed policy '*neither peace nor war*', which partially replaced the policy '*balance of power*', in order to contend for themselves spheres of influence. They are thus using people's right of existence, territories and sovereignty as counters to strike political deals. That is the crucial reason why the question of peace settlement in these above mentioned countries have long remained unsettled. Such tactics of super powers are now being seen more and more clearly through the melting of freezed secrecy by the people of these areas.

These countries who had been fighting for their survival and the recovery of their national just rights and lost territo-

ries are convinced that though they lost many long drawn battles, they will surely with the final victory—*of live and let live*—through unyielding struggles. Because history takes its normal course.

It is erroneous to think that military defeat pure and simple will be a final solution; unless the population of Pakistan has been weened away from causes for which the war had been fought. In this case military defeat is only a pause and fighting can easily erupt again. These are some of the lessons which the people and leaders of Pakistan and India should learn—if they have not already done so. History is replete with such events. It a writting written on the wall.

“Approve not for another what thou approvest not for thyself.” Juvani’s advice to Chengiz Khan. The Quran had stated: “Read what has’t written”. Finally I have included also my views under caption ‘*Eye On the Future*’ which I presented in April 1972 as the oldest war veteran of Pakistan to the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for his consideration about 1971 war and its aftermath. I have now included it in this book as a food for thought for the people of Pakistan, as Mr. Bhutto has rightly said: People of Pakistan are the real masters and the People’s Party Government are their proxy.”

*“Let there be closest co-operation rather than conflict between India and Pakistan in the future. Both of us not out of wood, economically—to achieve property we need peace.”*

RANGRUT

December, 1972

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## INTRODUCTION

### Why this effort ?

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” so said historian Santoyona.

The fighting man has occasionally put the clock forward or back in the most unforeseen fashion. The Dabacle of 1971 needs very careful study by all members of the nation. Because the future is invariably moulded by the past. The best promise for the future lies in understanding and applying the lessons of the past. Military history is a flesh and blood affair, not a matter of diagrams or of rules, not a conflict of machines only but of men and their leaders. The man is the first weapon of the battle for it is he who brings reality to it. Only study of the past can give us a sense of reality and show us how the soldier will fight in the future. Napoleon who was a keen student of Islamic military history and who copied Khalid bin-Walid, did not gain the position he did, so much by study of rules of strategy as by profound knowledge of human nature in war.

The Indian politicians planned that the Pakistani politician after the demise of Quaid-i-Azam and later on, the Revolutionary Junta, must be drawn in the psywar of a protracted conflict for which the Indian politicians considered that Revolutionary Government had not fully equipped themselves. To

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make sure their purpose stick, the Indian politicians launched a psychological, ideological (such as Bengali language), political and economic offensive to exploit the explicit contradictions with the East Pakistan Bengalis and the Pakistani Central Government's orbit.

The strategy also aimed forthrightly at the eradication of Pakistani Revolutionary Junta's influence which they were now operating in White Hall, White House, Soviets and other Western Governments. The theatre of boycott of foreign industry, goods etc. in India by the Indian politicians—as we shall notice—deprived Pakistani hawks of its advanced bridgehead in East Pakistan—nay—even in the Western nations. The gaps between our diplomacy and strategy, defects in our national security machinery and *'telling the world'*—remained unbridged. These shortcomings and proposed remedies will be discussed—though briefly—in this book as a food for thought. We should also admit our lethargic attitude to our national security but we *'must'* now find a remedy. The nation today stands at the brink of a precipice.

Unfortunately, we labour too often under illusion that facts speak for themselves. They do not particularly when they can not be seen. Facts must be interpreted and interpretation requires a general conceptional framework. Our (Pakistani information media and intelligence system was indeed very poor. No wonder that in psywar our enemies stole a march on us more than once.

We Pakistanis in Majority :

- (i) tend to forget that diplomacy is but one of many tools of strategy.
- (ii) we have failed to perceive that military man is

weapon which should be used judiciously.

(iii) we have failed to perceive these truths largely because our understanding of the Quran, hadith and study of Islamic military history remain conditioned by study of literature which has been destroyed by the western nations.

(iv) unity does not come naturally but it comes after hard struggle through psywar.

Would you enjoin righteous conduct upon people while you forget yourself...Will you understand?" Quran (2: 44)

History is something which cannot be altered or deleted by the subjective views of some men, or authors. The principle of historicism must be applied with equity to the histories of all countries, whether, it be the history of one's own country, or the history of the others. With war, as with all studies, the first process, and a very laborious one would be to ascertain truth. The next would be to tell it without fear or favour—a very difficult affair. The third and invariably the most difficult, would be to persuade people to believe it. How many, or for that matter, the average politician understands truly that '*war is hell*' Yet the pages of the history of many nations are stained with the names of those who have sacrificed fighting forces, not with the single purpose of defeating an enemy, or to advance some great cause but for the lesser object of keeping some individual, a group of opportunities, or a government in power by pondering to the well known public demands for successful combats, such as, combats of Indo-Pakistan 1971, regardless of their ultimate influence upon the issue of war.

The Holy Quran gave the command to the man to "Read

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in the name of thy Lord..." and extended the promise of limitless inheritance and prospects of limitless hope—that through knowledge, the mortal shall put on immortality. The Holy Prophet said : *Know thyself and know thy enemy*. "Examples from history", wrote General Clausewitz "make everything clear and furnish the best description of proof in the empirical sciences. This applies with more forces to the Art-of-War than to any other".

Wars are the supreme test of any social system. A country in which the interests of the people, the government and the armed forces are fused '*ideologically and politically*' is invincible.

Only those who are completely wedded to an ideology and love their land dearly will sacrifice their life and perform deeds of valour to defeat the enemy. But this has to be ingrained in the minds of the people! Did we Pakistanis do it? It will be discussed.

Generals are not infallible. Soldiers are the backbone of a nation. Weapons are said to be the foundation of an armed force's fighting strength, but weapons alone do not make it efficacious. It is the man behind a machine that matters. Machines no matter how good can help and supplement, but can not replace man as the final arbiter of victory. If disasters are to be avoided, the man on the ground carrying a weapon in his hands, must know what he is fighting for. This is the foundation on which modern armies should be raised and trained. Of course it is not to be interpreted that a man can act freely with no regard for the objective material conditions. '*Man and matter at any time are the two opposites in a unity*'. Man is the master of matter, while matter provides certain conditions for man's activity. Man can not achieve success beyond the limits set by these

conditions, but within these limits there is ample room for his initiative to manoeuvre within these limits, politics, ideology and man's revolutionary drive can give rise to technique and other material conditions. Numerous facts show that due to differences in people's and their leader's consciousness and in the path of their subjective initiative, organization with approximately the same material and technical conditions may achieve quite different results—some good and some bad. It holds that man and matter are in state of a unity in which the man plays the leading role.

Wisdom after the event is an expensive wisdom. But it is the most vital of all. What touches all is the business of all, and it is no more right to hand over the study of war to the professional soldiers alone than it would be to permit no one but lawyers to touch constitutional history.

Till some general knowledge of war exists, it is open to any person, military man or civilian to pontificate upon one of the necessary functions of the state, without being recognised at once as a crank, or a socialist by the audience he is addressing. This unfortunately, did happen after the demise of Quaid-i-Azam. As far as the masses of both Bharat and Pakistan are concerned, they are desirous of maintaining peace. Both dread war. Yet, in the past the leaders of both maintain: "we must go on, or we will go down". Here the pertinent question arises: Do they know the consequences of 'going on'? And, how the doom of the belligerents are heading headlong for can be avoided? All they propose merely gravitates around but they dare not face the real problem—how to live and let live. The result so far has been economic bankruptcy and national disasters both for Bharat and Pakistan. The last quarter of a century 1970-2000, constitutes an epoch to which may be applicable the Contem-

porary History. Events have occurred and may occur of which we are the spectators. A few among us help to mould the character of these events; while all of us by our discussions and reactions feel ourselves in some measure participants. Theoretically, then we as Muslims should be better informed by intelligent study of Quran and Hadith not only about the world in which we live but also about the past, for the knowledge the non-Muslims of which they are dependent on written and often meagre, often distorted, records. No wonder Historian George Stantayan has stated: "History is always written wrong, and so always needs to be re-written." Actually this may or may not be the case.

### Why begin story since 1625 ?

To see events in their true perspective we need the distance of time, just as we need the distance of space to see the mountain as a whole. The eddies and cross-currents that swirl around us since pre and post-partition in a distracted sub-continent confuse our judgement. The Kaleidoscope character of the international situation as regards spheres of influence, global strategy, no peace no war diplomacy of super powers makes it difficult to interpret its real significance and to relate it to the eternal verities. The colourful and picturesque incidents and horrible tales of violence which crowd upon us in a breathless succession oppress the mind. Life seems a bewilderment, and humanity appears to be building its edifice on shifting sands. It is only when the chaotic movements have worked themselves out to their appointed end that we can appraise their meaning, distinguish the forest from the trees and detect the secret spring of action protected by iron curtain or the secret Acts. Nevertheless the twenty-five years which elapsed between the birth [of Pakistan in 1947 and 1972] have revealed certain well defined traits

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which enable us to connect the present with the past and to discern in the confused welter of modern happenings, the trends in world politics, strategy and economics. The two dominating 'motives', in the light of which we may unravel the chequered pattern, are :

First, the attempt to establish a new Islamic Order on the basis of collective security as envisaged by Quaid-i-Azam. Second, as the sequel to its failure, the retreat from national unit accompanied by the demand of Bangladesh.

As regards why Britain, Bharat and Soviets became partners to dismember Pakistan under a pre-conceived plan ?

Because : England was prepared to grant political freedom to all her colonial possessions as soon as a generation of intellectuals and politicians imbued through English education with the ideals of English culture were ready to take over, 'but under no circumstances' would the British Government for a single moment tolerate an independent Islamic State." Lord Cromer explained Britain's Policy in 1908 Britain repeated her policy—though in different words to her Second World War Allies—even when her hands were forced after Second World War in the partition of India into Bharat and Pakistan. If Israel was created 1917 by Western Power to keep Arabs disunited and as a bridgehead for Nato Powers ; Bangladesh has been created by these Super Powers to dismember not only Pakistan but to keep a stranglehold on China—in fact—on the entire Communist World as well as—to keep all South East Asian Powers disunited. *Lastly to use Bharat as pawn in the field of World (global) strategy.*

In the following pages we shall be also concerned with the emergence, rise and decline of the Muslim League, the growth of dictatorships, the causes which led to the creation of Bangladesh and also with the economic consequences of a

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distorted nationalism, namely, the Cessionist Movement. All these developments give present age a dramatic intensity, which seems destined to mark it as no ordinary phase of history. Posterity alone can decide between what is transient and what is permanent in our generation, and alone it can estimate events not by the noise they make in the world body—U.N.O.—but by the place they occupy in historical evolutions. Yet the difficulty of his task need not deter 'Rangrut' from endeavouring to make the present in some degree more intelligible. Lastly in this book, the readers we hope, would be able to decide for themselves '*Who won the race*' ?

I most sincerely thanks those who helped and encouraged me to present this book to the nation, which I am very proud to belong.

I '*dedicate this book*' to our Pakistani youth who are our future custodians of security of peace and prosperity.

I started writing this book in the last quarter of 1971 '*as a reminder to the nation*' of what one saw on the horizon. But events moved most fast and eventually they were overtaken by Bharat's wanton lightning war. Pakistan met the '*Debacle*'.

I, therefore, decided to present the nation my views as a contemporary writer as a food for thought, i.e. why we met the debacle, with the aid of hindsight of press reviews, my own militarily trained imagination and as a keen observer and as a keen student of history. Moreover Rangrut had taken part in two World Wars, and in many frontier campaigns. Again Rangrut had also commanded the vast worst communally affected areas in India areas where blood flowed, rape, loot and destruction was rife. Post-partition I was success-

ful in nipping in the bud enemy inspired incursion in Pakistan. The presentation of my views may, I sincerely hope, that these observations of Rangrut would act as reminders to the leaders and the nation and thus enable us to face the challenge squarely. Moreover, I fear that we are not as yet (December 1972) by any stretch of imagination *'out of the wood'*. Let us now onwards avoid being caught napping or allow our enemy to steal a march on us. Will the Indian Congress throw overboard Mr. Gandhi's Legacy and also the legacy of Mr. Nehru's dreamland? I wish they should, as we wish *'to forgive and forget and live as good neighbours'*. But only a seer can foresee the shapes of things to come.

PAKISTAN ZINDABAD, PAKISTAN PAINDABAD

## CHAPTER I

### BENGAL, ITS PAST PRE-PARTITION

“Meditation of a single hour is far better than prayer extending over 70 years”.

#### Why Bengal was partitioned ?

The great object in trying to understand history-political, religious, literary or scientific, is to get behind men and to grasp ideas. Ideas have radiation and development on ancestry and posterity of their own in which men play the part of godfathers and godmothers more than that of legitimate parents—so let us trace *‘why Bengal was partitioned’*. The Quran has enjoined : “Alike of you is he who hideth the saying and he who noiseth it abroad, he who lurketh in the night and he who goeth freely in the the day-time.” (13 : 10).

Has Science doomed the old way ? Will atomic bomb economically fill our political-military needs ?

Impatience is an expensive luxury : It has always been difficult to bring about any strategy on the top of an old strategy. To impose haphazardly now old strategy on top of the new is difficult, but not out of question, if it is done judiciously. Conflict get great and full attention ; while good work hardly receives notice due to it. The Muslims could never be heavy on the trigger, as they try hardest on peace. They

seek to avoid incidents rather than provoke incidents, as Islam means peace. We must steadfastly defend the system which maintains freedom, to express eccentric ideas, non-conformist ideas, from which we are privileged to choose those best ideas.

Again patriotism is not enough, people must learn how to defend it, or perish. The pages of the history of many nations are stained with the names of those who have sacrificed national interests, not with the single purpose of defeating a national enemy, or to advance some great cause, but for the lesser object of keeping some individual or party in power : regardless of their ultimate influence upon the issue of security of the nation. Human memories might be short but history repeats itself—hence this presentation !

### **Historical backgrounds of why Bengal was partitioned !**

Let us turn away from speculations and return to History. In the case of East Pakistan (Bengal), history is indeed the projection of the present into the past.

To understand the thinking of policy makers of Bharat today we must know the ancient history of Bengal which has seen many days of grandeur and fame, as well as, the set backs—*'its causes and results'*.

The famous Greek historian Megasthenese who had visited Bengal about 280 B.C. when the Maurya Empire was at her Zenith, describes Pataliputra, its capital, was a very imposing city—"twenty five miles in circuit, surrounded by deep moat and walls having 570 towers and 64 gates". In Asoka's days, Maurya Empire comprised the whole of the country contained between Hindu Kush and Himalayas on the north and a line running approximately from Mangalore to

Madras in the South; its extreme Western provinces were Afghanistan, Kabul and Sind, whilst its extreme Eastern province was Bengal. Mr. Nehru dreamt to be heir and successor of Asoka's Empire and one who would revive and revitalize it as Akand Bharat.

Here comes the rub. As already stated, the Bharati Government has never accepted the emergence of Pakistan as final. Moreover, it should be recalled, that, it was the ruler of Bengal, Sher Shah Suri, who having defeated the Moghul King Humayun, drove the alien Moghul forces in the deserts of Sind and Baluchistan. Again it was from Bengal that the British having established themselves as rulers of Bengal eventually became the rulers of India. Why should not Bharat do it—because history repeats itself? Let us now try and understand various events which were the causes of rape of Bengal by the British and the Hindus—as faithful allies—though on surface only, while they both had their own axes to grind. We must not also overlook the fact that at the same time a '*triangle battle*' was being fought on political battlefield between the leaderless Muslims, Hindus (under Indian National Congress and her satellites) and the British hawks of White Hall in U.K. and in India in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The East India Company, in 1615, established factories initially at Surat, Calicut and Masulipatan. Little by little they succeeded in extending the field of their commercial-cum-military operations; and, whilst Emperor Shah Jahan ruled over Moghul Empire, they obtained from him privileges of trading in Bengal. In the course of the seventeenth century, they built Fort William around it where now Calcutta stands. In 1715 Calcutta became a separate Presidency, like Madras and Bombay. As the Moghul rulers became weak, the English

daily grew stronger. Both the French and the English were bent on building new empires on the Indian mainland. There was dissensions among the Muslim ruling princes and the Moghul Emperor's power over the realm was very limited. *The greatness of a nation lies, neither in the abundance of its possessions, nor in the money, the sinews of war where the sinews of men's arms in base, and effeminate people are failing*'. British plans of carving a new empire materialised beyond all expectation. Their policy of interference in the dissensions of Indian princes was equally successful.

When the British Governor began to extend and to strengthen the fortifications of Fort William, the ruling nawab, Sirajuddaulah resented those measures. He, accordingly in 1756, informed British Governor of the Fort that the new fortifications should be forthwith demolished. When the request was not complied with, the nawab marched upon the Fort on 19 June 1756 and demolished the new fortifications. "Black Hole" tragedy was invented as an excuse to invade Bengal in December 1756 by a mixed force from Madras under Captain Clive (later Lord) of British and Indian mercenaries. In January 1757 both Calcutta and Hugli were captured by Clive. Though Clive had made peace with Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah, he was not slow in winning over Nawab's Commander-in-Chief, Mir Jafar who was anxious to secure Nawabi for himself. Eventually Clive won through treachery the decisive battle of Plassey, in 1757. Clive secured the rights of a landlord (Zamindar) of Twenty four Pargnas, and a large sum of money as damages from the Nawab. It was not long before Siraj-ud-daulah was put to death and Clive installed Mir Jaffar, as Nawab of Bengal (which included Bihar, Orrissa and Assam). Clive, in fact became the real ruler of the state, for only semblance of power was left to Mir Jaffar.

## Creation of Power Triangle in India

British historian, J.H. Gense, S.J. remarks : '*Evil Effects of Clive's First Administration.*' Many of the servants of the (British) Company had received their share of the vast sums of money paid first by Sirajuddaulah and afterwards by Mir Jaffar. The result was that those who shared in the booty were anxious further to increase their wealth, whilst others, who had been less fortunate, set out to work to improve their prospects by trading on their own account. Thus it came about that the servants of the Company, in their eagerness to amass vast fortune in the shortest possible time, had recourse to means which deserve full condemnation. For to such an extent was corruption practised that Sir John Malcolm wrote : "There is no page in our Indian history so revolting as the weak and inefficient rule of Clive's successor, Mr. Vansittart'..."

Events moved fast, as when Mir Jaffar could not pay money demanded by the British Governor and his agents, he was replaced by his ambassador, Mir Kasim. To the British Mir Kasim ceded Midnapur, Chittagong and Burdwan in 1760. But historian Gense adds : "Mir Kasim displayed considerable ability and, had a chance been given him, there is every probability that he would have solved the financial problem... But the opportunity of doing so was denied to him. The servants of the Company first of all claimed considerable sums of money as personal presents. Next they asserted that they had the right of trading in country-produce, without paying any dues. They also sold permits of trading to Indian merchants. They youngest writer in Company's service could make 2,000 rupees a month by selling passes....."

".....When Mir Kasim abolished "all transit dues and put an end to trading permits by which the servants of Company were substantially increasing their salaries. Then War broke

out. A battle was fought in 1764 at Buxar, the historical battlefield where Sher Shah Suri had inflicted decisive defeat on Humayun, when the allied armies of Mir Kasim, the Nawab of Oudh, (Shuja-ud-Daula) and the Moghul Emperor Shah Alam II, were defeated. The British sway now extended upto Delhi under the Treaty of Allahabad (1765). The servants of Company from now onwards were acknowledged by the Moghul Emperor as his feudatories ; thus the British from mere traders and Zamindars became lawful possessors and legitimate rulers. Shah Alam II also bestowed upon the British a feudatory status ; and he granted them the Dewani of Bengal (Assam, Orrisa and Bihar). The granting of the '*Dewani*' amounted to virtual sovereignty—it was the third and final step in the foundation of the Bengal Presidency. The road was now clear for the British to make her hold over India an everlasting one”.

#### **Administrative Reforms (a diarchy)**

The most important of Clive's administrative reforms was in introduction of the '*Dual System*'—or—Double Government. According to this arrangement the country was occupied by the British military but financially and judicially administered by the Nawab's officers. But besides the money paid to the company, there were considerable sums of money which went into the pockets of the British agents. There was practically no settled and legal revenue and by the use of intimidation the people were made to disgorge the greater part of their hard won-earnings.

#### **A Death-blow to Muslim Influences—Cultural and Economic.**

In the first stage, management of the Financial Department was withdrawn from the Nawab and transferred it to servants

of the Company, who leased vast tract of land or business concerns, such as, indigo plantation and its factories, textiles, and other industries to the highest bidding persons for a period of five years under the term, *i.e.*, "The Temporary Settlement".

This new system which was applicable throughout Bengal (Bihar, Assam and Orrissa), was far from ideal. It did little to better the lot of that the land or factory was only leased for a period of five years, after which it would be again placed in market to be farmed out anew to the highest bidder, made the lease holders in possession more than reluctant to improve their holding; for any improvements made would only serve to increase the price he would have to pay if he wished to remain in possession. Thirdly, it transferred the holding of agricultural land of indigo factory, textile factories etc. from the farmers or owners of Bengal to the Marwari Banias, or the Hindu money lenders of Calcutta. Dacca, the capital of Bengal of the Mughal Governors and Chittagong as a busy port, lost their importance as an industrial centres, or trading and commercial centres. The British had already struck a heavy blow on Dacca Textile Industry—*'the Malma'* or the 'Muslin' the world famous fine cloth, as well as, the Muslim jewellers. Now the Muslim Jagirdars (land—holders) and ryots were ruined. A new class of British Planters and Hindu Zamindars was created at the expense of Muslim farmers and ryots.

"Moreover, the conduct of the servants of the Company was not above reproach; now they fell more than ever into the old ways of their predecessors and amassed vast fortune by accumulation of personal employments." States historian Keene.

"In his policy towards Indian Princes of Bengal (mostly

Muslims), Warren Hastings was bent on improving the financial prospects of the Company and the British planters. He cut down the allowance of the Nawab of Bengal by one half and thus curtailed the yearly expenses of the Company by sixteen lakhs". Historian Trotter.

### Permanent Settlement in Bengal.

After the war of American Independence, British statesmen earnestly began to consider India as a fair substitute for the lost territories in America. Accordingly, Pitt's India Bill of 1784 was passed to strengthen the stranglehold of Britain over India. As regards Bengal Lord Cornwallis replaced '*Temporary Settlement*' by '*Permanent Settlement*'. The lease holders thus became '*Zamindars*' i.e., they became both hereditary land owners and landlords, whilst the old Jagirdars or ryots (mostly Muslims) were reduced to the state of tenants—landless labourers.

'*Permanent Settlement*', firstly, ignored the rights of small proprietors, whose holdings became the property of the new Zamindars. Secondly, it did not sufficiently safeguard the interests of the Muslim Jagirdars and the ryots, who were now entirely at the mercy of the Zamindars. Thirdly, the Governor-General introduced the appointment of European District Judges in place of the Collectors. "By this measure the Indians were practically excluded from all the higher offices, and could only secure very subordinate positions in the service of the Company". Historian Smith.

It should be noted that during the period under discussion, the majority of the land owners, the members of judicature, traders and artificers were Muslims, who were now deprived with one stroke of pen their means of livelihood. Great and far

reaching changes to the detriment of Muslims in the status and the recruitment of Muslims as soldiers, Civilian officers and in Police had already been taken in hand by the British rulers.

### **Trade War to wreck Muslim Industry**

The liquidation of the Muslim artisan class led to unemployment on a prodigious scale. What were all these scores of millions, who had so far been engaged in industry and manufacture, to do now? Their old profession was no longer open to them, the way to new one was barred. To begin with Indian goods were excluded from Britain by legislation. The East India Company held a monopoly in the Indian exports business, this exclusion influenced other foreign markets. To some extent this was inevitable as the older (Indian) manufacturing came into conflict with the new (machine) industrial technique. It was hastened by political and economic pressure, due to loss of territories in America. Indeed every attempt was made to prevent economic development of India and the revival of the old industry prevented. Machinery could not be imported into India. A vacuum was created which could only be filled by British goods and which led to rapidly increasing unemployment and poverty among the Muslims in Bengal.

What were all these scores of millions of the muslim artisans who had so far been engaged in industry and manufacture to do now? Where were they to go now? They could die, of course, that way of escape from an intolerable situation is always open. They died in tens of millions. Lord Bentick, the British Governor General, reported in 1834, that: "...the misery hardly finds a parrallel in the history of commerce. The bones of the cotton weavers are bleaching the plains of India..." The compulsory back to the land movement of artisans and craftsmen led to an ever-growing disproportion between

Agriculture and industry. Permanent Land Settlement became an unsurmountable obstacle for the Muslim Jagirdars or royats due to their poverty. Thus the crisis in the Industry in Bengal spread rapidly to the land and became a permanent crisis in agriculture for the Muslims. The chief business of the East India Company—the very object—for which it was given a 'Firman'; was a carry Indian manufactured goods, textiles etc. as well as spices and the like from the East to Europe, where there was a great demand for these articles, underwent a great change. The British market for imports was closed to Indian products and the Indian market opened to the British manufacture. No wonder FARAIZI Movement had already taken its roots in the Muslim Community.

#### **The Faraizi Movement in 1822**

The Faraizi Movement was basically a religious movement for reminding the Muslims soiltiller the Farajz (Commandment) of Islam. It was a movement started by Haji Shariatullah in 1810, for moral rearmament, of Muslims soiltiller of the Eastren Bengal. As this movement ran counter to the interests of the British rulers and their co-workers, Hindu-Zamindars, and non-Muslim trade agents, they opposed it strongly and took adequate measures to suppress it by force.

Haji's successor and his son Muhsin-ud-din Dadu Mian, in 1840 was forced to take a firm stand against oppression by the rulers. To meet this situation, the British engaged Hindu sub-judges and junior policemen, especially when similar Movement was started by 'Titu-Mir' for the Muslims of Western Bengal, Bihar and Orrissa. As a consequence, illegal cases were farmed against the Muslims and the courts imposed various forms of tortures, and imprisonment for the defaulters to crush the movement by breaking the morale and already meek economic structure of the Muslims of Bengal. He died in 1863.

It should be noted that originally trade in indigo was one the main sources of income and a most profitable trade jointly run by Muslim Jagirdars and Muslim merchants. But now indigo was grown in Bengal by British farmers and processed by British owned factories and then exported to Europe.

The British made fabulous fortunes from indigo trade. But the poor Muslim ryots became poorer than ever, because, the British indigo and textile factory owners and the British indigo planters indulged in malpractices, such as, extracting forced labour (bega'r) from the Muslim peasants in their plantations, cheating the peasants in weight at the time of accepting the indigo crops at the factories, or when making the payments for the crops, or making loans or advances for seeds etc., to the peasant for indigo plantation, and falsifying their account books (maintained in English) to hold the ryots down for service for life, since he was never able to clear his dues. The notorious cases, for example, fought between Dadu Mian and British planter Mr. Dunlop of Madaripur, and another planter Mr. White which went up to the Calcutta High Court, are well known for injustice and partiality in law in favour of the British Courts that it need hardly be mentioned here in detail.

#### **New Tools and Patterns**

“Up to that time (1861) the British Government had been satisfied with saying: *‘Let us hear what a few Indians of our own choosing have to say about our laws’*. For Example, the members of Jury in the High Court belonged to “Yes men”. Says historian Keene.

But the agitation grew stronger among both Muslim and non-Muslim Indians, as by now the Hindu's dream of becoming

the successors to the British rulers of India, had vanished. To pacify the Indians, local self-Government in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, and other large towns was introduced by the Indian Government. These Local Boards were of three kinds. A rural district was divided into various rural areas. At the head of the each rural area there was a Minor Board. The Minor Boards were under the control of District Board which presided over the whole District and they had also to send delegates to the District Council for the passing of common measures, affecting the whole of the District.

### **Emergence of Indian National Congress**

The First Indian National Congress met in Bombay, in 1885, for the consolidation of union between India and England, and the modification of such conditions as may be unjust, or injurious to India. In 1892 Government of India said : *'Let us hear what a few Indians Chosen by the Indians themselves have to say about our laws!'*

### **First Partition of Bengal—Minority gains power**

In 1899 Lord Curzon arrived as a Governor General in India. He adopted extremist pro-British policy. Lord Curzon carried out the partition-plan (which, however had originated in White Hall, and not with him), and created a special province called Eastern Bengal; as he declared it a big province in area and population. It now hit hard the newly created Hindu Bengali Landlords who, though they had now become large Zamindars in various parts of Bengal, yet, they lived at Calcutta. He thus planned to eliminate Hindu Zamindars who had become rivals to the British Zamindars.

The partition of Bengal took place in 1905 when Muslim League had not been born as yet. An interesting aspect of the

question was that Muslims never made a demand for carving out a new Muslim province from the unwieldy Bengal Province which then included Bihar, Orrissa and Assam as well. It was the British who posed as friends of Muslims and Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, speaking of the partition said : *"It relieves the over-burdened administration of Bengal advantages and opportunities of which they had perhaps hitherto not had their fair share..."* Soon the Muslims realised the significance of the move and as the first Governor of East Bengal had pointed out they welcomed it with thanksgiving prayers.

The partition of Bengal and Curzon's Agrarian Reforms caused great excitement among the Hindu Bengalis, who viewed the splitting up of Bengal and Agrarian Reforms as a national (Hindu) calamity. Curzon also passed '*the Suspensions and Remission Resolution*', by which the District Officer in-charge (a British) was entitled, either to suspend, or remit the revenue and interest in time '*dire distress*'. The Hindu Zamindars could, therefore, no longer oppress the ryots as much as they did before. Furthermore, by '*the Land Alienation Act*' the cultivators were protected from Hindu money-lenders, who could not legally, either buy land, or hold land on mortgage for a period exceeding twenty years. Agriculture was further encouraged by the creation of '*Co-operative Credit Societies*.' These above Acts did not affect the British planters ; who gradually began to buy Zamindaris of Hindu farmers.

A British historian states :

"In order to allay the unrest and discontent amongst the Hindus the rulers of India (Lord Hardinge) pursued a new policy, as on the visit of King George in 1911, the partition of Bengal, which had caused so much discontent among the Hindus, was revoked." British historian Keene has stated :

“East Bengal, the six-year old new Muslim province disappeared as a result of British surrender to the large-scale Hindu terrorist movement aided and abetted by the Indian National Congress. For Muslims it was a complete route leading to a widespread disillusionment...” But it was also a blessing in disguise—for it resulted in a three-pronged exposure—of the British as breakers of promises, of the Congress as essentially a Hindu Organisation working for Hindu domination and for the Muslim League as a coterie of Muslim loyalists whose policy of “loyalty and contentment” had been rewarded by a generous helping of the humble pie. However, this action of the Government left in the Bengal, Bihar, Assam and Orrissa ; British planters in majority with large holdings as Zamindars ; and second to British, came the Hindu Bengali Zamindars ; while the Muslim peasants were left in helplessness and misery at the hands of newly created British and Hindu Zamindars. Especially under new Reforms, the factories, posts—in police, judiciary and the civil—were now, either held by the British, or the Hindu Bengalis. The Muslim Bengalis remained oppressed as an under-dog even upto 1947, because English education did not spread beyond big towns, such as Calcutta. Moreover, as it was expensive, hence the Muslims, especially in rural areas, could not afford to educate their children. Mosques and Madrassas were neglected mostly due to economic reasons as Arabic and Persian was no longer a court language. The Hindu Zamindars encouraged Sanskrit (Bengali) script which acted as a stab in the back to Arabic, Urdu and Persian languages.

### **British Diplomacy Active**

The transfer of the Indian capital from Calcutta to Delhi and the decision to establish a University at Dacca were presented to Muslims as compensation for the annulment of

partition and H. H. The Agha Khan, a loyalist Muslim leader in the course of an article entitled "*The Recent Changes and the Mussalmans*" welcomed the transfer of capital to Delhi for "it will have the great advantage for Mussalmans of bringing the Government of India nearer to the centres of Muslim intellectual activity and to the most virile portions of the Muslim community in India". He supported the annulment of partition on the plea that "the Bengali resentment had been set at rest and the Muslims had been promised a University at Dacca".

Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar wrote a series of editorials in his journal "*The Comrade*" condemning the annulment decision in no uncertain terms. He said: "...it will not be possible to discover in history a more ignoble instance of rewarding loyalty with deprivation of recently recovered rights and punishing contentment as the worst of crimes".

Pathetically he observed: "As for the Mussalmans of Eastern Bengal, they must derive that cold comfort they can from the well-finished lines:

Laugh, and the world laughs with you,  
Weep and you weep alone.

After all they are only "loyal and contented", and as a reward of their loyalty and contentment they have been given a generous helping of the humble pie. We pray that they may not have a too acute attack of indigestions."

Strong resentment was expressed by Sir Salimullah, Nawab of Dacca, in the course of his presidential address to the sixth annual session of the All India Muslim League. He said: "The partition gave us a great opportunity to bestir our-

selves and it awakened in our hearts the throbbings of a new national life which went pulsating through the various sections of our community in Eastern Bengal...We felt sure that the people of East Bengal, particularly the Muslims, would be immensely benefitted by a sympathetic administration, easily accessible to them, and always ready to devote its time and attention exclusively to their welfare...Our ill-wishers at once perceived that the partition would necessarily bring to the fore the long neglected claims of the Muslims of English Bengal; and though we never got more than what was justly our due, what little we gained was so much loss to them..."

"The annulment of partition...has appeared to put a premium on sedition and disloyalty, and created an impression in the minds of the irresponsible masses that even the Government could be brought down to its knees by a reckless and persistent defiance of constituted authority. Moreover, it has discredited British rule to an extent which is deeply to be regretted".

### **The Economic and Cultural Paralysis of Bengali Muslims**

As already stated, that at Ideo-politico-cum-economic weapon, the court language was changed as anti-Muslim measure from Arabic, Urdu and Persian script into English. In order to make this change in language a success, at first, schools and later on colleges were established by the Western Missionaries. It was financed and supported by the British Government. According to Professor Hitti: *'this was the new but most effective and more lasting form of the Crusade'*. However, these Missionary Educational institutions were established in main cities only, such as Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. As regards Bengal, English educational institutions it seems,

neglected even the Eastern Bengal city Dacca. The result was, that the Muslim youth could not compete with the Hindus as regards obtaining jobs in Government departments only but also they could not defend their legitimate rights in the courts of law, where English language was now in vogue instead of Urdu, Persian or Arabic.

It may be recalled that Bengali language had so far been written in Arabic and Persian script, was now changed into Devanagri or Sanskrit script. The Muslims could not get even low grade employments in civil administration, banks or as trade agents. Marwari money lenders, thus gained complete control over the economy of the farmers, ryots and artisans. The Bengali Muslims sank lower or deeper in the morass of economic and cultural frustration to the stage of desperation. They lacked leaders who could lead them to escape from the seemingly fast approaching certain death. The leaders of the organizations, such as FARAIZI or Titu Mir, were hunted down by the Government. Even the sympathizers of these Movements were sent to jails and hunted like mad dogs with trial under new Acts and Security Ordinances.

However, when at least some Muslims awoke out of their slumber, then they found that entry for their children in the English Schools was most difficult due to :

- (a) Anti-Muslim views of the Missionary British Staff, who were duped in crusading ideas of hatred for Islam.
- (b) The non-Muslim Indian staff who had been recruited locally were Hindus or Indian Christians who had no desire to help their rivals, i.e., Muslim youth,

to break their monopoly in the Government jobs, such as education, judiciary, police ; or in business concerns, like banks, or industrial concerns.

The annulment of the partition of Bengal was a turning point in the history of Muslim politics for Muslims at last realized that their political future lay neither in collaboration with the British, nor in an unconditional surrender to the Indian National Congress, but only in mobilising their own resources for establishing their independent identity in the body-politic of the sub-continent. The realization brought in its wake a new leadership with a more bold programme that made Muslim politics more lively and more dynamic.

Hindus were opposed in this move. Their capitalist clique in Calcutta saw in it the end of century old exploitation of the Muslims of that backward region. The result was a tearing and raging campaigns against partition both through the press and the platform. The Indian National Congress also entered the arena and declared its opposition to the move. The extremists like Bal Gangadhar, Tilak and Bipin Chandra Pal sponsored a movement for the boycott of British goods and there also emerged a terrorist movement that concentrated its activities in East Bengal. Its workers worked underground, throw bombs on government buildings and shot dead a number of officers.

The figures of terrorist crimes shows a progressive upward trend as is evident from the following :

1906—2 ; 1907—17 ; 1908—21 ; 1909—46 ; 1910—90 ;  
1911—116 ; 1912—140.

These points have been very clearly and effectively dealt

in his biography by Mr. Fazal-ul-Haq, who is known as "the Tiger of Bengal". In this connection it should be noted that due to Kitchener's policy as regards administrative changes in the Indian Army and the emergence of Indian National Congress since 1885 as a strong political party. The British policy took a turn, who (British) now decided to fight on one front only. As they felt that, if the Muslims—were allowed to emancipate—they would become most dangerous rivals, hence Lord Hardinge under Morley-Minto Reforms revoked the partition of Bengal much against the wishes of the Muslims. In other words, the British while pursued a conciliatory policy to placate the Hindus, and thereby they succeeded in causing a split in the Congress ranks, i.e., among Hindus and the Muslim members. An Indian (Hindu) was nominated as the member for Education in the Imperial Executive Council, who could veto any move made by the Bengali Muslims, who controlled about half the elected seats in the Assembly.

The Movements by the descendents of Duda Mian and Titu Mir among the Muslims had become a powerful cultural-cum-political organisation. Repressive measures against it, had made it volatile, It had won popular support among the Muslims.

### **The Reactionaries**

Hindu businessmen—i.e., Bania or Marwari—now once again joined hands with the British Planters and British Merchants to meet the situation. East Bengal, which had become a hinderland to supply raw materials to West Bengal, now again one Bengal, could be more directly and mercilessly exploited by these merchants of Calcutta in various forms.

The British Government in India's anti-Muslim policy,

encouraged these non-Muslim Zamindars, planters and industrialists openly joined hands with British to suppress these Muslim cultural Movements. The non-Muslim Zamindars, for example levied '*a beard tax*'; as the Muslim members of these Movements were enjoined to keep a beard. Again, '*cow slaughter*' by the Muslims for food or religious ceremonies, was banned. However, cows could be killed for beef for British civilians or troops.

### **Emergence of New Muslim Leaders**

The battle was lost in so far as the immediate objective was concerned but in a way it was not lost, for the Muslims realised that loyalty alone did not count. There emerged a new set of young political leaders like Mohammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Dr. Ansari, Abul Kalam Azad, Hasrat Mohani, A. M. Khawaja of Aligarh, Maulvi Fazal-ul-Haq, Nawab Salim Ullah and Zafar Ali Khan who through press and platform set the ball rolling in the direction of a full scale battle for the freedom of the country from the foreign yoke and particularly the Muslims struggled not only for their own emancipation but also for the liberation of the Muslim world.

It was the widespread disillusionment caused by the annulment of partition coupled with the imperialist machinations for the liquidation of the freedom of the Muslim countries that served as an eye-opener for Muslims and within a decade they were able to launch the Khilafat and non-Co-operation Movements, which though not successful, shook the very foundations of the British colonialism in the sub-continent and within a quarter of a century they were able to achieve Pakistan including the East Bengal which was later on snatched from them because they were weak.

Dacca, which had been since 1508 the seat of the Muslim Governments, of Bengal and also industrial centre, especially for textiles, jewellery and a seat for learning, was deserted. No wonder, therefore, that few well-to-do Muslim families had to send their children to Calcutta for Western (English) education, such as the children of Nawab of Dacca and others, like Maulvi Fazal-ul-Haq's families.

Maulvi Fazal-ul-Haq eventually formed a coalition Ministry of Bengal in 1936 by capturing 116 seats out of 250. In 1938, he introduced and successfully manoeuvred the Agricultural Bill which safeguarded the Muslim cultivators and land-holders against malpractices of Zamindars, Planters, money-lenders and factory-owners. In 1940, Fazal-ul-Haq introduced '*Secondary Education Bill*' to provide a just and equitable rights to the Muslim Children for admission in Secondary Schools. Moreover, the Bill demanded fair representation of Muslim (educated) youths as teachers etc. However, the Bill was '*rejected*' by the joint efforts of Hindus and and the British members of the Bengal Assembly.

It was due to these unjust and ugly tactics, that the Muslims in India, left the Congress, and the Muslim League came into existence. The way Muslim Indian princes, nobles, landlords were liquidated and turned into state of beggars, is a part of the history of India. Rangrut (the writer) does not agree with those friends, who state that this part of history of the Muslims need hardly be reproduced here. The step-motherly treatment inflicted on the Muslims of East Bengal, jointly under a pre-conceived plan of the British and Hindus, planters, Zamindars, factory-owners, and the elites in Education Department in Bengal till 1947: is most pathetic and needs careful detailed study which is not possible in this book, hence it is being described briefly. If the author has even

succeeded in giving it '*as a food for thought*' to the readers, he would feel gratified. The Holy Prophet has said: "Know thyself, Know thy enem.". I shall revert to it later on. The Quran eays: "God asketh not a soul beyond its scope". (2 : 286)

### **Rangrut in the Whispering Gallery**

After a very long spell since 1935—1943 wanderings and serving in various battlefronts, on the North-Western Frontier, with the British Expeditionary Force in France, as a fighter in the Battle of Britain, and lastly on the Bengal-Assam-Burma Front; I returned home to roost.

I was posted first as Commandent Recruit Training Centre, Vice-Chairman of various Army Committees and later on as a Senior General Staff Officer at General Headquarters, at Delhi. My last job being a Commander of the worst communal riot-ridden part of India. This last job, I consider, was more administrative and political than as a soldier; because my main job were suppression of communal riots, release and rehabilitation of sailors, soldiers and airmen in various release centres and training of new recruits and soldiers with an '*eye on the future*'. And lastly to supervise arrangements for the exit of the British to their homes in U.K. and overseas, when the British Government decided to do so—i.e. '*quit*'.

When I took office in Delhi, Lord Wavell was the Viceroy, who was succeeded by Admiral Mountbatten. I had met Lord Mountbatten when he had come out to India in 1921 with the Prince of Wales, when I was also attached to the Prince's staff as an A. D. C. I had the privilege of meeting Lord Mountbatten again in New Delhi where he had his headquarters as Supreme Allied Commander (1943-44). One, therefore,

heard a good deal about the political activities in 'the Court Circles', and in the headquarters of various parties. Mr. Gandhi's prayer sermons which I attended wherever possible, gave one very good forecast of the Indian Congress's attitude towards various political changes in the melting pot. I also met many elite of Muslim League and Indian Congress at my father-in-law's house.

The Court gossipers stated that the instructions given by Mr. Attlee to Wavell and Mountbatten in the form of a letter were concerned, were the keynote of British policy in India and was: "to be the closest co-operation with the Indians and the transfer of power was to be in accordance with Indian Defence requirements, and the Viceroy to impress upon the Indian leaders the importance of avoiding a break in the continuity of the Indian army and to point out the need for continued collaboration in the security of the Indian Ocean.. and the Imperial trade...". Hence it was based on the security of the Empire, and also the security of Imperial life lines—the British Sea Trade Routes.

There were riots in 1946 in Bengal. Mr. Gandhi had been, therefore, on 'Repentance Tour' in the Bengal and Bihar.

In Bengal the I. N. A. (Indian National Army of Subash Chandra Bose) were widely regarded as heroic liberators, largely because they had been raised and commanded by a Bengali, Subash Chandra Bose, who had once successfully defied Gandhi's opposition to become President of the Congress—and who carried his enmity of the 'British Raj' to the point of linking up during Second World War with the Axis Powers and providing the Japanese with I. N. A. as an auxiliary force for their offensive on India. It was like cutting one's nose to spite one's face. But the Hindus called it heroic

and patriotic. Yet on April 2, 1947, Mr. Nehru had backed F. M. Auchinleck to the hilt as in the Assembly: "I. N. A.," he argued, was subjected to different pulls. There was the pull of loyalty to the army, there was the pull of a larger loyalty what one imagined was the good of the country. When loyalty is in conflict, the result is an inner conflict in the individual. When this happens, the best man suffers, the lesser man is insensitive. Not all the I. N. A. men were patriots, as with every one else, there is some good, some bad and some in the middle...". The old Kite was flown but with disguise. It was designed to create a '*detente*' without which no political solution would be worth—pin's fee. It was the first victory of Nehru over Mountbatten for his open diplomacy.

#### The Mystery of Greater Bengal Versus Security

It might be recalled that on 15th March, 1946 Cripps Mission visited India, which consisted of Hon'ble Lords Cripps, Pethric Lawrence and Alexander. They submitted a scheme, which is being stated here very briefly to depict the hypocrisy of the Indian National Congress worked versus the minorities :

- (a) Unitary India ; Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications under the Centre ;
- (b) Country to be divided into three groups—'A', 'B' and 'C' group—Bengal and Assam formed 'A' group.

It was accepted by Maulana Azad as Congress President, Mr. M. A. Jinnah as President of Muslim League and by the Government of India. However, soon after it Maulana Azad was replaced by Mr. Nehru as President of the Indian Congress.

On 27th July, 1946, Mr. Nehru issued a statement, which meant rejection of the plan, which had already been accepted by Mr. Azad as President of the Congress. Consequently Mr. Jinnah also withdrew his acceptance of the Mission's Scheme due to the new exposition of it given by Mr. Nehru. On 16th August, 1946 on Lord Wavell's request, Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru drove to Mr. Jinnah's house. But they failed to agree. Lord Mountbatten took up the threads and called a meeting of Governors of the Provinces to consider a new formula.

However, group 'A' Scheme, i.e., 'Greater Bengal' was killed by the Congress in a subtle way as it would give Muslims of Bengal who formed majority to their own Government, who could at a later date secede from India and declare Great Bengal or federate with Pakistan. It was revealing for the Muslim Congress members and the Europeans in Bengal. Sardar Patel's policy was reported in 22nd April's Hindustan Times :

“If there is a settlement between the Congress and the League as a result of which the Muslim majority areas are allowed to constitute themselves into separate Sovereign States, we have no doubt that the Union will not stand in the way of Britain establishing contacts with those States. It must be clearly understood, however, that the Indian Union will consider it a hostile act if there is any attempt by Britain to conclude any treaty or alliance involving military or political clauses...”.

There was threat—to which the British Government succumbed :

“His Majesty's Government had clearly enjoined Mount-

batten not to enter into any discussion on this matter which might imperil the changes of Indian Unity, to attain which had always been and would remain Mountbatten's first ambition and determination". States Campbell Johnson in "Mission with Mountbatten".

### **Bengali Muslims were Stabbed in the Back**

As a matter of interest, I reproduce an extract from Alen Campbell Johnson, s book, "Mission with Mountbatten", who has stated that on 15th April, 1947, how and why Bengal was partitioned once again in 1947 :

"J. D, Tysen, Secretary to the Governor (represented the Governor of Bengal who was ill and unable to attend the conference) reported, that there were twenty thousand Europeans in Bengal and that he was also seriously worried about the five thousand in the outlying districts. He felt that the chances of maintaining law and order in the province were very slim. Communist agitation—stronger here than anywhere else—was definite anti-European, and he believed that the Europeans were not looking ahead...".

"Tyson similarly examined the prospects for Bengal, if under partition. East Pakistan, he felt, would become a rural slum. There were some twenty-five million Hindus in Bengal—forty-five per cent of the population—and they all wanted to be absorbed into Hindustan. The concept of East Bengal was unacceptable to many local Calcutta Muslims. The relationship between Mr. Jinnah and the present Muslim Premier of Bengal Suhrawardy, was far from cordial. Suhrawardy is frightened of partition and is ready to play with the Hindus. Jenkins (Governor of the Punjab), too, spoke of the possible growth of anti-Pakistan opinion in the Punjab and

Bengal. The local Muslims would be satisfied to run Bengal as a Muslim-controlled Province”.

“The Governor of the Bihar drew attention to the concentration of wealth, mineral and iron. The industrial development of Chota Nagar was part of Suhrawardy's concept for the building up of an independent Bengal. Provincial devolution would be felt in the case of Bihar have wide repercussions.... Mountbatten considered, however, that East Bengal might control out...”. Panikar stressed that: “the constitution of the Muslim League had been weighted heavily in favour of the Muslims living in minority areas. This simple fact, he claimed, had enabled Mr, Jinnah to bring extra pressure on Muslim members living in majority areas. Bengali loyalties, he said, were increasingly cutting across those of Hindustan, and would require careful handling....”

#### **How Minority gained Power ?**

“...It is not difficult to see how the minds of the conspirators worked. These anti-Muslim elements jointly worked hard to bring the crisis to head. Mr. Gandhi, who had so far been patronizing Mr. Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy now dropped him like a hot potato and secretly gave accent to Lord Mountbatten to the partition of Bengal—though publically he kept on opposing the parition of Provinces of Bengal and Punjab.”

There were many other sinister motives behind the plan of creation of East Pakistan, such as

- (a) The economic interests of Europeans in Bengal, Bihar and Chota Nagpur would be preserved only if East Bengal was created as an economically

bankrupt area who would be dependent on the resources of West Bengal for her economic existence.

- (b) Hindus and Europeans could then form a majority party in the West Bengal Assembly. Those educated Muslims who hold political power in United Bengal would lose their identity as a majority party.
- (c) By acceding to the request of partition of the Indian Congress, Lord Mountbatten argued : that Bharat would co-operate most fully with British Government in safeguarding the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, which were in fact, life lines of the Imperial British economy and the Imperial Defence.
- (d) Pakistan would get another liability which would act as very heavy dead weight against its already economically sinking boat and would bring its death faster than otherwise,
- (e) At an opportune moment, it would be possible to stir up hatred in Eastern Bengal towards the Western wing, due to the fact that (during the British Raj) people in Bengal were led to believe as gospel truth that Punjabi and Pathans adventures as traders and mercenaries were responsible for all the ills, despite the instructions or orders issued to them by their British Officers.

'These are but only some of the points' which were used by the British rulers under their policy of '*Divide and Rule*'. Of course, our Muslim political leaders must share the burden of the blame for being lethargic, neither being inquisitive, nor being farsighted.

It is a sad commentary that Pakistani leaders fell in a

trap cleverly laid by the British and became too involved and occupied in the invasion of Kashmir by the Indian Army under a pre-conceived plan by Lord Mountbatten, and let slip vicious anti-League and anti-Pakistanis propaganda which went unabated and unchecked in East Pakistan under the very noses of the League Ministry. The nation has the right to know why ?

*'To understand the present we must know the past, for the present is the text and the past is largely its interpretation. We want no political pamphlet, no controversial monograph, but a sober, well considered, well equipped, well weighed historical work'.*

One of the grave errors, which I consider, have beset the Muslim in general in the Indian Sub-Continent pre-partition and even post-partition in policy making, is the emission of loud and effervescent noises and sounds, filling the air with threats to the non-Muslims and to take Indian National Congress and her satellites, Akali Dal, R.S.S., Mahasaba and Jansang lightly ; pay little attention to their moral collapse and also generally pay little attention to their strong points in action and their mode of subtle propaganda. In short, we omitted to follow the Holy Prophet's advice : "Know thyself, know thy enemy".

## CHAPTER II

### REFLECTIONS ON RECOLLECTIONS OF RANGRUT

#### Challenge and Response

The further is moulded by the past. The best promise for the future lies in understanding and applying the lessons of at least the past few decades. For this reason while discussing the problems which have been created by Bharat and White Hall ever since the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, under a pre-conceived plan in East Pakistan, more light may therefore come from tracing the whole course of the Bangladesh Movement-cum-Muslim League in Bengal. This will be attempted in separate chapters. If we realize how conditions of this movement came about there may be some prospects of averting a more deadly recurrence in our time.

The political condition in the world at the termination of Second World War - if it can be called an end of the war - brought in its wake '*cold war conflicts*'. The phrase '*the war to end war*' was on every one's lips though no measures had been taken to turn the Victories on the battlefield into reality. In India there was political unrest as the British hawks desired to set the clock back in order to redeem their losses in trade and to retain their stranglehold

grip on their colonies even through broken pledges which they had made during the war. The Indian Muslims had hoped that their long oppression had rolled away. But the future once again had become very heavy with forbidding. The Muslim League leaders with singular accuracy observed '*this is not independence*'. The great part of India was in throes of Civil Disobedience, riots and armed revolts in 1945-47.

In these pages, I will attempt to briefly recount some of the incidents and impressions only, which form in my mind, the story as it appeared in the press, or one who witnessed or one heard coming upon the people of East Pakistan as well as West Pakistan, of the worst tragedy in the tumultuous history of Pakistan since her emergence as an independent state. This presented itself not only in the destruction of life and property inseparable from war of hatred among Muslims and Muslims, and among communities, but also made hatred and lack of faith and trust between the two wings of the state, unnoticed, unchecked by the rulers of Pakistan who were lethargic. In this psywar every bond between a man and man, as well as between a Muslim and Muslim of the two wings perished. In the early stages (1970-71) crimes were committed by guerillas (Mukti Bahini—both Muslims and Hindus) under the Awami League flag—which were sponsored under a pre-conceived plan by the Indian Congress with the blessings and support of Soviet and British hawks to which the Government of Pakistan and Provincial Government allowed themselves to be ungrudgingly subjected, which find no equal in scale and wickedness with any that have darkened the human record. The Martial Law authorities sat and watched like '*Nero*' while Rome burned. Were they warned? We shall try to notice.

“Happy is he that is advised by what falleth on other”—Juvaini

History is the national panorama and Islam has the proved heritage to claim traditions set up by the Holy Prophet and his companions, which are not likely to fail or fall short of the expectations of the world at the large and the Muslims in particular. It was after the demise of the Quaid-e-Azam that the trail blazed by him, which if understood and applied correctly, would have helped to bring to its fullest realisation the ideology of Islam—‘Unity, faith, discipline’—which gave us ‘the mission, vitality and will’ to build selflessly the foundations for solidarity of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan based on freedom, justice, equity and forbearance.

As it is considered that the study of the period of rejuvenation of Indian Muslims outlines the struggle of Mujahids in India, it will be presented in the succeeding chapters. These Mujahids struggled hard to establish a homeland for the Muslims according to Quranic teachings and Laws. Their unshaken and steadfast loyalty to the Quran and traditions was responsible for the Emergence of Pakistan. Wise policy by the successors of Quaid-e-Azam would have crowned and fortified the two wings of Pakistan, instead a gaping void was opened in the Muslims of the two wings, It offered the strong elements of the Indian Congress and her satellites—the fanatic bodies such as, Mahasaba; the British hawks, the Soviets, the C. I. A. of U. S. A. and the hanger on Awami League (Mujib and his Mukti Bahini) to unite to undo Pakistan. The Revolutionary (Pak) Government stated: “It can never happen!” But it did happen, because we allowed anti-Pakistan elements to steal a march on us!

We Muslims of what is left of Pakistan, at length have emerged from a scene of material ruin and moral havoc the like of which have never darkened the imagination of former centuries. After all that we suffered and achieved, we find ourselves still confronted with problems and perils not less but far more formidable than those through which we have so narrowly made our way. *'It is due to dissensions within the Muslims and threat of annihilation from without'*.

It is my purpose as one who lived, acted and critically witnessed events in those days to show how easily this great tragedy of Muslims killing Muslims, could have been avoided. Hatred and war could have been prevented—if not entirely eliminated. How and why the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the Indian Congress, the C.I.A. (U.S.A., the British hawks and the Soviets, as well as, by the weakness of the virtuous. How the structure and habits of militant bodies - such as Mukti Bahinis, Indian guerrillas and fifth columnists—unless they are welded into large organism such as Indian Congress, lack those elements of persistence and conviction which alone can give security to the people. But the modest requirements—the might, civilization, burning quest for justice and peace—of the team i.e., the leaders of Indian Congress, British hawks, the Soviet, U.S.A. and the leaders of Awami League (Axis powers) were unable to supply. Instead of it, there was spite and malice among the Axis powers, while the Revolutionary regime in Pakistan had been overridden by wishful thinking. The Muslim leaders in both wings had overlooked the warning from Quran; *'because they were looking inwards'*: "O ye who believe! Take not for intimates those who are not your own, they would not fail to corrupt you, they love to ruin you. Hatred is uttered by their mouths but what their breasts hide is greater. We have made plain for signs if you would but understand", (3:118); because they were looking inwards.

Absorbed in their own affairs (selfish) and all abounding interests, activities and accidents of a free community, the Muslims of both wings gasped at the vast changes which were taking place under their very noses. They imagined, it was no concern of theirs. U.S.A. and other countries who had signed the pacts, when asked to honour the various pacts merely shrugged their shoulders. And all this while the United States remained only a passive spectator and did not '*lift arm embargo*', unlike Soviet Union who equipped Bharat with not only most modern weaponry, but also erected factories to manufacture arms and equipment as well as taught Bharat the '*know how*'. U.S.A. and Britain knew fully well that our battleships were old and also that Pakistan had neither enough aircraft cover, nor submarines. Neither the British nor can U.S.A. escape the censure of history. Indian Congress and Soviet Union regarded U.S.A. as a frightened flabby old woman who at worst would only bluster, and was anyhow incapable of making war in Asia because they said '*Let Asians fight the Asians*'. They had been struck by U.S.A.'s failure in war in Indochina. It has not been originally my intention to write why or how the war in East Pakistan engulfed Indian Congress, U.S.A. White Hall and Russia, but now I consider it is essential to give a brief account to depict the reasons for the past to enable us to '*forecast the future*'. I repeat that I am not doing it against any of them either for spite nor malice and also neither for glory nor for pelf. I work '*Fi Sabil Allah*' (gratis). I am offering it as a food for thought for both Pakistanis and Indians (Bharatis) we both must learn '*to live and let live*' or perish.

### The attractions

The attractions of the Middle East, Bangladesh and Pakistan as far as the Soviet Union is concerned can be easily

defined. Geographically, proximity to its two pronged strategic maritime policy in oceans in the East and the West, is an obvious factor. Ten years ago, or even five, one would not have mentioned M.E. and Persian Gulf oil in this contest, for until recently the Soviet Union was self sufficient in oil. But Soviet and her Warsaw Pact countries due industrialisation consumption, is now outstripping production, hence there is demand to import oil and natural gas in these countries. There is little doubt that toward the end of the present decade oil from these eastern countries will figure as a major factor in Soviet strategy. The first big consignment from Iraq has already left for Russia under the 15 years Friendship Pact with Iraq.

But more important than economic and even military factors such as, bases in Bharat, Bangladesh, Iraq or Egypt, Indochina and elsewhere, are political considerations. Expansion in South and Eastwards direction has been one of the constant factors in Russian Policy since the regime of Czars. Furthermore and more concretely, if these countries became an exclusive sphere of influence of Western bloc, this would have far reaching repercussion on the situation in Europe, as well as in Africa and Asia. In fact it would constitute a radical change in the global balance of power for either bloc, as well as, for China and the countries of a Third World bloc.

Again Soviet policy in these above mentioned countries at present aims, very briefly, at the neutralisation of CENTO Powers especially Turkey and Iran, since Pakistan have been truncated, and at the installation in the Arab world of regimes on which it can rely for close cooperation and collaboration on the pattern of 15 year Mutual Friendship Pact for collaboration under President Saadat, Mrs. Indra Gandhi, Mr. Mujib and the President of Iraq. The general assumption behind this

policy is that power in these countries (so called non-aligned)—despite occasional setbacks, is bound to pass gradually into the hands of people even more closely indentified with Soviet aims.

But the more deeply the Soviet Union becomes involved in the East, the more complicated its position. To certain extent this was inevitable process, while the West was 'in' and the Soviet Union 'out'. Moscow did not have to take sides—just as it could be on friendly terms with Egypt, Pakistan, India and other eastern countries. The West had the monopoly of 'committing mistakes', whereas the Soviet Union 'could do no wrong'. But progressive involvement in Eastern countries, for example Indo-Pak affairs, meant that Moscow has had to choose sides in such existing conflicts. In spite of the fact that Soviet policy had reconciled to the fact that political power will remain for a long time to come in the hands of military junta in Indochina and many other Asian and African countries, was not viewed as major threat to Soviet's penetration. Anyway when the question choosing came there was little doubt that Soviets would prefer India, just as they would prefer Helsinki over Tirana-Governments because 'the Pakistani military leaders' were radical democrats in uniform and 'petty bourgeois' in spirit and action. Objective logic of events would carry them into much closer collaboration with Islamic ideology than Islam. Moreover in the recent, it had been realised by the Soviet that their appraisal that these military leaders can turn 'right' and 'left' in rapid succession with equal ease, has been proved as over-optimistic. As a result there is now hardly veiled disappointment in Moscow about their agonisingly slow or even no progress made by commission in Pakistan or the Muslim World—or Third World. Nationalisation of industries and agrarian reforms by no means lead to socialism

or communism. It was announced by the military rulers in Pakistan that they would gradually democratise political life, that is, hand over power to the avant-grade, the socialists. But in fact they had not shown the slightest intention to do so. According to Soviet expectations the military were to be political—made to share power with civil leaders. In the opposite had happened, political life had been militarised. In other words, unless the pro-Russian forces make steady and marked progress the overall balance as far as Soviet Union is concerned may be negative. No wonder Soviet Union openly backed India both diplomatically and with weaponry in the creation of Bangladesh. The U.S.A., Britain and Cento and Seato countries helplessly watched the transformation. There is every reason to assume that these contradictions in the Arab World—and in the so called Third (Muslim World) will loom larger in the years ahead.

#### **The writing on the wall—which was ignored**

One must learn to live with the bitter fruits of self-inflicted defeat—for we deserve no better, and now an equal peace terms from a manifestly unequal position. The imbalance in the fields of political, diplomat, psychological and military—lest it is removed—will have its inevitable impact on the course of negotiations that are going on. History tells us it inflicted First World War on the peoples of the world and later on unequal position adopted by the belligerents—the victors and the so called vanquished '*at the point pistol*' brought in its wake Second World War, as well as, the cold war conflicts. Moreover it was the language of the victors which has drawn so much blood and inflicted sorrow and hatred in Asia and Africa—nay even in Europe and Americas.

History repeats itself, though inward looking and unwise

leaders say—'it will never happen again'. Self-confidence is mixed blessing in international affairs. It can induce a sense of satisfaction that breeds generosity, or it can express itself in the assertive spirit that makes empires and wars. Both these moods are present today, in a Bharat bursting with self confidence after its 13 days victory over Pakistan in December, 1971—a victory for which she had worked so hard since 1946. And same blend is shaping Bharat's (and Bangladesh's) current approach to its defeated neighbour. Bharatis are determined to terminate the 24 year old cease fire line in Kashmir and wish Pakistan to accept the present cease fire line into a firm international boundry. "When an Indo-Pakistan agreement is finally reached all outstanding issues between two countries must have been resolved; the Bharatis are unequivocal about this." Officials insist that 'Bharat does not want an inch of Pakistani territory'—yet, the only thing that is non-negotiable is any concession to Pakistan's long-standing demand for a referendum in the Bharati—held part of Kashmir.

Bharatis are adamant about another point: the new treaty will not be a 'latterday version of the 1966 agreement at Tashkent'. This time a victorious India will go it alone. Anyway, the Russians have little leverage left in Pakistan. Still, Indians say, there is a third party who could persuade Mr. Bhutto to swallow a bottle of bitter pills—Mr. Nixon. Yet, Mrs. Gandhi told a meeting that India would not be bound by any Chinese-American attempt to dictate terms to Asian countries.

### Prisoners of War (POW)

A Pakistan re-armed to the teeth by America, and strong China is the last thing India wants. Indians make it clear that Mr. Bhutto must accept a military imbalance on the sub-continent

as one of the elements of a durable peace; hence Mrs. Indira Gandhi is swallowing a bitter pill in her turn to feed 93,000 P.O.W's even at the expense of her own starving Bharatis. In fact, as a political lever, the Indian officials point out, the POW are technically outside the purview of bilateral negotiations between Bharat and Pakistan, since they surrendered to a joint Indian-Bangladesh Command—forgetting purposely that the so called Bangladesh Command had at that time no status except that of an insurgent rebels. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Mr. Mujib, the Soviet Union and the British Government thus are in fact trying to twist Mr. Bhutto's arm to force him to recognize Bangladesh as pre-requisite before any submit talks can begin.

#### **Another pre-condition**

Another unspoken pre-condition is that Pakistan should acknowledge its roots in the Indian cultural area—the Akhand Bharat, the dream stated by Mr. Nehru in his book 'Discovery of India'. Indian Congressmen in general and Mrs. Indira Gandhi in particular are dismayed at the fact that Mr. Bhutto may decide to turn its back on Akhand Bharat in favour of closer relationship with Afghanistan, Iran (which according to Mr. Nehru's theory form part of Akhand Bharat) and the Muslim World of Asia and Africa. What Indian Congress would like to see is the fulfilment of Mr. Nehru's dream of Akhand Bharat in the West, North West and North and East of Bharat—now that Bangladesh is at her heel. The next step in the scenrio would be for Ceylon, Burma, Malaysia and Indonesian Islands. These appendix F.

India's confidence and assertmeness are now here more striking than its present attitude as "Bhai Bhai" towards the Soviet Union—because Bharat knows that Soviet needs Bharat

to crush United States global strategy as well as to place an iron wall to stop the emergence of China as a great power in the East. Not a harsh word can be heard about Soviets in India, the Congress Government and its critics speak with one voice about the virtues of Indian-Soviet treaty of 1971 which has given them victory over the Muslims after a lapse of centuries.

### **We had been warned**

We must face facts and should not rely on glories of past only. We must learn lessons from the past and should not use history as fables. Wine and women has destroyed many powerful nations in the past and its evil effects will continue to be very destructive and devastating in the future—though only those who are foolish say: '*it will never happen again*'—in spite of fact—it has happened again and again. The ill and evil effects of poor leadership has turned the victorious Pak armed forces into a defeated hords. We must accept that we as a nation have been humbled to the extreme. Yet everything is not lost. Rangrut has witnessed disasters and defeats in the First World War in Iraq (Mesopotamia), Iran and on the North Western Frontier battlefields in 1919-38. Rangrut happened to be also in the retreats during Second World War in Dunkirk (France), on the Assam-Burma Front and he was one of those who fought along with Britains with their backs to the Wall in the Battle of Britain, as a soldier of the British Empire. The British survived because they were determined to fight back and retrieve the honour and glory of the nation which had been blemished by those who believed in '*Munich Pact*' in letter and spirit. The leadership was changed by the people. The defeated nation once again became one of the Victorious nations.

Let us look back to Muslim nations. The Turkish Empire

lost the war in 1919 and it was parceled out. But when everything, it seemed, had been lost, then a Turk—son of a poor Turk—awakened the nation. Turkey was brought back on the map of the world by A'a-Turk (son of a Turk) as a powerful independent nation. Again it was the dominating leadership of a civilian lawyer, Mr. M. A. Jinnah who won a home—Pakistan—for the Indian Muslims.

We defended our homeland and honour against wanton aggression by Bharat in 1947-48 and 1965. We should be proud of it. But the fact which should have glared at our face is, that we committed the unforgiveable blunder:

a) by overplaying it i.e. 1965 war as a great victory. By believing in false propaganda as gospel truth, although it was a well fought, at best, an action in self defence.

b) by allowing ourselves to be lulled to sleep by overestimated our strength even in defence, let alone as an aggressive power.

c) by being deceived by the false propaganda by our Government—because we did not heed the advice of the Holy Prophet: '*know thyself and know thy enemy*'.

d) because we forgot that the Quran has enjoined Jihad on every '*Pakistani Muslim and Muslimah*' (2:216). "Warfare is prescribed for you, though it be not to your liking..."

However, let us now having learnt a most bitter and humiliating experience look to the future with courage, and determining to win back our honour. We can do it if we now '*stop washing our linen in public*' and get to work. We should admit the fact that we remained silent spectators for the last 24 years

i.e. since the death of Quaid-e-Azam and did not ever raise our little finger in protest against what the leaders of the past did, or omitted to do, or the way they acted.'

Yet some people accuse the writers—the editors of papers, magazines or editors of books. In this case Rangrut can state with clear conscience that he tried his best to awaken his Pakistani brothers and sisters by presenting more than 52 books in Urdu and English on Jihad, as a comparative study against strategy of the leaders of both blocs. But I am sad to state that very few have read those books inspite of the fact that elite of the literary world in both blocs acknowledged it as a pioneering work of very great value. Rangrut presented these books '*Fi Sabil Allah*' and neither for pelf nor for glory. There were also many other writers who did warn the public.

*'The lessons of the sweep of history are clear enough.'*

**"Approve not for another what thou approvest not for thyself"**

The Lahore Resolution passed unanimously by over 1,00,000 members in 1940 ran as follow:

"Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically is a majority as in the north western and eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute '*independent states*' in which the conststuent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

When I looked up the Quaid-i-Azam's speeches I came across a very significant observation with regard to the scheme of federation in his Presidential address delivered at the 30th Session of the All-India Muslim League in Delhi on April 24, 1943. I quote :—

“Federation however described and in whatever terms it is put, must ultimately deprive the federating units of the authority in all vital matters. The units, despite themselves, would be compelled to grant more and more powers to the central authority, until in the end of strong Central Government will have been established by the units themselves and they will be driven to do so by absolute necessity, if the basis of a Federal Government is accepted. Taking for instance the United States and her history, the Dominions of Canada and Australia, the Union of South Africa and Germany and of other lands where federal or confederal systems have been in existence, necessity has driven the component members and obliged them to increase and delegate their power and authority to the connecting link, namely the Central Government.

“It is not of much importance whether the units in theory have the residuary powers of the Centre. But once the units accept the basis of a Federal Government it follows that it will inevitably and out of sheer all-powerful Central Authority and the units will be compelled to grant and delegate more and more powers to the Centre, which also can hold these units as connecting links, more or less like a country council or glorified municipalities or feudatory states under the central authority.” The Quaid-i-Azam had given these arguments against establishing a Federal Government of United India comprising eleven provinces.

It is considered that Quaid-i-Azam, reflecting the true aspirations of the nation, referred to the establishment of Pakistan as only a means to an end—the end being *‘a state in which we could live and breathe as freeman and which we could develop according to our lights and culture and where principles of Islamic social justice could find free play.’*

In a broadcast to the people of Australia on February 19, 1947, the Quaid said: “West Pakistan is separated from East Pakistan by about a thousand miles of the territory of India. The first question that a student from abroad should ask himself is: how can this be? How can there a unity of government between areas so widely separated? I can answer this question in one word. It is *‘faith’*—in Almighty God in ourselves and in our destiny.”

Elucidating the point further, the Quaid-i-Azam said: “The great majority of us are Muslims. We follow the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad (may peace be on Him). We are members of the brotherhood of Islam in which all are equal in right, dignity and self-respect. Consequently we have a special and a very deep sense of unity.”

Lest we forget, that we failed on Constitution making even in 1971—let us see what Quaid-i-Azam said:

“The constitution of Pakistan can only be formed by the *‘Millat and the people’*. Prepare yourselves and see that you frame a constitution which is to your heart’s desire. There is lot of misunderstanding. A lot mischief is created. Is it going to be on Islamic Government? Is it not begging the question? Is it not a question of passing a vote of censure on yourself? The constitution and the Government will be what the people will decide.” Quaid-i-Azam, 14.8.47.

Serious trouble began when the opposition to the federal principle began soon after the death of Quaid-i-Azam. It is a well known how the First Constituent Assembly (mostly of Muslim League members) found its way to constitution making barred by violent differences over the question of division of powers between the federation and constituent units—provinces—i.e. soon after the Basic Principles Committee had finalised its report. This (1940) Resolution having been enshrined in the Indian Independence Act, 1947 which together with the Government of India Act, 1935 formed '*the provisional constitution*' of the Federation of Pakistan.

The Third Governor-General—a civil servant—in the discretion, sacked the Council of Ministers in contravention clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 8 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 which said: "Provision as require the Governor-General or any Governor to act in his discretion or exercise his individual judgement as respects any matter shall cease to have effect as from the appointed day (August 15, 1947)."

Emboldened by its unqualified success, a year later when the First Constituent Assembly was about to consider the draft constitution-based on the federal principle—as '*coup d'etate*'—the Assembly was prorogued by the Governor General—not withstanding the fact that it was the sovereign Constituent Assembly. However, the following factors should be noted:

a) the Independence Act, 1947 was the creation of the British hawks of the White Hall and the Indian Government with the connivance of the Indian Congress (Mountbattan-Nehru Simla Conspiracy). Both desired a united India, though their ideas on its form differed. The British wanted to keep her stranglehold on India, yet the Congress hoped through co-

operation with Mountbatten whom they voted to be a common Governor-General of Bharat and Pakistan, they hoped to reunite Bharat and Pakistan in due course.

b) Quaid-i-Azam did not live long enough to break up the ring of sabōtors and quislings planted by the British in Pakistan. How they succeeded will be explained in another chapter.

Soon after Quaid's death four provinces of West Pakistan and the princely states and the Independent tribal areas were merged into 'One Unit' of West Pakistan. The other unit being East Pakistan. This was done in utter disregard of popular feeling, the Federal principle and in violation of fundamental law—which made the federal principle immune to legislative vagaries.

Then came, the Martial Law which gave protection to the bad law from being struck down by the judiciary, whose jurisdiction for the first time was blatantly abridged. The jurisdiction of the highest court of judicature in a dispute between the federation and a province as also the power to probe the vires of federal laws in respect of provinces was barred. It could be seen how disregard and violation of the federal principle made those political leaders in the first and second instances, civil servants and the military revolutionaries—who had assumed power, committed sin upon sin—wrongful dismissal of cabinet of government who had wrongly tried to stay in power and which did not enjoy the confidence of the public, wrongfully prorogued the Sovereign Constituent Assembly; and wrongful abridgement of the freedom of the judiciary and the people. No genuine effort to put the country back on the rails was made. As one thing leads to another the rot that set in original by the political leaders, who had scrapped a Constituent Assembly,

was made into a running chronic sore by a civil servant and the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces who had sworn to defend the law. No wonder, when one hawk dismissed the other, there was no shedding of tears of sorrow by the public who lay prostrate. The enemies of Pakistan had stolen a march in the diplomatic and political field, i.e. psywar.

Both democracy and federal principles stand and fall, and fell with the respect of fundamental law and independent judiciary for the enforcement of fundamental law—denied respect for fundamental law, neither democracy nor federal principle, could be immunised against the vagaries of guerrilla partism—as it is only too evident from our own brief history of the last twenty-four years. We will see the mighty fall after the death of Quaid-i-Azam, farewell to federal principle, farewell to the ways with democracy, farewell to Islamic ideology, justice, equity, brotherhood and tolerance.

### CHAPTER III

“Thy remedy is within thee and thou dost not see, and thy illness cometh from thee and thou dost not know.”—Hazrat Ali (661 C.E.)

#### THE EMERGENCE OF MUSLIM LEAGUE AND BALANCE OF POWER IN TRIANGLE STRUGGLE IN BENGAL

In order to reach a well balanced and sober judgement it is essential we should make use of historical periscope. We thus may hope to find why and how it happened in East Pakistan since the partition. In this prospect we have to repeat—though briefly—the economic-cum-political power history of Bengal, in order to clarify the methods and tools that were and are being used by the belligerents in the Triangular conflict. *‘Do we, all of us, know the causes of our sufferings? How can we find something which can relieve us of our mental, economic and political uneasiness? What can we do about it?’*

**We connived to let historical events to repeat itself**

It is indeed a very sad commentary that the Muslim

League leaders, as well as the Muslims of Pakistan allowed themselves to fall a prey to mischievous anti-Muslim propaganda of Indian Congress which grew in great volume soon after the demise of Quaid-e-Azam because it was neither countered, nor checked by the Pakistanis. What happened in East Pakistan pre-partition, since partition and particularly in 1952-54, was consequently repeated in 1970-71 but with more perfection, is a most painful part of the past 24 years old history of Pakistan. The anti-Pakistani elements stole a march over us. How and Why? However, I propose to depict affairs in army as an example, simply because I was closely associated with it.

### The guide-lines

When India in pre-partition period was a British Colony the British had laid guidelines as regards the studies and training of Indian (both King's and Viceroy's) Commissioned Officers. When Indian Officers became senior enough in service and experience to hold administrative appointments on command and staff, the British hierarchy issued '*classified instructions*', some of these were delivered to British Officers by name, both in civil and military departments. British, therefore, excluded political subjects from Indian armed forces formations but not from British Officers and British troops. The clubs were the meeting places of both the civil and military officials in India. That was the main reason why most clubs, such as Punjab club, Sind club, till the day of partition of India, were reserved for British membership only. Even those clubs, such as Wheeler Club, Meerut and Peshawar Clubs, the Indians were accepted as ordinary members, but the membership of the executive committee was elected from

the British members only. In these clubs the British members discussed every aspect of political, economic and administrative problems facing the Government.

The Indian Congress was not slow in the uptake and created cells in the clubs, through the servants who pretended to be loyal to the British yet they passed on all important news to the Congress. This arrangement became easy as there were many Police, non-Gazetted, Gazetted officials as well as the senior Indian Police and Civil Service Officials who secretly assisted the Congress. The Congress was, therefore, well posted about national and international events which the Government handled.

However, even at time of the birth of Pakistan we created no such cells to feel the pulse of the civil and military officials.

### Swastika to Chakra

Let us return to history which is indeed the projection of the present into the past. Has science doomed the old way? Impatience is an expensive luxury. Again patriotism is not enough, people must learn how to defend it and their homeland. The pages of history of many nations are stained, with the names of those who have sacrificed national and ideological (i.e. Islamic) interests, not with the single purpose of defeating a national enemy, or to advance a great cause, but for lesser object of keeping some individual, or party in power, regardless of their ultimate influence upon the issue of security of the nation. Human memories might be short but history repeats itself. Where is the Congress Government in Bharat going and to achieve what object? How and why Mr. Mujib-

ur-Rahman and some members of Awami League joined hands with Indian Congress ?

## I

### **The British—Peaceful Penetration**

One of the first Englishmen to visit India was Thomas Stevens, of New College, Oxford, a member of the Society of Jesus. The letters which Jesuit Missionary wrote are said to have done much to rouse a great desire to trade in the East as well as for conquests. It was a copy of the policy of the clergy and the nobles in Europe, which they had followed in the Holy land in the tenth and eleventh centuries. The clergy outwardly came as advance guard under the cover to propagate religion, but in fact they came for economic and political moves—i.e. as expansionists and crusaders. They formed various militant orders of the Knights, such as, the Free Masons, Hospitalars and Templers. The Dukes and Lords followed, who were followed by the free booters.

The First British ambassadore, Sir Thomas Roes presented his credentials in 1625 A. D. in the court of Moghul Emperor Jehangir for concessions for import and export goods by the East India Company, whose members consisted mostly of landless sons of Lords and Barons who wished to come as adventurers to the East to carve new state as they had done in the Holy land for themselves. The Dutch, French and Portugese also came.

Little by little the clergy and Directors of the East India Company succeeded in extending the field of their commercial, ideological, Cultural and militant intrigue operations.

During Shah Jahan's rule they obtained from him trading concessions in Bengal and Coromandel Coast. In the seventeenth century they built forts under the cover of security for the English at Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Fort St. David 26 miles south of Pondicherry. While the English were daily growing stronger and the time was now approaching when the strength would be tested as rivals of local dissension ridden Indian princes who were but very nominally under the Emperor at Delhi. The plans of the English in religio-commercial and intrigue materialised beyond their expectations, i.e., in the field of interference in the dissensions of Indian princes as well as in trade and commerce.

Compare it as you like, you will find the British policy of penetration in religious, trade, commerce and conquest in India a very good but improved copy of the policy of the clergy and stateless sons of the British and French nobles in the Holy land, in Africa and Mediterranean Sea, its islands and coast line in tenth and eleventh centuries. The victories in the battle at Buxar in 1764 were so productive for the British that the Directors of the East India Company were amazed, as they beheld the large fortunes with which their servants were returning to Britain. The English had won their battles mainly through causing dissension among the Indian princes and assisted by the intrigues of their Hindu Ministers who acted as collaborators of the British who had given them hopes—which were never fulfilled—of power and wealth.

A very important change—though temporary—in the policy of the British took place when they replaced old Indian princely order by creating new Indian princes, especially

newly created Hindu princely states. Another noticeable move in British policy in religious and cultural breakthrough was the creation of new cults, such as, the Mahrattas and Sikhs, among Hindus. But when the Mahrattas became hostile, then Peshwa element, i. e. the priestly class like the Brahmin, among the Mahrattas was encouraged and financially helped to weaken the power of Mahratta princes. This policy was also persued by the British amongst the Sikhs by dividing them into Khatri, Akali, Mona, Mazhabi and Jats Sikhs. More classes were created among both Hindus and Muslims, under '*Martial and non-Martial class*' system.

After the war of American Independence, the British statesmen began to consider India as a fair substitute for the lost territories in America: Accordingly, Pitt's India Bill of 1784 was passed to gain a firm stranglehold on India. Having nearly liquidated the Indian Muslim princes, now permanent land settlement was introduced by Lord Cornwallies by which the Muslim nobles as farmers, traders, industrialists and common Muslim ryots were reduced to the state of tenants, e.g. landless labourers. In this way the landless British nobles became Zamindars and the Muslim owners of land now became their tenants. For diplomatic reasons, some Hindu money lenders and capitalists were also given the status of Zamindars.

### **A Change in Britlsh Policy**

When Marquis of Hastings became Governor General (1813-1823) a policy of active interference in India politics was adopted, for example, against the Gurkhas of Nepal and the Nawabs of South and the Mahrattas. In fact, the Forward policy of interference became the guiding prin-

principle of British statesmen in the administration of Indian affairs. In 1858 the Crown took over the sovereignty of India. India was reorganised as a colony of the Crown. The dream of Hindus that they would replace Muslim rule over India since seventh century, was now dashed to the ground by the Queen Victoria's Proclamation in 1876 as Queen assumed the title of Empress of India. Triangle Struggle was reborn.

The struggle in this '*balance of power in triangle*' struggle was uneven for the Muslims. The British hawks proved to be the strongest party as they had full backing of the Government machinery and followed a well-conceived plan and a policy. On the other hand the Hindus were following too ambitious, wishful hope, hence they soon found themselves in a dilemma. The Muslims who had fallen a prey to dissensions, were the losers inspite of their valiant resistance. Because, they had to fight on two fronts, as the British hawks had joined hands with Hindus to keep the Muslims down. They now became a weak and silent minority.

#### **Frustration brings Hindus in Conciliatory Mood towards Minorities.**

It is sufficient for our purpose to say now that, when the British included India in her British Empire, they created a strong impression that the rulers of United Kingdom would never tolerate the establishment and exercise of political control from inside, or any outside power over India. The British policy forced the Hindu a change in their outlook as well as in policy towards the British and the Muslims, They, in order to achieve their

objective of the creation of Bharat, changed their hostile policy to a conciliatory one towards the minorities.

### **The First Indian National Congress—its Birth.**

The following were the causes that led to the convocation of the First Indian National Congress in Bombay in 1885.

a) The distrust which Indian and Europeans viewed each other was assuming the proportion of a bridgeless abyss. Accordingly, Hindus under the spell of a dilemma caused by the frustration, and the Muslims under British reprisals, adopted a policy of conciliation.

b) The '*new Indian priestly and princely orders*'<sup>2</sup> created by the British had found its feet and had become the most faithful ally of the British. They openly crushed the independence feelings of their country-men—Indians.

c) 1905 (both civil and military) so called, 'Reforms' had very grievously disappointed both the Hindus and the Muslims, especially the Black Act (Vernacular Press Act), had caused widespread discontent among the Indians.

d) The Land Reforms and control of trade and treasury, by the British rule, under Pitt's India Bill, had now awakened under Permanent Settlement Bill of Economic Reform the Hindu Zamindars, the money-lenders and the Hindu merchants etc. By these measures the Indians were practically excluded from all the higher offices and they now could only secure very subordinate positions in services of the Company or in trade, or economic structure.

she were a dominion of packages rather than a dominion of men and he left India with not only the politically minded minority raw and smarting, but with that minority, in Bengal at least, in closer rapport with the non-political majority than ever before. Curzon bequeathed a situation where the British were obliged to politics—and to play politics openly—in order to defuse a political time bomb. After Curzon, British India could never appear as an administrative state again as a British possession and this, let it be recalled, nearly a decade before that first great European War of the twentieth century which so weakened the White man's creditability as the selected rulers of creation."

### **Balancing and Rule**

"But in that decade the British in India were still able to play politics from strength or at least to choose the kind of politics they would play. The politics they wished to play were those of '*balancing and rule*' or of encouraging a babble of voices in India so that no strong voice could be heard above the din which might rivet the attention of all upon its call to depose the British from their ruling position. One of the voices the British wished to joined the babble was that of the Muslims".

**"Muslim League not a creation of the British Rulers" says Prof. Hardy**

"Many have alleged that any voice in India in the first decade of the twentieth century was that of the British Ventriloquist...If '*the Simla deputation (1906) had been a command performance*', it would be surprising to find the players arguing so much about their script. However, I hope Dr. Rehman would agree that the members of the Simla deputation knew in advance that they would not to say the least, meet with

a hostile reception from Lord Minto (Viceroy), and this foreknowledge powerfully influenced, the requests they made and the manner of the Indian National Congress had germinated under equally favourable atmospheric conditions so far as officialdom was concerned".

"...By 1906 the question was not whether Muslims would have an All India political organisation, but whether they would have a cautious and conservative or a radical political organisation. As Sir Harcourt Butler (later Governor U.P.) was to note: "later there was never any question of any '*splendid loyalty*' of Muslims to the British, but how rather to prevent the younger and predominantly English-educated Muslims of the professional classes from abandoning the curriculum of the '*Anglo-Mohammadan School (at Aligarh)*.....' The British policy seem to me to have been one of '*divide and rule*' within the Muslim community, a policy of trying to keep Muslims away not only from Congress politics, but also from the militancy displayed by those Muslims whom Minto's successor, Hardinge (as Viceroy) was elegantly to describe in official correspondence as "Mohammad Ali (Jauhar) and his gang". It is this policy that helps to explain the success of Muslim agitation against Lord Morley's electoral college scheme, once the British realized the strength of this agitation and that agitation was mainly led by Muslims with whom it should be possible to work on a conservative basis in the enlarged provincial Councils".

#### **Muslim Leaders in Search of followers**

".....If members of the League were in the event elected in the separate Muslim electorate under the first elections to be held after the Morley-Minto Reforms, it was by reason of their personal, local and provincial prestige and not by reason

of any subscription to the League programme—which indeed in 1909 did not exist. Indeed, after those first elections the League continued for nearly two years to present the appearance not only of *'leaders in search of followers'* but also of *'leaders in search of some goal towards which to lead'*. No doubt it was tacit British appreciation of these difficulties of the League that explains why anxiety over a possible *réponse* did not enter into British calculations before the revocation of the partition of Bengal”.

Mr. Hardly adds: “Henceforth for Muslims too there were to be no settled facts and no reluctance to put pressure upon a government (the revocation of the partition educational reforms and Zamindari system) apparently now revealed as so vulnerable to pressure. It was irrelevant that in 1910 the Muslim League had been a debating society many of whose members seemed to have more important things to do. What mattered now was that it existed as a ready made arena for the display of Muslim gladiatorial talents...many Muslim members of Congress such as, Ali Brothers, Mr. M. A. Jinnah also joined the League but not to be the exclusion of their Congress membership. The *'Objective resolution of December 1912'* with its demand for self government in a *'suitable'* for India, its proclamation of loyalty not, as hitherto, to the British Government but to the British Crown, and its call to promote national unity by fostering public spirit among the people of India and by co-operating with other communities spoke, after just six years, a very different language from that of Simla deputation which had begged *'most respectfully'* to approach Lord Minto with an address for his *'favourable consideration'*”.

“...In the Cawnpore Mosque incident of 1914, Hardinge's bowing to the storm of Muslim protest, however graceful, revealed how sensitive the Government of India had become

to any possibility of an alliance between the younger Muslim Leadership and the advanced wing of Congress. The government knew very well the weakness of the Conservative Muslim when faced with the cry of '*religion in danger*'. By 1914, the Muslim League, against the background of Muslim suspicion of British over the Balkan Wars, over her developing association with Russia and France, countries with recent records of imperialist attack upon parts of the hitherto independent Muslim World, was becoming more Muslim and less a League of gentlemen for preserving their gentility. The Lucknow pact of 1916 surely signified that although the '*League may have begun its life as an army of all officers and no privates*' in so far as it was now raising the banner of Islam it was drawing in the privates, and must be accepted by others as a serious political force..." Mr. Hardy's statement ends.

### **Indian Congress in search of Policy**

It is hoped that readers would agree, that contrary to the widespread misconception which was given by the British hawks that the Muslims and the Hindus hated one another for centuries, and that Congress-League confrontation is merely another phase in this long cycle of mutual animosity is not true, there is, however, one thing crystal clear that in spite of tolerance and justice as well as equity shown by the Muslim rulers towards their Hindu subjects and British missionaries and adventurers—the British hawk's were still suffering from defeats that they had received in the Holy land in thirteenth century at the hands of the Muslims. There is probably no place on earth even today where the conquerors i.e. the Muslims in India of a country shortly after the conquests, had appointed the conquered subjects—for example, Hindus in this case—as Prime Ministers, as Commanders-in-Chief and generals, as the Muslim d

since Mohammad bin Qasim laid the foundation of a Muslim State in India. The Muslims remained rulers of India for centuries where peace, equity, tolerance and harmony was practised, on a scale which did not exist, or even now exists anywhere in the World.

### The Guidelines

If the hue and cry by the Hindus at the partition of Bengal in 1905 had created a sense of self defence among Muslims in India, Balfour Declaration had now awakened the Indian Muslims from their slumber for a demand of homeland for the Muslims in India, it also drew the attention of Indian Congress to study and follow the method adopted by the Zionists. All Catholics in Germany were not Nazis, but only some Germans accepted the Nazi Cult, similarly majority of the Jews in the world Jewery were not Zionists, yet they have succeeded in persuading the World in believing that they alone represented the Germans or Jews.

The hierarchy of the Indian congress similarly argued '*why the Congress should not claim to be the sole representative of all Indians*'—or at least of all Hindus and other minorities as the Zionists are doing for the entire Jews who are spread all over the World? In spite of opposition by many members of Congress Committee—which had now divided the Congress into '*forward bloc*' and '*Moderates*'—the Congress laid the foundation of underground satellite militant bodies among the Hindus. The clarion call was made that '*Hindu religion was in danger*'.

The Sedition Committee Report of Bengal 1918 says "The agitation was Hindu and drew its strength from BHADARLOK (respectable brave people). It was keenly resented by the

Muhammadans, who form the majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Bengal; and thus throughout the year 1906—07, Hindu and Muhammadan relations were exceedingly strained in that province."

#### **Anusilan Samiti Psywar**

To undo the partition and organisation named "Anusilan Samiti" was set up with the main offices in Calcutta and Dacca. At one time the Dacca office controlled five hundred branches in the villages and towns of East Bengal of the Hindu press, was to the Hindu scriptures and the Hindu deities. The "Dacca Gazette" welcoming the festival of Puja wrote: "Indian Brothers, there is no more time for lying asleep. Behold, the Mother is coming! Oh Mother, the giver of all good. Turn your eyes upon your degraded children. Mother, they are stricken with disease and sorrow. Oh Shyama, the reliever of all the three kinds of afflictions, relieve our sorrow. Come Mother, the destroyer of the demons and appear at the gates of Bengal".

The "Barisal Hitaishi" added: Why should you despair of success? Look at Kartiki, the god who is the chief commander of the armies of gods, who has stationed himself to the right of the Mother: he is coming forward with his bow, to assist you against the demons of sin, who stand in the way of your accomplishing that great object and as he is up in arms, who can resist?" Yet another paper of East Bengal namely "Khulnavasi" made the same politico-religious appeal and said: "Awake, Oh Goddess Durga: I see the lightning flashing from the point of thy bow, the world quaking at thy frowns and creation trembling under thy thread. Let a river of blood flow overwhelming the hearts of the demons".

#### **No Muslim Press**

Against that campaign Muslims in 1905-11 could do nothing. They had no press worth the name and the only Muslim weekly the "Mussalman" that existed in Calcutta was

a silent spectator for it was more of a nationalist than of a separatist paper.

A series of articles written in Urdu by Dr. Nazir Ahmad, the well known novelist and social reformer appeared in an Urdu journal of Calcutta which presented the Muslim viewpoint but the Hindu press campaign was too formidable. Moreover, the Muslim relied on the British who repeatedly declared that partition of Bengal was a settled fact and no amount of Hindu agitation could undo that.

### **What was done is now undone in 1911.**

In 1911, came the shock. The partition of Bengal was revoked by royal proclamation. This was a clear betrayal of Muslim interest. Even Lord Minto said in the House of Lords : "We told the Mussalmans that the partition was a settled fact and over and over asserted that it must continue to be so. We assured the Musلمان population of Eastern Bengal of our appreciation of their loyalty and our determination to safeguard their interests. I should think there could have been scarcely a civil servant in India who had not declared that it would be impossible for the British Government to reverse the decision it had come to as regards the partition of Bengal...".

The congress followed the Zionist's Haganah as model for their military training organisation, as well as, infiltration of Hindus, though under various names, such as, Arya Smaj Seva Sangh, Shudhi and Awami Muslim League in Eastern Bengal. However, it was a poor copy of Haganah due to the unsurmountable weakness of Hindu caste system and untouchability. Moreover, there was another factor which was indeed a very powerful one, i.e., the Zionists were helped by the British who were the mandatory power in Palestine, with money, material and by military mission. In India pre-parti-

tion, the case was different as the British Government were now pursuing the policy of '*Balancing and rule*'. The Hindus were in delimita due to dissensions caused by caste, class and other factors such as untouchability and religious intolerance.

### **Congress on the horns of a Dilemma in Twenties and Thirties**

Indian Congress who had hoped to become rulers of India found that they had now pre-partition to fight on more than two fronts, i.e., the British hawks, the Muslim League and to compete with Christian Missionaries, British traders, industrialists, the minorities such as Sikhs and untouchables to name only few obstacles.

To meet the situation, Congress divided itself into (a) the right (b) the left and neutral (c) and loyalist to British ; wings. In other words, the Congress decided to play in the diplomatic field with more than one string, so as to be able to meet various eventualities. In other words, they organised themselves to be friendly with the minorities, the British hawks of the conservative, the Labour and the Liberal parties, as well as, the '*Doves*' of these British political parties. It was a clever move which we shall notice later, that this division paid very handsome dividends to the Congress at the time of partition of India in 1947. For example, many Hindu I.C.S., I.P., Judges of the High Courts, etc., played dual role of '*hunting with the bounds and running with the hare*' at the time when the fate of Indian sub-continent was in the melting pot. However, one major, if not the most vital problem still remained unsolved—the policy which the Congress should adopt as rulers of Akhund Bharat if and when it comes in existence.

### **Congress in Search of New Policy.**

As already explained the Congress followed—though in

their own way—the policy of Zionists which they mixed with that of Hitler—the heavenly ‘*twice born Aryan*’ in Europe. They, therefore, adopted the Swastika as their emblem, in spite of the fact that their mushroom satellites such as, the Arya Samaj, the Mahasaba, and the Akalis had their own party emblems based on their religious beliefs. This policy of adoption of various flags enabled the Congress to play with more than one string. When the Nazis were annihilated by the Western Allies, the Swastika was hurled down at a bad omen by the Indian National Congress. It was replaced by Asoka’s Charka.

While Congress was hypnotized by Ashoka as a conqueror, yet his policy later on as a Royal Monk—a Buddhist, who chastised Hindu religion—was abhorred by majority congressmen—a Hindu organization. They, therefore, decided to wander about in search of a policy.

### **The Race of Conquerors**

At last, for political reasons, they decided to keep Ashoka’s Charka on their tri-colour flag, yet as regards Bharat’s War and expansionist policy, they went back to Chynica, (the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief when Ashoka was the Conqueror prince), the Mahabharata and Artha Shastra Kaultliya, as they greatly resemble one and another.

However, in the sphere of international field of diplomacy for the Indian Government, they it seems to have received most part of its immemorial tradition from their pre-historic times that had been formulated in “Artha Shastra of Kautliya”, because being Aryan, they belonged to the race of conquerors. It is probable that Chynica too had followed Artha Shashtra’s traditional diplomacy, because the two very greatly resemble each other.

Briefly Artha Shastra’s strategy is based on its policy :

- a) “When one ruler (Raja who desires to become a Conque-

ror) is weaker than his rival (his immediate neighbour) he should make peace with him"; which the present Bharati Government's calls '*No war pact*', '*Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai*', i.e. Indians and Chinese are brothers.

(b) When he is devoid of strength, he should seek refuge, with an other ruler;" for example Bharat's secret pact with U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. for nuclear Umbrella and aid in weaponry.

(c) "When his end can be achieved only through the help of an ally, he should practice duplicity"; for example, pacts with neutral as well as both Western bloc nations and also with the Eastern bloc nations.

(d) "When he thinks that : The other is not capable of putting me down, nor am I capable of putting him down, he should mark time " ; fr example, Nehru, Liaquat pact and Tashkent Agreement 1966.

e) "When he feels stronger than his rival (the other), he should make war with him"; for example wanton aggression in 1965.

f) "When he possesses an excess of necessary means he should attack", for example, creation of crisis in East Pakistan since 1952, or his aggressive designs in NIFA against People's Republic of China in 1962.

A very careful comparative critical study of these principles will highlight practically all the modes of diplomatic response by which the Indian Congress policy makers have hitherto tried to solve the problems of their foreign policy pre and post partition of India (1940-1971) towards all neighbouring States : Pakistan, China, Nepal, Butan, Burma, Ceylon.

It is probable that 1962 Sino-India was due to error of judgement as regards war potential of Bharat by Mr. Nehru as advised by his arm chair strategists, War Minister Krishna Memon and Dr. T. N. Rama Sidarta, the author of "Essentials of India Stratecraft".

Dr. Sidarta has elaborated the principles of Kautilya's Artha Shastra" for Bharati contemporary readers ! This book was published by Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1962.

Dr. Sidarta elucidated the above major principles of war as follows :

1. "Any power inferior to another should sue for peace ; any Power superior in might to another should launch war ; any power which fears no external attack and which has no strength to wage war should remain neutral ; any power with high war potential should indulge in invasion ; any debilitated Power should seek new alliances ; any power which tries to play for time in mounting an offensive should indulge in bilateral policy of making war without and sue for peace with another".

2. "A state should always observe such policy will help it to strengthen its defensive fortifications and life-lines of communications, build plantations, construct villages, and exploit the mineral and forest wealth of the country, while at the same time preventing fulfilment of similar programmes in the rival state."

3. "Whoever estimates that the rate of growth of the state's potential is higher than that of the enemy can afford to ignore such an enemy."

4. "Any two States hostile to each other, finding that

neither has an advantage over the other in fulfilment of their respective programmes, should make peace with each other."

5. "No State should pursue a policy which, while not enabling it to have means to fulfil its own programmes, does not impose a similar handicap on its neighbour : this is the path to reversion."

6. A State can augment its resources by observing peaceful pacts with an enemy in the following situations :

a) Where maintaining peace, productive operations of strategic importance can be planned and executed, preventing the rival state at the same time from fulfilling similar programme ;

b) When the State can plan works or sabotage through espionage on the plans and projects of its enemy.

c) A state can pursue a bilateral policy where it can benefit in resources by maintaining peace with one enemy, and waging war with another.

(d) When an invader is assailed by an alliance of his enemies he should try to purchase the leader of the alliance with offers of gold and his own alliance and by diplomatic camouflage of the threat of treachery from the alliance of powers. He should instigate the leader of the allied enemies to break up his alliance."

What has happened for the last 24 years since the birth of Pakistan, it seems obvious that Indian National Congress, who rules Bharat, inspite of her failures, continues to religiously

follow Kautilya Policy, strategy, as well as, tactics.

She, it seems, has not learnt a lesson from their great Saint Rama. Moreover, Bharat ought not to forget that Pakistan as an independent sovereign state, came into being as a result of an agreement between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League of undivided India, and it was in terms of this agreement that the sub-continent was partitioned. Pakistan's creation can not be undone by any human being. It would be in the interest of Bharat to review its policy of hatred and hostility towards Pakistan and pursue the path of rational understanding of the view point of Pakistan and its people and thus conduct its foreign policy on better principles as depicted by Rama, their holy saint in Ramayana even towards the Rashkasha King Rawana of Ceylon and not on Kautilya policy. We Muslims believe in justice, equity, i.e. nothing but fairness both in love and war '*live and let live*'.

## CHAPTER IV

### EAST PAKISTAN PRE-1947

It is considered not too late even today to recapitulate the state of affair in the East Pakistanis during the British at the time of partition *i.e.* before the Emergence of East Pakistan.

#### Famine :

When Mr. Shaheed Suhrawardy was the Premier of Bengal, very severe famine overtook Bengal. The extra-ordinary part was, that all blame was laid at the doorstep of Mr. Shaheed Suharwardy and the Muslims ryots by British Government and the Congress and NOT on the Hindu landlords, the British farmers, or Hindu Commission agents, Marwari grain hoarders, Hindu grain merchants or '*the Central Government*'. Curiously enough, when riots in Calcutta occurred then Mr. Shaheed Suhrawardy and the Muslims were again accused for it by the Indian Congress and the Central Government, though General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command India, General Tucker, told me that the Indian Congress was responsible for it. General Curtice also expressed similar views in a letter to me. General Curtice also blamed the hawks of British of the Labour Government for abetting in the crime.

The British officers could speak freely and publicly on

their views, as they were—as already stated elsewhere—protected by Acts of British Parliament. The Indian Officers however, never enjoyed such privileges or protection. I know many Indians (K.C.I.O) who in unguarded moments, spoke the truth, had to resign their commissions or were dismissed from service. They found the sword of Democles hanging over their heads throughout their service. I felt most relaxed and relieved when I forced my way to retirement from service when Pakistan was still a dominion.

### Education :

There was only one college in East Bengal *i.e.* at Dacca, at the birth of Pakistan. However, 85 percent of its tutorial staff was Hindu. Another notable point was that although the Muslim population was 90 percent in East Bengal, yet, the number of Muslim students in the college and Secondary Schools, was only 15 percent. Even after creation of Pakistan the state of education did not improve in spite of the fact that Bengali Muslims served as Governor General, Prime Ministers, Governor of East Pakistan as well as Premier of East Pakistan. S.M. Ikram has stated in his book, "Modern Muslim India and Birth of Pakistan": "...95 percent of 1290 High Schools and 47 colleges in East Pakistan were privately organised and financed by Hindus from secret funds, whose population in the province was not more than 25 percent...the Muslim struggle against them was...*'have nots'* against *'haves'*."

In 1911 Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar struggled hard to establish a university at Dacca but the Hindu Bengali saw in the proposed university "the re-incarnation of the spirit of partition and opposed it...The Government again yielded to the Hindus."

· Professor Iyer of Dacca University (who later on migrated

to India) said in a lecture in 1952 to the Dacca University students that : "the partition was temporary". No action was taken against him for such anti-Pakistan statement.

### **Economy :**

The Hindu Zamindars and Marwaris as brokers, commission agents etc., except in case of British owned gardens, had bought over most agricultural Zamindaris from the British Zamindars during the scare of defeats sustained by the British in Second World War on the Burma Front 1940—41. These landlords at the time of Partition of India in 1947 were therefore, mostly, Marwaris or Bengali Hindus, who permanently lived at Calcutta and occasionally visited East Pakistan to collect, or sell the crops. Naturally they managed to keep Calcutta as the principal market for raw materials, such as jute, fish, poultry, vegetables, from East Pakistan. The banks in East Bengal were owned and run by the Hindus, so they held stranglehold grip on economy of East Pakistan whose 90 percent population was Muslims.

### **We Muslims Acted as Laggards**

India's first Prime Minister and the President of Indian National Congress Mr. Nehru has stated about Bengal as follows in his '*Discovery of India*' :—

### **How were the Islamic Educational Institutions destroyed :**

"While the new education was deliberately prevented from spreading, the old (Islamic) education had been largely liquidated in Bengal. When the British seized power in Bengal there were a very large number of '*muafis*', that is tax-free grants of land. Many of these were personal, but most were in the shape of endowments for (Muslim) educational institutions. A

vast number of elementary schools of the old type subsisted on them, as well as some institutions for higher education, which was chiefly imparted in Persian. The East India Company was anxious to make money rapidly in order to pay dividends to its share-holders in England, and the demands of its directors were continuous and pressing. A deliberate policy was therefore adopted to resume and confiscate these '*muafi lands*'. Strict proof was demanded of the original grant, but the old sanads and papers had long been lost or eaten up by termites ; so the muafis were resumed and '*the old holders were ejected, and the schools and colleges lost their endowments*'. Huge areas were involved in this way and many old Muslim families were ruined. The educational establishments, which had been supported by these muafis, ceased to function, and a vast number of teachers and other connected with them were thrown out of employment".

"This process helped in ruining the old feudal classes in Bengal, both Muslims and Hindus, as well as those classes who were dependent on them. Muslims especially were affected as they were, as a group, more feudal than the Hindus and were also the '*chief beneficiaries of the muafis*'. Among the Hindus there were far larger numbers of middle class people engaged in trade and commerce and the professions. These people were more adaptable and took the English education more readily. They were also more useful to the British for their subordinate services. '*Muslims avoided English education*' and, in Bengal, they were not looked upon with favour by the British rulers, who were afraid that the remnants of the old ruling class might give trouble. Bengali Hindus thus acquired almost a monopoly in the beginning in the subordinate government service and were sent to the northern provinces. A few Muslims, relics of the old families, were later taken into this service."

## **New Landlords and Artisans**

“In Bengal one can see more clearly than elsewhere the early effects of British rule and Western influence. The break-up of the agrarian economy was complete and the old feudal classes had almost been eliminated. In their place had come new landowners whose organic and traditional contacts with the land were far less, and who had few of the virtues and most of the failings of the old feudal landlords. The peasantry suffered famine and spoilation in many ways and were reduced to extreme poverty. The artisan class was almost wiped out. Over these disjointed and broken-up foundations rose new groups and classes, the products of British rule and connected with it in many ways. There were the merchants who were really middle men of British trade and industry, profiting by the leavings of that industry.”

“The nineteenth century produced a galaxy of brilliant Hindus in Bengal, and yet there is hardly a single Muslim Bengali leader of any note who stands out there during this period.”

## **Creation of New Classes**

“The Revolt of 1857-58 flared up and was crushed, but Bengal was hardly touched by it. Throughout the nineteenth century the new English-educated class, ‘*mainly Hindu*’ looked up with admiration towards England and hoped to advance with her help and in co-operation with her”.

## **Trade and Marketing**

“The ‘*Marwaris*’ from Rajputana used to control internal trade and finance, and were to be found at all the nerve centres of India. They were the big financiers as well as the

small village bankers ; a note 'hundi' from a well-known Marwari financial house would be honoured anywhere in India, and even abroad. The Marwaris still represent big finance in India but have added industry to it now."

"Muslims, as a whole, especially in Bengal and the north, not only kept away from English education for a long time, but also took little part in the growth of industry. Partly this was due to feudal modes of thought, partly (as in Roman Catholicism) to Islam's prohibition against usury and interest on money. But, curiously enough, among the notorious money-lenders are a particular tribe of Pathans, who come from near the frontier. Muslims were thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century, backward in English education and therefore in contacts with Western thoughts, as also in government service and in industry".

"To begin with, the new middle classes were almost absent among the Muslims. Their avoidance of Western education, their keeping away from trade and industry, and their adherence to feudal ways, gave a start to the Hindus which they profited by and retained. British policy was inclined to be 'pro-Hindu' and 'anti-Muslim', except in the Punjab, where Muslims took more easily to Western education than elsewhere. But the Hindus had got a big start long before the British took possession of the Punjab. Even in the Punjab, though conditions were more equal for the Hindu and Muslim, the Hindus had an economic advantage. Anti-foreign sentiment was shared alike by the Hindu and Muslim aristocracy and the masses. The Revolt of 1857 was a joint affair, 'but in its suppression Muslims felt sufferers'.

*'After the Mutiny the Indian Muslims has hesitated which way to turn. The British Government had deliberately repressed them to an even greater degree than it has repressed*

*the Hindus*', and this repression had especially affected those sections of the Muslims from which the new middle class, the bourgeoisie, might have been drawn. They felt down and out and were intensely anti-British as well as conservative. British policy towards them underwent a gradual change in the seventies and became more favourable. This change was essentially due to the policy of balance and counterpoise which the British Government had consistently pursued.

'East Bengal which was named East Pakistan after partition was, therefore, at least one century behind its counterpart West Bengal in developments, such as cultural, industrial, education, economical and agricultural and fishery etc.'

We did not reproduce the opinion of various Bharati leaders in 1947 to support our opinion for reasons of brevity. Mr. Nehru knew what for he, as the future Prime Minister, was doing when he abetted with Lord Mountbatten and presented truncated East Bengal and West Pakistan area to the Muslim League. He threw a heavy smoke screen over his misdeeds by starting a covert wanton war in Kashmir. By this action and his propaganda machinery he was able to conceal his evil designs in East Pakistan (Bengal). He, thereby, pushed millions of Muslims from West Bengal, Bihar and Assam into East Pakistan, unnoticed by the outside world. Moreover, the Congress was able *'to push in'* many millions of Hindus from Bengal, Assam and Tippura area. We omitted to follow the Holy Prophet's advice: "Know thyself, know thy enemy".

Why did not the Muslim League leaders of East Pakistan protest about it, or tried to bring it to the notice of the Pakistan Government or the U.N.O. to gain World opinion, has remained a mystery? At least we should have told the World about the rape of East Bengal in 1952-54, i.e., its backwardness and exploitation in every respect, by the British and

the Hindus. *'The fact we did not do it then—even during the last 23 years'*, is a very sad commentary. No wonder—we missed the bus, should be our lesson.

### **Indian Leaders had warned us**

On 3rd June, 1947, the Committee of Indian National Congress stated : "The Committee earnestly trusts that when present passions have subsided, India's problems will be reviewed in their proper prospective and the false doctrine of two-nation theory in India will be discredited and discarded by all". The Times, London.

Mr. Gandhi declared : "The Muslim League will ask to come back to Hindustan. They will ask Jawahar Lal Nehru (to be allowed) to come back and he will take them back..." 5th June, 1947, 'New York Herald Tribune'. Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister said : "India's heart has been broken, but its essential unity has not been destroyed..." 16th June, 1947, the Statesman, New Delhi.

*'No wonder, Mr. Nehru and his successors worked hardest to make their leaders' dream come true'*. The Indian Congress infiltrated Hindus and Sikhs into Jammu and Kashmir as well as in East Pakistan during the partition period of India. The *'peaceful'* penetration continues even today. The ruling Congress party has, it seems, worked equally hard to encourage the starving Hindu population of West Bengal to proceed to East Pakistan. Every year flood disaster gave them golden opportunities, especially the Cyclone disaster in 1970, when hundreds of thousands Hindus infiltrated in East Bengal. No wonder, the Congress Government, did not approve our arrangements to permit only bonafide East Pakistani refugee into the East Pakistan. They, ruffians from India, as the reports state, have been able to wipe out majority of Muslim refugees from West Bengal and Bihar etc., and they now wish

to replace it with Hindus, even under Muslim names. The locals state that danger was freely used and is being used under the guise of '*Mukti Fauj*' from India, in order to terrorise the opposition party. On 31st March, 1971, the Prime Minister of India Mrs. Indira Gandhi while addressing the two Houses of the Parliament, expressed : "...solidarity with the people of Pakistan" and assured them of "the whole-hearted support of the people of India". The history is being repeated in 1972 as many thousand Indian Hindus are waiting to be pushed in as refugees in Sind in Pakistan.

### **Communications**

There was only one meter gauge line in Assam which served the planters of tea gardens in Assam and Sylhet area—the later is now in East Pakistan.

The rest of East Pakistan had no railways. There were hardly any all weather road. Some tracks were improved during Second World War in Chittagong—Do Hazari area to support the troops fighting on the front. I was made responsible to improve the road transport at first in Assam (1942-43) and later on I submitted a plan for improvement in Chittagong—Do Hazari area. Not much had been done when the War came to an end. So East Pakistan area did not develop even during the War as was the case in Assam and Nagaland.

In 1943 I was delivering nearly 2,000 lorries and about 500 ambulances and cars daily to Imphal on Assam-Burma Front. This state of traffic shows that it was a first class road. Even the port of Chittagong did not receive much attention during the War, as most of the pressure of enemy was on Assam Front.

## CHAPTER V

### FACING THE FACTS ABOUT POWER TUSSE

#### A Muslim's Outlook

The Green Crescent envelopes many of those countries which belong to two blocs. Moreover, Muslims have settled down in every continent and island in every ocean so that in order to deal with the geographical aspect of Defence, the strategic relation of the Muslim community to the rest of the world must be described, which involves writing '*a geography*', or description of the whole world. The description, however, has to be given from one particular point of view, and in that order we may take the right standpoint we require for strategic principle for the study of geographical-cum-ideological facts.

Fortunately, there is a very close agreement among strategists as to the key of successful (global) strategy. This is considered to be the concentration of a superior force (Army, Navy and Air Force) on a battle-field which is tactically favourable, and where the defeat of the enemy entails special difficulties in maintaining the concentration of his forces. From this it follows that strategic geography is essentially the geography of the concentration of resources. Therefore, its method is to examine the world in relation to the productive regions which are the geographical foundations, or Bases, of

communities and their ideologies, the barren regions, or frontiers, between them, and the routes within and connecting the productive regions (especially the intersections which are the centres of traffic);—the routes (air, river, land and sea) and centres of traffic being comprised under the term '*Communications*'. These factors bear directly on the planning for security of Pakistan as well as the stumbling blocks which world powers may create to safeguard their own global strategy.

The most marked interference which rainfall determines, is due to the course of winds and the lie of rivers, or the mountain ranges. The monsoon region of Continental Asia, which includes East Pakistan, is poorly provided with railways and roads due to seasonal rains and floods. A combined railway, road, air and steamship map (in 1947 and 1971) brings forcibly before us the geographical requirements and character of a commercial ports (includes Airport) which must not only have good access from the sea, (deep water and sheltered anchorage) but good access to the interior, which entails primarily a long gentle sloop on the landward side. As the draught of vessels increases, so the number of ports available for ocean traffic diminishes and these few (Chittagong, Khulna) become increasingly important strategic, commercial and naval centres. Again these airports and seaports in the East Wing lay across the main arteries (the lifelines) of trade, communications and therefore their bearing on the global strategy of the big powers of both blocs.

### **A Return to Reality**

The ultimate benefits to be hoped from the work of our fathers in building Pakistan and from the efforts we had been putting forth to maintain it, are threefold. There is first the mutual economic benefit to both Wings of Pakistan, as well as

for the mutual economic benefit of the Muslim world. There is secondly, the shepherding of two classes of people of same ideology one of whom at the time of emergence of Pakistan were unable to safeguard themselves due to the colonial ruler's policy. Moreover, the Eastern Wing had not been given adequate opportunities for developing industrial and agricultural developments.

The third benefit to be hoped for was that to develop Muslim people of the two Wings thousand miles apart into one nation under the Quranic ideology : "Muslims are but brothers". To halt the expansionist policy of Indian Congress of Akhand (Great) Bharat made the Military defence of East Pakistan, not yet developed in Agriculture, trade, industry, communications, a problem of great magnitude—for it involves difficult relations with the proud, uncompromising Bharatis who outnumber the Pakistanis in population, industrial and weaponry as four to one. The problem grows still bigger as Bharat as protagonist of Asiatic races is desirous to be the leader of Afro-Asian countries. Thus the magnitude of military problem which faced the Pakistan Government and with it those of all the Muslims, was apparent from the very birth of Pakistan. When the interests of Great Powers whose friendship can only be relied upon as long as their own interests are paramount and safe, made the problem of very great magnitude and very intricate.

## I

### Martial And Non-Martial Classes

An erroneous opinion based on Hindu legend—'Manu Shashtra'—which was exploited and propagated by British hawks in India that two classes exist in India, *i.e.* martial

and non-martial. Moreover, there were also many people in the Western World before the First World War, who also opined that Occidental civilization was unfavourable to soldierly qualities, and that, at most only recruits from rural districts in the Western World, would face both danger and hardships, and that even they would not endure such proportional losses as Turkish and Arab dervishes without flinching. These ideas were dissipated in the desperate struggle of the late World wars and since then in the cold war conflicts since Second World War. It was then proved that neither courage nor endurance had deteriorated among urban population, and that townmen and miners furnished many of the best battalions during these wars—especially since the era of mechanization which united the man and matter. But Pakistani leaders were laggards because they had not learnt lessons through study of military history of even World Wars—*'study costs little'*.

#### A pertinent Question :

Is the superior strength of industrialized (urban) nations of the Western World as compared with Asiatic states relatively modern? For example, "...in the sixteenth century the Grand Turk had probably greater military power than the sovereign of any European ruler. In the seventeenth century, the Indian Empire of the Great Moghul had an overall organization in some respects superior to that of European states, greater population and up-to-date military equipment. Persia was equivalent to any European power, and the Manchu Emperor of China was a greater factor in Asia than the Russian Czar."

"The reversal of form as between Occidental and Asiatic States was not complete until nineteenth century. Its immedi-

ate causes was the introduction of mechanical power and the advance of chemical manufacture in the West. We have, therefore, to enquire why it was in Europe rather than Asia that these developments occurred. The answer is that these great agents of wealth and war were the result of a century or more of preparatory study in [Chemistry, Physics proper and mechanics. But there had been a time when the Asiatics were well ahead of Europeans in such studies, and we must therefore note the time when Europe began to draw rapidly ahead. This was about the beginning of the sixteenth century, and the date is evidently connected with the commencement of trans-oceanic voyage....." Vaughan Cornish continues.

".....The crossing of the oceans by the Europeans brought with it new requirement in practical astronomy, and there soon followed great improvement in Mathematics, in the instruments for recording time and measuring angles, and in optical aids to observation...". It was from this foundation which the Arab scholars at Baghdad, had made a marked progress and where the oceanic navigation originated. When the Western nations acquired the habit of visiting all countries, it widened the European knowledge. In the meantime, the Muslims fell a prey to dissensions and became lethargic, they became content to let Europeans to lead the way and consequently missed a most valuable stimulus to the appetite for knowledge. It is suggestive that the first Asiatic nation to recover equality with the Western national efficiency is the Japanese and now China is nearly abreast of these nations. These nations have displayed readiness to learn foreign languages and study the ways of the Occidentals. They had also carefully studied the wants of their own people and of their continental neighbours, which was, in the general opinion, much in advance of the Occidentals.

The fluctuations of national efficiency which have

followed on change of trade routes has alarmed the Occidental therefore against the assumption that no other Orientals besides the Japanese will regain equality with Occidentals. It should be noted that no nation has so far admitted U.S.S.R. as an Oriental State.

## II

### Language and Cult

It was in 1947 that once again a part of Bengal was declared as East Pakistan, because it had Muslim majority. As already stated, that inspite of the fact that the whole of Bengal had Muslim majority, but Lord Mountbatten had it partitioned under the pressure of British hawks and Indian Congress. Tradition that the culture of all Muslims had remained pure Islamic, it appears, to have been taken too much for granted by the Pakistani leaders. As explained earlier, most of educated Bengali Muslim leaders has settled down at Calcutta which was the centre of political activity, centre for Western education as well as the seat of Indian Government. They were therefore not fully aware of facts about East Pakistan. The Muslim League leaders including those who were Bengalis, did not pay adequate heed to the history of Bengali language since the British came to Bengal. No comparative philologist would imagine it to be pure as it was before the British occupied Bengali in 1615.

Sanskrit script and Hindi had made appreciable inroads since 1755 in it. For example, the script had changed from Arabic and Persian into Hindi script. Although the cult of a Bengali Muslim had remained Islamic in religious worship such as—daily prayers—yet its culture and customs had intermingled with Hindu culture such as, folklore.

As regards the education in East Pakistan, it was controlled and directed by the British missionaries and Hindus in their schools and colleges as they had replaced the Islamic education in mosques and in madrassas, which had virtually ceased to function due to economic reasons and official pressure. That is also certainly the case as regards its structure—the most characteristic and enduring part of a language—and it is a remarkable fact that due to it Muslim League's influence was destroyed by Congress propaganda from within the Pakistani hegemony and therewith the old literary class, the language and culture from below now did not remain pure Islamic, but mongrel. Hindi emerged as new '*lingua franca*'.

It became a conjecture whether the West Pakistani and East Pakistani could—due to language—be reckoned for recruiting purposes both for military and civil services as if they were traditionally one nation. There were indeed, people in East Pakistan who were devoid of any form of patriotism, some of whom even regarded Islamic patriotism as a vice, but it is so also in countries of single compact nationality unlike the two separate wings of Pakistan. The lesson to be learnt is that the Pakistanis overlooked the value of ideological work to be carried out constantly amongst the masses—even after these Wings had become one politically de-jure. In physical geography also East Pakistan become an integral part of Pakistan but in cultural field it was not the case. However, if language only had been considered in re-arranging the map of Bharat, then no doubt it would also had a very different due to various languages spoken in Bharat for example in West Bengal, Assam, Bihar, United Provinces, East Punjab, Madras and Bombay provinces.

## CHAPTER VI

### EAST PAKISTAN—POST-PARTITION ERA BEGINS

“O mankind! We created you from a single (pair of) male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, that may ye know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you”. (49 : 13) The Quran.

#### I

### THE AWAMI LEAGUE

#### Grave Warnings that were Ignored

It is considered that we should trace the growth in power of the '*Awami League*', a satellite organisation of the Indian Congress which has caused the greatest upheaval in political field in Pakistan since 1947.

I (Rangrut) have taken some extracts from '*Taamir-e-Millat*' Series No. 4 '*East Pakistan Crisis 1954*' as foreseen and foretold by Mr. Raghīb Ahsan, a social, as well as a

political worker. Such warnings are never too late for critical study, as the nation-building programme has yet to be carried out. *'We are not out of the wood as yet'*.

Secondly, we have to make sure that no more infiltrators are allowed to come in the guise of Muslims or minorities, he states : "...Re-shuffle of the East Pakistan civil administration is most urgent and essential. Our Intelligence Department most miserably failed. Why? Lastly, only miracle has saved us [twice] from going down most dangerous abyss." Opportunities never repeat itself, yet history repeats itself. Once again we allowed the Indian Congress to steal a march on us. We forgot what the Quran has enjoined in (60 : 1, 2) "O ye who believe! Take not My enemy and your enemy for friends...If they gain mastery over you they would act as your enemies..."

"And hold fast ; all of you together, to the cable (law) of Allah and be not divided" (3 : 301) the Quran. "It is a guidance sure, without doubt, to those who ward off the evil" (2 : 2) the Quran.

*'Prophecy which came true in three weeks'*

Raghib Ahsan adds :

"...The noteworthy fact is that on 1st February, 1952, this Letter of Warning was written and on the 21st February, 1952, the Language Riots started at Dacca. The Warning that "the Saboteurs and the real enemies of Islam, who are only too ready to take advantage of Muslim controversies and conflicts" came true only in three weeks. The most serious Language riots, which developed into rebellion and revo-

lution started on the 21st February, 1952, and convulsed whole of East Pakistan. The first stone hurled at the Police near Curzan Hall, Dacca, were hurled by the Communists who started the Conflagration and disappeared from the Scene..." Raghieb Ahsan adds :

**"Sanskritized Bengla is foreign to East Pakistan"**

(4) "...Historically the foreign Aryan Race, Brahminical Sanskrit and the Sanskritised, Hinduised, Literary Bengla of Calcutta and Devnagri Script are more alien to East Pakistani masses than Arabic, Persian and Urdu Language and Script which are inextricably interwoven with the daily Spiritual, Social and Cultural life of Muslim Bengal. Nay Sanskritised Language and Script are incompatible with Islam and Pakistan..."

Yours sincerely,  
RAGHIB AHSAN

1.2.52

**"HINDUS AND COMMUNISTS TO BENEFIT  
FROM ANARCHY OF FAITHFULNESS"**

45, Mian Saheb Maidan,  
Dacca.

11th June, 1952.

**EAST BENGAL AWAMI LEAGUE IS ANTI-JINNAH,  
ANTI-CENTRE, ANTI-URDU AND ANTI-ISLAM**

**"...Vital Points of Difference between Jinnah League of West  
Pakistan and the Awami League of East Pakistan."**

(By Raghieb Ahsan, Dacca)

"This note was forwarded to all the leaders of Jinnah

ration is purged, overhauled and reorganised, there can be little hope for any betterment of the situation in East Bengal. The present Inspector-General Police should also go to Karachi and either strong and first class officer should be brought from the West or Mr. Hafizuddin Ahmad, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Special Branch, a native of Dacca (whose upright, efficient and patriotic Administration won the admiration of the people during '*Direct Action Days of Calcutta*' where he was Deputy Commissioner of Police in North Calcutta, the storm centre of the metropolis) should be appointed I.G."

**"Mohajirs should be Recruited in Ansars"**

"(2) Few Mohajirs have been recruited in the Ansars. In the Interest of Security, bonafide and suitable Mohajirs should be also recruited in the Ansars..."

**"50 Per cent Punjabi and Mohajir Elements in Police"**

"(3) The present Police completely failed and collapsed during the February Language Riots. It should have at least 50% Punjabi-cum-Mohajir elements both in the Officers, cadres and the constabulary to toughen and strengthen it."

"The Punjabi and Hindustani Muslim Policemen were the backbone of the Calcutta Police before partition. Unless the Bengali Police is strengthened and toughened by 50% Punjabi-Mohajir Officers, Rank and File, this Police Force is absolutely of no use. Not only that ; the growing Bengali Nationalism of the Police is a great danger for the Security of the State..."

Yours sincerely,  
Sd/- Raghbir Ahsan.

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Yours sincerely,  
Sd/- Raghbir Ahsan.

To,

His Excellency,  
 Malik Mohammad Firoz Khan Noon,  
 Governor, East Pakistan,  
 Government House,  
 DACCA.

x            x            x            x

## II

### **Bengali Literature, Language and Press**

As already stated in Part I, the British hawks had worked hardest to destroy the Islamic traditions in ideology, cultural, social and economic in collaboration of Hindus whom they had led the garden path. It is admitted the Hindus did receive some benefits in trade, agriculture, employment, education which the British could afford to part with but ultimately the major benefits went to strengthen the stranglehold of the British over India. Rangrut is, therefore, presenting the views of a contemporary witness of social and political standing. It is a very sad commentary that the ruling Muslim League destroyed itself by looking inwards—this is what the events have proved.

Will the Muslim Leaders of both wings allow more water to flow past under the bridge? The nation would be fully justified to ask such a pertinent question.

“Bengali Language, Literature and Press”, *Taamir-i-Millat*,  
 Series No. 4, Page 15

(A) Firstly, the modern Sanskritised (i) Bengali Lan-

guage, (ii) Bengali Literature, and (iii) the Bengali Press are not only all creations of the Hindus but the greatest vehicles of '*Hinduization*' in existence. They are the greatest potent factors of the mental Hinduization and the cultural '*Shudization*' of the English educated Muslim intelligentsia, which is being gradually de-muslimized. The influence of the Bengali Language, Bengali Literature and Bengali Press is really the influence of Hinduism of West Bengal and Bharat which is the real '*Home*' of modern literary Bengali Language.

- (B) The Hindu Bengali population of East Bengal which as the pioneer of modern education, landed and cultural aristocracy and the class of Mahajans, Wakeels, Doctors, Professors, Teachers, Journalists and Writers still wield great influence over the Musalmans of East Bengal, so much so that the Hindus still cherish the idea of the '*Re-Union of Bengal under Bharat*' and there are Bengali Muslims who support them. They are getting valuable moral, pecuniary and material support from West Bengal and Bharat."

**"Danger of Repeating Sind History of Allah Bukhsh in Bengal**

- (C) The Communal population situation in East and West Pakistan are such that the Hindus can never aspire to form a Ministry in any of the Provinces of West Pakistan but the one Crore Hindus of East Pakistan still dream to rule East Bengal by splitting Muslim Votes in the Provincial Legislature and by

exploiting the balance of non-Muslim Votes as the *'Third Decisive Force'* as they did in Sind in the Pre-partition days. For instance, Hindus shall welcome an Allah Bukhsh or a Fazlul Huq Ministry which shall serve as the hand-maid of the Hindus and shall be ready to shake hands with Shyama Parashad Mukerji of West Bengal as they did in the past.

**"Hindus and Communists to benefit from Anarchy of Faithfulness**

But the Muslim League as at present constituted in East Pakistan is a soulless body. Unless it is purged, revived and reorganised as a Dynamic, Democratic Islamic Party with a clear cut Islamic and Socialistic Programme, there is little hope for it. The only people who shall benefit from this situation of the anarchy of Faithfulness and lack of leadership and organisation are the Hindus and enemies of Pakistan, the Secularists and the Communists.

"The one and only hope for East Pakistan is the evolution of a mighty Islamic Party, may be under the name of the revitalized League which must be capable of re-uniting all the various elements of the Muslim Millat for the achievement of a Powerful, Democratic Dar-el-Islam.

RAGHIB AHSAN"

Dacca,  
16.6,1952.

## III

**“Realistic Review of ‘Bengla-Bhasha-Riots of February, 1952  
Communist-Hindu Plot to Dynamite Pakistan and the Millet—  
Page 35.**

**The Inner Story of the ‘Red’ Origins of ‘Bengalism’**

On the 8th March, 1952, Janab Raghieb Ahsan, issued the following statement at Dacca on the Bengali Language Riots, which started from Dacca on the 21st February, 1952. The analysis of causes are so true and realistic that it may as well be fitted in with the Analysis of causes of the ‘*Karnafully-Adamjee Riots of 1954*’, the natural after-effects of the Language Riots of 1952, given by Mr. Mohammad Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan on May 30, June 28 and July 17, 1954, at Karachi, declaring that ‘*Pseudo Bengali Nationalism has been master-minded by the Communists*’. This conclusion was drawn by Janab Raghieb Ahsan two years earlier on the 8th March, 1952. This under-mentioned Review was forwarded to the ‘*Ministers of the Centre,*’ ‘*the leaders of Pakistan* and ‘*almost all leading Papers*’ in March, 1952.—

“DACCA  
the 8th March, 1952

“It is a matter of great shame and concern that the Politicians of both the Muslim League and the Awami Muslim League in East Bengal have tried to make the national issue of the National Language, the Urdu-Bengali question, an Election and Party Issue. They have made the Language Issue a ‘*Pawn*’ in the game of Party Politics for winning the General Elections

in East Bengal, promised for 1953, and created a highly explosive situation, and a real danger to the Integrity of Pakistan. Khawaja Nazimuddin must take the pride of place for starting this game. In his speech at Dacca on the 28th January, 1942, Khawaja Nazimuddin (now deceased) declared that Urdu and Urdu alone shall be the State Language of Pakistan and that Bengali should be written in Arabic Script. There was absolutely no necessity of this statement. Obviously Khawaja Nazimuddin's object was to defame and defeat the opposition."

"The East Bengal Awami Muslim League, which is a leaderless motely group of youngsters, directed by a few clever Secularists, Communists, and Separatists taking full advantage of the golden opportunity thrown to them by the Prime Minister of Pakistan started the mass-movement for the recognition of Sanskritized Bengali as one of the State Languages with the enflamable University students of their War Magazine definitely and clearly with the object of defeating the Muslim League in the General Election by fomenting '*Bengali Linguistic Nationalism*'. It was a great blunder and a very sinister move. They formed an All Parties State Language Committee of Action of which the moving spirit was the Communist Organization of the Youth League. The Youth League was organized during the last few months in the Dacca University, its different Hostels and Halls, as well as different colleges."

#### Fostering of "Bengalism" as election stunt

"That their slogan for '*Bengali*' was mainly an Election Stunt and a Pawn in the game of Party Policies was confessed to me by several responsible office-bearers of the Language

Committee and the Awami League Workers. They come to me and insisted on my joining the Committee but I strongly differed from their whole Movement. On 1st February, 1952, I felt it my duty to write a letter to Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, the East Bengal Awami Chief solemnly warning him against the dangers of promoting Racialism and Linguistic Nationalism among the Musalmans because it cuts at the very root of the basis of Pakistan—The TWO-NATION-THEORY—that Muslims from one Nationality, the MILLET-I-ISLAMIA, and Pakistan is the Uninational State of all the Muslims of Pakistan regardless of Racial, Linguistic and Territorial differences. I requested the Awamees to confine their struggle for democracy to clear political and economic issues and not to create racial passions and hatred among the Muslims for Election Purposes. My old friend and Comrade-in-Arm of the Battle of Pakistan, Mr. Abul Hashim, also came to me to invite me to join the All Parties State Language Committee of Action and I had to decline on the same ground, namely, that Racialism and Linguistic Nationalism was the very antithesis of the '*IDEAL of Pakistan, as well as of ISLAMIC MILLETHOOD and Islamic States*'."

#### **Leadership of 'Bengalism' slips into Communist hands**

But it was soon clear that the leadership and initiative of the Bengali Language Movement, first started by the enthusiasts of the Bengali Language as a purely literary movement, had passed from the hands of the Awami League and the students into the hands of the Communists and the Secularists who converted it into a purely Political Movement and challenged the very basis of Pakistan and aimed at complete separation of East Pakistan from the Centre. The Communists, the Hindus and

the 'Bharati Professors, Teachers and Agents' not only identified themselves fully with the movement but became its prime movers and main supporters."

"The entire movement was sired, led and controlled by two Red Bodies namely; (1) 'The Parties State Language Committee of Action' and (2) 'the All Partizs Committee of Action For the Democratic confederatian of Pakistan'. Both aimed at one and the same thing, disintegration of Pakistan through Racial Nationalism.

"In the beginning the Movement may have been originated by Bengali Language enthusiasts of the 'Tamaddun Majlis' type but very soon the Communists, the Secularists and the Enemies of Pakistan fully controlled and exploited it for their own objects. Once the mob-frenzy of racial hatreds and Linguistic Nationalism was roused by the Communist Chief Engineers of the Bangali Language Movement, and prejudice, fear and hysteria gripped the masses all sorts of persons and groups, good, bad and indifferent, willingly or unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously, co-mingled in the Movement which was soon turned into an open 'revolt and rebellion'. Among others, the following elements played their parts in the Movement :—

**" 'Marxist' origins of Movement for Bengali Nationalism**

(i) The 'Leaders of the Marxist' Theory of Nationality, headed by Mr. Abul Hashim, who formed the Brain Trust of the Bengali Movement, and preached that on the model of the 'U.S.S.R. (Russia)', the Bengalis, the Punjabis, the Sindhis, the Pukhtoons, the Baluchis and the Kashmiris are separate Nationalities on the basis of race, language, and territory and

must get full Autonomy and Independence of Pakistan should be their '*Confederation*' with the '*right of secession*' for the autonomous Racial and Linguistic States."

### The Starting Point—History which repeated itself in 1971

"Mr. Abul Hashim first propounded this "Red" Theory of Racial Nationalism in his draft Manifesto of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League in 1945. It was drafted by one of '*PEOPLE's WAR, Bombay*', and '*JONO-JUDH, Calcutta*', the official organs of the Communist Party of India with full size Photo of Mr. Hashim. Mr. Shamsuddin, a '*Red*' follower of Mr. Hashim, and Secretary of the Dacca League published it from Dacca in booklet form. This became the starting point of my own difference with and separation from Mr. Abul Hashim who was made Secretary of the Bengal League mainly through the support of my Calcutta League in teeth of the opposition of the Khawaja group. I led the opposition to this Red Manifesto. The Bengal Muslim League under the leadership of Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy, Khawja Nazimuddin and Maulana Akram Khan denounced this '*Red Manifesto*' and condemned the action of Mr. Hashim in publishing it in Communist Papers without the knowledge and approval of the League. Mr. Hashim had to offer apology to the League and declare in the Press that the League had nothing to do with the manifesto. It appeared Mr. Hashim was repeating the same game in Dacca in 1952 through the Bengali Language Movement. Whatever, his real motives the result was the same, namely, the Fostering of Bengali Nationalism."

"The other elements of the Movement are :—

(2) The Bengali Language Enthusiasts.

- (3) The Critics of the Ministry.
- (4) The University Students.
- (5) The Democrats who demanded restoration of Civil Liberties.
- (6) The Secularists.
- (7) The Bengali Nationalists who preached the Political Independence, '*Sovereignty*' and '*Unification of the Bengali Race*', Language and Culture.
- (8) The Communists and the Youth Leaguers.
- (9) The Separatists, Anti-Centre Elements and Anti-Pakistanis.
- (10) The Opportunists.
- (11) The disgruntled Politicians and Political malcontents.
- (12) The Congress Leaders, workers and Hindu Professors and Teachers.
- (13) The Hindu Dreamers of the Re-Union of India and the undoing of Pakistan.
- (14) The R.S.S. Agents from Bharat.
- (15) Agents of the Forward Bloc, the Revolutionary Socialists Party and the Terrorists Groups of West Bengal.
- (16) Marwarees and Hindu Capitalists.

- (17) Professional goondas, looters and criminals.
- (18) Saboteurs, Fifth-Columns and Enemy Agents.
- (19) Hindustani coolies and workers.
- (20) Sympathisers of Student Victims of Firings.
- (21) Many Bengali Hindus, the Sahas. the Pals of P.S. Fatullah Narayanganj and the 'Sankharies' of Dacca.

**"The Red Plot was:**

"The Red Plot was first to generate Racial hatreds and passions, to work up the students and the Youth Leaguers to mad-frenzy and insanity, to create anarchy by large scale disorders, sabotages and fratricidal Civil War between the Urdu speaking people and the Bangalees, the Mohajirs and the locals, paralyse communications by dislocating Rail and Road Traffics and cutting Telegraph, Telephone and Trunk lines, blowing up bridges, setting fire to the State Bank of Pakistan, the Head Post Office, the District Court and Collectorate, the Secretariat and other State Officers, tempering with loyalty and discipline of the Security and Police Forces, organizing open Rebellion and Revolt in Government offices, the Secretariat and the Radio and then to install a Communist Revolution and 'invite Foreign Forces to occupy the Country'. The Dacca Narayanganj Road was cut and blocked, Dacca Trunk Telephone dislocated, Railway, Post and Telegraph paralysed. The East Bangal Secretariat revolted. The Bengali Police rebelled and disobeyed orders. The Morning News Press and office was set on fire and destroyed. The Pakistan Observer of Hamidul Huque Chaudhury had become the champion of Bengalism and of all anti-Centre Propoganda."

“The original workers of the Movement may have been innocent of this design but once the conflagration started they became absolutely helpless. They were overwhelmed with grief at the shooting of the students. They were swept off their feet. They lost sense. The leadership of the Movement slipped into the hands of the Communists, the Secularists and the Enemy Agents. There was complete lack of Leadership on the Muslim League Front as well as the Awami League Front. In fact there was no leadership. The only leadership which was deftly operating and directing and cleverly the Movement was of the Communists, the Secularists, and the Separatists who had clear idea of their object and methods and who as experts trained agitators, created a torando of hatred against the Centre as well as against the Urdu speaking people and the Mohajirs. While poor students were raising slogans of “*Urdu Bengala Bhai Bhai*”, the Communists and the Separatists organised attacks on the shops, firms and factories of the Mohajirs. Urdu speaking people were abused, insulted and assaulted. Water was denied to them. They were subjected to Social Boycott. In some places Mohajirs houses were set on fire. Speaking of Urdu was violently stopped with threats of murder. Terrorism was let loose against all papers and politicians, workers and leaders who dared to express slightest disapproval or dissent. Cries of ‘*Jaihind*’, ‘*Re-unite Bengal*’, ‘*Do’ee Bengala Ek Hok*’ and ‘*Pakistan Dhauksho Hok*’, were raised in Dacca, Narayanganj, Bunder and other places.”

#### “Collapse and Surrender of the Muslim League

The Muslim League completely collapsed. There was no trace of the Muslim League anywhere. The League Leaders had not the courage to come in the public at all. The Muslim League

Party of East Bengal Legislative Assembly on the 22nd February, 1952, on the motion of the Chief Minister, Mr. Nurul Amin passed a resolution recommending that '*Bengali*' should be one of the State Languages of Pakistan."

"The abject surrender of the League Government to the Terrorism of the disruptionist demand of the Bengali. Language Nationalism, within twentyfour hours of the terrorist movement and disorders repudiated the Quaid-i-Azam's dictum of '*one Nation. One State and One National Language propounded at Dacca in March, 1948*'. It amounted to complete anti-climax and right-about-turn of the Muslim League from the position so recently reiterated by Premier Nazimuddin at Dacca on the 28th January, 1952. This meant nothing less than the moral death of the Muslim League. The Muslim League destroyed the only moral, logical and political ground of its existence."

#### IV

#### **"Agitator emboldened by the Government surrender:**

This surrender emboldened the agitators as they had won victory much easily and much earlier than they had expected. They thought they had won the first round on the Language Front, and must win the Second and the Third Round, on the Political Front, the over-throw of the Provincial and Central Governments, by methods of terrorism, sub-violence, general hartals and anarchy. Now they started the open fraternization of the Bangalee Hindus and Bengalee Muslims as one Bengalee Nation. They started campaigns of social boycott, denial of water and necessaries of life to and attacks on Mohajirs, their shops and factories. Many incidents took place. The portraits

of the Quaid-i-Azam were burnt, spit upon and trampled under feet in Dacca and Narayanganj."

*'Pakistan Dhangso Hok Movement'*

"Hindu and Muslim Bengalees raised slogan of '*Pakistan Dhangsho Hok*'—Separation from Pakistan Centre, was openly demanded. "*Pakistan Dhangsho Hok*" was written on walls and raised as slogan. Cries of '*Jai Hind*' were raised. Sabotage of Rail, Road and Communications were organised. Hindus openly took leading parts in these movements. They collected lacs of money and financed the movement. Arms and bombs were made and distributed. On the 29th February, 1952, when the Hindus created a riot at Narayanganj, the Dacca-Narayanganj Road was completely blocked at four different places between Fatullah and Chashara by a mob of hundred percent Hindus which fell P.W.D. trees on the road with the cries of '*Jai Hind*'. Lacs of most inflammatory leaflets were published. Jeeps and trucks of the organisers were ever on the move in Dacca and Narayanganj. *Thousands of Red and R.S.S. Agents entered East Pakistan from Bharat.* The Calcutta Press and Hindu Parties demonstrated their active support by meetings, processions and resolutions. Cries of '*Re-unite Bengal*' were raised in Dacca, Narayanganj and Bunder and Calcutta. "*Doee Bengala Ek Hok*"—"The Two Bengals Must Unite"—Were written in Bengali on the walls and streets with chalk."

**"Undeniable facts**

"To deny or gloss over these facts shall be a dangerous self-delusion. The students and the youth must realize that they were made tools in the hands of designing politicians and

used as raw materials in the most dangerous and explosive political game of fire, the game of rousing Linguistic Nationalism to dynamite Pakistan itself. They were injected with the fear, passion and prejudice the 'Bengali' was in danger and was being swamped by an "Alien Language", Urdu. The pity is that they fell victim to the venomous, false and baseless propaganda of the enemies of Islam and Pakistan. The Awami League committed suicide by adopting senseless policies of extremism, excesses and directly or indirectly supporting the Separatists, Disruptionists and Anti-State Movement. Had they worked for organizing a Democratic Muslim Party on sound, political, economic and Islamic Principles they may have won the people on their side and fulfilled the need of a patriotic, Constitutional Opposition in East Pakistan. But the naked fact which emerges from this crisis is that both the Muslim League and the Awami League have completely failed. They have tried and found wanting."

#### **"Balance Sheet of loss and gain**

The verdict of the people is that the Muslim League Party is mainly responsible for the crisis. Khawaja Nazimuddin first started the controversy on 28.1.51 at Dacca, a howl was raised and the Khawaja quickly retreated only five days after, on the 3rd February, 1951. The Provincial League Ministry on the 20th February unnecessarily imposed Section 144 at Dacca, banned meetings and processions of the Pro-Bengali Students and on 21.1.51 lastly resorted to firings and killings of students which created an explosive situation verging on open rebellion and evolt paralysing the heart and the brain-centre of the Province. Thousands who cared little for the language controversy and took no side were shocked and driven to the side of the

students a national sympathisers. Within twenty-four hours the League staged a complete somersault. They adopted the very slogan of the people they dubbed as disruptionists. The Muslim League ceased to be the Muslim League. The Muslim League and the Awami League started competition for championing Bengali Linguistic Nationalism."

#### **"The moral suicide**

No sane and true Muslim could support Civil War among Muslims. Terrorism, violence, indiscipline among the Government servants, and the Security Forces, appeals to racial hatreds, the rousing of Linguistic Nationalism, mob-frenzy and hysteria, sabotage and open Revolt and Rebellion by the help of alien agents and Communists. Every Muslim must condemn it as anti-State and anti-Islam. But it is clear the League Ministry first created the explosive situation and then itself became the standard bearer of Bengali Linguistic Nationalism. The League tried to blow the wind out of the sails of the Awami League's Bengalism, in its fight for power. By this act the League forfeited the confidence of all honest men. It committed moral suicide. It undermined the only moral, logical ground of its existence in the Post-Partition period, namely, the preservation of the Integrity of the Millet-i-Islamia and the Islamic order of life."

"The Balance Sheet of '*loss and gain*' can be summarised as under :

#### **"On the Muslim League Count**

(1) The Muslim League became the most hated and

haunted party in East Bengal. It collapsed completely as a popular organization. The moment the Muslim League Ministry falls the League will disappear.

- (2) The Muslim League Assembly Party and the League Ministry in East Bengal is exposed as thoroughly unscrupulous, unprincipled and faithless, opportunist group which declares lip loyalty to the Quaid-i-Azam, Pakistan and Islam, but repudiates them in practice, in public, to save its own selfish interests.
- (3) The League Ministry has no control over its Government servants, its Secretariat Staff and the Bengali Police which showed most serious kind of indiscipline and paralysed the Government. But for the superb work of the Army and the Punjabi Officered E.P.R., there was complete anarchy in Dacca and Narayanganj, the heart and capital of East Pakistan—thanks to the utter failure and collapse of the authority and machinery of the Ministry. The Bengali Police openly revolted and supported the Bangla Bhasha Rebellion. Brute Force appears to be the only basis of the Ministry.
- (4) The East Bengal Legislative Assembly was prorogued without passing the budget and the Finance Bill and the fate of the Ministry hangs in the balance.
- (5) There is a great hiatus between the Rulers and the Ruled and the gulf is widening day by day.

- (6) The Dacca University, Colleges and Hostels are closed and Educational System stands paralysed.
- (7) The Dacca University has been revealed and exposed as the citadel of Communism and the Brain Centre of Bengali Nationalism and Hindu, Indian and Russian influences, and consequently there is complete disharmony, hostility and anti-thesis between the basic ideology, conception and objective of Pakistan and the University. The University is under the influence of Communism and Hinduism.
- (8) Very acute and venomous Racial and Linguistic hatreds have been engendered. Urdu speaking people and Mohajirs in some places, were subjected to mal-treatment and insults.
- (9) Anti-Centre feelings has been allowed to grow by the weakness and lack of Policy and leadership of the Ministry and the Provincialism of the Ministers themselves who supported the agitators."

**"On the Awami League Count**

- (1) The Awami Muslim League in East Bengal has committed '*Harakiri*'—suicide—by adopting extremist and senseless methods and disruptionist tactics of racial hatreds and Linguistic Nationalism and committing series of excesses which alienated the sympathies of saner sections of the people. The Awami League which has gaining ground now stands liquidated. All its workers are arrested or wanted by the Police.

(2) The Awami League or at least its General Secretary, Mr. Shamsul Huq, has been preaching the Sovereignty of East Bengal according to the Lahore Resolution of 1940, forgetting the fact that Pakistan has not been made according to the Lahore Resolution but on the principle of a Uninational State of the one indivisible '*Millat-i-Islamia*' and the partition of the Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab on lines of religious divisions of Muslims and non-Muslims regardless of the Linguistic Unity of the Bengali Race and Bengali Language in Bengal and the Unity of the Punjabi Race and Punjabi Language in the Punjab. Whatever may be the Policy of the Jinnah Awami Muslim League in West Pakistan, '*the East Bengal Awami Muslim League seems to aim at separation of East Bengal from the Centre*'. This is the reason the Awami League of East Pakistan lost confidence of the true Muslims and true Pakistanis.

(3) It has been demonstrated that the East Bengal Awami League is absolutely a '*Leaderless*' group and is exploited by Opportunists and Secularists from Bharat for their own ulterior purposes. It is a leaderless, incoherent, motely group of misled Youngsters who do not know their mind and in the absence of any other popular and vote-catching slogan, have adopted Linguistic Nationalism as their main Party Programme. Provincialism seems to be their stock-in-trade. They denounce and abuse non-Bengali Muslim businessmen the Ispahanis and the Adamjees in strongest terms although they

know that they have brought capitals of crores from Bharat in East Pakistan but they say nothing against the Marwaris, West Bengalis and British exploiters who are draining out Pakistani capital to Bharat and Britain.

- (4) Some of the Awami Leaguers fraternised with the Hindus and preached the unity of the Bengali Nation. They are charged with common cause with the enemies of the State and the enemies of Islam.
- (5) They are charged with working with sections which committed sabotage, violence and tried to paralyse communications and create anarchy".

#### **They are Looking Inwards**

"The Awami League as well as the Muslim League in East Bengal stands thoroughly exposed as utterly incapable of leadership and unfit for public confidence in as much as they are proved to have least respect for principles and are cent per cent for opportunism, the pursuit of power for the sake of power. Moreover, there is essentially no differences at all between the Awami League and the Muslim League in the principle they profess, save and except that the one is in power and the other wants to take its place."

#### **The dangerous vacuum (1952)**

"The Muslim League is dead. Ideologically the Awami League is extinct. Both have failed in the Post-Pakistan period to offer a new dynamic leadership, programme and ideology

capable of rallying the masses and realizing the ideal of Islamic order of life, democracy, socialism and the progress towards the unification of the world of Islam for which Pakistan was founded.

“There is complete organisational vacuum in the popular political sphere of East Bengal public life. This is dangerous. There is frustration and demoralisation everywhere.”

#### “*Towheed-i-Deen-wa-Seyasat*”

The people feel that the days of the Muslim League, the Awami League and Jinnah League are over. They have not fulfilled their missions. Only a hundred per cent Islamic Party with a hundred percent Islamic, dynamic, progressive, democratic, socialist programme, led by men of invincible faith, character and determination can lead Pakistan and the Muslims to self-realization as the State and the Nation with a World Mission. Only *Towheed-i-Deen-wa-seyasat*, the Unity of Religion and of Politics on the progressive Platform of an All Pakistan Islamic Party with the ideal of All World Islamic Programme of Political and Economic, social and cultural reconstruction and progress according to the basic values of the Quran and Sunnah, but on lines of modern science can save them from capitalism and communism and make them Ummat-i-Wusta—the Middle and the Model Nation of the Holy Quran. Want of *Iman & Faith* and Lack of Vision and Leadership is the real disease of Pakistan and the Islamic World. Pakistan is crying for men of dynamic Faith, clear Vision and Leadership character and sincerity, mission and destiny who can create a new world and salvage the Millet from the sloughs of despond, degeneration and downfall. It requires galvanizing *Iman (Faith)*.

vision, inborn leadership, inspiring character of sterling gold and spotless steel, ceases *Jehad* (struggle) and *Ijtehad*—the intellectual independence and excretion of the mind to meet and provide for new exigencies and new problems of life on the basis of eternal values of the Quran and Sunnah and the demands of Science and Dynamics of life”.

RAGHIB AHSAN

Dacca,

the 8th March, 1952.

V

### Historic Karachi Decisions of December, 1947

“The Bhashanian argument that Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah in the opening address of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on August 14, 1947, denounced the Two-Nation Theory and pleaded for the joint nationality of the Muslims and the Hindus, is a calumny on the Quaid. It is absolutely incorrect. It is the echo of the argument of Mr. Sarish Chandra Chattopadhyaya the Congress leader, advanced in the Pak Consenbly last September, 1953, opposing the concept of Islamic State. This fallacious argument has been torn to shreds by irrefutable evidence and authority. Quaid-i-Azam himself removed this misunderstanding only two days after his Consenbly speech in his *‘Idul Fitr Address’* at Karachi Idgah Jamma. The Quaid-i-Azam declared that : “...he could never repudiate the Two-Nation Theory of the Quran or the Islamic basis of Pakistan, but only hope that all citizens of Pakistan, Muslims and Hindus, shall have equal and common civic and economic rights” Four and half months after this speech on the 16th December, 1947, presiding over the last session of the

Council of the All-India Muslim League held at Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah reiterated the principles of the Two-Nation Theory, the basis of Islamic State and the great importance of maintaining the Muslim League after partition as the medium for building Pakistan as an Islamic State and consolidating the Muslims of the various Provinces as one integral Millet. I participated in this historic meeting. I am an eye-witness of its proceedings. The League Council resolved to divide the Pakistani and Indian Muslim Leagues and in its resolutions re-affirmed faith in the Two-Nation Theory and Islamic ideals of Pakistan. The resolution also propounded the ideal of building Pakistan as an Islamic Democratic State on the model of Khilafat-i-Rashida”.

#### Quaid-i-Azam Rejected Secularization Attempt

“It is noteworthy that in this Historic Karachi Session of the League Council in December, 1947, Mian Iftkharuddin tried his level best to secularize and ‘*Nationatize*’ the Muslim League by dropping ‘*Muslim*’ from its name and throwing open its doors to the Hindus but the Quaid-i-Azam vehemently opposed its moves and the Council rejected his proposals.

“I invite Maulana Bhashani to carefully read the proceedings of this historic Karachi Session of the League Council and its printed resolution”.

#### ‘*National*’, ‘*Communal*’ and ‘*Universal*’

“The argument that the term ‘*Muslim*’ makes the League a ‘*communal*’ body as opposed to ‘*national*’ body shows the immaturity and defeatist mentality of the Maulana and the

Hindu-cum-Marxist origin of his ideas. According to Islam the basis of unity for mankind should be Faith, Ideology, and Way of Life and not blood and bone, clime and territory. Man is not an earth-rooted plant or animal but a spiritual, rational and moral being who must rise high above its environments and not remain a '*slave and prisoner*' of his material conditions. So Islam is not only the greatest Universal Brotherhood which transcends barriers of race, language and geography but also the greatest Humanizing and Unifying force of world civilization".

RAGHIB AHSAN  
and  
MAULVI FARID AHMAD  
DACCA—1954.

## CHAPTER VII

### NATIONAL DEFENCE UNDER BRITISH RULE

#### Divide and rule.

The British did not recruit Bengali Muslims in the :

- (a) Armed forces and senior police service for political reasons.
- b) The British and Hindu Indian Zamindars (farmers) wanted cheap labour which they could get plenty only from Bengali Muslims, for their tea garden, jute cultivation and cotton growing.
- c) The Mill Owners, both British and Indian Hindus in majority lived at Calcutta. They too needed cheap labour for, such as : Textile Mills, Jute Mills.
- d) Majority of deep sea fishermen were Muslims. The fish was the staple food for Bengalis. Bengali Muslims who were hardy and poor so they stuck to their risky job which provided living wages for their families. Moreover, the British navigation Companies employed a very large number of Muslim Bengalis on their ships as seamen because they were good sailors.
- e) The British employed soldiers and policemen from Western

Wing of India. They all were lumped under one heading '*Punjabis*' for convenience's sake although they were Pathans, Punjabi and also Muslims from U.P. The men were employed for internal security purposes and to suppress riots etc. Hence word '*Punjabi*' became an appendage to cruelty and therefore hated by the Bengalis. However, it suited the British hawks under their policy of '*divide and rule*'. Moreover, these Muslim policemen and soldiers were looked upon as aliens both by the Muslim Bengalis, as well as, by the Hindus. Even the Indian Officers and men of the Bengal Governor's Body Guards were Punjabis. The soldiers and policemen who belonged to Northern India wore smart dress. They invariably appeared well groomed and well fed, were not looked upon by the locals as their friends but with awe and despise. This feeling which had become deep rooted since the advent of British Raj was exploited by the Indian Congress—Hindu body—and other Hindu fanatic political parties to their best advantage after the partition of India.

It is unfortunate that no Bengali troops were available at the time of partition, so a garrison of Pakistan Armed Forces was stationed in East Pakistan. Immediate steps were, however, taken by Quaid-i-Azam to recruit Bengali Muslims in the Armed Services but the British Generals who wielded power opposed it in the beginning. However, when their hands were forced to do it, they obeyed it very passively—because they were working on a pre-conceived plan to dismember Pakistan—the soonest possible. But it is no use putting all blame on the British hawks but it should be shared by the Pakistani political leaders i.e. Muslim League who held the power, especially when Bengalis became Prime Ministers of Pakistan with a Bengali as the Secretary of Defence Department. Were they callous or laggards? This point will be discussed.

Anyone who looks at the map of Indian Ocean, in fact of the Green Crescent, visa-a-vis the map of the world, cannot fail to conceive the importance of the both Wings of Pakistan strategically and commercially. The present era of mechanization makes Pakistan very important as a link in maritime and aerial communication. Its free and unfettered use is eagerly sought by all world powers.

### **Balance of Power**

The phrase '*Balance of Power*' has a long association not only with the horrors of war but also with the deliberate plotting of war, such as, tussle between NATO powers and the Eastern bloc countries—for example U.S.A. Versus U.S.S.R. in partition of days, Kashmir war, 1965 war and in the 1971 East Pakistan Crisis. It has consequently become an anathema to many who, the heat of their indignation with these things, cry out against this policy as a danger to mankind. In the light of cold reason, however, the Balance of Power is fundamental to national and social liberty, for no nation however big, wealthy or powerful, is morally fit to be entrusted with the '*absolute power*' in the world. In spite of it against this doctrine there is an instinctive dread of any nation which seems on the way to attain preponderance in the world, a dread so effectual that it quickly ends harmonious relations which are dignified by the name of national friendship. The common dread of such a power even composes long enmity between nations. Thus a '*Third bloc*' of small under-developed countries has emerged.

Both wings of Pakistan have very long coastline and it has comparative less depth. The vulnerability of such country to Naval and Aerial bombardment is proportional to its development of naval basis, air-ports in proximity to the sea

coast, i.e. to its manufacturing development and density of population, including shipbuilding. Consequently the bombing of Karachi, Lahore, Chittagong, Dacca and other places during the recent war (1971) was the merest child's play as compared to what could be done especially when great powers such as Russia and Britain had put a large part of its industrial and material fighting strength into the Indian Army, Air and Naval Services.

What we witnessed in 1965 and 1971 crisis was the effect of bombing such great cities by numerous units of Air and Navy. The disastrous result was obvious, that the local fires started by bombs coalesced in one great conflagration, with which no fire brigade of even advanced nation could have coped, and which ended only when the whole area was reduced to ashes, shambles and ruin. Evacuation of dead and wounded under such circumstances presents a tremendous problem. When the Naval blockade was added to it, it made the problems economic and political of very great importance and grim. Thus if we do not maintain a strong army, an independent powerful Air Force and Navy and a shipbuilding and Aircraft industry, the nation is liable at any time to be burnt out and broken up. This is the kind of grave risk against which it is imperative to be covered at all times. It would be criminal to leave the country in the hands of a few military professionals only, with inadequate protection because of a prevalent opinion that no great war will break out within the next few years. It is the concern of all, as it touches all. We cannot rush to arms for this kind mechanized war as was the case few decades ago when not much technical training for a soldier was needed. Technicians cannot be trained as full fledged soldiers in short period. Such technical training, for example, an air pilot, takes many years of work.

The continental defence of Pakistan which is the defence

of North West Frontier and a long border with India in both Wings whose hostility against Pakistan needs no comments as it is a well known fact. West Pakistan is well provided with means of communications which was not the case in East Pakistan ; where centuries neglect was in the process of being put right when Bharat imposed a crisis of unknown magnitude in the history of the Continent. The situation became extremely grim when Britain and Russia very extensively helped Bharat, morally, in the diplomatic field, materially, and with trained men.

### **NATO Power Pre-Crisis.**

'Great Britain' has lost her place as a leading military power. She is now (1972) most vulnerable target in the atomic era. Once again she is busy in raising a most mobile airborne force which would be small but modernly equipped in weaponry. She can not fight alone, so she is adhering fast to NATO. Moreover, she has decided to call herself a European community hoping thereby to gain economic, moral, material, diplomatic and military assistance from NATO bloc nations. She has also joined European community countries, hoping thereby to get economic aid as well as military and moral assistance from the E. C. M. countries in the diplomatic field.

'France' is however, out of NATO Treaty as she does not like the idea of the French soil becoming a target for first 'atomic strike' as she was the nerve centre of NATO. What would she do in case of Third World War is any body's conjecture.

'United States and Canada' : taking account of both geographical position, developed resources and advance state of their weaponry, they have less to fear from invasion by a

foreign single African, Asiatic or European powers, but war with Russia would be a much more serious affair for her than with any other State. United States has, therefore, involved herself more due to error of judgement than her will in a protracted war in the Middle East and the Far East, to test her newly invented weaponry, just as the British used to do on the North West Frontier of India and the Middle East. United States and Britain have taken the sides of different belligerents in Indo-Pakistan War 1971 in order—as they said: *'to cut Pakistan to its size'*. When will India meet similar fate is only a question of time. It should be noted that the global strategy of United States has recently undergone many changes. For example, she is trying to pull out from Indo-China where a large American striking force has bogged down, another one is tied down in the Middle East, another one is acting as sentinel in Africa. For economic reasons, British Navy had to vacate the military and naval bases, in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, and this vacuum was filled by the U.S. Navy who would be leaving the Pacific Channel (Japan and China Seas) as soon as an ally of NATO powers can take it over. Japan, Russia and India has been in the run for it but now People's Republic of China has warned them to keep off.

The strategic policy of U.S. has been described by the authors of *'A Forward Strategy for America'*: "...The United States and the free world are confronted by a deadly challenge within less than a generation, the cause of the freedom and the prestige and influence of U.S. have been progressively so weakened that *'West-at-Bay'* is no longer a figure of speech but a precise statement of a real condition...The priority objective of any American grand strategy is, by a broad margin, the preservation and enhancement of our political system rather than maintaining the peace..." The Indian ocean and the Pacific Ocean, is the life line of trade of NATO and Anzac powers,

has now been threatened by Russia in collaboration with India, just as Russia and Egypt collaborated for destruction of the homogeneity for the Mediterranean Sea. It is no longer a sea lane of NATO Powers, specially when Spain is demanding the British to give up her occupation of Gibraltar—which has a very fine artificial harbour and airfield. Again the fortified harbour of Aden and in Gulf States have gone. U.S.A. has announced that she would be taking over the use of naval base and airport of Bahrein. American's powerful Seventh Fleet will increase shadowing of Soviet ships in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, its Commander said today (7.1.72).

### **U.S. Naval Policy**

Vice-Admiral William Mack said in an interview that the Fleet's purpose was to "keep in a high state of readiness." No one should take our disengagement from Viet-Nam as a sign of Naval weakness", he said, and added "we are strong and intend to maintain our strength".

The Seventh Fleet now numbers 95 ships, including three aircraft carriers and 25 destroyers. This is down from its Viet-Nam war peak but Admiral Mack said no further cuts are planned.

Naval planners in Washington apparently foresee the keeping of three carrier Task Forces in the Pacific for the indefinite future.

One of these in the nuclear-powered "Enterprise" the world's largest, which recently stationed in the Tonkin Gulf.

When America's second nuclear powered carrier, the "Nimitz" joins the U.S. Fleet in 1972, it too will probably be assigned to the Pacific.

The U.S. fleet has been moved in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Oceans as a counter move to that of Russian Naval Fleet of 28 Naval Ships in collaboration with India; however, various United States leading newspapers have published in December 1971 and January 1972 that huge Dollar and Pound Sterling aid that was given to India for relief work on the refugees and for other projects, has been passed to Russia as payment for the latest weaponry which she provided to India. The exchange has had dual effect on economy of world's two mighty powers —as regards Russia it saved her economic bankruptcy but it pushed U.S.A. into a graver economic crisis of 1970.

Nations of the world have come to realize that 10 million Bengali refugees never left East Pakistan. It was for this reason Bharat refused admission to foreign missions to visit refugee camps and to do missionary work lest the cat came out of the bag. "An examination of secret Government papers reportedly relation to high-level U.S. policy on the Indo-Pakistan war can lead to two conflicting interpretations."

"The first conclusion, and the one that appears obvious on the surface, is that the Nixon Administration in at least one major instance deliberately misled the public about its true policy towards the warring nations."

"The second is that what White House and other Government officials said in public did not necessarily deviate from the policy deliberations made behind closed doors, even if their statements may have been less than candid. This second point is not the stated view of any U.S. official. The Administration has been constant in not commenting in any way on the background to U.S. policy toward the war. Issues of a credibility gap and charges of lying have been raised in Congress and elsewhere following disclosures by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson of the classified minutes of some meetings by the Washington

Special Action Group of Indo-Pakistan... *'The policy of this Administration.. is neither anti-Indian nor pro-Pakistan. The issue today is not opposition to India but opposition to the use of armed forces across borders to change the political structure of a neighbouring State...'* The U.S. then cut off 100 million dollars in aid to India." APA January 9, 1972.

By this lukewarm policy U.S. stood with folded hands while Indo-Russian war machine dismembered Pakistan. To U.S. we say:

To the grave he comes today  
 To offer prayers for the dead.  
 Oh! No!! He comes to seek grace  
 For having done me unto death.

## II

### **Russia (U.S.S.R.)**

The predictions as to the course of Russian affairs by our Government, our politicians, pressmen, Air, Naval and Intelligence Branch, both civil and military during the last five years have been so often falsified by events that the Russian had been an enigma to us. However, 1971 crisis has made Russian policy very clear, though Tashkent Agreement should have made our Government wise and on alert.

The difference between the Russians and the peoples of Western Europe is greater than would be anticipated from a comparison of anthropological characters, or of languages, or from the close neighbourhood of their ancestors to the Teutonic peoples in the fourth century on the eve of the great tribal migrations. The remarkable divergence is traceable to the fact

that Metropolitan country is physically more Asiatic than European. The metropolitan country of the late Russian Empire of Czars and present Soviet Republic is the region of Moscow. Although, however, the Russians are racially European, the history of the Great Russians (who are mosly Muscovites), has had very little in common with that of other European nations since the thirteenth century. Christianity and most of the civilizing ideas came to them during and after ninth century from Constantinople, then the seat of the most civilized government in Europe. During the greater part of thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the East Russians were tributary to the Tartar Emperor of Kipchak who ruled from Sarai on the lower Volgo, the capital of the Golden Horde. They were badly mauled by Timur (Tamar Lane) who occupied Sarai the Capital of the Golden Horde.

The decline of the Tartar or Mongol (Timur) dynasties of the house of Chenghiz Khan left the way open for the estward expansion of the Muscovites, now relieved from the danger of Tartar invasion at home or of an attack on their Asiatic enterprise. '*Little Russian*', the dialect spoken in the Ukraine, differs from '*Great Russian*' the dialect of Muscovy, which has always been the official dialect of the Russian Empire, and there is some difference of blood as well as of tradition between the Great and the Little Russians. The Russians, whose political system before the Great Wars was Oriental depotism, have now adopted an economic system equally antagonistic to the traditional economy of Western Nations, which is capitalism. There has always been antagonism to private ownership among a considerable proportion of the unpropertied people. Their aim has been to do away with the Capitalist on which Western Governments are economically based. The power of Communism must not be reckoned solely in terms of reasonableness, for it has an enormous appeal to feeling.

## Russian Navy and Pakistan

Pakistan has generally been regarded by our enemies as the Achilles heel, or the most vulnerable part of the Green Crescent. Their assumption is, apparently that in the Western Wing there would be formidable risings in the rear of the West Pakistani troops while Bharat attacks her all along her few thousand miles sea coast and land frontier, or alternatively, that large numbers of these troops would have to be retained in the interior for preservation of order, thus dispersing her forces against foreign aggression. This is wishful thinking on the part of our enemies—1971—has depicted it to be so.

As regards East Pakistan, it is completely cut off from the Western Wing by sea where a very strong Indian Naval Force can intervene and impose a blockade. Moreover, this Wing is surrounded on three sides by India. East Pakistan internal communications by land, river and sea—though it had been considerably improved since 1947—is still weak and unreliable during monsoon rains and typhoons. The Armed forces in 1970 in this area from among Bengalis were still in the process of being raised, trained and organised. Poverty which reigned, inspite of Herculean efforts made by Pakistan Government was the weakest point which could be exploited in 1970 by Pakistan Government's enemies. Now it was fully exploited by the enemies of Pakistan in psywar.

Russia had aimed for over two hundred years at possession, or access to sea ports and airports in Europe and Asia :

- (a) In Mediterranean Sea, the shores of the sea of Marmora in order to secure naval access to the Mediterranean by the passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The ambition of Russia in this quarter has come nearer to fulfilment due to Middle East

crisis. The prize of Constantinople though being beyond the reach of Russia for years to come and perhaps is not counted by the present Soviet Government, and is no longer an obstacle to cordiality between them—especially due to uncertain, if not hostile attitude of NATO powers towards the Muslim World. Russia has already gained some advantages in the naval base of Malta where her ships could go for repairs under the latest treaty between Maltese and Russian Governments. She has also made some political progress in Yemen State.

- (b) To the Indian and Pacific Oceans—in this area too, due to conflicts in the Far East between NATO powers and hostility between Bharat and Pakistan, Russian Navy has considerably improved Russian Naval strength in global strategy. A study of the Economic Map show how great inroads has Soviet made towards co-operation between these two countries. Moreover, rail and road extensions and air-fields inside Iran, has enabled Russian economic drive in this area a marked success. Soviet Empire is only about 400 miles from the Pakistan frontier. Iran is not as hostile to Russia as she was about a decade or so ago. But Libya is not happy with Russia. As regards Algeria, she has given some positive and very useful concessions to the Russian Naval Force and the Algerian dependence on Russian weaponry.

Any one who has watched the *Salt* meeting carefully, he would be on safe wicket to predict that Russia is not at the moment risking an all out nuclear war with U. S. A. although the Secretary of State for War U. S. A. has warned the Ame-

ricans that Russia is already slightly ahead of U. S. A. in nuclear stockpile. Moreover, Soviet has been successful in her policy of :

(a) Exhausting the NATO and Western Powers—especially the U. S. A. by stirring constant trouble—political and cold war conflicts—all over the world, for instance at first in China and later on in Indo-China, Algeria, Indonesia, Arab States, Congo, Sudan, in Aden and now in 1971-72 in the Indo-Pakistan conflict. In these areas Russia provided these countries such as, India, most modern sophisticated weapons as well as technicians to train her allies in its technical use ; tactically and strategically. For example, she trained the Bharati Armed Forces the use of long range guns, land to air, air to air and sea missiles against various types of targets—tactical and of strategical values. On the contrary the U. S. A. has not so far trusted such modern weapons to her allies of pacts, such as CENTO and SEATO. No wonder American military writers state that '*West is at bay*'. The Russians have therefore never sent their troops in the aid of her allies—at least so far—like the U. S. Armed Forces in China, Indo-China. Russia, therefore, in her subtle propaganda is crying out at housetops that U. S. invariably sends an army of occupation and does not trust even her allies in sharing her '*know-how*' of the most modern weaponry. This type of subtle propaganda has two anti-U.S. effects :

(i) U. S. aid has been misunderstood even when U. S. was genuine in her offer of aid to her allies.

(ii) The recipients of U.S. weaponry which is at least

not very modern as compared to Russian weaponry, fails most miserably against Russian weaponry. It is not too difficult to weigh the efficacy that such anti-U.S. impression causes in the minds of U. S. allies who had purchased the weaponry in question with hard-earned foreign currency. Secondly, when U. S. aids her allies with her armed forces equipped with most modern weaponry then U. S. allies armed forces feel the inferiority complex, hence allied forces are not equal in moral ; then that force has seldom, if ever, a chance of attaining final victory in war. Moreover, the Western powers invariably offer aid '*with strings*'. Again, the superiority in weaponry of these aid-giving powers unconsciously creates '*a complex problem*' between allied forces. Subtle propaganda in such cases becomes invincible.

Thirdly, even in the diplomatic field no voice of the aid-receiving nations is heard except that of the aid-giving Western power who gives the impression of being master and not an ally.

The Russian's couple of centuries old dream is now coming very near to fulfilment as her one arm of pincer movement from Black Sea is very near secure in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Atlantic Ocean with naval and air bases in Algeria and Cuba. The other arm through the Pacific, Sea of Japan, China Sea and the Indian Ocean has penetrated deeply as far as Aden via India. It can be said that it is also near its goal and objective in the newly created Bangladesh.

### **A Return to Reality**

Soviet leaders—Leonoid I. Brezhnev and Alexie N. Kosigin

—who have had to make concessions to other Big powers to achieve the four-power accord on Berlin and who are reportedly near an agreement with United States on limiting defensive strategic arms (*Salt*) have also launched a major double-pronged diplomatic *'peace offensive'*—which had floundered in the past—to keep the Western World excited in the coming months, that she aims in *'detente'* in Europe and the East. Without question the ultimate Soviet objective is the convening of a European Conference on security and co-operation sometime next year. But there is a growing body of opinion in Western diplomatic circles that Moscow is really not interested in the results of Conference for the reasons.

- (i) This mini-United Nations would dominate the news media for Europe for months and would create mood of detente.
- (ii) It may achieve through it one of its primary foreign policy goal—the elimination of Western Europe as a threat to Soviet interests.
- (iii) Although Soviet leaders have advised against pressing the panic button over the Peking-Washington contacts, it is safe to assume that Moscow has chosen not to let its main rivals steal all the publicity and is interested in making its own deals to counter any that Washington and Peking may create new situation in the Indian Ocean. It is more so that Russia in collaboration with Bharat in creating Bangladesh where Russian bases—naval and air—*'would constitute a real threat to the communications of Western powers'*. The interest of the Soviet Union in the Middle East is that of a Super power in the Middle East in an adjacent area who sees good prospects for extending its poli-

tical and military influence. Several factors have favoured these designs :

- (a) The area is militarily weak due no heavy industry and has to rely on obtaining weaponry from other countries.
- (b) Politically unstable and divided due to dissension, political, provincial and tribal.
- (c) Economically — with few exceptions — under-developed.

Nevertheless, no direct Soviet military involvement in any area as Soviet policy has paid her handsome dividends, when it is compared with military aid given by the Western powers. But situation may change since China has made inroads in not only in this area but also in other parts of the world. This is a great challenge to Soviet Union especially when Russia is not happy about China becoming a member of U. N. O. as well as of nuclear club. China is also not happy about the Soviet's intention of becoming a major maritime power in the Pacific Ocean, China Sea, Sea of Japan and the Indian Ocean. This is not to say that the Middle East, Indo-China and Pakistan no longer enjoys high priority in Soviet strategy. It simply means that at present the Russian leaders want no more than controlled tension in this area. Direct Soviet military involvement there, quite apart from the risk of a wider conflagration, would mean a departure from their general policy and would defeat some of their designs elsewhere, such as the European Security Conference and naval power tactics in the Indian Ocean and bases in Bangladesh, the latter, they currently attribute greater importance. The Soviet leaders seem to have realised that it

is impossible to combine these ambitions at one and the same time.

Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact consumption in oil is now outstripping their oil production and there is little doubt that towards the end of present decade Middle East, Gulf Oil and Persian Oil will figure as a major factor in Soviet strategy. Shah of Iran's visit to Pakistan on 10th January, 1972, may have sobering affect on Indo-Soviet collaborators, especially when President Kadaffi and Arab Governments are also pro-Pakistan. But the more deeply the Soviet Union has become involved in espionage in the Muslim countries, the more complicated her position has become in diplomatic field. To a certain extent this was an inevitable process: *'While the West was 'in' and Soviet Union is 'out' in this area'*. Moscow's position now stands exposed—just as pre-crisis in 1970 in East Pakistan. She could show to be on friendly terms both with Arab countries, India and Pakistan. But who is the winner—India, Russia or Mr. Mujibur Rehman? For example, the Soviet Union cannot, at one and the same time, support the Sudan's President General Numeri and President Bhutto and those who wanted to overthrow their regimes. It can be tried again due to wishful thinking—but the attempt is bound to fail. *'Soviet Union now stands exposed'*,

We wonder, therefore, Arab World has become suspicious of Russia's aid. Libya is not concealing his views. Algeria, Yemen and Egypt are in dilemma. No wonder, therefore, that Egypt's Prime Minister's visit in October, 1972, and promise of military aid and unanimity of opinion has been announced with fanfare. China has made best use of this opportunity and has made substantial penetration in the Arab world and Africa—China's victory to win the seat in Security Council is the proof, if proof is needed about peaceful penetration in the diplomatic field.

As regards reverses, the Tashkent Agreement and her open hostility to Pakistan in collaboration with some Western nations and India during 1970-71 crisis has forced Russia to adopt a rearguard action. The events of Indo-Pakistan have also very adversely affected Russian trust and faith or sympathy to the Muslim World. But very crucial factor due to Soviet's retreat in the diplomatic field is that Soviet has now begun courtship with the Government of Japan.

### **Pertinent Questions**

1. Will Russian technicians, military missions and naval ships leave Indian soil and also of East Pakistan—i.e. Bangladesh?
2. Will U.S.A. be able to keep on a '*serious look*' on economic aid to India for long?
3. Has U.S.A. really fathomed the trickery of India and her duplicity in the political and diplomatic field?
4. Is it possible that U.S.A. will be consistent in policy?

## CHAPTER VIII

### FACING FACTS—THROUGH PERISCOPE

#### **Bengali Nationalisation.**

It is considered necessary to recapitulate through study of the origin of Bengali nationalisation vis-a-vis its relationship to Islam, presents us with a very complex problems because of the differences in the pressures they were subjected to in the political and cultural fields—peculiar to each parts of Pakistan—The East and West Pakistan. When we take into account the respective conditions pre and post-partition prevailing in the East Pakistan on the one hand and in the West Pakistan on the other, these differences appear so profound that it is not possible to view the problem in its 'ensemble'. So that in these pages we shall limit our activities to the study of some of the questions directly connected with East Pakistan nationalism, as viewed within the framework of the general evaluation of ideology of Pakistan and Islam at the beginning of 20th century.

It may be recalled that in 1858 at the termination of the autocratic rule of East India Company, the Muslims of Bengal had in a petition to His Majesty's Government, drawn her attention to their most pathetic condition economically, culturally and socially. Sir William Hunter in his book, "The

Indian Mussalmans" has stated many decades ago "...Now there is no alternative left with the Muslims of Bengal to end their miserable life by either drowning themselves in the sea, or perish in the mountainous wilderness of Orissa..." Orissa was part of Bengal. The uprising by Bengali Muslims at last bore fruit in the partition of Bengal in 1905 into Western Bengal and Eastern Bengal. However, to counter it, the Hindus all over India through various organisations, such as Indian National Congress, Arya Samaj and Mahasaba, started anarchism by bomb throwing and other such activities. These activities were supported by the British hawks, the British and Hindu landlords (Zamindars), industrialists, Marwari bankers and the officials both British and Hindus of Bengal morally, materially and by keeping a blind eye on the law. The Indian Government, therefore, found a good excuse to annul the partition in 1911. This wanton act of the Govt. to placate British hawks and Hindus took Muslims of Bengal by complete surprise and dismay. The Indian Congress, it seems, having correctly judged the resentment of Bengali Muslims had geared up its subtle propaganda in full swing of Bengali nationalism— One Bengal — One nation — One language — One culture. The Indian Government — if it did not help actively, yet it kept a blind eye on its course.

In spite of this setback, Nawab Sir Salim Ullah, Maulvi Fazalul Huq and Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar having picked up the gauntlet thrown at them, proclaimed that Muslims of India were a separate nation. At first Sir Salim Ullah led a deputation to wait upon the Viceroy and *'begged his support'*, but later on he and his party formed the Muslim League to redeem their political position. Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, who later on become the Premier of Bengal, at first sought co-operation from Indian Congress and Mr. Gandhi's assistance for fair-play and equity, but later on

being disappointed, he joined the Muslim League to fight the case for justice for Bengali Muslims. It may be recalled that during this struggle, Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar, though he hailed from Rampur, had shifted his headquarters from Delhi to Calcutta where he was now to publish his paper 'Comrade' and was also to lead the Khilafat Movement. When I asked him in one of meetings, the reason for doing so, he said that he '*felt the need to bring the Muslims in Bengal and in U.P., Punjab, N.W.F.P. etc. to closer understanding and that they should actually understand the problems facing each other*'. His news papers were published one each—in English and Urdu—to revive Urdu language in Bengal which had become paralysed due to official pressure.

#### **They were Looking Inward—While Conducting Psywar**

For the presence of the British and Hindu domination in Bengal was, such as it needed to affect profoundly the rejuvenation of the Bengali Muslims, through its political nationalism and social repercussions and by its intellectual and moral influence, it was to act retrogressively on the Bengali Hindus, consciousness and to modify more or less markedly the Bengali Muslim's opinion on the Islamic Ideology of '*the believers are but brothers*'. But the British-Hindu front, anti-Muslim propaganda had been a decisive factor in the upsurge of Bengali national feelings among the people of Bengal. It provided the essential subject matter for its arguments, and gave it its particular '*culture*'. The closure of Mosques and Madressas due to economic pressure by the Government's these measures succeeded in its object.

The problems which attained priority of the anti-Muslim forces—was with which the public opinion in early stages of twentieth century, was concerned—were the problems of

dynasty and the age-old Bengali traditional values which the anti-Muslims claimed had been challenged, if not overthrown. Islam in Bengal was only becoming relegated to a position apart, isolated from the mainstream of the thought of the Muslim world, but was also being directly exposed to the various influences, which an important British Christian nation in collaboration with wealthy Hindus and Indian National Congress were capable of exercising. It was in Bengal that the Muslim community had most reason to fear for its religion, its cultural heritage, its very existence. It was, therefore, in Bengal that, '*a priori*', Muslim society decided to adopt the most energetic counter defence tactics for its survival, such as, Faraizi Movement, in order to preserve the integrity of Islamic values and character. For these reasons we have considered it opportune to examine closely the first beginnings of Islamic versus National sentiments in Bengal. For, it was this region which was the most exposed to the impact of '*depersonalising*' influences and consequently the regions where the nationalist processes had already taken the maximum of motivation for the security of British Empire. The Hindus, similarly, considered it would doubtless be the most vigorous anti-Bengali nationalism and against Muslim brotherhood. The Christian Missionary was out for a crusade.

### **Tools of Oppressions**

We will at once rule out all the temporary and less serious un-Islamic constraints—though important, due to human failings, such as share in Government jobs, administrative pettiness, undue harshness on the part of British and Hindu farmers, landlords, industrialists and money-lenders, or even mischief-making, despotic conduct of certain British and Hindu officials. But we will make special mention in retrospect of at least some which constituted in no small degree to

the development of nationalist ardour versus Islamic Ideology among the Bengali people.

In Bengal the '*British regime*' of direct administration, generally speaking, brought the Muslim masses under the complete domination of the British ruling power—the Hawks. Alas—the work of betterment of Muslims after the creation of East Bengal in 1905 due to very formidable man-made obstacles, was carried out with such slowness that it did not succeed in modifying to any great extent the economic and socio-cultural conditions of the Bengali Muslim community. Nevertheless, at the same time, in spite of appearances, the Muslims of Bengal saw their liberty of action becoming more and more limited by a multitude of restrictions and prohibitions.

**Only some details of restrictions which the British Administration imposed on the Muslims of Eastern Bengal**

- (a) Through the maintenance and operation of political, judicial and administrative, the life of Bengali Muslims was confronted on all sides by every kind of barrier, for which legal justification was provided in the Regulation Act, Pitt's India Bill, Permanent Settlement, Educational Reforms 1786 (Sanskrit script replaced Persian and Arabic scripts) and English became official language and medium of instruction in Schools, Administrative Reforms (1856-1876), Agrarian Reforms (1905) by Curzon which was revoked by King George in 1911 due to heavy pressure from the Indian Congress who even now poses as fair and just to Muslims.
- (b) This code, or bills, or the so called reforms, con-

tained a veritable host of obligations and prohibitions which were ideal instruments for applying a breaking action to any dynamic Islamic or communal tendencies which might develop, and such other moves for blocking the channels of economic, social, cultural and political interchanges between the Muslim communities living in various other provinces of India—interchange, which was more often than not connected with their religion or starting religious educational institutions, such as Aligarh Muslim College, and their popular Islamic traditions. The change of script from Persian and Arabic script to Sanskrit, became a very formidable barrier between the Bengali Muslims and Muslims living in other parts of India. Poor communications, such as poor roads made things most difficult. East Bengal became a hinterland.

- (c) Under such conditions the spontaneity and '*bonhomie*' of the Indian Muslims were, at least in part, inhibited. The simple joys and moral comforts which Muslims in India, through Urdu language, could at one time find the religious and popular traditional gatherings, were not becoming few and far between. The official control collective meetings by the Government reduced the opportunities for the profitable exchange of ideas and experiences, in the emotional, as well as in the moral and cultural domains.

### Political, Psychological War in Nineteenth Century in Phases

In addition to this, Islam in Bengal, which had now become a '*controlled*' religion, and which had been reduced to

its ceremonial aspect, had ceased to be an active and energizing principle in the Indian Muslim life. For example, the Mosques and Madrassas which had played a most vital role in the religious, cultural, social, economic, diplomatic, educational, social fields, were rarely made available to even private teachers. It had lost their role as places of intellectual exchange and active centres of Islamic culture. The Mosques which were rarely made available to private teachers, had lost their role as places of intellectual exchange and active centres of Islamic culture. The official religious teaching given in them was purely symbolic. The number of their personnel was insufficient, inefficient—because they were very poorly paid.

Owing inadequate and ineffective representation on public bodies—as the representatives were nominated—the Muslim community was unable to make known its spiritual needs and give expression to its cultural aspirations.

Muslim thinkers and leaders, such as Nawab Salim Ullah, Sir Syed, and others tried to organise Islamic studies—in modified form—so that at best the bare minimum was to be made available. Even this effort met with opposition by the British hawks and their satellites—the Indian National Congress, who opposed the Muslim College at Aligarh and Dacca, yet, they backed to the hilt the Hindu University at Banaras. Even the opening of the Quranic Schools, such as at Deoband, U. P. did not receive official recognition inspite of the fact that such modest centres of elementary Arabic teaching, were especially meant for the teaching of reading and writing Arabic script simply because it had played an essential part in the struggle of the Muslim community against idolatory since the arrival of Arab Saints in Bengal in eighth century. Against the misery of total ignorance and illiteracy which now (1971) prevails among Muslims, it was only 20% pre-British rule and

had now become 80%. Even upto the time of partition of India in 1947, the Muslim press had been extremely meagre. Moreover, it was not a means of diffusing information in the real sense of the word, because its role was as an instrument of political and social education—was still quite negligible. The output of the intellectual type of literature on Islamic studies that was made available was also on a very modest scale.

### Second Phase

Muslim public opinion in Bengal had, over the years formed rather vague ideas of formation of Pakistan. The masses, thrown back on themselves or the literature issued by the British hawks and Hindu press, were by force of circumstances had isolated the Bengali Muslims from the main current of thought and idea which were at that time so profoundly stirring the Muslim in other parts of India because majority of it was published either in Urdu or English language. Because of it, they had no clear-cut idea or opinion about cultural and political war which was being waged between the Muslim League and the Indian Congress who was being backed by the British hawks. The above pen-picture, sketched in its very broad outline in retrospect, gives us only a very partial idea of the socio-cultural and political atmosphere prevailing among the Muslims in Bengal at the time of partition in 1947. It is true that the Bengali Muslims bore these innumerable restrictions and hinderances, constraints and annoyances of every imaginable kind, with patient resignation—yet it is wondered that they did not critically study and practice the Prophet had said '*Know thyself, know thy enemy*'.

### Post-Partition—Third Phase

It is, therefore, at this level that we must seek for the

psychological roots of that vast movement which was, slowly but surely, to take the form of a ventiable the so called 'Civil Rights' campaign, an insistent and widespread demand for emancipation, which eventually came to be given the label 'Bengali Muslim Nationalism'. At a cursory view at least by some Muslim League leaders after demise of Quaid-i-Azam had the impression—though wrong—that common people (especially rural), absorbed in their woes and their privations, were hardly capable of thinking clearly and concisely over their problems, or of envisaging the reforms and changes that would be necessary for the betterment of their material and social conditions. Further, it was also considered—though wrongly—that they backed the medium that was absolutely essential for bridging the enormous social gap separating them from the governing power—the medium of language, the linguistic instrument. *'There lies the rub'*. The question remains whether on examining the claims of the pre-partition Bengali Muslim political groups, we can detect some tendency which can be accurately described as 'nationalist'. It, for this reason, lengthy statement of facts—as Mr. Raghieb Ahsan witnessed them—have been presented as a food for thought.

### Subtle Move

Here we should point out that the tone of claims (nationalist) during the period from the end of the nineteenth century till 1947 were extremely moderate. In the discourse and the writings of Muslim political leaders there was apparently nothing approaching, for example, the exaltation and the tumultuous oratory of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, or Maulana Bhashani of 1950 onwards. An analysis of the political vocabulary of Awami Leaguers, as indeed of their forebearers, the notables; reveals no reference to Bengali nationalism, and certainly no mention of independence or secession—modern

term '*Qawmiyyat*' (national individuality) as dear to the Bengali Muslim nationalists today, were little known and were, so to speak, quite foreign to Bengali Muslim thought of pre-1950 period. Perhaps certain words or expressions (such as nationality and autonomy as advocated now by Bengali Hindu) were by common and tacit agreement, regarded as taboo?

However, investigation of linguist nature propagated by fifth column Hindus, would throw much light on the origin of Bengali nationalist and secessionist thought in East Pakistan. The repercussions—even the distant over from Bharat—of the political activities of the Hindu Bengali of West Bengal were exerting their influence on Muslims of Bengal whose education, language script and customs for festivities had received from Hindu political leaders, Hindu professors and school teachers. It is a very sad '*commentry*' that extremely large grants for education were granted by the Centre to Provincial Muslim League Government to Universities, Colleges, Secondary Schools and even the Kindergarten were given to those which were run by anti-Pakistan Hindus while the Mosques and Madrassas were starved for funds. No Muslim institution, such as Muslim College at Aligarh, Lahore and Peshawar were founded in East Pakistan by the Muslim League Governments—why?

However, even pre-partition in the politics—intellectual atmosphere of British society in Britain and British doves in India was propitious to the awakening of the Bengali Muslim political conscience. For instance, the idea of strong East Pakistan was being widely entertained and discussed. It contained no reference to nationalism and above all, no reference to what is '*Bengali Muslim Nationalism*'. Neither was there any reference to Islam and the Bengali national culture.

Generally speaking, the Bengali Muslims were indifferent

to the vigour with which anti-Pakistan Bharati propaḡanda or were enthusiastic '*liacists*'. They were whole-heartedly devoted to this ideal—fusion with the Pakistan as one nation. It is true that the solicitude they displayed for their native race, their continual reference to the '*miser*' of the Bengali Muslims, to the aspiration of the masses, should have been analysed or interpreted—especially by the ruling Muslim League leaders—as the expression of a deep-rooted subtle counter move by those who had never accepted the emergence of Pakistan as final.

While we recognise the decisive role played by these anti-Pakistani fifth columnists in 1971, we should also admit that it haprened through the wishful thinking—'*it can't happen*'—or '*Lack of appreciation*' of the situation by our ruling party in the centre, as well as, by the provincial government. Its blame has been laid at their doorsteps by persons like Raghbir Ahsan, 'On the Bengali ministers of ruling party at the centre in general, and the members of the East Pakistan Provincial Government who gave Bengali Muslim the impression although wrongly—that they were shunning their own society and their own history, that they were consciously drifting towards a complete depersonalisation of their very being'. The Indian Congress was thus allowed once again to steal a march on us (Muslim) because we were lethargic. Those Bengali Muslims who cherished a living and deep-rooted conception of the Ummah in Pakistan, considered that love of the Islamic community, the true spiritual motherland of all Muslims, should take a bigger place in their hearts than the love of any territorial or linguistic or political motherland. The latter, as circumstances show that they were wrong.

By reason of their staunch fidelity to the external signs of a '*Bengali*'—dress, language, family and folklore traditions and

their steadfast observance of religious practice, they were convinced by anti-Pakistani subtle propagandaists that they were the embodiment of the Muslims of Bengal. But although in good faith, the Muslims in East Pakistan being a victim of subtle propaganda considered they were furthering the cause of their community—yet they were unfortunately, really erecting a barrier—the barrier of inertia, across the path of progress and were thus unconsciously helping to slow down the general, all round evolution of Bengali Muslim society. What is more, since they were much too obsequious and pliable to the directives issued by the Indian Congress and its satellites, they gave no indication that they possessed any kind of original Islamic or political thought, or opinion and they scrupulously avoided any activity which could be regarded as Islamic.

It is thus obvious that their (Awami League) political aspirations were not exactly those of the community—Pakistani—which had at long last become aware of its problems. Since they were indifferent to a conception completely foreign to Islam or Pakistan, as they knew it—and since they were profoundly impregnated with the soil and political ideas—all anti-Islamic. They represented a new kind of Bengali Muslim nationalism. This situation irritated those Muslims who were working for Quranic ideology—“Believers are brothers.”

The Hindu militant groups, under the congress flag, and their Bangladesh midday dream in 1971, to which they allowed themselves to be subjected under a well pre-conceived plan and motives, find no equal in scale and in wickedness with any that have darkened human record. The whole-scale massacre by systematised process of thousand of innocent refugee Muslims and those who were not members of Awami League, men women and children, in East Pakistan exceeds in horror, the rough and ready butcheries of Nazis, Facists, Zionists, or the Garhmuktes-

war and Kashmir massacres, by Bharatis, and in scale reduces them to pygmy proportions. Deliberate extermination of whole population was contemplated and pursued by the Indian militant infiltrators across the border into East Pakistan, in this War of expansionist policy of Bharat Government *'was conceived in 1946 and carried out with precision in 1971'*.

We have not at length emerged from a scene of material, the massacre, and moral havoc, the like of which has never darkened the imagination of former centuries. After all that we suffered, and what we have so far achieved, we find ourselves still confronted with problems of global strategy of World powers, who still seem to have their covetous designs on Pakistan and its perils, not less but far more formidable than those through which we have so narrowly made our way. *'We must fully realize that we are by no means out of the wood'*. Vigilance and counter measures should be our policy. That is the only way we can survive.

All things are double, one against the other. Every power, every form of Government, every influence strong as it may be, has its natural remedy or match, by which it is prevented from doing all things at will. In constitutional governments they appeal to law, in absolute monarchies they rise, under fanatical frantic violence—they assassinate. However, the countries of blocs—Western, Eastern or so called non-aligned, are liable to fall a prey to well conducted propaganda.

It is not my purpose as one who lived and witnessed the oppression by Imperialists and the wanton communal riots and butcheries at close quarters by Hindu militant groups at the instigation of colonial powers by our own countrymen who were looking inward in India, to dig up the dead or to depict, or pontificate how easily the tragedy of such massacres and com-

lity of Russians towards Pakistan since U.2 affair has been constant and unabated. Zionist leader Alexander Bittleman has revealed in his book *'The Jewish People Face the Post War World'*: ".....If not for the Red army, there would be no Jews in Europe today, not in Palestine, not in Africa; and in the United States, the length of our existence would be counted in days.....The Soviet Union State saved the Jewish people, therefore let the American Jewish masses never forget our historic debt to the saviour of the Jewish people—the Soviet Union".

No wonder Jews dominate in Russia, U.S.A., France, Canada, West Germany and Britain—because in the words of *'Journal Paris La Capital Des Religion'*: "The meaning of the history of the last century (nineteen) is that today, three hundred Jewish financiers, all master of Freemason lodges, rule the World..."

### Why Bangladeshism ?

Mr. Mujib acted as pawn in the hands of these Axis Powers: Who could, but a perverted mentality, feel proud of these *'Bangladesh revolutionary achievements'* of the self-styled deliverer of the Muslims of East Pakistan? These are then the accomplishments of the greatest spokesman of Bengla nationalism. The first victims of Bengla nationalism are people of Bangladesh. God knows whose cause Mr. Mujib served ?

If the basic loyalty to Islam is made to suffer and mere Arabism or Bangladeshism is allowed to take its place, then no power on earth could save the Muslim World from disintegration and there will be no end to the story of degradation and humiliation of the Muslims.

### Pakistanis Unite

The peculiar thing about the slogan of Bangladesh[nationa-

lism is that Bengali language in Hindi script is supposed to be its basis. One who speaks Bengali is a Bengali.

And through this definition Bengali Muslims and Bengali Hindus too became the brothers of the Bengali fraternity and not as Quran states : "Believers are brothers." It is a vice total and complete, and just a little thought would clear the cobweb. Its first casualty would be the Islamic basis of the Muslim society. Its most manifest harm would be that out of 700 million Muslims of the world, about 50 million Bengali Muslims have been turned once again as pawns in the hands of Axis Powers and U.S.S.R. It does not require much imagination to understand when the basis of the socio-political structure would be just Berg'a nationalism, and Islam shall not be permitted to have any say in it. What interest the non-Bergali Muslims could have in it? The Marwari Bengali speaking in the grab of a Bengali would once more play pray havoc.

Behind all political upheavels, socio, cultural heresies confusion in thought and perversion in outlook, there is always the mysterious hand Anglo-Indo-Israel Axis powers that have been and are still most active very sweeping?

But the facts are undeniable and the evidence irrefutable. In the face of mounting testimony provided by the new Axis Powers which have lately admitted a new ally—U.S.S.R.—themselves, any attempt to exonerate these Axis powers and its agents from their crimes is most ridiculous—very pathetic indeed. Israel's involvement and co-operation should surprise no one as Israel is a genuine British product due to Balfour Declaration in 1917. Will Russia make a somersault at a future date as she did when she signed a pact with Nazis? However, if Pakistanis attempt to exonerate it, that means the poison has worked too deep. Hence this calls forth all

the more efforts with greater zeal—in the words of Dr. Iqbal :

“ Beat the trumpet hard  
And still harder and harder,  
If the response is slow and sluggish”.

The pages that follow are an attempt in this direction. The shrillity of notes contained therein to arouse the Ummah in general and Pakistanis in particular from its complacency towards the new Axis Powers threat. Shall the Pakistanis realize in time the ~~peril~~ they are facing ? Shall they ?

**What we omitted to do.**

We should admit that we and our leaders failed to perceive what was on the other side of the hill, i.e., that a wanton aggression by India under pre-emptive strategy was a ‘*must*’ at an early date. Hence we miserably failed to nip the trouble in the bud.

We failed to impress our brothers and ourselves that ‘the believers are brothers’ (49 : 10), we omitted to take necessary precautions (4 : 71), that we Muslims will be tested as our forefathers were tested (29 : 2, 3), that we listened to rumours against the injunctions of the Quran (4 : 71, 74, 94). We were warned by the Quaid-i-Azam on the first Id-ul-Fitr 1947 and again and again that we are Muslims and that colour, creed or different provinces should not hinder our mutual trust and equity (5 : 9) and justice (4 : 135).

We omitted to bear in our minds and act on Quranic injunction (60 : 12, 9) as regards choosing our friends.

History teaches us that big powers do not have permanent friendship but only permanent interests. They are prepared to let their friends down cruelly when they lose interest

in them. The latest example of dropping friends is that U. S. A. dropped Marshal Chiang Kai Shek in favour of People's Republic of China. If the Pakistanis in general, like the Chinese, could manage the miracle of strength by following the Islamic Ideology, then there is no doubt that the United States, Britain and Soviet Russia—one day will be forced to give up their hostile attitude. Muslims need be less emotional and more practical and active, because it is the man behind the machine that matters. Are we doing it now ?

Have we critically studied the past historical facts about Bengal presented to us by no other person than the pure and great Aryan architect of Bharat, Mr. Nehru. We have to face the realities of the world we live in, and one of these is that the Indian National Congress stole march over us at the time of partition in 1946-47, in 1954, in 1965 and once again in 1971.

**Heart searching is vital for the security of the nation.**

## CHAPTER IX

### LET US PAUSE TO REFLECT ON THE MYTH OF EXPLOITATION

#### East Pakistan

East Pakistan is abounds in monuments, hill resorts, beaches and big game hunting, angling and deep sea fishing, yet it had been grossly neglected by the British whose main interest lay in jute and tea. They, therefore, opened up those areas where their interest lay upper-most.

Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, was founded in 1608 and was the residence of Moghal Viceroy of Bengal. Dacca muslin and ornaments were once world famous and the silk and cotton made here were also much in demand. However, as already stated, the British traders and Marwari money lenders killed Dacca in eighteenth century to make Calcutta a great industrial centre.

#### Centres of attraction of Moghul period

Among the best known historical monuments in Dacca are the Lal Bagh Fort, Bibi Pari's tomb, Bara Katra, Hussaini

Dalan, the Star Mosque, the Sat Gumbad Mosque and the Dakeswari Temple, Dacca Museum.

### Population ?

Since 1969 Shaikh Mujib and his henchmen of Awami League claimed the population of East Pakistan to be 75 million. Recently the U.S. weeklies 'Time' and 'Newsweek' claimed it to be 78 million. In the Census of 1961 this figure is 51 million. No one stops to think how population of even an Asiatic country can rise by 50% in 9 years? Taking annual increase of 2½% it should not exceed 66 million now 1972.

### Exploitation ?

Basing their adverse propaganda on Mujib's covert propaganda the Western Press say that West Pakistan has drained wealth of East Pakistan. It is a blatant lie. If real figures since 1947 are brought out in a White Paper, it would prove to the hilt that it is East Pakistan which has benefited at the cost of West Pakistan. *'East Pakistan has actually proved to be a burden on the West Pakistan and not vice-versa'.*

We have discussed in the previous chapters how the British Hawks succeeded in their conspiracy to make the Muslims of India generally and Muslim in Bengal particularly in making her poor economically, industrially and to turn the 80 per cent literate into less than 20 per cent literate during their notorious Reforms in education in Bengal. Mr. Nehru's description of Bengal in 1945 is clear, concise and needs no comments. In 1947 the Muslims of Bengal were in a state of frustration and decay.

### Plans for Progress—1947-71

It is considered that for national purposes, the first priority

of education should be to create a literate society. In this atomic era, it is now widely accepted that the greater factor in a nation's economic progress is the quality of its manpower resources, which can be improved through education. It is, therefore, necessary that education should not be treated as a social service but should be regarded as a necessary investment in man—without which real economic progress in security of national defence and in culture is difficult. The aims of the new education policy should be to :

- (a) impart a common set of cultural values based on the precepts of Islam.
- (b) Create a literate society.
- (c) Attach a high priority to the development of analytical and technical skills.
- (d) Attract some of the best talents of the country into the teaching professions.
- (e) Use education as a force of national unification.

Education in Pakistan is administered by the Provincial authorities. Framing syllabi and conducting examinations of the Degree and post Graduate stages are functions of the individual universities.

One of the legacies of the British Raj has been the fact that the language of administration is English while that of the masses is not. The result has been that administrators are unaware of popular aspirations. If we add to it the change of written script in Sanskrit (un-Islamic) makes the situation from bad to worse. So long as the official language of the Government

remains in English and Bengali into Sanskrit, our leaders will continue to use it for their day to day purposes and language barrier will continue to remain.

Due to backwardness of Muslims in East Pakistan at the time of partition very great difficulties were experienced of providing the requisite Muslim teachers as well as the necessary laboratories, workshops and equipment, particularly in private schools and madrasas. It has so far been possible to make only a beginning in the direction of the full implementation of the revised curricula. However, Government Model comprehensive schools and other pilot schools have proved very in useful helping towards a greater diversification in schools with a correct teacher-students ratio, new techniques of education buildings that are spacious and well equipped and finances capable of meeting the new curricular requirements. Eventually there will be at least one Model Comprehensive School in each District and thana level.

At the higher secondary level (grades XI-XII) enrolments are also increasing at a rapid rate. Girl students form about 13 per cent of enrolment at this level. By 1968, 26 Polytechnic/ Technical Institutes have been established where the enrolment is encouraging. There are newly established 73 vocational Institutes offering certificate trade courses. Again since 1948, 27 Commercial Institutes have been established for students who have matriculated. A programme of in-service and pre-service training of technical teachers at selected polytechnics at Dacca.

#### **Universities—1971**

There are now Universities at Dacca, Chittagong, (Jhangir:

nagar near Dacca), Rajshahi, the Agricultural University at Mymensingh, Engineering and Technological Universities at Dacca. This is a remarkable progress.

Pakistan is still substantially an agricultural country. The Agricultural University at Mymensingh offers pre-service and in-service training and extension courses as well as short courses and refresher courses. Besides there is now 2 Agricultural and Animal Husbandry colleges. There are also 3 Engineering Colleges. Similarly there are 6 medical colleges and institutes for training nurses and scientific research institutes. There are now 29 professional colleges in East Pakistan, 2 Commerce, 1 Fine Art, 1 Home Economics, 7 Law, 7 Medicine, 6 Tibbia, 1 Social work, 7 teachers training, 1 Physical training.

#### **Hospitals—1971**

There are now about 48,000 beds in this wing. Specialized treatment for complicated diseases is available at all large hospitals and each hospital has 6 resident doctors and treatment is free in the Government hospitals. Since the bulk of the country's population lives in the country nearly 300 Rural Health Centres have been established. In addition there are about 660 new sub centres with one doctor, one health visitor and one compounder—dresser. There is one Malaria Eradication Centre in the East Wing.

#### **Rural Development—1971**

Agricultural, including animal husbandry, forests, fishery and crop production, constitutes the largest segment of the country's economy. About 97 percent of the agriculture labour force in both wings of the country work as cultivators and

agricultural labourers. One of the big problem of life in the agricultural sector is widespread under-employment in some part of the East, while in part there is invariably shortage of labour such as at harvesting period. Only a very small percentage of the agricultural labour is engaged in subsidiary occupations such as poultry, bee keeping and silk worm keepers. A big change in the life and work of farmers has come about recently as a result of the adoption of new agricultural techniques, canal, tube irrigation, chemical fertilizers, tractors and improved communications and transport.

Thus, in East Pakistan, the projects executed under Works programme relate mainly to flood control, communication, irrigation and construction.

#### **Major Achievements since 1947**

- (a) Irrigation and drainage channels, 7800 miles.
- (b) Embankment 7800 miles have been constructed.
- (c) Communication, 64000 approx. Kutchha roads and about 3200 miles metalled roads have been built.
- (d) About 41,745 bridges and culverts.
- (e) 7,262 buildings have been built.
- (f) Besides these projects, 4,354 miscellaneous projects such as, reconditioning of derelict tanks and construction of parks and playgrounds were completed.
- (g) Irrigation during dry season (winter months) 14,000 power pumps, 3,000 fractional pumps, 82 storage godowns and 160 training workshops were built

under Thana Irrigation Programme, have been installed.

(h) Canals 3,300 miles have been recently dug.

### **Banking—1971**

Pre-partition the banking was run entirely by Marwaris. However, now a wide network of institutional credit is provided by 66 banks which are supported by the Central and provincial Government, such as PICIC, the National Bank, State Bank of Pakistan, IDBP, HBF Corporation.

### **Water And Power — The Life-Blood.**

Water and Power are no less than the life-blood of agriculture and industry, and they are interlinked because water can be harnessed as a source of power, Hydro-electric projects usually combine the dual purposes of supplying irrigation water and electricity to the commissioned area. The problem of water in East Pakistan is complex, the problem in one part of the year is to control the excess water of heavy rains and swollen rivers; in the other, to make enough water available to support an additional crop. Yet another aspect of the problem of water is represented by salinity, alkalinity and waterlogging—all three of which corrode the land. These are grave problems in West and East Pakistan. With a dense population, increasing alarmingly fast—if the figures are correct—and with per capita land-holding extremely low, the area needs to grow more than one crop in the year to be able to meet its food requirements. This can be done only with the help of adequate irrigation projects. The traditional method of irrigation was confined to preserve

flood water, on confined to lifting water from shallow wells and stream by manual labour. It was laborious and exacting on manual labour.

The first organisation surface-water irrigation project was started in 1954 and in 1962 East Pakistan inaugurated the first hydro-electric project, Karnaphuli and Kaptai. Since then surface water and underground water irrigation has been developed through application of power pumps, Ganges Kobadak, the Tessta Barrage. The groundwater development in districts of Ranpur, Dinajpur, Rajshahi which is on higher level for flood water but the soil is fertile and could produce two to three crops a year.

#### **Flood—1971.**

EPADC is busy to save coasted districts of Chittagong, Khulna, Noakhali and Bakergunj where about 6,000 square miles are plagued by tidal waves inflow from the sea. Monsoon floods in the three major Padma (Ganges), Barhamputra and Meghna ravage over 100 million acres of land and crops on it. Projects like Barhamputura Embankment, Dacca, Narayangunj, Demra Project and Tippera, Chittagong Project cover many thousand square miles from floods and provide irrigation water, pump drainage facilities.

#### **Smaller Schemes.**

Other projects, such as Little Feni Drainage Project, and Drainage schemes for Faridpur, Comilla and the Gazaria, Ichhamati River Projects, are among more than 100 small schemes which are now in operation.

## Power

In view of the flat topography of East Pakistan, emphasis has been laid on developing its thermal generating capacity. Specific big projects under way include at Ghorasal, Chittagong, Khulna Thermal Power Stations. These are smaller projects such as Karnaphuli, Ashuganj Sidirganj, Saidpur, Bogra, Serajganj, Mymensingh, Cox's Bazar Thermal Plants.

## Transmission

Transmission and distribution lines are now about 5,000 miles Secondary Transmission lines for Chittagong-Dacca, Ullon, Sidhirganj, Pahartali, Haliashahr, Kalurghat, Comilla-Candpur, Feni-Choumuhani, in the towns of Khulna and Kushtia, Ishurdi, Pabna, Serajganj, Ishurdi-Sardah-Rajshahi have been laid since 1947.

## Transport and Communication.

In this sector too, East Pakistan has made *'very marked progress'* in inland water transport, Road and Railway.

## Railways

At the time of independence, East Pakistan had a route mileage of 1,618 miles which is now 5,335 miles. It should be noted E.P. Railway inherited its railway system in very deplorable condition, which necessitated laying of new track for the main and branch lines, purchase of diesel electric locomotives, passenger coaches and wagons, modernisation of signalling techniques, strengthening of bridges, addition of

rolling stock, remodelling yards and terminals.

### **Routes**

Dacca to Chittagong (213 miles), Dacca to Sylhet (148 miles), Dacca-Darsana (92 miles) and involving a ferry service between Jagannathganj and Serajgunj Ghat, Dacca to Khulna (368 miles) and Dacca to Rajshahi (353 miles) including a ferry service depicts progress since 1947.

### **Roads.**

At the time of independence there were only 240 miles of all-weather roads. However, there is now about 2,400 mile length of all weather roads. Work on bridges over the rivers Buriganga and Karnaphuli and many other smaller bridges are being carried out, inspite of the fact that East Pakistan is considered more suited to inland water transport because of a number of major rivers flowing through it and numerous streams feeding the rivers. Yet roads are essential, particularly in the dry months, major administrative, industrial and agricultural as link to these centres and with the river and sea port. However, the maintenance on the roads had been neglected since long hence whatever existed at the time of partition their condition was very poor. Hence immediate attention was paid towards repairs and extension.

### **Road Transport**

The East Pakistan Road Transport Corporation, which was established in March 1961, had only 4 buses, when it started operation. Its fleet now more than 2,700 buses which includes double decker and a depot for it at Mirpur. It carried

about 170 million passengers in 1959.

### **Inland Water Transport**

The quarter of the total traffic in East Pakistan is carried by Inland Water Transport, and during the flood season, it is the main means of communication between large areas. These waterways consist of over 5,000 miles of navigable channels—of which about 3,113 are perennial waterways—and 1,420 river stations. They handle more than 23 million passengers every year.

The old motor vehicles at the time of partition have been replaced by modern 2,490 steamers, motor vessels launches and dumberaft with a total carrying capacity of 115,230 passengers and about 256,400 tons of cargo.

In addition there are some 300,000 country boats which carry passengers and about 17 million tons of cargo every year. All the major river ports such as, Dacca, Narayanganj Chandpur, Barisal and Khulna are now open to passenger and cargo traffic. Eighteen timber jetties have been provided on the coastal islands and 18 floating pontoons constructed for smaller river stations—all since partition.

Barisal Repair Workshop now undertakes repairs of all kinds and sizes of vehicles. Augmentation, modernisation and replacement of I.W.T. vessels and expansion of dry docks and slipway is constantly being carried out. The Corporation has its 4 coasters, 4 landing craft type of vessels, 10 motor life boats, and 12 ferry vessels—the latter operate where there are no bridges.

## **Chittagong**

This principal port of East Pakistan has been improved since 1947. It has 11 permanent jetties, some light pontoons jetties and moorings. An off-shore which supplies crude oil to the Eastern Refinery, also handles tanker upto 45,000 dead-weight tons. Other facilities include cargo handling storage, fresh water, fuel oil, harbour craft, lighterage fleet fire protection and ultra light radio network, two new jetties reconstruction of 6 others, the building of new transit sheds and warehouses and addition to harbour craft, navigational aid and cargo handling equipment, workshop and slipways all are nearing completion.

## **Chalna**

Chalna (Mongla) was established in 1950. This port is making a significant contribution to the economic development of East Pakistan. Total tonnage handled in 1968-69 is about 1,700 thousand tons. Six launches, six truck cranes, six fork-lift trucks, two motor vehicles and new import jetty at Khalishpur are some other additions at this port.

## **Civil Aviation**

Since 1954 has made very marked progress as it has brought a network of service in the country both for international and home.

To sum up progress since 1947 of East Pakistan under various heads are given below :—

*Note :—*Very extensive damage was done by Mukti Bahini, Indian Army and Navy to sea ports, river ports, bridges, railway stations, Air ports etc. in 1971. It will cost the Muslim Bengal lot money and labour to put it in running order.

## Ports

Chittagong ports handling capacity was limited to half million tons in 1947. In 1969-70 it handled 4.7 million tons.

Chalna, a new port developed after Pakistan handled over two million tons in 1969-70.

## Airports :

There were only two small fair weather airports in 1947 at Dacca and Chittagong. Now there are a dozens Airports and airstrips with big expansion of Dacca airport which can handle Jet planes.

## Roads :

East Pakistan's land area is 55,000 square miles or only 15% of total area of Pakistan and it depends mostly on reverine communication. The British left 240 miles of high type roads, none of low type roads. Now the High type roads is 2,400 miles and low type 1,400 miles. The high type has increased by ten times.

## Industry :

Although Pakistan inherited 20 percent of the sub-continent's population, her share in industry was less than 7 percent and even this consisted of small-scale and minor industrial units—most of these were located in Western Wing. East Pakistan producing 75 percent of total world jute output, had virtually no jute manufacturing capacity. Since resources were inadequate, especially in East Pakistan, to permit of all industrial investments that would be desirable, choices had to

made. Recognition was given to the desirability of promoting the use of indigenous raw materials, such as, jute, cotton and to the need for maintaining opportunities for employment, particularly in the case of small scale industries.

Industrial estates on a large, medium and small scale, have been set up at various places with such facilities for industries as roads, railways connections port and telegraph offices, water and power. The first of these estates was set up between 1953-55 at Tejgaon. In the second plan nine large scale industries and nineteen small scale industries were set up in East Pakistan. In the Third Plan EPIDC had 42 on-going schemes which covered the following industrial fields, jute, textiles, paper and board, ship building, sugar, cotton, textiles, non-metallic mineral products, basic metals, chemicals and fertilizer, engineering, fuels and minerals and miscellaneous enterprises : such as Kohinoor Jute Mills, Afil Jute Mills, Khulna Hardboard Factory, a Polythene Bag Unit, a DDT factory and 500 looms at M.C.M. Ltd. Chittagong Steel Mills,

During years 1967-68 ten projects were completed in the Eastren Refinery, Shympar Sugar Mills, Ground-nut Oil Mills, Mutarakganj Sugar Mills, and six more jute Mills. In 1968-69, one new Jute Mills was opened and nine other projects for Jute Mills and Cable. diesel, were completed. The North Bengal Paper Mill at Paksey, Pabna has begin production (1970).

East Pakistan Small Scale Industries Corp was established in 1957 to promote the growth and development of 'small' industries in East Pakistan, has so far set up 20 industrial estates. In addition to it three pilot projects for agricultural implements, glazed pottery and for coir and copra ; one model production

unit each for cheese and butter, and for cigars and cheroots; eight textile facility centres, four service facility centres for wood, cane and bamboos, and one engineering service institute.

In addition to substantial loans from banks, the private sector of small industries received rupees 19.7 million from EPSIC and IDBP for 1,072 units. Pay-As-You Earn Scheme (PAYE) was introduced in 1962 and revised in 1967 to enable individuals to purchase of complete plants for the establishment of new industries—as provision of necessary funds in private sector by East Pakistan had been a stumbling block. A central Testing Laboratory was set up at Dacca by the Government.

#### **Pakistan Standards Institution (PSI).**

This Institution was founded at Dacca in 1958 in order to win the confidence of foreign buyers on such items as jute, coir, tea, plywood and tea chests. The Pakistan Industrial Technical Assistance Centre (P.I.T.C.) was established at Dacca in 1957 for the introduction of controls, procedures and techniques for reducing ineffectiveness and wastage of materials, the improvement of the quality products.

Up to the late fifties industries were mainly concentrated in Karachi, Lyallpur and Lahore. But since then there has been growing process of diversification, with a rapidly expanding production of fertilizers, cement, paper, newsprint, Superphosphate, Natural Gas, Fertilizer Factory (Ghorasal), wire, cable, chemicals and the steel mill (Chittagong). It has been spread outside Dacca, Chittagong, Khulna, Kushtia, Bogra and Sylhet.

The Eastern Refinery at Chittagong has a capacity of 1.5 million tons. The gasfields at Rashidpur, Kalash Tila, Titas Bokharabad, Chhatak and Habibganj has begun its production. There are coal field at Bogra and Sylhet.

**Press :**

The spread of education coupled with industrialization has revolutionized the character of the press in Pakistan. As many as 1,064 journals and periodicals are now (1970 statistics) being published in the following languages : English, Urdu, Bengali, Baluchi, Pashtu, Punjabi, Sindhi and Gujrati.

As regards daily newspapers, there are 11 English language newspapers. At first the Muslim share in undivided India's press was very small. On the eve of independence, there were no Muslim owned newspapers or periodicals in the areas constituting the new state of Pakistan except the Pakistan Times and Nawa-i-Waqt. Dawn, Jung and Anjam started after the birth of Pakistan at Karachi having transferred their offices from Delhi.

In East Pakistan, the English daily, Morning News (Calcutta 1942) re-emerged from Dacca first as weekly (April 1948) and then as daily (December 1949). The Azad was also shifted from Calcutta to Dacca where also a new daily (English), The Pakistan Observer started. The newspapers started in the early years of Pakistan shared in the heartbreak and the difficulties the new State itself was encountering. Good printing presses did not exist. Acute shortage of such essential materials and equipment as ink, newsprint, blockmaking plant and linotype machines and spare parts dogged every stage of newspaper production.

The leading metroopolitan dailies are :

*Urdu* : Jang, Mashriq, Imroz, Nawa-i-Waqt, Hurriyat.

*English* : The Pakistan Times, Morning News, Dawn, The Pakistan Observer (daily).

*Local English* : Dainik, Azad, Attefaq, Unity Chittagong, Chitralli, Purbodesh.

New addition are, Sangram daily, The People and Forum (Weekly) all in English (Dacca). The Wave in English weekly (Khulna).

All newspapers and journals in Pakistan are privately owned by individuals or joint-stock companies. The Press in Pakistan inherited a strong political character. The English language press, despite limited membership continues to be influential.

#### **Radio and Television :**

At the time of birth of Pakistan Dacca had one (5 KW) a feeble medium wave station at Dacca ; but it became a 7.5 KW in 1949. Since then Radio Pakistan in the Eastern Wing has come a long way on the road of better service to its listeners at home and abroad. Its regional broadcasting stations now include Dacca, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Sylhet and Rangpur. In the third plan include relaying station at Khulna, replacement and improvement of equipment, separate studios for transcription service at Dacca a 100 KW short wave transmitter at Dacca.

The beginning of television in Pakistan is quite recent—it

started in December 1964 at Dacca. TV programmes generate as usual during its birth-pangs—a considerable amount of interest, some appreciative and some valuably if not constructive critical. Plans for future developments are under active consideration.

### **Film Industry :**

Pakistan film industry started with three very poorly equipped studios in Dacca in 1948. While the quantitative development of the film industry has been very rapid and its equipment has improved, the quality of feature film still leaves much to be desired. For the exhibition of films there are more than 550 cinemas and over 150 distributors in the country as a whole. But much remains to be done to achieve real progress. There are over 100 active producers in the country. The East Pakistan Film Development Corporation with Government support was established in 1958. Since then it has produced 292 films. The corporation has also established a film laboratory for processing of 35 mm and 16 mm films. There are four shooting floors with a capacity of five sets a day and two sound theater, dubbing and recording.

**Vital Steps have been Undertaken for parity but they were not propagated, hence some comments on baseless Propaganda Carried on about Exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan. Facts do not speak itself, 'telling the world is vital'**

### **Import of Foodgrains.**

After Independence, between 1948 to October 1971 Pakistan has imported about 21 million tons of rice and wheat

through Aid/Grant/Loan and through its own resources by cash payments. Total cost of 21 million is over Rs. 8 Billion (or 8000 million). This is in addition to foodgrains supplied by West Pakistan.

Of this total imports about 75 % has been imported into East Pakistan, which is a perennial deficit area in food, because of smuggling of their foodgrain to adjoining provinces of India.

#### Earnings of Employees in each other's wing.

- (A) In East Pakistan, over a million Muslims of Bihar took shelter from India and settled there since 1946. They are part and parcel of population of East Pakistan.
- (B) Before the crisis, there were about 25,000 persons consisting of West Pakistan including migrants from India (other than Biharis) were earning through employment in private sector from highest to lowest job at an average salary of Rs. 600/- per month—a total of Rs. 15 million per month. Their employment composed of as Managers, Executives, Clerks, shop assistants, peons, watchmen, shopkeepers etc.
- (C) *'There were about 200,000. (Two hundred thousand) East Pakistanis' employed with private sector all over in West Pakistan in factories, shop assistants, domestic servants, peons and other skilled and unskilled jobs. Taking their average earnings at Rs. 150/ per month, 'these East Pakistanis earned about Rs. 30 million per month in West Pakistan.'*

## Export to Foreign Countries.

*'The glibble correspondents of Foreign press' in unison with the false assertion of Mujib and his henchmen carry propagand that the West Pakistan has lived on the exchange earnings of East Pakistan. 'This is a palpable lie'. Let us compare the figures.*

Since 1948 to February 1971 (23 years) the earning through exports of East Pakistan is Rs. 25,-97 millions, during the same period West Pakistan earned Rs. 21366 millions. Thus an excess *'of Rs. 4031 millions is in favour of East Pakistan'*.

*Note:* It may be added here that one of the main items of exports of West Pakistan namely Raw Cotton, is largely consumed by the Textile Industry of Pakistan. During 23 years ending 1970-71 season, out of total production of 43 million Bales, 26 million bales of the FOB export value of nearly 13 Billion Rupees has been consumed locally to cloth the people of both wings of Pakistan. If all these 26 million Bales had been exported, value of West Pakistan *'by 8 Billion Rupees'*.

## Inter-Zonal Trade

Trade between East and West Pakistan since 1947 to February 1971, West Pakistan has exported goods worth Rs. 16518 million to East Pakistan and East Pakistan has shipped goods of Rs. 9493 million to West Pakistan, thus in inter-zonal Trade, *'a sum of Rs. 7025 million is due to West Pakistan from East Pakistan'*.

### **Imports From Foreign Country.**

Since 1947 to 1971 East Pakistan imported goods machinery etc. of Rs. 21309 millions and during same period West Pakistan imported goods, machinery etc. of Rs. 46470 millions.

The reason for this smaller import into East Pakistan as compared to West Pakistan *'is it's limited capacity of absorption'*. Further such huge import into West Pakistan was made possible through vast loans advanced by the Foreign Countries specially since 1958. A portion of such loan has also been utilised in East Pakistan. For the first decade East Pakistan suffered due to absence of inter-structure. *'in the first decade'* most of development of Industries in both the Wings of Pakistan was carried out by the private Sector and very little of Foreign Loan was made available to the country.

### **Contribution of East and West Pakistan to Central Revenue.**

During 9 years 1968-69, East Pakistan contributed a gross sum of Rs. 8051 million to Central Federal Government taxes. Out of this Rs. 3884 million or 48% was refunded to it as provincial share of allocation. Thus a net of Rs. 4167 million was retained by the Federal Government.

As against this during same period West Pakistan contributed Rs. 22371 million to Federal Taxes and got refund of 4000 million or about 18% as Provincial share. Thus a net sum of Rs. 18371 million was retained by the Federal Government.

*'From the above it will be seen that the net contribution'*

to Central Revenue of Rs. 4167 million by East Pakistan 'represent about 14% as compared to it's total gross contribution of 26½% i.e. Rs. 8051 million'.

As against this the net contribution of West Pakistan to Central Revenue of Rs. 18371 million represent about 60% as compared to it's total gross contribution of 73½% i.e. Rs. 22371 million.

Now after contribution about 14% net to the Centre, if the salaries, allowances, pensions etc. of East Pakistan personnel employed in the Central Services like Civil Service, Foreign Diplomatic service, in Defence services like Navy, Army Airforce etc. the East Pakistan the margin becomes very colossal and 'explodes the myth of exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan'.

#### **Misconception about Inter-Zonal Trade**

It is stated by the Foreign Press that East Pakistan is the consumer of Industrial goods of West Pakistan. 'It is incorrect'. In fact the trade is complimentary in Mutual interest of both the wings.

In 1969-70, East Pakistan supplied manufactured goods like Jute goods, Paper, matches, tea etc. of the value of Rs. 753 millions, as against this West Pakistan supplied manufactured goods like Cotton Fabrics, Cotton yarn, Machinery, Drugs and Medicines, Tobacco manufactures, paper, cement, Edible oils, rubber goods etc. of the value of Rs. 754 millions to East Pakistan. The Primary commodities exported to each other in 1969-70 is extra. West Pakistan supplied it of the value of Rs. 898 millions and East supplied to the West of the value of Rs. 162 millions.

#### **Loans for Development :**

The Federal Government of Pakistan made available loans

for development purposes between 1948-49 to 1969-70 to two wings as below :

To East Pakistan total Rs. 8419 millions.

To West Pakistan total Rs. 6847 millions.

Thus it will be seen that as compared to West Pakistan, the East Pakistan was allocated Rs. 1572 millions more money.

#### **Shares of East Pakistan in the 'invisible earnings' of Foreign Exchange :**

In addition to earning through exports of goods to Foreign Countries, Pakistan now earns annually about 900 millions through invisible sources such as remittances from abroad by Pakistanis, freight earnings by ships, insurance premium etc. In former years this earning was much less. However taking average of 600 million per year for 20 years ending 1969, a total of 12,000 million have been earned invisibly. In this share of East Pakistan is about 30% or 3600 million covering mostly the remittance by the East Pakistanis from U.K. etc.

#### **'Periscope Development' in East Pakistan—Since 1947**

- 1) Five more Universities at Jehangirnagar, Mymensingh, Engineering Technical Institutions, Chittagong and Rajshahi set up.
- 2) One and only Steel Mill in Pakistan set up at Chittagong.
- 3) Only Newsprint Plant in Pakistan set up at Khulna.

- 4) A number of Radio Stations have been set up.
- 5) Post Offices have increased from about 3000 to over 6000.
- 6) A large Government East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation has carried out and built a number of Industrial plants in which nearly a billion rupees invested.
- 7) A large paper mill and a viscose Rayon factory has been established near Chittagong.
- 8) An Oil Refinery set up at Chittagong.
- 9) Entrepreneures of West Pakistan have invested over a Billion rupees in setting up Industries in East Pakistan.
- 10) A number of Sugar Mills have been established.
- 11) A number of Diesel Power Stations set up and Hydro-electric Schemes have been established.
- 12) A Naval Academy set up at Chittagong for cadet training, the only one in Pakistan.
- 13) Ship Repairing Dock Yards established.
- 14) The number of telephones have gone up from 3000 to over 50,000.
- 15) Many Colleges, High Schools etc. established.

In 1947 :

- 16) Revenue receipt of East Pakistan Provincial Govern-

ment was Rs. 169 million, has now gone upto Rs. 1789 millions.

- 17) *'There was not a single Jute Mill'* now there are 55 Jute Mills which consume 2 million bales of Raw Jute.
- 18) *'There were 5 Cotton Mills, now there are 44 units'* to which raw cotton is supplied by West Pakistan.
- 19) The revenue of Dacca Municipality was Rs. 1.6 million, in 1969-70 it was 16.3 million (increased by ten times).
- 20) The revenue of Chittagong Municipality was only Rs. 700,000 in 1968-69 it was over Rs. 15 million (increased by 22 times).

## CHAPTER X

### MYSTERY UNMASKED

*'Patriotism is not enough people must learn to defend their liberty and homeland or perish!'*

#### **Lest we forget events concerning partition of India**

The great object in trying to understand history of a country, i.e. political, military, religious, literary, cultural, or scientific is to get behind man (the leader and the led) and to grasp ideas. Ideas have radiation and development on ancestry and posterity of their own in which men pay the part of god-fathers and godmothers more than that of legitimate parents, so let us trace the history—though very briefly—the thinking—i.e. policy of some of the leaders and of the Governments at the time of partition of India (1947) as well as at the time of the debacle. Let us turn from speculations and 'return to history' because human memories are short and history repeats itself.

The Government of the country rules the nation through its policy. Strategy is considered maid of the policy. And strategy in peace time may be defined as the direction and management of war. Strategy in peace will, therefore, comprise the manage-

ment of all national resources so that they may be capable of being exploited not only to the greatest possible extent, but also at the time when they will be most useful, should the necessity for protecting national interests involves the nation in war. Preparation for war falls into the following categories:—

Political, moral, psychological, material (logistics i.e. allied industries), military (naval airforce and army). In the diplomatic field, material and monetary support may also be given to small states (allies) under the strategic plan.

#### **U.S.A. and Britain's Political Policy and Planning in 1947**

British policy was supreme in India at the time of partition of India. However, U.S.A. was very keenly interested in post-war Britain's policy as she hoped to be the successor of the British who had become militarily a tired nation and economically weak. The British, therefore, was compelled to hand over to U.S.A. the '*policing of the world*' till she had found her feet and put her own house in order. In order to safeguard British national interests, such as in economy and trade British Government was bitterly opposed to partition of India and also to lose control on international trade routes on land, sea and air— which geographical and strategical location of undivided India could guarantee. U.S.A. had no different views on this British policy. Please see the pentagon papers, U.S. policy in the Far East (p. 15).

#### **Political Planning by British and the Indian Congress**

It should be recalled that Mr. Nehru as a pure Indian Aryan leader, like his European Aryan big brother—Hitler, had written

his future plan in his book under the title of '*Discovery of India*', wherein he, as the leader of Indian Congress not only advocated one India (as it was under the British) but also a very expanded one, i.e. as Akhand Bharat of Ashoka. To mislead and mystify his adversaries, he had also stated to suit his covert plan of expansion and to support with available propaganda in psywar that he had no longer any desire to pursue his aggressive policy which had '*led him many times to jail*'. Moreover, to prove the bonafide of his new policy of non-violence, he also changed the Indian Congress flag from ensign of '*Swastika*' to that of '*Ashoka Charka*'.

Encouraged by such gestures made by the Indian Congress, the British Government sent a Royal Commission which presented a plan of one united India, yet divided into three (A,B,C) autonomous groups. Maulana Azad, as President of Indian Congress, Quaid-i-Azam as President of Muslim League and the Viceroy of India agreed and accepted this plan. Mr. Gandhi also gave his blessing to this plan.

#### **A Blitzkreig**

Soon after this acceptance, '*under the advice of Mr. Gandhi*', Maulana Azad, not only resigned as a President but agreed to stage a '*Coup de grace*' as desired by Mahatma Gandhi to get Mr. Nehru elected as the President of the Indian Congress, who once elected as president, at once denounced the Agreement. It took White Hall by complete surprise. Eventually F.M. Lord Wavell was recalled and Rear-Admiral Lord Mountbatten was appointed as Viceroy of India, because White Hall found the Field Marshal unsubmitive and the admiral was willing to play the tune of White Hall as long as his career as a sailor in the

Royal Navy was assured. The British Government sent another Royal Commission under Lord Radcliff who decided to put his seal on what Lord Mountbatten presented to him as '*Partition Plan*'.

Lord Mountbatten decided to inflict a policy of '*Surprise*' and '*treachery*' on the Quaid-i-Azam. Lord Mountbatten in collaboration with Mr. Nehru, the Congress and Mr. Gandhi succeeded in deceiving Quaid-i-Azam who—though unwilling; as an honest broker—now accepted a truncated Pakistan. This acceptance as a counter strategic move mystified White Hall London.

### **They Conspired the Dismemberment of Pakistan**

Lord Mountbatten and Mr. Nehru became vindictive as they considered the partition of India as an ignominious defeat. Lord Mountbatten felt it heart rending as he had failed to become the first Viceroy of the two dominions—Bharat and Pakistan. He, therefore, acted as a strategist if possible, to destroy, or at least dismember Pakistan, the sooner, the better! White Hall, it is obvious, gave blessing to this Mountbatten plan. U.S.A. the presumptive successor as '*the policeman*, of the world to succeed Britain on '*whose empire the sun was about to set*', decided also to put his seal on the Mountbatten dismemberment plan.

No wonder, therefore, U.S.A. who had grown very prosperous and militarily supreme, aided and abetted the way the partition of India under Radcliff plan. U.S.A. went a step further, as she also took keen and active interest the way the partition of Bengal, the rape of Kashmir, and other princely

Indian states took place. Please appendix E.

As regards political psywar planning for Bengal, Lord Mountbatten decided to let the economic disparity and cultural issues, especially language problem, get mutured. He, therefore, decided as a pre-requisite to strike a strategic surprise blow on West Pakistan's economy before Pakistan Government had recovered from her birth pangs by inflicting the refugee problem. Pakistan's share of armed forces, which were under pre-conceived plan spread all over in India under the Boundry Commission Force, were not spared. The country had no arms and no means to manufacture it due to the fact, it had no logistics as no factories (civil and military) were located in Pakistan, and also the share of funds due to her, were held up in State Bank of India in Bharat, to paralyse the administration in the new state of Pakistan.

#### **Military Planning by Anti-Pakistani Forces**

It is a well known fact that the Punjab had been the '*Sword arm*', as well as, the granary of India. In spite of the fact it had Muslim majority, it was treacherously partitioned under '*Mountbatten plan*'.

- (a) to destroy its economy by forcing an influx of many millions of Muslim refugees from not only rest of India but also from Indian princely states and Kashmir and from what is now known as East Punjab;
- (b) Second reason was both economic and strategic. By partition for military reasons, a land corridore was

provided to Kashmir for movement of Bharati troops as well as to weaken northern border of the Punjab. Kashmir the '*Water Storage*' i.e. the area from which the five rivers of the Punjab originated and which irrigated the lands of the Punjab became the future battlefield. Moreover, for economic reasons the partition was done in such a way that all head-works, which controlled the canal water irrigation system, were located in the Corridore;

- (c) Lord Mountbatten at once got down to the planning for the conquest of Kashmir by invasion by the Indian Army. It may be recalled, that the British Military Mission as well as the civil service officers (British) were on loan to Pakistan but for discipline etc. were under Lord Mountbatten. These were dangerous tools which Lord Mountbatten effectively used against Pakistan. No wonder, therefore, Generals Meservy and Gracey, the Commanders-in-Chief Pakistan, refused to carry out orders of Quaid-i-Azam '*to help the Liberation forces*' of Jammu and Kashmir. In spite tremendous handicaps, such as, no organised army, air force; no transportation (logistics), natural calamity, such as floods in Sind and East Pakistan in 1947, influx of refugees, communal riots instigated and fanned by foreign powers, incursions by armed gangs from India and Afghan Lashkers financed, organised and led by a British general and senior Indian Civil Service Officer in 1948 and again by Afghanistan in 1950, Pakistan not only survived, but grew from strength to strength. Lord Mountbatten full of despair left Bharat. White

Hall promoted him as Admiral and later on Chief of Imperial General Staff. The United Nations being a sterile organisation, the Kashmir Dispute was kept as a running sore and a factor to keep the attention of Pakistan Government glued on to this problem. The sore in East Pakistan, as already explained earlier, grew chronic and incurable, mostly due to active derogatory anti-Pakistan Policy of Bharat, Britain and U.S.R.R. and due to allied foreign pre-conceived military planning based on political-cum-military conspiracy, Pakistan neglected to apply proper measures at the opportune moment to nip in the bud the secession issue.

### Old Wine In New Bottles

Due to changing conditions in world situation, strategic planning by Pakistan was modified in 1950 i.e. after the demise of Quaid-i-Azam. Britain had resigned in favour of U.S.A. who became '*The policeman in Asia.*' Bharat and Britain were relegated to the position of U.S.A's tools of strategy. Soviet Union was sitting on the fence, like a panther, to pounce on the prey instantly at the opportune moment. United States Government sent a Mission in 1951 '*to offer economic and military aid to Pakistan*'—though a small economically and also militarily weak state—'*to act as an ally*' to contain the Communist under S.E.A.T.O. and C.E.N.T.O. Pacts. A team of experts under the guise of '*Ford Foundation*' were sent to Pakistan under the leadership of Professor Edward S. Masson—who is now again working in Harvard University. He was (under a plan) assisted by a team of 8 workers who were said to be experts in agriculture, cattle and sheep breeding.

ding, poultry and sub-soil water lifting with water pumps. It was in agricultural pursuit that I met some members of various foreign institutions often, as they visited my farm at Karachi and at Khuzdar in Kalat State. I might recall that after I forced my retirement from the Army, I took up farming. I was farming now in an area, which had been laying barren for at least a century or more and away from civilization. It was very poorly served with even country tracks, so my visits to Karachi were very few and far between. So I decided to spend my spare or relaxing time in writing books (at that time in Urdu) on Islamic Military History. As it happened my books were extremely well reviewed by the press. This, it seems, drew attention of this Mission, because during their visits to my farm as agricultural experts, they were more interested in Islamic Pattern-of-War or psychological warfare than agriculture. At last the spell was broken, as three of the members of this team (so called experts) acknowledged that they were in fact U.S. Army Officers of field rank (majors and above).

In addition to the Masson Mission, research work of *'how to break up Pakistan'*, was carried out secretly also by U.S.A. C.I.A., by a Mission of the University of Philadelphia, and by the Rana Corporation U.S.A. The Military aid has been described in Chapter XIII. Another professor Robert Dorfman later on joined these Missions in 1962 *'as an advisor'* to the President of Pakistan on the problem of water logging and salinity. Britain, Australia, Colombo plan and Bharat had similar agencies such as British Military Mission.

As regards the U.S. Military Group under Mr. C.B. Marshall, all members of U.S. Military Assistance Group had access to every single section of the G.H.Q., and even a field

officer and of above rank could reach the Commanders-in-Chief and the even President of Pakistan. On the contrary, no Pakistani Military Officer, even of General rank, could enter the U.S. installations, such as, at Baddabare near Peshawar and Malir near Karachi from where the U-2 spy flights were carried out without, it has been stated, the consent or knowledge of the Government of Pakistan.

### **Behind the Mask**

It is obvious that most of these Foreign advisers, or experts who were deputed by the U.S. Government and by various American British and other foundations, were not exactly doing the jobs they were supposed to do according to the 'Agreement.' On the face of it, Ford Foundation and all other such Foundations are private non-profit making institutions serving 'public welfare'. One of its official aims is 'to identify and contribute' to the solution of problems of national and international importance. The foundation workers mainly by giving funds for experimental development efforts that are likely to produce significant advances within its fields of interests. However, lot of extra Covert curricular activity seems to have been going on behind the mask of aided projects, which may in fact be needed by the country.

### **The Volte Face**

In Pakistan these U.S.A. and other foreign groups sought to salvage their reputation by climbing on the East Pakistan bandwagon by becoming eloquent spokesmen for higher allocations to this region. There was irony in this, given their intimate involvement with those very policies which promoted

the growth of disparity. For example, Richard Gilbert was rushed back in Islamabad from Indonesia following the fall of Ayubi Government. He intervened to get for Mahbubul Haq the post at the expense of the East Pakistani Dr. R.H. Khandker, to create further rift between the East and West Pakistan. Another fact which came to light was, that eight out of ten members of Masson Group with the planning Commission were of Jewish origin. Another example out of many, is that while Mr. McGearge Bundy, President of the Ford Foundation during his tour in Pakistan in 1968 said : "I think the reputation of Pakistan and her Government for economic planning and for effective use of outside assistance is very high....." The Advisory group, however, reported in its '*Secret Annual Review*' for 1967-68 :—

".....While the Advisory Group was waving the flag of victory for Pakistan's capitalist development, the people of Pakistan were rioting in the streets of all major cities..... Although a new military take-over in early 1969 forced calm upon the country, it is clear that animosity towards the ruling elite runs deep over corruption, repression, unemployment and general poverty.....".

**More extracts from Masson's Secret Report 1970 on U.S. Economic and Military Aid**

".....We believe the East Pakistani claims to be largely justified, First, It is indisputable that the bulk of public investment has been in West Pakistan though the majority of the population lies in the East. East Pakistan's share of central government development expenditure has been as low as 20% during 1950-55.....Third Five Year Plan period

1965-70 East Pakistan has received an even smaller share of private investment less than 25%.....In any event the fact remains that investments in the West have done little or nothing for the people in the East.....”

“.....Foreign exchange has been allocated to the detriment of East Pakistan. Over the last two decades East Pakistan export earnings have varied between 50% and 70% while its share of imports has been in the range of 25% to 30%. Until 1962-63, East Pakistan has shown significant surpluses in foreign account, which has changed recent years to small deficit. By contrast the West's foreign trade has shown a substantial and chronic deficit that has absorbed virtually all foreign exchange made available through foreign aid...”.

#### **A Captive Market ?**

“...general economic policy has clearly favoured West Pakistan. The West's preponderant share of imports and investment might have provided inexpensive necessities for all of Pakistan's people. In fact, it had allowed the development of inefficient industries, which ironically have prospered largely because of tariffs and quotas that have made East Pakistan a '*Captive Market*'. 40% of all exports of West Pakistan are sold to East Pakistan ; in 1968-69 the West Pakistan sold 50% more to the East than it bought from the East.

“An analysis of foreign trade data reveals that a net transfer of resources has taken place from East to West Pakistan.....In short, Pakistan's economic policies are harmful to East Pakistan. '*Exploitation*' may be a strong word but it seems clear, all in all, that East Pakistan's interests have been

subordinated to those of the West and that East Pakistanis have had good cause to resent the fact.....The military regime in Pakistan has existed with modifications since 1958 and decision-making authority rests with a well-entrenched civil service and their military bosses. All senior military members of the administration have been West Pakistani and all the senior officers in the Central civil services..."

*Comments by Rangrut* on economic progress, logistics and agriculture have been recorded in Chapter IX. These foundations distorted the facts to suit their use in anti-Pakistan covert psywar. The U.S. ambassador Benjamin H. Achler's (1967-69) remarks. Some extracts of it have been reproduced also in succeeding pages to contradict the malicious coloured reports by various U. S. agents—name them what you like—Ford Foundation or C. I. A. etc.

#### **U.S. Military Aid to Pakistan, in Masson's Report**

The information collected by the Director of Institute for Defence studies and Analysis 1970 India, has been reproduced in Chapter XIII. The quantum of U. S. aid to Pakistan is a '*classified figure*' we cannot therefore attest it or reject it. The Masson report estimates puts it between 5.1.5. billion to 5.2 billions for the period between 1954 and 1965—*i.e.*, before 1965 Indo-Pak War. In fact, it had already started diminishing very rapidly since 1962 when U.S A. had decided to plunge herself into the quagmire of Indo-China war and desired Pakistan to be an active participant under SEATO Pact by sending a strong military detachment. However, when no Counter guarantee of U.S. active participation in case of Wanton Bharati invasion against Pakistan was given by U.S. ;

Pakistan declined to take any further interest in despatching forces to distant land, as she rightly point out that security of her own home was vital and foremost. This was followed by U. 2. affair and then the 1965 wanton Bharati covert aggression came, which gave the U.S. and Britain a pre-conceived excuse by these powers to place an embargo of weaponry on Pakistan.

### **Indo-Pak War 1965**

However, 1965 war brought out some very important military factors :

- (a) Even with second hand weapons given by U.S. to Pakistan in 1954, Pakistan could effectively defend her homeland against even 4:1 odds and against Bharati Army equipped by U.S. and U.S.S.R. by more modern weaponry in 1962-65.
- (b) Bharati military leadership which had proved very weak against China, was now discovered not even capable to defeat Pakistan—a much smaller fry—even after great expansion and stiffening by U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and U.K. of its armed forces with material and money
- (c) Even a threat of Chinese participation to aid Pakistan could be real and most damaging to India was discussed in these reports.
- (d) The debacle of 1962 Sino-India had enabled the world's greatest powers to jump in the arena under the pretext to save India from Chinese aggression.

Britain, U.S. and Russia began to pour in machinery, weaponry, material and money to save Bharat being wiped out.

(e) The report gave a new look to U.S.'s global strategy. It also made the fears by the Chinese threat to U.S.A. and Britain's life line—the maritime trade to East and Far East, look real, which demanded their immediate attention.

(f) It also gave an excellent excuse to the Soviet Union to make a firm footing on the soil of India. In fact, due to this entry the Soviets felt, would be able to fulfill the centuries old cherished dream of Russia's entry in the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean and, if possible, in the Mediterranean Sea. Soviet stole a march over Western (NATO) powers in establishing herself in Egypt, i.e., Aswan dam project on the Nile. Soviet constructed steel mill and factories in India for manufacturing arms, armaments which would also manufacture military fighter planes, frigates, tanks, guns, motor cars and carriers.

1965 Indo-Pak war defeat, therefore, came as a blessing in disguise to India as politically, it enabled her to cast aside her '*neutral policy*' and adopt a masked policy of alignment, which Bharat called '*a modified policy of non-alignment*'. She also got more closer to Israel. Militarily Bharat expanded her army, air force and navy manyfold—even much beyond her economic resources could bear. She very cleverly justified this huge extra expenditure under the cover of slogan, '*India's security is in real danger*'. She, therefore was able to plan for

a covert war :

- (i) Because India needed it to safeguard U.S.A.'s interest to contain China. U.S.A. therefore armed, and paid all costs for most modernly equipped twelve Mountain division—a covert force—newly raised by India under cover to safeguard her borders against China—*'later on we shall witness'*, where and how, these divisions were used by Bharat against Pakistan in West Pakistan and East Pakistan. Please Map Nos. 1 & 3.
- (ii) Bharat sent a team of officers and men to be trained as instructors in guerilla and anti-guerilla warfare to Israel. Israel, later on sent Zionist General Jacob and a military team to India, who also acted as an advisor to the Commander [of the Indian Eastern Command which was poised for invasion against East Pakistan.
- (iii) U. S. and Britain gave most generous loans and U.S.S.R. provided most modern weaponry to India to raise most modernly equipped armed forces ostentatiously to act as sentinal against China. But, in fact, it enabled Bharat to successfully destroy Pakistan at an opportune moment.
- (iv) Bharat, as planned by a Zionist General Jacob, formed cells of guerillas, fifth columnists, and spy rings in occupied Kashmir and in East Pakistan—under the quislings—the Premier of Kashmir and Mr. Mujib-ur-Rehman. C.I.A. of U.S. was no less active in anti-Pakistan work. Soviet increased her

Consul staff many-fold to act as military advisors and to enable her to keep a close watch on the political and military situation in East Pakistan. It is said that C.I.A. provided the funds for the election in 1970 for anti-Pakistan elements—Mujib's Awami League.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi worked very feverishly in psywar to make sure to see that her father's (Mr. Nehru) dream of 'Akhand Bharat' in the East becoming real. She deserves very great credit for making her aggressive covert plan most effective.

**Extracts of U.S. Ambassador's speech on 17th March 1972**

It is interesting to recount the statement of Mr. Benjamin H. Achlert Jr. U. S. Ambassador in Pakistan (in 1967-69) that :

"...Today, more than twenty years later, India is a household word in the United States while Pakistan is very little known inspite of the fact it is the fifth largest country in the world..." U.S.A. was therefore, bitterly disappointed to see India getting very close to the Soviet Union, which had culminated in signing of the '*Mutual Friendship Pact*' for 15 years duration..."

To counter Bharat's move, United States not surprisingly and ostentatiously made an exception to lift in 1970 the arms embargo on military sales to Pakistan. It was stated by U. S. A. press that U. S. A. intended to sell to Pakistan, armoured personnel carriers, a few maritime reconnaissance

aircraft, about half dozen F.104 Jet fighters and about half dozen B-57 bombers. But their deliveries were delayed for one reason or other, and in fact, it seems, these weapons were never intended to be delivered. Looking through the hindsight, this ostentatious announcement was made as a bait :

- (a) to persuade President of Pakistan to induce Chinese Prime Minister Chou En Lie to receive President Nixon's personal advisor. Pakistan was to be the secret base of operation. To lull Pakistan Government to sleep ?
- (b) as a covert threat to Bharat that U. S. A. would make Pakistan] once again a formidable country militarily and economically. This announcement was also desired to impress on Soviet Union that U.S.A. did not approve of her new closer relations between Bharat and Russia and also the Soviet's weaponry deal with India.

As regards Pakistan, this bait was swalled by Pakistan who arranged a secret visit from Islamabad to Peking and return of Mr. Kissenger, U.S.A. President's personal advisor to meet Chinese Frime Minister. When the success of this visit was made public and also the fact that Chinese Prime Minister would receive President Nixon ; it had very adverse reaction in Bharat, as well as in Russia.

However, these two governments played their cards diplomatically well and effectively. Soviet Union also consented to receive President Nixon but, later on i.e. by the end of 1971, Bharat, however, put her anti-U.S.A. tirad propaganda

machinery at top speed denouncing re-arming Pakistan, as an aggressor nation, 'who was suppressing East Pakistan' in degree unknown in the history of torture in the world.

#### Effects of Indo-Soviet Agreement—August 19 71

Bharat and Russia so forewarned, decided to act swiftly. Rise of 1971 saw Indian forces fully deployed for aggression on land, sea and air. Mr. Mujib came out most forcefully with his six-point demands which outwardly meant 'an autonomous Bangladesh'. It was a most clever, well camouflaged, and subtle diplomatic move which left General Yahya and his advisors aghast. Mukti Bahini had already started a campaign of destruction of communications, loot, arson and terror against pro-Pakistan elements. This terrorism was covered by subtle covert propaganda by 'Free Bangladesh' press and radio station located in Tripura State—the part which should have been handed over to East Pakistan in 1947. Along with it, went the psychological campaign of Bengali cultural and linguist issue. Mukti Bahini's so called successes were flashed out as great victories in the foreign press and radio all over the world.

Bharat and Mujib's move took U.S.A. by complete surprise. While in March 1971 Masson's report was in final stages of compilation, the Pakistan Army under General Tikka Khan struck a heavy blow to Mukti Bahini. It is coincidence that, like Hitler at Dunkirk, General Yahya allowed the Awami Leaguers, the civil and armed police and the rebellious East Bengal forces in thousands fully armed to safely cross over the border into India. General Yahya did not also allow General Tikka Khan to kill the snake, who instead,

was allowed to cross into India to breed there many more and most dangerous ones. No wonder, General Yaha, like Hitler, later on most sincerely regretted his error. But it was too late. The result of these Himalayan blunders were the same, i.e. the dismemberment of Germany, and 25 years later the dismemberment of Pakistan. History repeated itself.

### **Masson Report—April 1971**

Masson Group submitted its report in April, 1971. It was written to suggest the likely implications for international relations of the *'break up of Pakistan'*. But it was not the only one of its kind compiled for U.S.A. It is known, for example, that research on similar projects was also carried out by Britain, Soviet, Australia and in the University of Philadelphia, the Rana Corporation and the C.I.A. (U.S.). The fact that they were commissioned jointly by the Governments and private foundations, depicts the interest that was taken by them to *'break up Pakistan'*, which in the words of President Lyndon B. Johnson was *'to cut Pakistan to its right size'*. All these reports had been coalited by April, 1971, so as to ensure that interests of these powers in Bangladesh remain uppermost.

### **Sum up**

The sum total of these research studies seem to have prompted the U. S. State Department to encourage and support the *'emergence'* of Bangladesh as an independent nation State the soonest possible as the time was ripe for it. It should be noted that so far the U. S. Government policy had been to *'let Asians fight Asians'*. However, by April, 1971, Pakistan

Army had annihilated the Mukti Bahini and all Awami League leaders, except Mr. Mujib, had escaped to Bharat and many hundred thousands East Bengalis had been forced under a pre-conceived Bharati covert plan at the point of bayonet of Mukti Bahini coupled with propaganda by the B. B. C., Moscow Radio, British, Soviet and C.I.A., A.I.R. fifth columnists, to take refuge across the border of East Pakistan. Once across the border, before they could pause to think, the Indian Border Security forces forcibly pushed them into the interior of India.

Indian, British, Israel and Soviet propaganda machinery was pushed in at top speed to make refugee problem an international affair. Though outwardly allies, each Super power vied to be to steal a march on the other.

### Where did Pakistan defaulted ?

We present, *'as a food for thought'* a few more extracts from a speech given by Mr. Benjamin H. Ochleri Jr.—a former U.S. Ambassador (1967-69), on 17th March, 1972. Was it an afterthought ?

“...Despite Pakistan's closeness to us for years, and our alliances with her, while India grew ever closer to Russia, our relations with each other began to deteriorate after 1962. There were many reasons to this, *'with fault on both sides...'* India took the opposite course from Pakistan...How did this all come about? It did not just happen, believe me. The image was consciously created through skilful Indian public relations efforts... *'But Pakistan did not act to create a good public image...'* Pakistan should have exerted every effort to

publicize 'who', 'where' and 'what', she was in the hopes that she too could make her name a respected by-word in the U.S. Had she done so, many subsequent events would have been viewed here (U.S.) with far more understanding and sympathy? Not only did Pakistan fail to move efficiently to create a favourable image, she also failed to explain and justify some of the later events of her history...They (U.S.) could not know unless Pakistan told them...How were the American people to know all that took place between December 1970 and March 25, 1971, when President Yahya Khan was finally forced to call on the army to suppress revolution —unless Pakistan told them? ...Over the years, Pakistan has systematically discouraged the presence of American press representatives, has expelled many and has closed down offices of 'AP' and the 'UPI' among others. She has barred American newspapers and magazines for carrying displeasing stories."

"All of this has forced the American press to rely on India and on American newsmen stationed in India for news of Pakistan. So, of course, the stories have been idoured. How could they have been otherwise? ...Until very lately, all of the despatches about the revolt in East Pakistan have come either from *'the Indian press, or from the antagonistic American reporters'* stationed in India. The sources of the stories have been either Indian, or from East Pakistanis who support the so called Bangladesh. Is it any wonder that those stories have been anti-Pakistan and pro-Indian and pro-Bangladesh?"

It is an ostensible propaganda after the event to blame Pakistan and to accuse U.S.A's failure in preventing Soviet stealing a march on her.

Reverting to the co-ordinated U.S., C.I.A. and various foundations report, it stated:

(a) "...The period (of political and economic decline) began at the end of 1950. In 1958 political instability ended abruptly with the military coup which brought Ayub Khan to power. Martial Law was maintained until 1962, the opposition was ruthlessly suppressed, and economic growth began. Per capita product grew at an annual rate of about 2.6% from 1960 to 1965. *'Thereafter the decline'*...A succession of capitalist governments operating with Advisory Group advice, have done nothing for the people of Pakistan. Income inequality between classes and between East and West (Pakistan), shows no signs of decreasing. Repression and corruption are as common today as when Harvard first intervened in the 1950's. Capitalism in Pakistan is *'not'* an independent developing system, but a very *'dependent client'* of the major capitalist powers, unable to finance its investment plans without massive foreign aid..."

(b) "Its ideological orientation prevents the Advisory Group from offering advice which can help the Pakistani people change their society. Pious declarations and juggling statics in Five Year Plans are of little help. The success about which the Advisory Group boasts, an apparently temporary period of rising income per capita, means little as long as it occurs within the capitalist framework of inequality, repression and dependence on foreign benevolence. The Advisory Group cannot change that frame-

work; at its best, it can provide technical improvements in transportation, agriculture, planning methods, etc. At present such improvements, far from leading to basic change, can only serve to stabilize an 'illegitimate' military government. And the people of Pakistan undoubtedly view that Government and its American advisors as part of the problem, not part of the solution...."

"...The rape of East Pakistan is already fanning the flames of separatism in the North West Frontier, in Sind and in Baluchistan—A disposition on the part of too many Pakistanis to consider themselves as Pathans, or Bengalis, or Baluchis, or Sindhis or Punjabis first and Pakistanis—second...Cultural, religious, ethnic, economic, linguistic and social back-grounds are important..."

### Comments

The above extracts pushed the U.S.A. in a quandary and uncertainty whether or not or how far to plan 'to cut Pakistan to its proper size'. The delay, however, enabled Soviet to steal a march on U.S.A. Although it may not be wholly valid to accuse the Ford Foundation, other similar institutions or the U.S. or Soviet, the British, or the Bharati Governments to have brought about in their psywar the 'secession of Bangladesh' movement but there is no doubt that having sensed the trend of coming events due to their subtle propaganda, they certainly substantially contributed their bit to hasten the secession. Certainly not for any idealist, or humanitarian reasons, but for well defined global foreign policy and global strategy and

greed for political and economic gains. These objectives have been borne out by the events that followed and are being hotly pursued—i .e. who is the victor? Who should claim the spoils of victory? Please read the Pentagon Papers, 1971-72; published by the New York Times.

It should be noted that Britain was very greatly involved economically in the whole of India but very particularly in West Bengal, Assam and Bangladesh. U.S.A. was no less financially and militarily committed in India. Cold reception of U.S. policy in India and no gains either in the sphere of politics, or her global strategy made her cautious for her next move! Undoubtedly USA had annoyed India by an offer of military hardware to Pakistan, but in actual fact no deliveries had been made either in cash or kind except it had given very false hope to Pakistan. As events that followed later on in the year, it proved most harmful to Pakistan. Please also study The Papers of Field Marshal Lord Wavell, the Viceroys of India.

As regards Soviet Union, she had not as yet (early 1972 openly) shown her hand even to her ally India.

### THE NEW OUTLOOK IN POLICY MAKING

#### India swallowed U.S.A's bait but?

While U.S. Government was studying consolidated report about East Pakistan compiled by various Foundations and other secret reports, i.e. Other agencies' reports on '*Conflict in East Pakistan*' '*Background and prospects*' were published in U.S.A. in April 1971 in a book form called; '*The Challenge of Bangladesh*'

which threw on this vexed problem an interesting light on the international strings behind the East Pakistan crisis. And also motives behind the demand of secession by the super powers while supporting the dismemberment of Pakistan! Either in haste, or ostentatiously or in panic, the U.S.A. government fell in trap *'to appease'* Bharat by offering many thousand million dollar aid in cash to India as an aid for Bengali Refugees. India accepted this aid or bait under U.S. *'carrot and stick'* policy. *'However, the Indian fish instead of toeing the U.S. line, broke it, and rushed in the den of the Russian bear'!*

To the great annoyance of U.S. Government Bharat exchanged that U.S. dollar aid for purchasing modern sophisticated weaponry from the Soviet. Both Bharat and Soviet Union scored, as Bharat who had no foreign exchange thus purchased not only badly needed weaponry but [also a reliable friend who could, or would defend her against any threat real, or probable, by China. On the other hand, Soviet Union received the U.S. dollars very badly needed for her balance of payments of her trade dues. This surprise move, it seems, so paralysed President Nixon's power of thinking and action that he sat with scalded hands and did nothing to get U.S. out of quagmire of political defeat and inaction.

***'Telling the world' as well as carrying a beggar's bowl***

As a second thought U. S. A. reprimanded India and supported Pakistan's action and withheld further economic aid to India. However, while India outwardly vehemently protested to U.S.A., yet she was fully contented to what she had been able to achieve so far in the diplomatic and economic field. Bharati leaders including Prime Minister Mrs.

Indira Gandhi started a worldwide tour of 'telling the world' about the necessity of the creation of Bangladesh and the tremendous economic and administrative strain which the influx of millions of refugees from Pakistan had imposed on Bharat. Moreover, she (Bharat) achieved the following objectives in the psywar :

- a) The foremost important factor was that Bharat very skillfully diverted the attention of the world from real issue—*i. e.* who was the real culprit responsible for this great tragedy in the Eastern Wing of Pakistan ?
- b) Bharat obtained not only political sympathy of nearly all nations of the world but she also received very substantial money and material help in food, medicines, blankets, clothing etc.
- c) Bharat had now fully realized that Mukti Bahini was a poorly organised, poorly trained and poorly led force. This force, therefore, needed more time to make it a reliable fighting machine.
- d) Strategically Bharat rightly judged that to ensure to be successful against Pakistan in the eastern wing it was vital that a blitzkrieg war should be fought and won against Pakistan. Here again Russia and Britain came to her aid at the nick of the time. Because Soviet Union and Britain lent her a fleet of transport aeroplanes outwardly '*to ship refugees from West Bengal to Central India*'. In fact, these military transport plans were employed to bring

troops and weapons from Indian Army Southern Command to reinforce Indian Army Eastern and Westren Commands. Bharat took advantage of the fact that people's memories are short, as Southern and Central India are invariably deficit food areas and thousands of miles away from Bangladesh. Bharat overtly stated that because the area selected was poorly served with railways so transport planes were urgently needed—yet<sup>1</sup> no nation asked why not keep the refugees nearer their homes to facilitate their eventual return easy and speedy? Moreover, Central India gets very heavy monsoon rains—so it could not be suitable place to have refugees in shelterness area. See Map No. 3.

- e) It is a sad commentry that Pakistan did not bring this vital point '*while telling the world*' which would have unmasked Bharat's real intention—wanton covert aggression!
- f) India got '*time*' she needed badly to adjust her originial strategic plan which she had found not very workable.
- g) Lastly, Soviet Union leaders agreed to receive President Nixon but at a time—after '*coup de main*' had finalized the issue. In other words it would be too late for U.S.A. to take any effective action in support of Pakistan.

### The New Outlook

At last when the leaders of the Eastern and Western

blocs met they evolved a new diplomatic formula. Under this new Soviet outlook, these two super powers agreed to follow a policy of '*no peace and no war formula*'. It would enable them to keep the fires burning and force the belligerents fighting and also force them to buy weaponry at exorbitant rate on loan, and at very high rate of interest. Moreover, it would also enable them to keep their spheres of influence safe in Indian sub-continent, Middle East, the Far East and in Indochina at the detriment of China and all small nations of the world.

#### **Lest we forget**

We often forget that "when a strong nation gives food (or loan) to smaller nations, it makes use of the latter". We hope that the mask of secrecy has been removed as regards how Bharat achieved her objectives and who was the winner?

Let us now review with the aid of hindsight of historical events and Bharat's strategical plan for a '*covert and clandestine war*' in order to achieve Mr. Nehru's dreamland before it gets beyond the reach of memory.

## CHAPTER XI

### INDIAN GOVERNMENT IN QUEST OF MR. NEHRU'S DREAMLAND

*A critical glance at the planning and execution of the Indian Diplomacy and strategem which brought the crisis to its finality in 1970-72 brings out very clearly facts about the policy which Bharat in the past and would continue to do in the future. Even if through skillfully carried out psywar one can be made to believe that Bharat has now put aside in cold storage, if not totally discarded, Mr. Nehru's expansionist policy envisaged in his book 'The Discovery of India', it would be knocked down, it is hoped that the glossary of events of the crisis sponsored or motivated, or abetted by some nations and a few extracts of the book would depict the picture clearer to the reader and easy to assimilate, i.e., why and how various nations reacted to the diplomacy and strategem of Bharat as her allies? Please see appendix—A—Long March.*

**A warning that was written on the Wall about 'Conflict in Shadows'**

**Mr. Nehru declared his inevitable and incalculable conclusion about his policy on the achievement of 'dreamland' in his book**

'Discovery of India' (pp 564-566) for his heirs and successors thus: "...That unity is geographical, historical and cultural, and all that; but the most powerful factor in its favour is the trend of world events. Many of us are of opinion that India is essentially a nation. Mr. Jinnah has a two nation theory and has lately added on to it political phraseology by describing some religious groups as sub-nation...The national state is too small a unit today, and '*small states can have no independent existence*'. It is doubtful, if many of the larger national states can have any real independence! The national state is thus giving place to the multi-national state, or to large federations. The Soviet Union is typical of this development. The U.S.A., though bound together by strong national ties, constitutes essentially a multi-national state. Behind Hitler's march across Europe, there was '*something more than the Nazi lust for conquest*'. New forces were working towards the liquidation of the small state system in Europe...We shall have to end to the national state and devise a collectivism, which neither degrades nor enslaves. The Prophets are ignored and sometimes even stoned by their generation. And so Mr. Well's warnings, and those of others, are voices in the wildernesses so far as those in authority are concerned. Nevertheless, they point to inevitable trends. The alternative is stagnation, decay and disintegration, leading to loss of political and economic freedom, both for India as a whole and its separate parts..."

Late Mr. Nehru, therefore, had struck for his heirs and successors of Indian National Congress as a '*legacy*' his inevitable and irrevocable conclusions in cold print. No wonder, his successors continue to harp and follow these ideas. It was warning which we Pakistanis omitted a note—because we did not study history—the cheapest way to '*know thy enemy*'.

It may be recalled that Britain's national ties of alliance and affinity with Hindus of India was founded on anti-Indian Muslim bias so as to establish an everlasting British Raj in India. Mr. Nehru's expansionist and strategem was founded on British Hawk's weakness for greed.

**The Long March that brought the Indian Congress on the threshold of Nehru's dreamland in 1971.**

India started seriously executing her '*long march*' plan for the achievement of the dreamland even before the arrival of Simon Commission. However, it was not till Lord Wavell was relieved by Lord Mountbatten as Viceroy that the Indian Congress could proceed with it. Lord Mountbatten was accepted as the head of anti-Pakistan Covert War strategic planners i.e. British Military and Civil Mission by the Indian Congress, White Hall London and U.S.A. in 1947. Please see appendix E. U.S.S.R. sat on the fence waiting to join later on in an opportune time. The planner decided that :

- (a) The situation in 1947 in East Pakistan was not as yet ripe enough to start a covert war. So it was secretly decided to start a '*psywar*' in the Eastern Wing under the leadership of Mr. Mujib, though Maulana Bhashani was accepted as the figurehead of the movement. The planners assured Mr. Mujib with full support of the necessary tools of psywar, such as money, men and material.
- (b) The planners selected the Western Wing as its first objective to dismember Pakistan, as well as, a

diversion before the emerging state had recovered from her birth pangs.

- (i) To achieve this objective, Lord Mountbatten, as Chairman, in 1947, moved swiftly according to his pre-conceived strategic plan by providing a land corridor to India so as to facilitate covert clandestine invasion of Kashmir. He thus threw away to the wind the '*Agreed Formula for Pakistan*', by also
- (ii) Ordering the recall of Rajputana Princes' representatives who had gone to Karachi to negotiate terms for accession to Pakistan. He thus forced these princes to accede to Bharat. He, thereby not only safeguarded the Eastern border of Bharat but also prevented the formation of a corridor by the confederation of Rajputana States, the Gujrat States, of Junagarh and Mongrol, Bhopal and Hyderabad State to Pakistan some of whom had already acceded to Pakistan. It was great gain for Bharat both strategically and politically. See Map No. 5.
- (iii) Diversions were created in West Pakistan by his agents by creating communal riots, border incursions by armed gangs from Bharat and Afghanistan under the leadership of mercenary British general and Indian Civil Service officers.
- (iv) However, when these overt and covert anti-Pakistan attempts failed, Lord Mountbatten decided to launch a wanton full-scale aggression by a covert clandestine war in Jammu and Kashmir State. It will ever remain

a black blot on the name of '*an arbitrator and a Viceroy*' appointed by the British Government who acted as a partisan and not as '*an adjudicature of justice and fair play*'. It is a sad commentary that British Military Mission in Pakistan displayed treachery by giving full support of Lord Mountbatten. See Appendix 'E'

Moreover, through the study of very brief glossary it is hoped to depict Britain U.S.S.R's and U.S.A's role in Indo-Pak conflict since 1947 and the 1970-71 as well as on pattern of politics and global strategy in the countries bordering the Pacific ocean, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea by drawing the nations of the sub-continent into the vertex of super power rivalries.

#### **Glossary of events for the achievement of the Dreamland in the East**

*9th July 1971* :—The Daily Telegraph complained that "B.B.C. had forgotten of late its duty to put truth, fairness and objectivity before sheer entertainment value while broadcasting news about Bangladesh. The voices of the British doves were lost on the noise of the hawks."

*29th July 1971* :—The Times London; "advocated economic pressure, embargo on the sale of arms by all nations on Pakistan. It asked the World Bank Consortium countries to follow Britain's lead. \$400 million and was stopped on March 1970 which seriously affected Pakistan's trade and balance of payment.

*13th November 1971* :—British press slightly modified

their anti-Pakistan attitude but it was too late as the Indian plan had already made great progress in their pre-conceived plan to dismember Pakistan. But when Indo-Pak war broke out, Britain openly helped India and Bangladesh by not only obstructing U.N.'s efforts to stop the war but increased the rush with the use of airlift of weaponry, and military equipment, and stores, such as, even Bailey bridges to India. Thus Britain by its own action in words and deeds broke its non-partisan claim. Sir Alec declared in the House of Commons that "British firms were supplying spares and weaponry under long-standing contracts and there was 'no prospects' of an embargo on sales to India." Chartered Boings air-lifted missiles and spares from U.K. to India—even during the war.

*August 1971*:—A Fund was sponsored in U.K. for the benefit of Bangladesh Guerrillas (Mukti Bahini). It was operated by Mr. Stonehouse, Abu Saeed Chaudry (now President) and other British M.P.'s as directors. It was kept and operated at 'Jewish' Hambrose Bank of Bishop Gate, London.

*19th December 1971*:—Sunday Times stated: "...that India launched attack on East Pakistan with Moscow's knowledge but also with its approval. She thus cast aside non-partisanship, she claimed in 1965 and in 1966 at Tashkent."

Russia now openly declared her new policy which she had followed since 1962—i.e. Soviets military

assistance to India (b) Soviet's anti-Pakistan role in U.N. re-Indo-Pak war, 1971, (c) Soviet's strategy to prevent China's direct intervention in 1971 war or U.S.A's intervention though too late in the Indo-Pak war in 1971.

*Thus role played by U.S.S.R. in Indo-Pak conflict had very great direct bearing on the pattern of politics in South Asia by drawing the sub-Continent into vortex of super power rivalries—which, only few examples quoted, will depict.*

*1962 ;—Indo-Soviet deal for MIGs which was pushed in full gear in 1965.*

*1965 :—Soviets and Warsaw Pact countries supplied to Bharat 730 million Dollar worth of tanks, combat aircraft, long range artillery, surface to air missiles, submarines, missile carrying fast moving speed boats. (President Nixon's report to U.S. Congress 9th February, 1971).*

*August 1971 :—Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship—under this treaty airlift of sophisticated Soviet missiles and weaponry to India.*

*November 1971 :—Under the cover of 'shifting refugees to Central and Southern India', Soviet giant transport aircraft brought SAMS and weaponry to Bombay and Delhi as well as Southern command forces to Calcutta. See sketch No. 3.*

*16th November 1971 :—Times, London, reported arrival*

in India of Russian military Advisors, 250 tanks, 40 mm rockets, large number of radio sets, supersonic medium bombers, medium reconnaissance aircraft, M.I.G. 23 fighters. The paper also stated that Soviet personnel were manning Indian missile boats and flying military planes inside Indian territory.

*4th December 1971* :—A Soviet spokesman declared that Mr. Kosigin did not plan to mediate between India and Pakistan as she did in 1966. Soviet also issued '*a warning to Pakistan*' about it to grave responsibility in following this dangerous course and called for '*the speediest ending of the bloodshed*' and for a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and interests of people. "...We consider it our responsibility to act whenever there is a tension in the world, but in this case we don't hold a special responsibility." A most contradictory statement to cover up her real designs.

*5th December 1971* :—Yet a TASS statement said: "Indo-Pak war was a threat to the security" and that it had warned Pakistan with '*all clarity*' that it must bear '*the grave responsibility*'." Soviet vetoed U.S. resolution in the Security Council. Soviet fleet headed by a Kræster class guided missile cruiser sailed into Bay of Bengal. In January 1972 another cruiser arrived to join this fleet.

*27th January 1972* :—Soviet offered extensive economic aid to Bangladesh.

### the field of diplomacy of mailed fist, or blackmail?

Before we proceed further, it is considered that the readers would be interested how India displayed her skill in the field of diplomacy to counter any anti-Bharat moves. Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her ministers began their whirlwind world tours. For example : On 7th December and 30th December, 1971 Daily Telegraph stated :—"Mrs. Indira Gandhi and foreign Secretary Mr. Kaul did not hesitate 'to remind Britain' of its assets in India and Bangladesh repercussions that might follow if Britain modified her policy towards them. Very roughly these assets to U.K. in raw jute, tea, tobacco about £200 millions annually."

This threat fetched good dividends for Bharat and Bangladesh.

*12th February 1972* :—Economist London stated: "Britain would be willing to sell sophisticated weapons to India in building up its Navy. Russia gave a modern cruiser to the Indian Navy...".

*2nd March 1972* :—Daily Telegraph reported that India had purchased from Britain Jaguar attack type planes. Since Indo-Pak war ended, Britain has been extremely busy in projecting the image of India as 'a potential great power, capable of being stronger than China.' And Bharat and Bangladesh as very powerful allies of NATO powers whose trade and national security interests they would protect.

No wonder, on 27th August 1972 Britain sponsored a resolution in the U.N. to admit Bangladesh as a Member of U.N.

*2nd February 1972* :—Britain gave interest free loan to Bangladesh which amounted to £4,835,000 which was in addition to £17 million given as gift for relief in January 1972. Moreover, Bharat made Britain to believe that '*strong Pakistan might not acquiesce*' in British plans but a reduced and weak Pakistan would neither have '*the capacity nor the will*' to resist.

### **U.S.A. Diplomacy in action?**

President Nixon, it seems, at the time of re-election as a President has been caught in crossfire of economic in his country and the deteriorating situation of political-cum-military situation in her Global strategy. SALT conference has produced as a backlash instead of slowing down arms race, it has resulted in arms race in top gear. Again '*No peace and no war*' formula for the Far East and the Middle East presented by Soviet has yet produced to tangible results. No wonder U.S.A. is sitting on the fence. On the other side of the scale U.S. had placed an embargo on supply of arms to India and Pakistan since 1965. In October 1971 U.S. press announced as a bluff or kite flying that U.S. would remove the embargo on Pakistan for the supply of arm but it never materialized. Please also study '*Pentagon Papers*'.

*1st December, 1971* :—U.S.A. announced the suspension of arms shipment to India. But it was too late in the day!

7th December, 1971 :—U.S.A. blamed India for broadening the crisis.

14th December, 1971 :—U.S.A. Naval Task force of nine vessels headed by nuclear powered aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE entered the Bay of Bengal.

10th January, 1972 :—U.S. Naval Fleet left Bay of Bengal for the FAR EAST.

### **Peoples' Republic of China Moves Fast**

12th April, 1971 :—Prime Minister Mr. Chou En-Lai made a public statement that '*happenings*' in Pakistan were purely their '*internal affair*' to be settled by Pakistani people without foreign interference.

August 1971 :—China's firm support to Pakistan was assured '*if Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan.*' This offer should have been cashed in by Pakistan Government' as a counter to Soviet-Bharat Friendship Treaty, but it did not do it. Especially the Chinese message had made no reference of the '*refugee*' problem for Bharat.

11th December, 1971 :—Radio Peking said that Soviet Union was seeking '*to contain China*' and to dominate the world through Moscow's support of Indian offensive. Pakistan Government remained lethargic and and did nothing.

25th August, 1972 :—People's Republic of China Vetoed

Bangladesh's entry into the U.N. The resolution to the U.N. was sponsored by Britain. The Veto shocked Mr. Mujib and India.

**Pakistan was caught napping**

*4th December, 1971* :—President Yahya called the latest Indian aggression '*is her biggest and last bid*' to achieve her aim. We have shown great patience and restraint but the time has come that we give a crushing response to the enemy..." A bluff that did not come off.

*17th December, 1971* :—President Yahya announced that he had ordered Pakistan forces '*to ceasefire*' in the interest of peace and in the pursuance of the resolution of U.N. General Assembly.

## CHAPTER XII

### 'WE HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION' EXCEPT WHAT APPEARED

*'We have little information to go by'* except what appeared in the Press 1970-72 and by reading in between the lines with trained military imagination and by appreciation of situation.

#### **General Remarks.**

However with the benefit of hindsight military training, experience and study, we may be able to raise, though only partially, the iron curtain drawn heavily by the Martial Law authorities, by reflection, with the aid of trained imagination. We may thus be able to answer some of queries which have been worrying us. Let us not forget that we, in Pakistan, are not as yet, November 1972, out of the wood, hence sober and correct appreciation of the situation is vital for our survival. Secrecy must be maintained. It is still vital.

The anti-Pakistan propoganda by our enemies' machinery is still churning at full speed. Again we have been partially paralysed by the mortal wanton covert and

treacherous surprise attack by our enemies on us. As the Quran has stated: "Many have been the rules of conduct (ways of treatment) that have passed away before you—do travel in the earth and see what has been the consequence for those who denied Truth...And lose not heart nor despair, for you are bound to overcome them *'if you are'* indeed believers" (3 : 137. 139).

### A Cursory glance on the military potentials of Indo-Pak forces

It is not intended to find faults for criticism's sake only, but to learn lessons for the future. I call it cursory, as it is not my intention to write history of the operations in both wings of Pakistan, because it would be done by the Government of Pakistan who has all resources and necessary information at its disposal. However, what I intend to do is to present to the readers where the belligerents violated or followed the principles the art-of-war. Let us not forget that every Pakistani Muslim and Muslimah is actual or potential Majahid—soldier. Again did we remember what Hitler the greatest Aryan, advised his fellow *'pure'* Aryans all over the world; "What is War but cunning, deception and *'delusion'*?" Lord Mountbatten—the right hand man of Mr. Nehru—had adopted seventeenth century policy of the British hawks *i.e.* "It was the inevitable tendency of our increasing our power and hold in India, is to oust the native functionary (Muslim) from their seat, lift him out of his saddle so that the whiteman might once again instal himself there".

### A Reflection—which has come true

What China's great leader Sun Tzo's advice to his

countrymen was repeated to me by the Marshal Chu Teh—the Chinese Commander-in-Chief, when we were discussing leadership, he said: “If generals do not know their men, they will deliver their nation to the enemy; if the men do not know their generals, they will deliver their generals to the enemy.”

War is a great affair of the states, the realm of life and death, the road to safety or ruin, a thing to be studied with extreme diligence—especially Mujahids (all leaders—political and military) should know how to make the best use of *‘the means the nation can spare.’* The Quran has stated “Warfare is prescribed for you, though it be not your liking (2 : 216) and we shall surely try you with something of fear and hunger and loss of possessions.....(2 : 155). And lose not heart nor despair; for you are bound to overcome them if *‘you are indeed believers’* 3 : 139)...And held fast all of you together .....(3 : 103) Allah’s purpose is to refine the faithful through trial and efface those who deny truth (3 : 141)”

The Bharati’s ally Soviet’s leader Lenin has said “If war belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from thence. If policy is great and powerful so will be the war and this may be carried to the point at which attains to its absolute form.....”.

With only few factors out of many known to us, let us consider if the 1971-72 Indo-Pakistan War was conducted on some of the above factors or not? An old soldier through his war experiences has learnt the fact, that war is proverbially full of mischances and it is easy to make war on paper but the implementation of its execution (of a plan) is

most difficult and full of pitfalls which can be solved only by being on the spot.

### Preparation for War

Preparation for war falls naturally into three categories :

(a) Political (b) Moral, ideological and materials (c) Military which includes logistics, and logistics includes industry and other factors, such as, economy, self sufficiency in agriculture, trade, means of communication.

Diplomatic negotiation with Bharat had been broken. The East Pakistani leaders especially, Mr. Mujib-ur-Rehman who had been bought or won over by Bharat's tall promises and the British and Russian for material aid, he come out in the open with his successionists demands. Mr. Mujib caught napping the Pakistani military ruling junta and also at least, some of the political leaders of both wings. The attack on the very existence of Pakistan planned by Mr. Mujib, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Soviet in which Britain and Israel also abetted, was double pronged—internal unrest by guerrillas (Mukti Bahini) and external by Bharati armed forces who had been equipped with most advanced modern Russian arms. Britain continued to augment with arms, money and material the enemies of Pakistan with which Bharati armed forces had been mostly equipped, yet she strictly observed embargo on arms for Pakistan. All India Radio, B.B.C., Radio Moscow and the press in India and Eastern bloc countries went in full blast in anti-Pakistan propaganda early in 1970 and has kept it up even today—November 1972.

Pakistani press was overcast by Martial Law as they

could not depict the truth before the Pakistani public. The administrators of the Martial Law were lulled to sleep, because they hoped that Commonwealth countries, the U.S.A. as promoter and god-father of CENTO and SEATO Pacts, and '*Soviets as defenders of the weak*', would come to the aid of Pakistan at the nick of the time. The Pakistan Government, since 1950, had allowed, due to carelessness or lethargy, anti-Pakistan psychological warfare carried out inside and outside the territories of Pakistan, unchecked or countered. The Pakistani ruling class since 1950 paid no heed to the Quranic warning: '*Allah does not change the condition of any nation unless it changes its own conditions by their own conduct and actions*'. Pakistani rulers allowed Bengali tribal and clanish tribal and arrogance with bitter feelings between the two wings—fed by the enemies of Pakistan—unchecked and unabated. Very briefly Pakistan callously allowed the Bharati-Russian-British axis powers to steal a march on Pakistan in the political, diplomatic and psychological warfare. What we forget is that Bharat had never accepted Pakistan as a sovereign state.

## I

**They were warned**

Admiral Chaudhri Pakistan Navy asked me to write a book or books in 1953 on the '*Evolution of the Islamic Maritime Power*'. I gave him a manuscript (two volumes) in 1955 which covered the early Islamic period, i.e., from the days of the to the rise and fall of the Turkish Naval power with Rangrut's (the author) suggestions on '*Eyes on the future*'. On my request he appointed a powerful committee of Pakis-

tan Naval Officers for check and constructive criticism. In 1959 I approached the new Naval Chief Admiral A. R. Khan about the manuscript, as I had not heard anything from that Committee. A new committee was detailed as the first committee had done little or no work.

This new committee, due to constant changes of the members, did some work but it was not enough which would enable me to push it in for publication. I might as well make it clear that Admiral A. R. Khan was very co-operative with me all the time. I am grateful to him for it. But he could not, I presume, push hard, as I was told later on, that the committee members were busy with the new reforms and expansion of Pakistani Navy. In my defence, I can state that *'Beggars are never the choosers'*. Moreover, my own efforts had by now been channelled into writing books Guerilla warfare past and present, *'On War Islamic Policy, Grand Strategy and Diplomacy'* which some Western illuminary writers had told me that *'no such work existed, or could be presented by the Muslim world'* ...I accepted the challenge and wrote 4 more books to rebut it—i.e. *'The Islamic Pattern-of-War'*, in two volumes and Ideologies in conflict i.e. Islam was not spread by sword but by preaching an ideology, and *'On War Islamic Policy, Diplomacy and Strategy'*.

In 1967 Admiral A. R. Khan became Defence Minister of Pakistan and he passed on the manuscript to the *'Islamic Research'* body who sat on it. I retrieved my manuscript in 1970. I have narrated this story only to depict that an attempt was made by me but it did not reach finality. Insha Allah it will see light to prove—if proof is needed—that the Islamic Maritime Power has a great glorious past. The Muslims went

down in power and economically, because they emitted to keep the traditional naval trail blazed by the Holy Prophet for the Muslims and their future generations. In fact the Quran has repeatedly impressed the value of maritime power. The Holy Prophet too preached and later on put in practice what he had advocated about maritime activities and land warfare through the ideology of Jihad—psywar of today.

History serves us best when we seek to make some kind of use out of its myriad facts. Of course, we must not force pattern alien to our needs. But we may hope to find one that does no violence to scholarship and has a positive value. Let us then see what we can make of the story of Debacle of 1970-71 in both wings of Pakistan and its causes.

However, it is not possible under the present war situation to discuss in detail for reasons of secrecy, the actions, the achievements, or failures of the Defence Department. The Army, or Navy, or air force, or the civil administrative services in both wings of Pakistan, except in general terms.

Because it is necessary to realize that modern war is no longer the matter of navies, the armies and air forces of professional sailors, airmen and soldiers, but one in which all the resources of a nation may have to be engaged. This tendency is fully recognised by the leading countries of Europe, Asia and in America—but in spite of repeated warnings in the Quran, was this fact seriously considered and amply applied by the Pakistan Government, Pakistani leaders and the public? Broadly speaking the work of national security divides itself into the main branches concerned with co-ordination of the fighting services and its logistics, i.e., both of armed services

and civil departments and its relations with the people.

“Modern War,” says A. G. Boycott in the element of Industrial Defence, “It is ceasing to be an art—it has developed into a business. In business success depends upon organization to ensure that the maximum use is made of the contribution of every unit engaged in production.” Again the business of diplomacy is often the business of adjusting rival interests and rival points of view.”

History is the national panorama. And Islamic Ideology has proved heritage to claim traditions set out by the Holy Prophet and his companions which are not likely to fail, or fall short of the expectations of the world at large and the Muslims in particular. The trail of Islamic (traditions) ideology if kept ablazed and understood and intelligently and correctly applied, would give us vision, vitality and ‘will’ to squarely face the calamities of atomic era and its cold war conflicts. The civil comparison to war must be that of a game—a very rough and dirty game—for which a robust body and mind are very essential. The civilian leaders and generals (admiral or air-marshal) are dealing with men’s lives and must have a certain mental rebustness to stand the strain of this responsibility. How great the strain is, one may judge by the sudden death, or nervous break down of many of the leaders of the last two World wars and in the cold war conflicts.

## II

### British Military Mission

It is a well known fact that the British Military and Civi-

lian Mission which was loaned to Pakistan as a dominion, was not under full control of the Pakistan Government but it was under the direction of White Hall, who naturally looked after its own imperial interests and controlled it through this Mission. It is a very sad commentary that White Hall set aside fair play and justice and connived with Bharat who withheld due share of Pakistan in armaments, weaponry, equipment and money. Even the set up of military command i.e. Defence Department, Armed forces, the Civil Services and the logistics was different in two Dominions. In Bharat, like in Britain, Canada or Australia, but in Pakistan it resembled that of a colony. The Quaid-e-Azam struggled hard to alter it but Providence did not spare him to complete the job he had begun. A faulty foundation for the defence structure was thus laid. Circumstances forced Pakistan to start on wrong foot.

At the time of partition of Indian sub-continent The Royal Pakistan Navy (R.P.N.) was commanded by Rear Admiral Jefford. R.P.N., received its share; five frigades. Sind, Jhelum, Zulfikar, Shamsher and Hindustan and three small naval vessels —Baluchistan, Khyber and in addition of it Pakistan received four small petrol boats. In 1952 Rear Admiral H.M.S. Chaudhri took over from the British Admiral as Commander-in-Chief R.P.N. In 1956 RPN was renamed as Pakistan Navy (P.N.) in 1958 when Pakistan became the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

In 1954 U.S. under a pact with Pakistan which was anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese, and as events proved later on, very damaging to the security of Pakistan—militarily, diplomately and economically as it tried down Pakistan's policy to serve U.S.'s global strategy as a mercenary. In return Pakistan Navy received in 1956, seven destroyers, eight Mine sweepers and

two frigates—but all old and outdated. To make matter worse under wrong conception, the Pakistan Defence Department instead of 'laying' five old frigates received from India as her share; destroyed them. It is a well known fact that U.S. and Britain due to great demand and 'due to losses in the early stages of Second World War had recommissioned old naval ships which after certain adjustments did useful war service, as coasters. Pakistan's share was out of these discarded ships.

These gifted destroyers were renamed, PN Shahjehan, PN Jehangir, PN Alamgir, PN Khybar, PN Badr, PN Tariq and PN Timur. The two gifted frigates were named PN Tipu Sultan and PN Tugtil. The fact that after a short period PN Tariq and Timur were scrapped, shows that US did not arm Pakistan Navy with anything near modern ship—needs no further comment and points to one important factor which caused the disaster in Indo-Pakistan War in 1970-71.

In 1956 Pak Navy received another light cruiser which was renamed Babar. It was an old ship which was re-conditioned during Second World War. But it should be noted that, this so called modernly equipped ship, was not less than 40 years old, as it had been commissioned in the First World War. Pakistan received one reconditioned sub-marine, PN Ghazi, an oil tanker, Survey Ship PN Zulfikar and four gun boats for use in East Pakistan. All these naval vessels were also relics of the past. After the Indo-Pak war, 1965, the Defence Department purchased 3 sub-marines from the French Government which reached Pakistan just before 1971 war.

### The Army

The tanks, guns and weaponry for the Pakistan army was

also not modern, but one which had been discarded by the US army. All one can say that the policy of 'balance of power' was observed—i.e. as compared to weaponry in India except in Pak Airforce we had a little edge over Bharat in model, but not in number of bombers or fighters etc. which lasted till 1965. After that Bharat had the lead.

Let us compare the naval strength of the belligerents in 1970 :—

<b>Pakistan</b>		<b>Bharat</b>	
1 Cruiser 5.25" guns	Babar	1 Air Craft Carrier	Vikrent
5 Destroyers	Babar	2 Cruisers 6" guns.	Delhi
	Khyber		Mysore
	Shahjehan	7 Destroyers	Ranjit
	Jehangir		Rana
	Alamgir		Rajput
4 Submarines	Ghazi		Godawari
	Shoshuk		Ganga
	Mangro		Gomti
	Hingro	4 Submarines	Calvari
		(Russian)	Kundari
			Karsala
			Karang

#### Other Ships

<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>Bharat</b>
8 Petrol Craft	8 Ossa Fast Boats fitted with Russian Missiles.
8 Mine Sweepers	5 Petrol Crafts
2 Other small naval craft (old models)	25 Petrol Boats
	8 Mine Sweepers
	8 Other small naval craft.

The above information is based on the report published by the International strategic weapon studies (U.K.).

### **Faulty Planning (1965) and Comedy of errors**

Before we proceed further, it is considered essential to discuss, though very briefly, the naval strategy of the belligerents in 1965 war. It is said, that Bharat expected a decisive victory in 1965 under her pre-emptive strategic blitzkreige plan which was based on the plans envisaged by the great Aryan of Europe—Hitler during the invasion of Europe in 1940. In her plan Bharat hoped to overrun West Pakistan by Bharat forces. It has been stated by some Bharati Comentators that Bharati Defence planners did not feel the necessity of even taking the Indian Naval Chief into confidence before the Indian army and Indian Air Force launched their covert wanton aggression? But others doubt this statement.

It was fortunate that a part of Indonesian Naval Fleet happen to be at Karachi on goodwill mission to Pakistan at the time Bharati land aggression was launched against West Pakistan. Bharat mistook it as pre-planned help by the Indonesian fleet, hence their Naval fleet though—three to one—did not leave their ports either due to wishful results of blitzkreige war on land, or fear, or lack of planning to meet the altered naval strength of Pakistan. The Indonesian fleet had more modern Russian Naval ships and submarines.

As regards Pakistani planners, it was a strategic blunder to attack Dwarka sea port when militarily, Pakistan could gain nothing. But the P.N. did blast some buildings or fishing boats—yet the biggest blunder came later on when this futile attack

was over played as a morale raising propaganda. Undoubtedly our military hierarchy wrongly took a leaf out of British Mission's Himalayan blunder i.e. When the British Generals fired every round of artillery ammunition in the 'Beri Pattan' attack. But militarily, Pakistani political leaders did not fathom that propaganda for waste of ammunition, was in fact to cripple the military potentiality of Pakistan which would enable the British hawks to force Pakistani political leaders to agree to accept (in 1948) 'ceasefire' because "Pakistan had no ammunition for her guns and that the British Government would not lift her embargo on supply of arms and ammunition to Pakistan."

In this later case of 1965 Bharat was able through subtle propaganda, to re-equip her navy. In this connection it should be remembered that the President of United States of America at that time was haunted by Munich Spirit due to :—

- (a) reverses in Indochina, especially in Vietnam
- (b) Russia had by now caught up—some say surpassed, in nuclear weaponry.
- (c) China had already become a world power militarily, economically, in the field of diplomacy and in heavy industry.
- (d) There was internal unrest in U.S. such as anti-Vietnam War rallies, popularity of drug edicts, strikes etc.

## Topography

With exception of low ranges in Chittagong Hill Tract, 1,200 feet above sea level, a plateau—called Madhupur forest area—above 40 to 100 ft. high—north of Dacca and a few forest areas, East Pakistan comprises a vast plain interspersed by numerous tributaries of the Ganges (Padma), the Brahmaputra and Meghna.

The Sunderban forest, as the tract of creeks, swampy island and jungles of the Ganges Delta.

Monsoon season proceeded by (Westerners) thunderstorms in March and April continues from May until October when cyclones disturb normal life and sever lines of communications.

## Military Situation—early 1971 onwards

Towards the end of February, 1971, Bharat created a tension by faking a hi-jacked Indian Airline Aircraft and took intelligence section of Pakistan by complete surprise. Bharat closed the airlink route between East and West Pakistan over India. While Pakistan authorities were fast asleep, the Bharati armed forces started their strategic moves. The Bangladesh Liberation Army (Mukti Bahini) which had been an underground organisation—recruited from East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles, the B.S.F. and the armed and civil Police came out on the surface as they rebelled in March, 1971. Bharati and foreign press gave this rebellion great coverage. The Bharati Eastern Command had already taken operational tactical positions all along East Pakistan

border to boost up morale of the rebels and to act as sanctuary if hard pressed, or to move into Pakistan territory if situation permitted. See Map No. 2

### **Pakistan Armed Forces according to Press Release by Indian Institute of Defence Studies**

In early 1971 the Pakistan Army had 12 infantry divisions, two of these divisions were very weak in manpower, weaponry and transport; one infantry division was located in East Pakistan; but by August, 1971, the situation was :

Armoured Divisions	West Pakistan	2
Armoured (independent) Brigade	West Pakistan	1
Infantry Division	West Pakistan	8
Infantry Division	East Pakistan	4 (in making)
Newly raised infantry divisions in West Pakistan		2 (neither fully trained, equipped nor of full strength).

Pakistan's para-military forces of West Wing about 20,000 (Civil Armed Forces=CAF) were located all along the border (many thousand long borders) of West Pakistan and they were armed with rifles, light sub-machine guns and a few medium machine guns. Some of it in West Pakistan was mounted on horses (hilly tracts) and had a number of lorries for conveyance of troops for rapid movements.

In East Pakistan para-military force was called '*Border Security Force*' (B.S.F.) about 20,000 strong which are mainly (90 percent) composed of East Pak Bengalis. Again in the two infantry divisions in East Pakistan had at least four-and-a-half brigades of Bengalis ; the rest were men who had been milked out of infantry divisions of West Pakistanis ; who were fully trained as infantry soldiers. Another factor of the East Pak divisions was that the only heavy elements available to the infantry division were one armoured regiment (about 50 CHAFFEE tanks) and only a few artillery units. Motor transport and logistics was its weakest point. These four infantry divisions had about 42 infantry batallions—all become further weak in manpower and logistics and officers, as most of Bengali officers had rebelled and joined Mukti Bahini.

Pakistan air force according to a report to the press by K. Subrahmanyam, Director of Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, was :

“ MIG-19 (Supersonic) interceptor	6 squadrons
Sabre (US) fighters	6 squadrons
Mirage III Supersonic fighters	1 squadron
B-57 bombers	2 squadrons
IL-28 bombers	1 squadron

Out of these only one squadron of Sabre was located in East Pakistan.

10 Lockheed T-33 Trainers	6 Lockheed C-130 E Hercules Transport
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7 Lockheed RT-33 A Reconnaissance Trainers	4 Kaman HH-438 Huskie Hunters
120 F-86 Sabre Jet Fighter Bombers	25 Cessna T-37 B Jet Trainers
26 Martin Canberra B-57 Bombers	—
6 Martin Canberra RB-57 Bombers	
15 Sikarsky S-55 Hunters	
4 Grumman HH-16 A Albatross Maritime Reconnaissance	Early warning surveillance radars facing India—at Badin, Multan, Sargodha, Peshawar. A microwave communication network under CENTO base programme
12 Lockheed F-104 A Star fighters	
2 Lockheed F-104 Star fighters	

#### Pakistan Navy

Submarines	...	4
Light Cruiser	...	1
Destroyers	...	2
Destroyer Escort	—	3
Frigates	...	2
Petrol boats	...	4

**\* U. S.**

7 Coastal Minesweepers

1 Tug

2 Oilers

4 'Battle' Class Destroyers

2 'CV' Class Destroyers

2 'Ch' Class Destroyers

**\* China — Pak Air Force**

1 Squadron of 11-28 Bombers

4 Squadron of MIG-19 Interceptors

— Army

Infantry and artillery equipment for :

Two divisions (AK 47 rifles, light and medium machine guns, 60 mm, 81 mm, 120 mortars, 100 mm field guns).

225 T-59 medium tanks.

**\* China — Navy**

Riverboats and coasters

**\* U. K.**

4 Petrol boats

**\* West Germany**

90 F-86 Sabre Jets (through Iran)

Cobra Anti-tank missiles

## \* France

5 Alouette III Helicopters

24 Mirage II fighters

3 "Daphne" Class Submarines

## \* Iran

5 Lockheed C-130-E Hercules Transport Planes

## \* Italy

8 Midget Submarines and 8 Chariot two-men  
submarines

## \* U. S. S. R.

M 1-8 Helicopters—number not known

200 130 mm guns

150 T-55 Tanks

Mobile Radar Sets

Spares for MIG-19

Above are confirmed

## \* Below are unconfirmed

100 Patton tanks from Western European sources and  
also some Patton Tanks from Iran-Turkey.More F-86 Jets from Saudi Arabia and Iran (not exceed-  
ing 50), ammunition, aircraft spares, communication  
and other equipment from U. S., Western Europe  
and China (quantities not known).*Note* :—( \* ) denotes weaponry purchased from other un-  
known countries."

As reported by K. S. Subrahmanyam, Director of Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi to the press.

**Did we consider ?**

*Transportation*—inland water transport—common rail, air, road—Sabotage of bridges—the sword of Damocles—if destroyed—were a constant worry. Pakistani forces also very desperately lacked—air-bridging operation due to shortage of air transport.

Width of two major rivers—was between 1 to 5 miles but width increased during flood—if bridges are destroyed then it become a major problem in troop movement ; major threat from the direction of India was—rail-road and along the direction of flow of rivers (drain of country) upto the line of the Jamuna and Madhumati rivers, since India's network of communications, petrol, supply, stocks, medical and other administrative facilities—made major invasion from this direction by India easy as it could be supported. Moreover, *Meghalya border* terrain was easier—it was fed by single road from Gauhati to Shillong—from Tripura and Silchar direction—Indian attack from this direction become very real, due to the fact that communications had recently been greatly improved, huge stocks of supplies and military stores had been dumped under faked name as stores for refugees from East Pakistan. If it had been decided to hold Dacca to the last ; Dacca bowl area should have been turned into impregnable fortress but only as a second choice—tactically and strategically. See Map No. 1.

Pakistani Intelligence service did not discover that the money spent for preparations for aggression against Pakistan i.e. it has been stated that millions of dollars received from

international sources for the rehabilitation and relief for the refugees (in cash)—had been passed on to Soviet Union for the payment of missiles and for the improvement of Indian logistical infrastructure ; such as, U.S.S.R.'s loan of air transporters, metting of roads etc. on the front.

### **Pakistani public lulled to sleep ?**

#### *'Psychological warfare'*

Brutality, hate of non-Bengalis to the extreme was inducted in the minds of East Bengalis but it was grossly underestimated even by those Indian Muslim refugees who had lived with them as locals, far more than 23 years in East Pakistan. This uprising of manslaughter took both the Pakistan Government in the centre and province by complete surprise and unprepared to meet the situation. It was not unlike the genocide, rape and arson campaign pre-partition in 1947 which was in full swing that the enormity of the horror had full impact on Pakistan Government. Even the Pakistan Government remained lethargic and did not take the nation into full confidence. Strict censor control imposed on Press and Radio made situation from bad to worse. General mobilisation was not ordered till it became too late.

Pakistani Political leaders and retired General's offer of services for the duration of crisis was politely declined by General Yahya's Government and the nation was lulled to false security by President's advisors. This was the first mistake. The next was to believe that the unorganised and often leaderless group of tribesmen, or groups, or C.A.F. from N. W. Frontier of Pakistan as anti-guerilla fighters could by themselves combat the ruthless efficiency of Mukti Bahini trained by Soviet, and Israel trained Bharati instructors. The latter

had been trained in Israel under the Israeli General Jacob and his staff. It should be noted that in earlier stages of crisis—in March 1971—Mukti Bahini officers and men had overestimated their own capacity as a fighting guerilla force yet, they had left it to become roving partisans and lost golden opportunity to become liberators just to feed their lust for loot, arson, barbaric and intolerant attitude even towards their own fellow countrymen. This attitude of Mukti Bahini gave a severe jolt to the confidence of Bharati Government, and to the leaders and men of Liberation Army. In fact it completely upset Bharati Strategical plan. Pakistan lost a golden opportunity by sitting idle, while Bharat decided to adjust her plan by delaying war for several months, i.e. till General Jacob gave them the green signal 'to go'. Mukti Bahini was—in March 1971—armed mainly with rifles, sub-machine guns and in some groups only with medium machine guns, also a few mortars were supplied by Bharati Army who could not give Mukti Bahini very liberal artillery fire support in early stages of war. Bharat also provided Mukti Bahini combination of air supply, water borne transport and wherever possible road and rail communications.

In March, anti-Pakistan revolt sponsored by Bharati policy makes had, it seems, overestimated Bangladesh insurgency, Mujib's political advisers and his insurgent's military strength. Even after that Mukti Bahini had not resilled from their early setbacks, and it had to be re-equipped and retrained—and its future exact role in the over all future Bharti strategical plan and caused many misapprehension.

General Tikka Khan's swift move in March 1971 had proved that Bharati sponsored and conducted guerilla warfare, solely through Mukti Bahini, had failed miserably inspite of the fact that they had been given a modicum artillery fire

support from India. Bharati B.S.F. had provided all along the border sanctuaries, arms, ammunition; and during their retirement Field artillery gave fire support to ensure their unmolested retreat. Co-ordination of Bharati, Soviet and British propaganda and statements by Bangladesh leaders in exile and in sanctuaries—was given a face lifting operation.

### **The blunder**

At the crucial moment when the psywar anti-Pakistan myth, i.e. Mukti Bahini were causing a monthly toll of 5,000 Pakistani soldier casualties a day and that the guerillas activities was costing Pakistani Government upto 150 crores a month; had also been smashed—Just about that vital moment, President Yahya replaced General Tikka Khan with General Niazi—sent the critical observers in quandary. By the end of April Mukti Bahini operations had abated considerably, because most of them had been withdrawn for training, regrouping and reorganization.

*'The world has never been reminded through press media the above-mentioned monthly claims of ravages and massacres claimed by Mukti Bahini for months which Bangladesh now states as the ravages and massacres were done by Pak forces'.*

### **Planning for new offensive by Bharat**

While Bharat fully appreciated her folly of starting a war 1971 with semi-trained Bangladesh troops and revised her strategic plan; it is a sad commentary, that strategic planners of the Pakistan Government adopted acquiescent attitude towards Bharat aggressive plan; thus once again they enabled Bharat to steal a march in recasting her the political, diplomatic and strategical plan. Bharat also realized that *'she could not make it a revolutionary war, but a secessionist Movement'* which

can only hope to succeed if there is a very large degree of political-cum-military support from friendly powers—such as Britain and Russia in this case, and also physical intervention by the Indian Army. If Mr. Mujib was to succeed in his secessionist plan, they felt, it would require all help that Indian armed forces can lend to him and also stiffen it with British and Soviet hardware and with also subtle international diplomatic campaign. It would need time for India to recast her overall strategic plans: Time for India to hold a purely defensive posture in the north and west of East Pakistan and to enable her to prepare for an all out blitzkreige military action against East Pakistan. However, it required considerable preparation :

- (a) Re-grouping of Indian forces to conform to the strategic plan.
- (b) The raising of necessary logistical units on the land, on the sea, and in the air.
- (c) Units for new airfields construction and its protection.
- (d) Re-adjusting her diplomatic campaign through a whirlwind world tour by Indian leaders—to meet foreign leaders in the international plane and adjustment of political breakthrough by propaganda drive.
- (e) Long process for moral re-armament and recruitment of Mukti Bahini, re-organising, training and equipping them. See Maps No. 3 and 1.

New sanctuaries were sought under the new plan for the moral re-armament of the so-called '*freedom fighters*' who had

been very badly demoralised, after the casualties they had suffered in March, 1971. Moreover, some of them had now taken shelter in the refugee camps in India. They were brought back to these new sanctuaries which were now strung out, for tactical reasons, all along the whole length of the Indo-Pak border of East Pakistan. After the end of May, these sanctuaries were pouring out 2,000 guerillas who had received six weeks training. They were posted as trained Mukti Bahinis with the various formations of the Indian Army Eastern Command. Many West Bengali Hindus were also recruited as props or watch-dogs among Mukti Bahini. From educational standard point of view, the Mukti Bahini force was the most educated lot among the guerillas of Asia.

These guerillas were now equipped with rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, anti-tank mines. The Pak Naval deserters were trained and employed as 'Frogmen' and Pak Air Force deserters were employed in the Indian Air Force.

#### Face lifting by Bharat. See Maps No. 1, 3, 5

By the first week of April Bharati Government took positive steps by :—

- a) Ordering (B. S. F.) Border Security Forces to stabilize events in East Pakistan.
- b) Ordered the Defence Council to re-group, re-organize and reconsider the strategic plan.
- c) Security plans to meet threat posed by internal trouble in East Pakistan, should be met from the very beginning by military action of the Indian armed forces *i. e.* if diplomatic policy fails, the military should undertake to take-over a policy to

pursue 'a win the-war aim' i. e. civilians conduct policies and diplomacy; the military conduct war to victory without civilian participation. In this new concept military action was to shorn off its 'all-or-nothing characteristic'—use of maximum force to attain decisive victory—general mobilization was ordered.

- d) As regards, neutralisation of Chinese threat—the absence of a joint communique on the end of Pakistani delegation indicated that the Pakistani mission had failed to achieve its object. Even then it was decided by Bharat Government not to start operations till November 1971, when mountain passes leading from China would be snowbound. Moreover, as a diversion China was locked in military confrontation with Soviet troops along the Usuri River—with approximately million troops tied up.
- e) In early August 1971 Indian signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Soviet to counter possible Chinese threat.
- f) Thus armed herself Mrs. Indira Gandhi decided to spend the intervening months in feverish preparation to wage war against Pakistan on all fields—diplomatic, political, psychological, economic and military. The regrouping of Indian armed forces along with re-equipping and training it with new weaponry from Russia on British was carried out. It meant movement of Indian formations from various commands so passed as to successfully carry out their mission against both wings of Pakistan.

- g) All formations, especially Indian Divisions from Nagaland and Mizo hills area were given artillery units twice more than under the normal allotment pre-crisis, by denuding other formations.
- h) Bridging resources were built up which could lay minimum 10,000 ft. of bridging. Britain supplied the necessary material to ensure its arrival in time by airlifting it.
- i) The Indian inter-services command system was re-organised to ensure the highest degree of co-ordination, for example, to H. Q. Eastern Command was sent an Advance Headquarters of Eastern Air Command, under an Air Commodore and an Indian Naval Headquarters representing the Flag Officer-in-Chief Eastern Naval Command at Visakhapatnam —this foresight paid full dividends when war eventually broke out. Inter-services command system made it possible not only to obtain naval gun and fleet Air Arm support to the army but also to mount at least one combined operation at short notice to fulfil the Army Commander's aim. The I. A. Force had been dispersed under to plan to secret locations.
- j) By the beginning of November, 1971, to invade East Pakistan, the Indian forces were located under Command of G.O.C. Indian Eastern Command as :
  - (i) XXXIII Army Corps, i.e., 7 re-equipped infantry divisions plus IV Corps and 101 Column and II Corps.
  - (ii) Indian Air Force had activated Kumbigram airfield

and were complete in their requirements of interceptor fighter squadrons, fighter bombers and air transport squadron.

- (iii) Operational infra-structure—in Selchar and Tripura. It makes most clear why Bharat never agreed to the demarcation of boundry since 1937 between Bharat and East Pakistan along these states.
- (iv) By mid-summer the Indian Army had begun to assume border responsibilities and retained Mukti Bahini and BSF who now had been amalgamated, were used as guerillas, who also had used force, or threat of force for the locals to leave at once their homes as refugees. Large scale sabotage was also beginning to be felt by Pakistani forces and the locals as guerillas waylaid buses etc.
- (v) At the same time Indian propaganda machinery was put into full speed to spread lies that Pakistani troops had encroached its Indian territory at Andermanik, Baganbasar and Hinsiku and dug trenches on Tripura front and also that Pakistani troops had '*blown up*' railway bridges in Nadia, Dinajpur, in the Karimganj area of Assam, in Maghalaya. Such a covert propaganda was a pre-requisite for her pre-emptive strategy for justifying wanton aggression by India against Pakistan. General Jacob (an Israeli) whose services had been lent to Bharat, most successfully used Israeli tactics in the operational field as well as in the field of covert propaganda. Many officers and Indian other ranks had worked under General Jacob in Israel since 1965 to study Israel's stra-

tegy, tactics in blitzkreige conventional war, as well as, in guerilla war, sabotage.

- (vi) By the end of October the Indian Army now openly announced that if necessary '*Bharati Army would now move into Pakistan territory in self-defence*' by faking Boyra Hilli incidents—27 November 1971. The stage was thus set for a full scale war of covert aggression under pre-emptive strategic—pre-conceived and boldly executed plan under Bharati strategic policy.
- (vii) Key factor in planning for operations on either front was going to be '*speed*'—for both political and military reasons—but "speed or mobility are most costly adventure"—says Wavell. Secrecy and speed for—political, diplomatic, military, psychological warfare. But Pak General Headquarters was wishfully banking on international intervention which never came.

Army Headquarters India, thus succeeded to mislead and mystify the enemy.

### III

#### Choices for strategic planning for Pakistan

General Yahya, it seems, overlooked strategical necessities, and for his political reasons and his thinking, he ordered to continue to occupy as much of East Pakistan as possible with Dacca as the '*pivot of defence*'. This political consideration seemed to have been an obsession to the detriment of both strategical and tactical considerations.

facing Calcutta front—Jhenida, Jessore (West of Dacca) held by 9th division, and Dinajpur—Rangpur 16 Infantry Divisions. But he had deployed only a brigade in the vicinity of Mymensingh. A cluster of strong points was built up along Tripura border with 14 Infantry Division with its Head Quarter at Ashuganj. The newly raising 36 Infantry Division that was located near Comilla to offset Indian build up in Tripura; in fact, where the enemy's strength was strongest. General Niazi thus could hope only to stop guerilla invaders all along border as an internal security measure. This scheme had proved successful during March-October period. But the planning of this scheme was based on political considerations only—to deny Bangladesh Government sponsored by the Bharati Government any territory inside East Pakistan and thus deny them to gain any diplomatic coverage for seeking recognition. But Pakistan High Command at Islamabad and at Dacca failed to recognise that Pakistan was now since August 1971 confronted with a major aggressive war by a strong power—so the strategic '*plan should be revised to meet a major threat*' and not to stop infiltrators entering the territory to create chaos. See Map No. 3.

It was end of November 1971 and Pakistani forces were still committed to rigid form of linear static defence based on '*hedge-hog*' tactics, with very weak artillery fire and no air support; with no mobile army reserve, and with no visible possibility of getting any further aid either material, manpower or moral from West Pakistan. The plan was '*passive, rigid and orthodox*' which no student of military history could support. Whatever the reason—it was a suicide—because the Pakistani High Command did not order the pull back either to an inner line of concentrated defence of the '*Dacca bowl*'—the triangle territory formed by the rivers Jumna—Meghna north of Dacca—which would have given General Niazi time—a breathing

space which he badly needed—given breathing time to the defenders they could have held at least for several weeks, if not months, before Indian Army could crack the defences. See Maps No. 1 and 3.

Both rivers near Dacca are wide at that point and with marshes, ricefield, quagmires and boglands all round, Dacca becomes virtually a fortress island. As the equipment situation of the enemy stood at that time, Bharati force had only some amphibious tanks but not enough gear to cross marshes. This area called '*Dacca bowl*' could have been turned into a small fortress. However '*it is considered that preferably*' Chittagong hill-track and Chittagong port area could have provided better, safer area than Dacca, which could have made a protracted war, more easy and desirable '*to gain time*'. The decision making month for the Pak Military High Command was April, as political situation had by now become crystal clear—even change in plan—though late—in September would have been '*better late than never*'.

Had we held '*Chittagong Hill tract and port areas*', all disruption of lines of communications carried out Mukti Bahini such as, bridges of railways and roads, would have very adversely affected Bharati blitzkriege plan especially if Pak Forces had added more destruction to it. It would have created for invading Army most seriously problems : such as,

- (a) To find enough bridging material ready at hand. Britain had provided Baily bridging material to bridge only few hundred feet. Moreover, Baily bridges are not of much use to bridge rivers like Megna. It is efficacious for bridging small rivers and streams only.
- (b) In addition to support the fighting services with

ammunition, food supplies and other material, the most perplexing problem for Bharat Administration would have been to feed millions of local population. The refugees in India too would have tried to rush back to their homes. This would have congested already torn up roads and railways—which would have showed drama of Bharati Army's advance—blitzkriege.

- (c) It would have exposed Bharat's expansionist plan. Economically it would have broken the back of Bharat's economy.
- (d) It would have given Pakistan '*time to recover*' from the shock which she had received from the covert war. It would have also made available an escape route in Burma and not surrender, if war situation did not improve. However, '*to gain time was vital for Pakistan*' just as reverse effect it would have had on Bharat war situation.

But Pakistan Government hoped—wishfully—to muddle through the war! Will the blame be passed on to the junior Commander?

#### **Manpower, Stocks of Equipment—Stores—Supplies in East Pakistan in 1970**

- (a) Pakistan army had not planned well ahead to fight a mobile or a protracted static war on either front; so she was very weak in logistics.
- (b) The ammunition for artillery and aircraft had not been stocked at combat scale of war of long duration.

- (c) East Bengal personnel before 25 March 1971 was 70,000 which was composed.
- (d) 16,000 (Approx) regulars in each of the six batallions of the East Bengal regiment (located in East Bengal).
- (e) East Pakistan Rifles—a border security organisation in all 15,000 were all Bengalis, both in (c) and (d) the Hindu Bengalis formed majority.
- (f) Razakars—(Bengalis) a homeguard organisation—50,000. The Razakars classed—Mujahids and Ansars, partly armed with rifles and shotguns.
- (g) Police—45,000 to 50,000 all Bengalis but the majority of policemen were Hindus. They rose in revolt to a man in March.
- (h) Communists who supported secession.

But the world had not been told about share of East Pakistan in civil and Armed forces.

### **Political groups**

- (a) The Moscow—oriented Maulana Bhashani Communists were both ubiquitous and greater in number but Maulana Bhashani decided to sit on the fence.
- (b) The Toha group of Peking oriented extremists, located mainly in the forest areas north-west of the capital and in the esturian regions of Noakhali district. Mr. Mujib never supplied them arms, yet they acquired at least some from across the Indian border.
- (c) Abdul Kadar Siddiqi a self-styled General, formed

his own group in Tangail Area, which was 16,000 strong. He was a blood thirsty ruthless person who played havoc especially in Mymensingh, and Dacca Districts. He was unstable and resembled a wooden clog which moves with waves as the wind changes its direction in the sea.

- (d) Again many Hindu Indian Army officers and men were inducted in Mukti Bahini to strengthen it—such as, faked Major Najamul-Huda who told foreign journalists that he belonged to the Pak Army.
- (e) Colonel Usmani had formed his cells in the regiments, such as, Major Zia-ur-Rahman 88n E.B.R. in Chittagong, Major Khalid Musharaf) 27 March 1972.

Captain Zia took over control of Chittagong area after killing his senior non-Bengali Officers—later he made his H.Q. in India across Mymensingh.

- (f) The spontaneous uprising became possible due to the effectiveness with which sabotage operations by Mukti Bahini were carried out. Road and rail communications were badly disrupted, bridges blown up and rivercraft sunk—depicts that the uprising was a well pre-conceived plan which was executed effectively in the psywar. Khaled group escaped northwards from Brahmanbaria towards Sylhet into Indian territory. He succeeded in isolating Sylhet from Comila and Dacca. He had been a staff officer in a Pak formation headquarters. He too effectively carried out destruction of rail and road bridges and captured Sylhet airfield.

- (i) However, where the Pakistani detachments were strong, such as, Dinajpur, Rangpur area, there had been little local leadership for the formation of effective guerilla groups of Mukti Bahini.
- (h) A rebel headquarters of rebels was established on Indian soil along Kushtia-Jessore-Khulna region.
- (i) Eventually Mukti Bahini started 'gram parished' (village—insurgency cells) which acted as counter Pakistani Razzakars propaganda. Bharatis admit that "Razakar was never so terrorised as to resort to betrayal and treachery"—very unlike other counter guerilla measures, Mukti Bahini effort was (i) to intensify economic warfare through, arson, loot and destruction (ii) to kill Pakistani Soldiers and their supporters.

#### To sum up

Pakistan Army hurriedly built up about 40 new semi-trained batallajons—about four and half infantry divisions—but these were not with full complement of armour, artillery, transport and logistics. The air support was very weak. The naval flotilla was also very outnumbered by the Indian Navy.

x            x            x            x

*The Bharati plan* was to raise the morale and efficiency of Mukti Bahini by inducting Indian soldiers into Mukti Bahini guerillas who had lost morals due to heavy casualties and defeats inflicted on them by Pak Army in every encounter in March-April. Their new role was to pin down and contain the Pakistani troops in their dugouts till the Indian strategic plan

would be ready for a lightning stroke. The Indian plan was sound and workable. The outwardly lull in operations gave false notion to Pakistani troops that guerillas had been decisively defeated and pushed in the Indian territory. The Mukti Bahini had become passive—as they were not pressing in their attacks with determination to win all along the border. This assumption made by Pakistani staff was wrong. Guerilla should never fight a decisive war. They should work on '*hit and run*' tactics. Our intelligence failed to find out that they were being re-organised, re-equipped, re-trained and were only 'probing to find the weak points in the Pak defences. The Pakistani intelligence wrongly interpreted Indian Command's press release: "Indian troops have been ordered not to cross the border to chase Pakistani commandos" that it meant, that the Indian Army had adopted a '*passive defence*' tactics. In fact it was meant to mislead the Pakistani Army Command—in it—it seems, they succeeded in achieving their objective.

x            x            x            x

### **On the other side of the hill**

*Indian Army Eastern Command* poised against East Pakistan in November 1971. See Maps No. 1, 3, 4, 5.

XXXIII Corps.

One Mountain Division.

Two extra brigades.

Extra supporting arms :

One light armoured regiment—PT-76 s-Russian.

One medium artillery regiment—5.5 inch British

Engineering bridging unit

101 Communication zones

One Infantry brigade.

#### **IV Corps**

Three mountain divisions.

Extra—two adhoc squadrons of light armour PT-76  
s-Russian

one medium artillery regiment 5.5 inch—British.

In addition to the above, the ground forces were allotted and given numbers of air sorties for close support—on as required basis.

#### **II Corps**

Two Infantry Mountain Divisions

Artillery and other supporting arms under command.

#### **Extra allotment**

One armoured Tank regiment T.55-S (Russian)

One Tank regiment PT-76 amphibious (Russian)

One Medium artillery (130 mm) long range (Russian)

One engineering bridging unit.

see sketch-page

#### **On West Pakistan Front**

By mid-summer the Indian Army had constructed all along Indo-Pak border steel reinforced cement pillboxes, bunkers and observation towers—against terms of ceasefire agreements of 1948 and 1965 (Tashkent)—all along Western Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir State under pre-conceived plan. They had been feverishly working on it since 1965 War.

General Yahya stated on 25 November that "...he might not be here (in Rawalpindi)...(but) off fighting war..." but he never left the President House.

While by the end of November 1971 the Bharati Army had been deployed in full strength also on the Western front—its Infantry divisions backed up by a number of armoured brigades—supported by Armoured Division—yet the Pak Army had just begun mobilization of her armed forces. Bharat Government had ordered '*general mobilization*' soon after the Hi-jacked incident in 1970. Though Pakistan had begun to recruit men in May 1970 to replace those who had been sent as re-inforcements to the Eastern Wing, as these West Pak divisions were already much below normal strength, i.e. all 10 Infantry Divisions, a few independent brigades, two armoured divisions and an independent brigades in the Western Wing, even then they were (in October 1971) much below normal strength. There was acute shortage of transport units, engineering units and medical units. Yet on December 3 an airstrike by Pak Air Force was carried out on Srinagar, Avantipur, Pathankot, Uttarlar, Jodhpur, Ambala and Agra. Later a second wave of aircraft flew over to deliver a repeat blow. But these raids were carried out on very minor scale i.e. by 3 aircrafts, so these sorties could not achieve desired results—except as a warning of what may come. However its great value to Bharat lay in propaganda value—a pre-requisite for a covert war under pre-emptive strategy.

In December 1971, I.A.F. claimed air superiority—after their raids by large formations at Chanderi, Shorkot, Sargodha, Muri, Mianwali, Mauripur, Karachi, Misalawala, Rawalpindi, Changa Manga and Lahore.

**Location on 1.12.1971 of Pakistan forces as released by Indian Institute of Defence Studies**

(a) *Kashmir Sector* : 12th Pak Kashmir Division.

## (b) Kotli-Poonch front—23 Pak Division.

Both these divisions were weak in artillery, logistics and ancillary units.

(c) *Sialkot Sector*—Pathankot—Dera Baba Nank front

II Pak Corps—H.Q. Sialkot.

No. 8, 15, 17 Infantry Divisions.

No. 6 Armoured Division.

(d) *Central Sector*—Lahore-Amritsar axis and Khemkaran Sector IV Pak Corps. H.Q. Lahore.

No. 10 and 11 Infantry Divisions and 8 Independent Armoured Brigade.

C) *Multan Sector*—Fort Abbas opposite Anupgarh in Rajasthan.

1. Pak Corps—H.Q. Multan.

No. 7, 33, Infantry Divisions, 25 Infantry Brigade and 1 Armoured Division.

(e) *Southern Sector.*

No. 18 Infantry Division and two armoured regiments H.Q. Hyderabad (Sind).

x            x            x            x

General Yahya wishfully relied on aid he might get from CENTO, SEATO, U.S. and China—as regards the latter it is said he had hesitated to sign a Defence pact like the one India had signed with Russia. Pakistani high command had for a number of years nursed a pipedream about launching a massive, surprise deep penetrating attack into Indian territory — spearheaded by

armoured formations. But India is not a restricted territory in which such a thrust even if successful, prove instantly decisive—i.e. legendary battles of Panipat in atomic era.

As the Indian Army crossed ceasefire line along Hijra-Poonch sector on 3 December—Pakistan counter attacked Poonch and Chhamb shortly after P.A.F. air strike. In Poonch Sector Azad Infantry brigade which was to launch counter attack against Poonch as a pincer, movement—supported by artillery in support of 7 Pak Division against Indians left Peshawar on 2 December.

Meanwhile Bharati Commandos infiltrated behind Poonch area. No one but an incurable optimist would, in those circumstances, hope for the cherished breakthrough to materialise. And yet that is exactly what the Pak G.H.Q. attempted by repeating 1965 plan—and with incredible ineptitude—because Bharatis had copy of the plan which a deserter Bengali officer had given to the Indians, the Pak Force's attempt failed. Indians counter attacked and by 16 December they captured several posts flanking Poonch-Kotli road and also struck at '*dagger salient*'—only 50 miles from Kharian and pushed back Pak Troops and thus safeguarded the rear of Chhamb post which had been protected by steel and mortar pillboxes. See Map No. 4.

In the rest of Jammu and Kashmir theatre, the Indian Army pushed forward without much opposition and crossed ceasefire line as the area was very thinly held by Pak Army, or Azak Forces.

### **Straightening out operations by Indians**

In Kargil Sector, the Indian Army launched attack to straighten out the line and to safeguard Zoji La pass of Communication—in fact a direct threat to Silk route.

Tithwal Sector West of Tut Mari Gali pass where Pakistan held a large salient in Lippa Valley lies on the east bank of Kishenganga and protects attack by Indians from Sopur, was occupied by Indians.

#### West Pak front

On Jaisalmir Sector the Pak Army came to grief, as it seems, neither the Div. commander, or his unit commanders had either made personnel reconnaissance or studied a very detailed report written by a Pakistani 8 Division Commander in 1948-49. No wonder soft vehicles of the supporting troops supporting Armoured regiment (mixed T-595 and Shermans) bogged down in the desert, thus armour was separated from its supporting column, forming an easy target for I.A.F.

## CHAPTER XIII

### WHY DID WE LOSE THE WAR ?

Let us be very clear in our mind that wars in the atomic era have become total wars, in that soldiers act only as the shield for the nation on the battle front while the Civilians behind the front line are the real strength which depict the 'will' of the nation.

The Holy Prophet warned the Ummah that ; '*know thyself and know thy enemy*'. To depict how we, as Pakistanis, omitted or otherwise this principle of War and what did our enemy—Bharat do as soon as the partition of India become known as inevitable to the Indians. As we let the Bharatis take initiative over us we would discuss their actions first.

*On the other side of the Hill—the Award—made Pakistan strategically weak.*


The term of reference as announced for the Bengal and Punjab Boundry Commission were announced on 30th June 1947 as follows :

"The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries the two parts of Punjab and Bengal on the

4

4


4



Indian Corps..... II XXX IV  
 Indian Border Security  
 and Mukti Bahini..... ☆☆☆


MAP NO.1 EAST PAKISTAN

MAP NO. 2



MAP NO.3

REGROUPING IN APRIL-NOV.  
OF INDIAN ARMY  
1971




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
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MAP NO. 4




# MAP OF PAKISTAN 1971

KEY.  
→ BHARAT ATTACK  
→ MAIN THRUST



DRAWN BY IZHAR.

MAP No. 5



basis of 'ascertaining the contiguous majority areas' of Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into account other factors..." In regard to Bengal. Sardar Patel lifted the curtain soon after Partition and in a public speech at Calcutta on 14th January 1950 by declaring ".....You all know our country was one and we had one economic system which had been broken all of sudden. We 'agreed to Partition' because we saw the alternative was worse (partition in to three A, B, C, groups). Therefore, we agreed. But we made a condition that we can only agree to partition if we do not lose Calcutta. 'If Calcutta is gone then India is gone.' We could not agree to any condition under which we had to lose Calcutta"... Armit Bazar Patrika, 15 January 1950.

Corroboration of it is furnished by Lord Ismay's Memories....."Eastern Bengal and West Punjab were to go to Pakistan and Western Bengal (which was to include Calcutta) and the Eastern Punjab were to go to India....."

"The city of Calcutta, which East Bengal claimed on the ground of contiguity and Muslim majority was unjustly awarded to West Bengal through pressure and influence of Lord Mountbatten. [But matters did not end there. This award besides giving Calcutta to West Bengal, also gave away large tracts of admittedly Muslim majority districts of Murshidabad, Maida, Nadia, Dinajpur and Jessore—which were contiguous to East Bengal."

By the verdict of award East Bengal also lost considerable contiguous Muslim majority areas of Assam, a part even of Sylhet and the entire Muslim majority area of Cochar, comprising Haikandi sub-division. It is noteworthy

that in every instance, the Award of Radcliffe resulted in depriving the Muslim of large contiguous majority areas both in East and West Pakistan to make it military and economically weak.

In all these cases the Radcliffe Award violated under pressure, or ill advise of Lord Mountbatten the terms of reference to the advantage of the Indian congress.

### **Indian on War Path.**

According to the strategic studies U. K., the Indian Army is normally organised into four commands.

- (a) Western Command consists 3 army corps of total of 13 Infantry and one armed division and some armoured brigades. This includes the reserve corps normally located in Central India but earmarked for operations on the Western front. Western Command also has two mountain divisions facing the Himalayan front from Ladakh to Simla Sector.
- (b) Central Command's operational responsibility is the central-northern sector of the Himalayas.
- (c) Eastern Command (1971) consists of 3 army corps. Its responsibilities extend to the Sikkim, Bhuttan and NEFA sectors in the North, the Naga and Mizo Hills and (before the operations) the East Bengal border.

- (d) Southern Command's areas of operational responsibility are in the Kutch in Rajputana.

*P.S. Note : Since 1971 war Indian Army has been reorganised into three Commands.*

Indian Army is eight and quarter lakhs approx. strong and organised :

- (a) 14 Infantry Divisions
- (b) 10 Mountain Divisions (these divisions would need medium and field artillery, additional transport if employed in plain).
- (c) Several independent infantry brigades.
- (d) two parachute brigades.
- (e) One armoured division and some armoured independent brigades.

Equipment of an Indian regular formation is :

- i) 7.62 mm self loading Ishapore rifles )
- ii) 7.62 mm light and medium machine guns ) indigenously produced
- iii) 81 mm and 120 mm mortars )
- iv) Infantry divisions are supported by 25 por guns and 100 mm Russian long range field guns and 130 mm medium guns.

- (v) The heavy gun is the 7.2 in howitzer. The anti-aircraft artillery, the old 40 mm 6-6 (radar controlled gun).

The Mountain Division depends upon :

- i) Pack mountain guns (75/24 Indian product and the Yugoslav 76 mm gun).
- ii) These divisions have artillery support like ordinary as stated above.

In armour, the Indian Army increased its strength since 1965 :—

- i) 450 T-55 and T-56 Russian tanks.
- ii) 300 Vijayanta tanks (Indian manufactured) mounting 105 mm gun.
- iii) Centurians (U. S. Supplied) are more powerful than Pattans.
- iv) Light armour AMx13 French tank carrying powerful 75 mm gun. Russian PT-76, a big lumbering amphibious armoured vehicle with limited fire power—invaluable for reconnaissance role, particularly in riverine terrain.

The Indian Airforce—expanded and had been modernised since 1965 :

- (a) Combat aircraft 625 (about) and a total of 90,000 men,
- (b) MIG-31 Supersonic (mach 2)—7 squadrons, interceptor fighters.

- (c) Sukhoi-7 fighters bombers—5 squadrons.
- (d) Gnat interceptors (indigenous)—7 squadrons.
- (e) Hunter fighter bombers—6 squadrons.
- (f) HF-24 trans-sonic fighters—6 squadrons.
- (g) Canberra bombers—3 squadrons.
- (h) Radar surveillance and communication system considerably improved.
- (i) Surface to air anti-aircraft missile system around all important targets in India had been established.

The airforce is organised into Western, Eastern, Central operational and Maintenance Command. Since 1971 war same operational changes has also been made in I. A. F.

**The Indian Navy—expanded 40,000 manpower since 1965.**

- (a) Aircraft Carrier (the Vikrant) 1
- (b) Cruisers 2
- (c) Destroyers 3
- (d) Destroyer escort 3
- (e) Peyta class petrol vessels 5
- (f) 'F' class (Russian Ocean going submarines) 4
- (g) Mine sweeping vessels and landing craft. Numbers not stated

The Indian Navy has two Eastern Coast and Western Coast fleets.

### Indian para-military Forces—a Covert Force

During the Second World War very heavy demands were made on Indian manpower and the internal security necessity: due to communal riots, political upheavals; the British Government raised para-military forces which were, until then, were common feature only on the North Western Frontier of India, such as, Scouts. Security Units *i.e.* CAF, were now raised into various forms in all provinces according to the internal political situation in India so as to release British troops and Indian Army troops for field service.

- a) These security formations were equipped with rifle and light automatic machine guns. They were a motorised force which could be quickly shifted from point 'A' to a threatened point 'B'. They were controlled by the Centre or the Governors and 'not' by the Provincial Cabinet, as the Governors were responsible directly to the Viceroy only. This force or part of it, could be sent also from one province to another.

### Indian Armed Police.

This was a semi-military force under direct control of the Provincial Government but the provincial Cabinet had a prior claim on it for its use inside the province to maintain law and order, such as communal riots *i.e.* it could be sent to another province for jobs such as, quelling riots etc. without provincial cabinet's approval.

Post-partition Indian Government like Hitler S.S. troops in 1936, very considerably increased these three forces. It

began its expansion and extensive use in occupied Kashmir, Nagaland during early stages. Its greatest and most effective value was in propaganda. For example, where Pakistan used armed forces from 1956 onwards to maintain peace, law and order an '*emergency*' and later on under martial law, the Bharati Government used its Security police and shouted at house tops that '*all was quite in India*' as law and order unlike Pakistan, was being maintained by the Indian police and not by the armed forces.

The value of efficiency of the Indian forces and the paramilitary Force was duly brought home in the eyes of the Bharati leaders since the debacle of the Indian Army at the hands of China and latter on bleeding of her nose by the Pakistan forces in 1965, which in fact this latter wanton aggression was a crucial test for the efficiency of the Indian Armed forces. As the test in 1965 too was a failure ; the Indian leaders decided to look for :

- a) New friends who could supply most modern arms to them and not the outdated discarded weapons as has been the case hitherto by the Western bloc. Because, though weapons do not win war but '*they do contribute a great deal*' in winning a war.
- b) Allies who would help to build '*heavy Industry*' on the Indian soil, which is a pre-requisite for the manufacture of weaponry as well as for improvement of agriculture and industry.
- c) A nation, who could not only provide necessary funds but also teach the Indians the '*know how*' also to manu-

facture Modern weaponry. A well planned propaganda campaign was therefore started by India that the democracy was in danger. As Mr. Nehru had critically followed events around the world, such as, the hunger for power by leaders of both blocs, they helped the Bharatis in getting what they asked for not only from the leaders of the countries of the two blocs—Western and Eastern ; but also by the newly created state of Israel and non-aligned countries.

It was a subtle move which was carried out with foresight, determination and under well pre-conceived covert plan. Another factor which proved most effective was, when the Indian leaders scored a great victory over British hawks 1946, by throwing out 3 group plan which would have denied the congress bloc what little industry and mineral wealth India possessed and which would have gone to the Muslim Majority blocs—*i.e.* Bengal, Hyderabad and Northern groups about which Sardar Patel had remarked has been reproduced earlier.

#### **Indian Armed forces poised For War—since April 1971.**

Western Command—three army corps. See Map No. 3.

a) responsibility from J and K State in the north to the borders of Rajasthan.

*Southern Command* moved its Advance H.Q. from Poona to Rajashtan.

It should be noted that India for the duration of 1971 war divided her armed forces Army-Navy-Airforce into two

distinct Army groups. Each group commander had been allotted few additional corps, a number of (Infantry, armoured and also air and naval forces) either, under command, or in support of these two groups.

Their entire planning, it is obvious, had been made after careful and detailed reconnaissance with the use of different aids, personal land reconnaissance, air reconnaissance, intelligence reports. It seems there were no 'Top Secret' plans of Pak Army which had not reached the A.H.Q. Bharat—most shocking and unprofessional militarily for Pakistan Military High Command. On the other hand, Indian operational planning remained, 'top Secret' for Pak Defence Department. No wonder, the Indian attacks all along Western front, such as Shakargarh, Zafarwal, Longewala, Godra, Naya Chor, Chhamb, Poonch, Kargil, Dera Baba Bridge and confined their planning on elements of surprise and blitzkrieg tactics.

It should be noted that though the Indian Army was far superior in numbers, armament and logistics in 1947-48 and even in 1965, they dreaded to meet Pakistani troops in the open, but it is a sad commentary that the situation had very abruptly changed since 1965. Because the deterioration in Pakistan Armed Forces had begun to set in since 1965 which had rocked its very foundation by over playing her efficiency after 1950. By then majority of the military leaders had become mentally, physically and morally corrupt. Only those, who were 'Yesmen', could get promotion. Even category 'B' and 'C' officers (Yesmen) were promoted since 1958 to Commands even active formations over the heads of those who were professionally, mentally and physically better suited. While India had learnt her lesson in 1962—we decided to

nurse the idea of sacrificing efficiency for political motives. No wonder that in 1971 the military edifice crumbled down.

### On the other side of the hill

We will now see what happened '*on the other side of the hill*' India, in 1971, who has won some decisive battles but not the decisive war. The sword Arm of the Indian sub-continent *i.e.* West Pakistan, is even now of not only capable to meet the challenge of attack but it will fight to the last because it has '*the will*' to win - if Bharat decides to humiliate the nation. History is replete with such instances. Let us see what Bharat did do to achieve its object ?

We reproduce few extracts from book, which had been sponsored by Defence Department India, and written by Major General (Rtd) D.K. Palet who has been a Director of Ministry Operation and Commandant Military Academy, Daeradun, he states in "The Lightning Campaign 1971":—

"During twenty-four years as an independent entity, the Indian Army has been continuously engaged in operations. Hyderabad, the Kashmir War of 1947-48 and then permanent state of confrontation that was its heritage; operations in Nagaland and Goa, the Chinese confrontation and the subsequent war of 1962 (in which her performance was very poor); the Mizo Hills insurgency; and the (undeclared) war with Pakistan in 1965. The Airforce was involved in some of these wars in a combat role, in the other only in transport operations, though always crucially. The Navy stood in the wings, never having been given the chance to come into its own"

“From all these conflicts, the watching world formed an image of our military machine ; the verdict ‘*a good second class British left over*’, steadily declining in operational potential. Supervisingly self-sufficient in weapons and ammunition for a developing nation, it was nevertheless on the wave in actual combat capability. At best it could be considered comparable to the Pakistani armed forces—but certainly in Western eyes, ‘*even that was debatable*’. Suddenly, it seems to have pulled a rabbit of the hat...”

“.. The Sunday Times of London, which had reporters on all its fronts, wrote on 12 December 1971, *it took only 12 days for the Indian*’ to smash its way to Dacca, achievement reminiscent of the German blitzkrieg across France in 1940. The strategy was the same, speed ferocity and flexibility...”

‘*How did this happen*’ ? General Palet replies “...One general misconception must be cleared from the beginning. There has been much speculation as to why the Pakistan Army collapsed in Bangladesh : Whereas the fact is there was nothing like a general collapse. ‘*In many places*’, as at Hilli Jamalpur, Khulna and other strongholds, the enemy put up bitter resistance after having to be physically destroyed before the post could be captured. To be sure, in certain cases such as Jessore and Mymensingh, ‘*the enemy withdrew*’ from the defence before the assault could be put in but by and large they fought hard...”

“There were many defended towns still holding out when the surrender was announced as at Mainamati (Comila), Khulna, Dinajpur, Saidpur and (a portion of) Sylhet. Had our Army based its plan on capturing these stronghold the

fighting would have lasted many weeks more. *'The real achievement'* of Eastern Command was that it outwitted the enemy by swift movement and by-passing tactics over ground that was previously thought to be inoperable; before the enemy could realize what had hit them, our columns were converging on Dacca. *'The war was over'* before the battles were won..."

"Certainly there were moral factors involved too. After many months subtle propaganda by the Indian, brutality, looting and raping, the Pakistani Army from the highest commanders to the men in the ranks, had become partly dehumanised... the debasing process that had shorn the Pakistanis of professional mettle... This moral disintegration however, was evident in the conduct of the Pakistan Army as whole rather than in individual battles. *'The collapse was that of the image of the army; units and brigade groups often resisted ferociously.'*"

"The main reason why they were vanquished so decisively and so quickly is because they were thrown off balance by the vastly superior direction and execution of the offensive—a classic case of the plan that worked against the plan that did not, as Mr. Henry Stanhope of the Times of London wrote on 24 December. Or as the Sunday Telegraph of 19 December put it, "India on above all because of a sense of vision, a carefully defined and maintained sense of purpose, with which the leadership, at times inspired..." This does not, however, detract from the achievements on the Western front, where the Indian forces *'held'* the enemy at bay while Eastern Command set about completing its task. The *'highest and bloodiest battle'* of the war were fought along the border between India and Pakistan in the West. Both material losses and casualties were heavier in the West..."

"The gains of the crisis, in fact lay in the illusion that Islam was a stronger binding factor than cultural heritage. Yahya and his army were to kill a million Muslims before that myth was finally exploded..."

"...The Ayub's regime, without regard to its failure or success in its historical perspective, was characterised by these qualities. The first, obviously the dominant voice in national affairs; the second, the gradual turnover of domestic responsibility by military officers to civil servants; the third, a not unusual component of military dictatorship, Ayub's personal assumption of policy responsibility in both the formulative and decisive stages..."

"...Ayub's statement : '*My authority is revolution*'. I have no sanction in law or constitution...the people of Pakistan badly served by politicians would return in time to a democratic form of Government..."

"...Ayub, not unnaturally exercising his dictatorial prerogatives made the majority of his policy decisions on his own rather than in consultation with army or other authorities. This procedure provides potentially the most vulnerable aspect of any dictatorship, benevolent or otherwise. Collective responsibility (and collective guilt) perpetuate themselves for lack of one recognisable villain who can be made the scape-goat. There is, however, no such thing as the indispensable man..." Further extracts state :

"Corruption, inevitable where power is the end rather than means...Yahya's aim was to perpetuate the absolute power of the military junta while according to the respect-

ability of democratic approval...he assumed, though wrongly, that none of the opportunistic political parties of Pakistan would ever be able to muster sufficient votes to form a majority Government. He even agreed to the 'one-man-one vote formula'-never imagining it possible...The acceptance of the election results would mean an end to junta's veto—and consequentls the end of military rule..."

"On 1 March 1971...Bangladesh was born—27 February 1971 his civillian cabinet was dismissed. 3 March 1971 troops in East Pakistan reinforced—Some Bengali units transferred to the West. Tanks were brought to Dacca and converted to soft tracks for use on urban roads. 2 March 1971, Mujib called for a general strike, non-violent, non-co-operation movement too late in the day..."

Over-killing—treachery played its part.

"Tikka Khan urged: Give me enough force and I will crush them in 48 hours" argued for a minimum of nineteen days to complete preparation for the definite crack-down in East Pakistan. Yahya resorted to subterfuge on 6 March addressing the nation by radio—Assembly opening 26 March—Yahya was eminently successful in the ruse—whether by his own skill, Mujib's naivete or, a combination of the two..."

"Tikka Khan, who had started life as an illiterate soldier in Pakistan Army—and despite his rank, never really graduated to any higher standard of intellect or culture—believed that he had the best solution to the problem. He would wipe out Dacca University...kill a few thousand intellectuals and professionals of the middle class, let loose his soldiery on a rampage in thu urban areas to cow the people..."

“Soon after Pakistan launched its repressive campaign in East Pakistan, it became clear that the political and strategic implications would not remain confined to that country alone but would inevitably engulf the whole sub-continent. Quite apart from the question of the security, the events in East Pakistan since mid-February had resulted *‘in creating a widespread sense of a political commitment in India.’* Resolution in Lok Sabha, and the State Legislative the formation of a *Bengladesh* Government-in-exile on Indian territory, the sanctuary given to members of Mukti Bahini and political leaders all these developments had created a sense of national commitment that could no longer be ignored...”

“...Walter Lippman has been quoted to say in his book ; “A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interest to avoid wars and is able, if challenged, to maintain them in War...” Tripura demarcation delayed into submission and thus preserve the junta’s colonial rule over East Pakistan. He embarked upon the grisly task of mass slaughter, mass destruction, looting and organised rape on the night 25 March...”

“...4 weak infantry divisions and more than 25,000 other military and para-military forces”... has been stated by general palet as strength of Pak forcee, he adds:

“The mass eviction of refugees was deliberate act of demographic aggression. It constituted a clear threat to India’s national security, there was reluctance by recourse to military action—even at controlled level would carry with it dangers of escalation to all out war with Pakistan and consequently,

*'the possibility of Chinese intervention as well military support by the United states'*. After experience of Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 during which the Chinese had threatened India with military action...defence policy readjusted—capability to conduct a two front war simultaneously...India found herself too dependent upon aid procurement...1964 five year Defence plan amounting to an outlay of Rs. 5,000 crores U. S. and U. K., manpower 8,25,000 modernisation of equipment the expansion of Airforce to 45 squadren modern aircraft, production facilities for the purpose of substantially reducing dependence, expansion of military research and development organisation...Soviet Union provided transport aircraft, helicopters and light (PT 76) tanks and establishment of the MIG 21 project in India. When U. S. withhe'd its aid programme, India again turned to Soviet and acquired large quantities of modern armour, field artillery, many squadrons of fighter bombers aircraft (Sukhoi 7)... Mobile radar and other items of modern weapons and equipment."

"The production plan could be expanded into full operation—in the field of sophisticated technology, ordnance factories for the production of propellants and explosives were completed—such as, electronic and sophisticated air defence ground environment equipment including high speed computers, the MIG supersonic interceptor and the indigenously developed HF-24 ground attack aircraft—Indian Army equipped with a new field gun—replaced 25 pounder : acquired two types of anti-craft missiles initiated indigenous manufacture observation role for the artillery from now on—to be done by helicopters—to be manufactured in India...The Navy acquired submarines, the Sea-cat (surface-to-air) missiles and

rocket boats, low level anti-aircraft missiles...logistical units and conduct of administrative units was given full attention to conduct mobile operation...The strategic metrological disadvantage April-May, monsoon—the passes would open with the approach of summer—facilitating Chinese intervention...”. Extracts end.

### **Indian Planning for Operation in East Pakistan as seen by Rangrnt**

Operation spearheaded by Mukti Bahini—regrouped to restore moral after receiving hard beating from Pakistani force on March 25, re-organisation, re-fitting and re-training necessary, hence :

- (a) She would have to complete her expansion and re-equipment programme as well as re-group her forces and re-plan their deployment.
- (b) She must wait until Mukti Bahini achieved operational capability.
- (c) She must wait until such time as the Chinese threat of intervention was minimised both by diplomatic action and by choosing most favourable season.
- (d) The terrain in Bangladesh is not dry enough for mobile operation until mid-November. On the northern borders the passes are not completely snow-bound till about early December hence November 1971 was earliest suitable month.

## CHAPTER XIV

### SOME DECISIVE FACTORS WHICH CHANGED THE COURSE OF WAR IN EAST PAKISTAN

As the hot weeks of 1971 of waiting, dragged by, while time after time the Bharati and Mukti Bahini soldiers rehearsed their operational tasks, the Pakistani General Staff meanwhile had now disposed to the extreme dangers their already weak force totaling about four weak Infantry Divisions. Though the Bharati and Bahini troops were now ready for battle—yet the Pakistani troops did not know the exact time the curtain will be drawn up. The mobilization was not yet complete.

#### **The Shifting starts—on Economic Order.**

To impede Pakistani troops manoeuvrability, Bharati overall Commander Eastern Army ordered '*scorched earth policy*' especially for the lines of communication, river craft and bridges. As regards fresh supplies of milk, vegetables, and meat became scarce in the market under the '*Economic order*' issued by the Awami League leaders. The last stage of the guerrilla warfare tactics *i.e.* the co-ordinated conventional warfare of the Bharati allied force and the Mukti

Bahini was now one of their most skilful military feats of the war, but it merely postponed the day of reckoning. Wars are not won by evacuation, or capturing a few tactical posts. Besides the 'scorched earth' policy did not significantly impede Pakistani army's approach to the rivers and seizure of some bridgeheads and river ports over it. But the Bharati troops did win the race, though a major part of the Pakistani Army now in East Pakistani were ferried across nearly unmolested to Dacca to its death trap ?

But India did not wish to start the War till she was fully and completely ready to fight the '*Lightning War.*'

She planned that there would be no threat on the flanks of her territory alongside China. Bharat had not forgotten that '*threat of invasion by China*' in 1965 had greatly upset not only her plans and also of those allies who were abetting and aiding her in this war. The time, therefore, chosen was when her mountainous borders along China were covered with thick snow *i.e.* December-April 1971-72.

The Guerrilla war fought singly by Mukti Bahini had failed miserably in March. They would not now fight alone unless fully supported by the Indian troops.

Moreover, the Indian High Command had fully realized that the first stage of guerilla warfare by Mukti Bahini alone from April-October 1971 would be over. The second stage of it should be that the guerillas should be used as spearhead only when fully supported by the Indian Army. Indian High Command had also done the morale lifting of the Mukti Bahini by inducting Indian soldiers trained

as guerillas and disguised as Mukti Bahini to act as props, or the backbone. Almost all deserters of East Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Border Security Force also had been absorbed in Mukti Bahini groups.

The Indian Eastern High Command desired to make sure that the operations would not be started prematurely or in hurry. There would be no rushing at the obstacle. Indian High Command had correctly summed up that while the casualties of the Pakistani troops were not solely due to fighting, but also due to bad weather condition, and long duration of living under field service condition with poor living conditions and home sickness would increase as days go by and especially when humid rainy weather starts.

Both Bharati Air force and Naval flotilla were extremely active and losses of rivercraft on Pakistani side were heavy. However, no attempt is being made to verify, or reject the claim made either by Bharat, or Pakistan as regards losses during these battles of river crossing, yet, throughout 1970-71 these grossly inflated claims were interspersed with reports from the Army headquarters of the belligerents. As to tank losses, here too both sides made extravagant claims which it is very doubtful that it would be supported by postwar data. At present it is impossible to say about the losses by postwar data.

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it". Santayana.

It seems that Pakistani High Command had not been critically studying war situation on both wings.

The major factor in mounting of this ill-starred operation by Pakistan Government was ignorance, in particular the failure of Pakistani Intelligence department to find out the real strength due to war planning and regrouping of Bharati force and its satellites facing them and still more to discover the real feeling and sympathy of the people in East Pakistan.

Was General Niazi allowed under the main strategical plan a free hand to plan to fight the battle as he thought fit ?

Was it that Gen. Yahya had lost his nerves and relied too much on pacts, such as CENTO or SEATO ?

Did Gen. Niazi ever suggested a plan to be allowed to retreat to Chittagong - Khulna area ?

Was General Niazi allowed to fight on a siege warfare strategy till the deemed fit ?

Were the Soviet T.34 tanks been so very decisively superior to the tanks given by the USA to Pakistan, or by other Westren powers, if so, how and why ?

It seems that Pakistani High Command laid too much stress of the defence of Dacca city and it is possible, it never occurred to them that Pakistani forces could have fought a protracted war lasting at least few months if the defence of Dacca Bowl had been considered in its strategic plan - failure of generalship on this point is very difficult to explain.

Again it is stated by some that it was General Yahya who decided to repeat the operation of the conquest of Chhamb

Area which was carried out in 1965 - without fathoming that India had strengthened this Chhamb-Kargil area with steel and mortar pill boxes, Artillery fire support, as well as, mobile fire with Russian tanks.

If it was envisaged by Pak G.H Q. that Pakistan would have to counter another Bharati wanton aggression, yet it was not necessary to counter it by recapturing again Chhamb area as bridgehead for defensive or offensive action, the same areas again. One of the principles of war is to surprise the enemy and thus to unbalance him mentally and morally. But if that country's army attempts to take the same areas again, it throws away the most effective tool of 'surprise' to the winds - this Pak strategists did follow.

It was stupid to stage surprise attack on this sector or to pierce deep in Rajistan sector all over again. Because the attacks on these sectors lacked strategic imagination as well as the element of surprise. It is well known that some senior East Pakistani General staff officers had deserted to India carrying with them complete plan of operation. Moreover Rajistan area is mainly desert which if occupied by the Pakistan forces would force them to face most difficult problems, such as, adequate supply of water, intense heat, sand storms and sandfly fever. But the overriding factor was that logistics was our weakest link.

Pakistan's strategic planning for the defence of Kashmir border deserve severe condemnation, as it lacked imagination and foresight both strategically and tactically. Yet the new line demarcation under Simla Agreement is more flimsy strategically as well as tactically than the line of Tripura Sec-

tor was since 1947 in East Pakistan. It is hardly necessary to elucidate now why India flouted for 25 years the Partition of India Agreement, as well as the U.N. Resolutions in the case of '*Kashmir and Tripura*'. What next? Please See Map No. 4.

Bharat now (in November 1972) is playing the '*bully boy tactics*'.

Moreover, without prior detailed intelligence report at hand, to repeat such an obvious operation which had upset Bharati 1965 plan of operation—one about which Bharat would have been on the alert ever since 1965, could not be called short of misadventure and wishful, especially when Pakistani General Staff did know that at least two senior Bengali Staff Officers particularly on that front had walked over with copies of entire plan to the Indian side. To attack a position without proper intelligence information or due to lack of any form of reconnaissance is nothing short of suicide.

These factors itself indicate the way in which the balance of power had changed in favour of Bharat. Even the most outstanding general with such meagre resources and power would not have dared gamble for such a major offensive.

What Pakistan Army could have done in East Pakistan, even if we had a million strong army there? No nation can afford to post one soldier to every 10 hostile-minded locals—nay, even one soldier to every 100 when the people of East Pakistan themselves had rejected the ideology of the ruling Junta. Again, no one can condone, if it is true, which I doubt, the killing by Pakistani forces of people, i.e., by their own defenders and brothers in faith, who had not been told and

fully explained the causes for such action and also about the ideology of Pakistan and why and how, it came into being. Jihad had never enjoined the Muslims to keep in power a family, or a group of leaders ; especially when the Government had not prepared the people to fight any war. There was neither remodelling of the existing operational plans—neither revising old strategic plans—nor moral re-armament of the armed forces, nor their re-armament with modern weaponry due to modern weaponry of the Bharati Armed Forces. It has been stated by some observers that our General Staff did not seriously consider signing an aid pact with a country who could have actively given aid morally and materiality. It is hoped that more information would be forthcoming when the veil of secrecy has been lifted. But one fact stands out that our planning to meet Bharati psywar was poor.

### **Where are the Airplanes ?**

Too much reliance on air power has become a state of mind yet, is it advisable by an economically poor country which Pakistan is, to train armed forces on Western tactics who possess strong air forces ? It is, therefore, questionable if she should, or should not, include imaginary air support on lavish scale in their annual training with troops, or in scheme without troops (T.E.W.T.) ?

This has had serious flaws from the beginning in our training. Ironically one of its chief flaws was that the Pakistanis had learned to emulate blindly the strategy and tactics of the Western nations of these Pacts, such as U.S., too well. Trained in strategy and tactics that depend on a wealth of

lavish air and artillery support and unlimited stocks of modern weaponry and ammunition ; many Pakistani Commanders set up far flung U. S. style defensive bases—outposts that could not be easily supplied by air or protected by Pakistan's small air fleet of 1955 model machines, which was located at Dacea, to outposts located in such places as Chittagong and Khulna sectors. In some instances Pakistani officers' morale went down, due to lack of massive doses of artillery or air support. No wonder that some Pakistani press reporters in both the wings told Rangrut : "When we made contact with the troops, they did invariably tell us : "We have no air support. Where is our air force' ?" There is nothing new about the support of air planes, as I had heard this query often enough during our evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940, and again during the battle of Britain and again on the Burma Front in 1942-44—'where is our airpower' ?

It should be noted that the Western Allies comparatively had very strong air fleet. Yet they could not be every where. At least Pakistani Press should have been taken in confidence and briefed by Pak High Command.

Bharati troops were already poised after careful preparations and stretched over along Indo-Pak borders. Several decades ago and they were only waiting for the signal to attack in full scale on Pakistani troops. Just when the signal might come, no one in Pakistan Army could say. Indeed, although intelligence analysis had spotted the Indian forces built up in all threatened fronts yet the Pak troops were consistently kept in the dark by Pak G.H.Q. and by Bharati subtle propaganda about Bharat's real intentions, the scale of attack or its timing. The Bharatis simply attacked when all was ready

psychologically, militarily, politically and diplomatically, as Bharat caught Pakistani rulers napping and in wishful mood. Secondly, the Bharatis had decided to switch from guerilla tactics in both wings to a full scale conventional warfare once the Pakistani forces had been pinned down at various places, widely dispersed, with no internal, or lateral, or external (East and West Pakistan) communication with no hope for further reinforcement reaching in Eastern Wing. And with poor logistics, it became virtually impossible for General Niazi to undertake any mobile offensive combat missions except to adopt passive defence.

Thirdly, even majority of P.A.F. Flying in East Pak (cast off U.S. and British aircraft planes which mere women can fly)—were outmatched by the Bharat's modern planes which were supplied by Russia—because not only they were very modern but they were seven-to-one in number. In spite of it, the Pakistani pilots have earned the reputation in all combats among foreign experts or being on par with the best Western bloc countries' fliers. Spurred by the flashes of excellent reports and fame of P.A.F. fighting force, no wonder, therefore, that Bharat had gone much beyond her financial means and against their policy of non-alignment to beg, borrow, or steal most modern weaponry from Israel, and Britain and Russian bloc countries. It has been reported in the Western press that thousands of million dollars received in cash by Bharat for the Bengali refugees was exchanged with Russian weaponry which was the cause of annoyance of U.S.A. But the nagging doubts had remained :

- (i) Deserter Bengali Pilots of the P. A. F. had plotted against Pakistan and had secretly joined Mr. Mujib.

They now openly fought against Pakistan as I.A.F. pilots.

- (ii) P.A.F. reserve officers and technicians pre-mobilization orders had not been kept fully trained, as prescribed by regulations, hence this reserve of manpower proved useless. Had the mobilization been ordered by the Defence Ministry in time, these reservists could have been given refresher training. If the last war (1971) events in the field could act as a guide, then the nation has the right to ask the Supreme Commander how and why it happened? The Pakistan Government should take the public in confidence. The Quaid-e-Azam has said :

“ It can never be unpatriotic to take your country’s side against your Government. It must always be unpatriotic to take your Government’s side against your country”.

- (iii) We are also told—and the press is silent on this point, that not even once Supreme Commander held a defence meeting of his armed forces’ chiefs, pre, or during the war.

It is a sad commentary, that no Defence Committee had been formed by the Revolutionary Generals. Those retired generals, admirals and air marshals who had offered their services, and whose service could have been very valuable, were declined. It is a fact that most of them did apply to serve the nation but it is said, that their requests were not even acknowledged. In Second World War five field marshals

—all over 80 years of age—visited Rangrut's troops (Indian) on Western Front in 1940 in France even when the weather was very unkind. The whole of France was covered with heavy snow and occasional heavy rain and sleet made it worse. Did our Government high command consider it necessary to visit Eastern front or Western front during operations ?

### The Psywar

“Disastrous effects”—said a U.S. Commentator on operations.

And “fear of big-power active collusion”, said another American strategist, “must have had an influence on their naval strategy” of the U. S. Seventh fleet. Soviet's active participation on one hand was to demoralize the people of Pakistan, while on the other, it demonstrated to the East Pakistani that U.S.A. and Pakistan Government could not protect them, and also to shatter the illusions that Pakistan's hope of receiving foreign aid ‘*from pact countries*’ was a complete flop—when the Russian promulgated the snare that capture of Dacca—the Capital—would be a military and psychological victory for Bangladesh, and it would be possible to establish a provincial government which a number of countries would hasten to recognise, i.e., they were looking for psychological impact and negotiating leverage against Pakistan. Pakistan High Command fell in the trap. Clearly, yet another of Bharat's aim was to unnerve the leaders of those parties and Razakars of East Pakistan, who were supporting the legal provincial government at Dacca and to precipitate the fall of Dr. Mallik.

General Yahya should have anticipated that it would be

long before the East Pakistan Government would be shattered under enemy forces' psywar pressure. And if the situation in East Pakistan continued to erode, he would be left few options—none of them very attractive.

We should not have escalated our armed forces because this is the key test—test of whether East Pakistanis can defend their own country! And Dr. Mallick stated flatly that “General Yahya had no intention—even if he could, of sending more soldiers to this wing”. Why did not General Niazi pay heed to it and adopted an alternative plan for the defence and security of his command?

All Mr. Nixon did at the moment was lip service and abstained from even despatching any weaponry or troops. Was he suffering from ‘*Gulf of Tonkin spirit*’, or did he feel that such a course might turn out to be a political suicide for himself? “If Bharat overrun East Pakistan what could we (USA) do about it? Bomb Soviet fleet?” As president, he had claimed much of his undeniable success in pulling out US troops from Vietnam without abandoning its ally, or injuring its own prestige. By so doing, Mr. Nixon himself was put to stern test. Looking through the hindsight one considers, that Mr. Nixon’s passive policy i.e. ‘*No war, no peace*’ has very considerably cut down his image as the leader of Western bloc nations. Some say, he was let down by Britain, whose leaders were looking inwards. Bharat proved herself to be a tyrant and expansionist for her weak and unhappy neighbour.

### **New Perils and poor leadership**

No military conflict in modern history has been punctuated

with as many predictions of finality as the war in both wings of Pakistan. And yet, like some tragic curse hanging over the peoples of Pakistan, the Pakistani Warlords stubbornly refused to listen reason. Five years after the Bharati's '*go for broke*' 1965 wanton aggression, Pakistan was defeated in 1971. The irony of fate is that Pakistani strategists had accepted as gospel truth that the Bharati Government had accepted their '*bluff*' and therefore, she had postponed '*a massive year end assault*' on East Pakistan. But everything was suddenly to square once—Bharati forces having poised along the borders of both wings of Pakistan under a pre-conceived plan—very suddenly struck down his enemy on all fronts. And with furious onslaught, the Bharati Mukti Bahini forces started skirmishes in earnest to make a mockery of General Yahya's broadcast '*to fight to the last*'. Those who have followed the war through its long and tortuous course since 1947 and have compared the conventional tactics of guerilla warfare employed during 1970-71—in it they find no difference this time of Bharati pattern of war which may be called a good copy of Chairman Mao's pattern. It was classic copy of Chinese war of liberation 1946-49. Though the situation in the Eastern wing was ominous, General Yahya airlifted more troops to stop the rot woefully at the cost of weakening the defence of West Pakistan. He, therefore, became weak everywhere. Throughout the week long final phase of the war, the President of Pakistan tried to play it cool by feeding the press with false propaganda. No ostentatious display of cool could conceal that the situation in both wings of Pakistan was critical. With Russian made arms long range artillery that rained thousands of screaming shells on the Pakistan armies of both wings and Soviet made tanks fitted with ground to ground and ground to air missiles, they churned through the hastily prepared defences in both wings.

### The Double Facet Policy

Having successfully created a turmoil in the Eastern Wing of Pakistan by the newly organised Mukti Bahini Guerillas, the process was repeated in Sind by the Hindu Thakurs and their Hindu peasant Thakurs of the same stock, living on both sides of the border of Sind. Due to it, on Sind-Bhawelpur front also became the heavenly area for enemy fifth columnists and intelligence agents who worked with great efficiency. The Bharati fifth (thakurs) columnists were successful in creating alarm and despondency among the Muslim people in towns and villages, who left in great panic not only their earth and homes, but their cattle and crops because, the Hindu fifth columnist were assisted by Indian airforce. They were often effectively challenged by PAF—although comparatively a very small but efficient arm—but PAF could not be everywhere. The situation in Pakistan was very similar to one, I witnessed in April-May 1940 in France and in Britain 1940-41. Like Lutwaffe, the IAF bombed and straffed railway trains, villages, towns, seaports and railway stations to create chaos and refugee problem as thousands men, women and children from rural areas gathered in and around the cities. There in Sind, they found no more safe from inhuman and barbarian attack by the IAF. The borders areas in Sind and Punjab near the fighting line was in turmoil. A most disturbing situation created by Bharati forces, through terror tactics made the defence problems for the Pakistani military commanders most complicated and difficult. Because we were caught napping! On the contrary Bharati had efficiently copied their Western Aryan brothers Nazi's air terror tactics. Yet, the Indian Congress were carrying deuhet policy—terror—in one hand and an olive leaf of '*peace based on no war pact*', in the other hand—a double facet Policy.

## Unprepared ?

President Yahya being unprepared to meet such large scale and sudden attack on Western Wing scrambled all troops and half trained units on the Western (Pak) front because he had no strategic reserve to this beleaguered zone. He had now no other recourse left but to send to the battle his semi-trained Razakars to fight a war as regular soldiers against a well trained enemy. These Razakars had been recruited only a few weeks earlier and had been trained as '*Home guards*', for the towns and cities. Yet to be sure to commit greater folly, it has been stated, that Supreme Commander never deployed two tank divisions which could have been most valuable. Why? The Pakistanis would like to know. The Supremo then tried to pay it cool, popping into television and on Radio only to make unrealistic statements. In similar vein, national security chief—the army chief of staff and chief of General Staff, made a point of conspicuously strolling in the battlefields but on television screen only.

No ostentatious display of cool—unrealistic display on television screen could conceal that the situation in both wings of Pakistan was, but grave. And, potentially at least, the *crisis* went well beyond Pakistan. For the enemy victory—accomplished with Soviet and British arms arms-bought with the money and material aid sent for refugees by US and other nations—would inevitably raise the question of whether President Yahya could politically afford to go ahead with his policy which was based on wishful thinking.

There was a certain bitter irony to all this. For though President Yahya had been confidently claiming that his armed

forces were ready and waiting for a Bharati offensive, the attacks caught him and his armed forces Commandars, off guard—despite the fact that Bharati, British and Soviet Governments had now tipped their hands in the plot rather openly. Many important factors within recent months such as new bunkers, airfields, had been built, Border Bharati troops had been reinforced, the new Soviet-Bharati pact and arms embargo on Pakistan by USA, Britain and Soviet should have left no doubt in any strategist's mind what it all meant. Recently even the press and Pakistan intelligence had reported newly installed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites near Bharati airfields, and air-to-surface missiles had been fitted on the Indian Airforce planes, and surface-to-surface missiles had been fitted on the Indian naval boats—yet, the Pakistan Government and her so called ally—the Pentagon—guessed wrong on virtually everything—which Masson's report depicts wilfully including timing of combined Bharati-Mukti Bahini attack in the Eastern Wing; and Air Naval and land attacks by the Bharati forces on the Western Wing. While all this happened our ally U.S.A. instead stated: "We should not escalate our armed forces. Let Asians fight Asians—if Bharatis overrun East Pakistan what can USA do about it?" President "Nixon had a plan"—which should have left no doubt in our minds — i.e., without abandoning its ally or injuring its own prestige based on '*no war and no peace*' policy.

Was he looking inward? Or was he too frightened of Soviet Union? By so doing Mr. Nixon has put himself to a stern test. No wonder General Giap decided to liberate South Vietnam, as he considered that Mr. Nixon was being haunted by '*Tokin Gulf spirit*' and was worrying only about his re-election as a President.

Yet we must also critically study some of the views and reviews that have appeared in the Pakistani or other press as hindsight in order to acquaint ourselves with the problems which the irony of situation was presented; such as :

- (a) A retired General, now a political leader, has stated: "The political power of the Pakistani army is totally broken, unless its morale is quickly restored, it could become a rabble".
- (b) A journalist has stated, "The army is finished for a long time. If it attempts anything against Mr. Bhutto, the people will not take it lying down. They will resist as fiercely as the Bengalis in Dacca after the crackdown last year." Times of India. It adds "—Bhutto is constantly looking over his shoulders at his Generals, not sure what they may be upto... because he is afraid of them...."
- (c) General Gul Hasan, "...was evidently reluctant to permit the use of army in coping with the ugly situation in West Pakistan created by policemen's strike. ."
- (d) Mr. Bhutto "...We cannot forget the Kashmir dispute...Even if we forget, the Kashmir dispute, the people of Kashmir will not forget it...". Dawn.
- (e) A Pakistani Air Marshal (Rtd) "Mr. Bhutto has talked of Bonapartism in the army but he is a Bonapartist himself..." Times of India.

- (f) Mr. Wali Khan remarked wryly : "Mr. Bhutto's Advisor on national security, Major General Akbar Khan (of Rawalpindi conspiracy fame), it is widely feared, that he is raising a private militia "Reminiscent of Hitlers Strom troopers..." Times of India adds : "...even though Pakistan has a small and articulate anti-war lobby for the first time, the large section of opinion in the country remain unreconciled to peace. They have learnt nothing from the recent debacle and cling tenaciously to old myths..." "Mr. Bhutto himself is giving the revisionist a helping hand by his declarations that Pakistan has not been defeated : it has been only the victim of conspiracy." Times of India.
- (g) Urdu Digest has stated. "...that a senior officer from the Army Headquarters carrying important operational information was kept cooling his heels for two hours at the President's House because both General Yahya as well as his C-in-C General Abdul Hamid were busy watching..."
- (h) Major General (Rtd) Sarfaraz Khan argues that "...General Yahya was reconciled to the loss of East Pakistan because his American agents had sown doubts in his mind about the viability of a unified Pakistan. These agents painted a rosy picture envisaging the conversion of CENTO into a political confederation...Yayha is of Iranian origin...Ties with Iran seem more natural to him than those with East Pakistan..." Urdu Digest Pakistan.

### The war that won't go away ?

- (i) ...It is convinced that US Government backed Sh. Mujib's idea of a loose confederation in the hope of annexing East Pakistan to the American sphere of influence. It was only later that US administration realised...that the Awami League had been infiltrated by pro-Soviet elements but it was too late by then..." Times of India.
- (j) Times of India also states : "A senior retired military leader (sic) told me...It was absolute madness to start the war in the West. You were dealing with fools or knaves..." This paper quotes Maj. Gen. (Rtd) as saying... "bells of the third round ringing..." According to Burk : "if we want peace, we had better prepare for war. If Hindus want settle centuries scores, he adds, "then we too have quite a few to scores and we must prepare accordingly..."

We now reproduce only few views by some war veterans of Pakistan Army on 1971 Indo-Pak War as it appeared in Urdu Digest April 1972.

Lieutenant Gen. Bakhtiar Rana stated :

"...the fundamental reasons for debacle are poor political policy and defective strategic planning by the Revolutionary Government. We should not have fought war in East Pakistan under such adverse political situation and most difficult terrain. We had made no military preparation to counter the huge military build up of India. General Yahya promoted his favou-

rits—though inefficient and inexperienced, hence our generalship was poor...” “...As regards our diversionary attack in West Pakistan, the Pakistan General Staff of three armed services was lethargic and in quandary. The counter attack along the Western Wing was delivered as a half hearted measure and too late. Pakistan Defence Ministry should not have overlooked strengthening the border defences of Kashmir especially since the Kashmir issue was very much alive and unsettled...”

Major Generals (Retired) Sarfaraz Khan, Abrar Hussain and Brigadiers Gulzar Ahmed, Ata Mohd, Amjad Ali Choudhri, support this above mentioned contention. These officers add that:“...we could have fought a protracted war in East Pakistan, had we not dispersed our forces all over the country...”They are also against signing ‘*no war pact*’ or ‘*confederation*’ with Bharat.

#### **Rangrut's Comments**

No military writer can fail to criticise if he is to get at the truth. He must start with analysis and then by discussion of facts and motives that he may have discovered, pass on criticism. From that point he is to suggest a better way of doing things, both in the present and ‘*eyes on the future*’.

How little real critical study we Pakistanis soldiers and civilians made of the possibility of fighting a war of wanton covert aggression by India in East Pakistan? We were frequently warned but our leaders were lethargic and inward looking ‘*It could never happen*’—they said. Yet we were rushed into a situation under a pre-conceived Bharati plan. Have we escaped destruction?

Before I try to draw lessons of the 1971 Indo-Pak war, it

is considered to draw the attention of the readers to some factors which were overlooked, such as:

- (i) "War may be science or an art, but its reporting is a dodge".
- (ii) "What is war but cunning, deception, delusion..."  
Hitler.
- (iii) "...but military supreme authorities, like other human being are fallible". Aston.
- (iv) "The man is the first weapon in battle. Let us then study the soldiers and his needs in battle, for it is he who brings reality to it. Only study of the past can give us a sense of reality and show how the soldiers will fight in the future. Every people is the child of its history, its past and it can no more break away from it than a man can separate himself from his youth..."
- (v) War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other means. And again the war in the highest point of view is policy, but no doubt a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes.
- (vi) There is a saying that '*power corrupts, and absolute power (under Martial Law corrupts absolutely,*' Let us not allow ourselves to be ruled by any regime, or person who holds absolute power.
- (vii) True, nations prepare for war with the firm intention

of never declaring one's arms purchases and other military preparations, are simply moves in a game of chess in which frontal checking attacks are rarer still. Yet there are many other ways other than official intelligence service to judge the measure of aggressive measures which had been and are being taken by one's enemy or enemies. '*Know thyself and know thy enemy*', said the Holy Prophet.

The outstanding factors about the invasion of East Pakistan by Bharati forces were to follow Mr. Nehru's policy in '*Discovery of India*' that: "India will inevitably exercise an important (military, air, naval) influence in the region". Sardar Patel had expressed his policy about East Pakistan more clearly even pre-partition. Bharati Government plan of invasion was a good copy of Hitler's invasion plan of Europe, as :

- (i) Its great similarity was with Hitler's blitzkrieg during conquest of France in 1940, in its being ;
- (ii) the invasion was so sudden, so overwhelming that Pakistani troops did not understand what was happening. Similarly, the main attack was preceded by '*fifth columnists*,' infiltrators, overt and covert propaganda through press, Radio, etc.
- (iii) This became possible because, while Bharati High Command had been zealously making preparations since 1947 in expansion, training, re-organising and in making Bharati armed forces self-sufficient in manufacturing most modern weaponry, aircraft, tanks, guns, logistics on land, sea and air ; Pakistan

was absolved in wishful thinking—although embargo on weaponry had been imposed on both countries by U.S.A., Britain and France since 1963.

- (iv) If generals do not know their men, they deliver the nation to the enemy ; if the men do not know their generals, they deliver generals to the enemy.
- (v) Unfortunately, Pakistan High Command was still thinking like the British Generals that : *'they would not allow the tail (logistics) to wag the dog'*. Whatever little progress that was made up to 1963 due to signing Pacts, Cento, Seato, was made in sharpening only the teeth. Hence the progress—if it can be called as such, was therefore unbalanced. Pak Armed Forces on both fronts were inferior to their enemies in weaponry air cover, naval support, fire-power, mobility and logistics—*'a starving army is actually worse than none.'* Wellington.

Finally : "Do people reckon that they will be left alone because they say: *'We believe. And will not be put to test'*? And O ye who believe. Take your precautions" the Quran (29 : 27, 4 : 71) "No nation can ever renounce the struggle for the cause of God (Jihad) without suffering ignomy and humiliation dispensed to them". Caliph Abu Bakr.

We shall notice how Bharati and Pakistani leaders reacted towards above mentioned guide lines.

x            x            x            x

### Indians' Plan for Winter Operations—1971

#### Face Lifting of Mukti Bahini—A dramatic change in her role

The Mukti Bahini had been severely moulded by Pakis-

tani troops under General Tikka Khan on March 25. Moreover, great panic created by Indian fifth columnists and guerrillas which caused very large scale exodus to India of local population as well as Awami League leaders, though started under a pre-conceived Bharati Operational plan, took the form of panic. Due to this surprising set back which caused exodus of refugees of such magnitude that it went even beyond the imagination of Bharati Government. The exodus of people also took Eastern Command (Indian army) by complete surprise. Hence time was needed by General Arora to let situation return to normal. That was the time when Pakistan High Command should have pressed hard on the heels of the enemy, but like Hitler, who missed the bus at Dunkirk in 1940, Pakistan Military Command repeated the same blunder in April 1971 in East Pakistan, and allowed its enemy respite.

It should be noted that originally Mukti Bahini were to form the spearhead of Bharati wanton aggression planned on a very large scale and on a very broad front. But due to heavy casualties suffered by Mukti Bahini and panic created by exodus among the public it became very essential for Bharati High Command that :

- (a) The Mukti Bahinis should now be used as '*an auxiliary force and NOT as spearhead*'.
- (b) To restore the morale of Mukti Bahini by collecting it in a safe place well away from Indo-Pak border conflicts. They were to be re-grouped, expanded and re-equipped and trained in these sanctuaries before being employed in operational role. It was decided that regular Indian soldiers would

be used as '*props or advisers*' amongst Mukti Bahini to boost up their morale.

- (c) The above actions needed time until new Mukti Bahini set up was operationally fit for the allotted tasks, such as, an auxiliary force, to carry messages, fifth column work. Wishful thinking about the efficiency and bravery or determination of this political army was now discarded. Their value was only for political purpose—'*a cover for invasion and to support humanitarian cause*'.
- (d) The terrain in East Pakistan is not normally dry till mid-November after the monsoon rains for mechanized mobile operations, i.e., until mid-November. Hence Bharati G.H.Q. planned to launch the offensive by first week of December 1971. There was the added advantage in this choice of time in December, as at that time all mountain passes along the Indo-Chinese border would be snow-bound, so there would be the least likelihood of Chinese attack on large scale or intention of it as a threat on Indian border in support of Pakistani forces till spring 1972 at the earliest.
- (e) Again time was desperately needed by Bharat for putting anti-Pakistan propaganda on international scale—a most dangerous weapon—to win moral and material aid from other nations—for the influx of refugees into Bharat. India needed money to purchase sophisticated most modern weaponry for her

britzkriege war—the Lightning war to pay Russian and other foreign countries. Hence she insisted aid offered by other nations, such as, U.S.A., Britain, Canada in cash as she desired to buy need for the refugees from Bharati sources. In fact, when Bharat passed the U.S.A. dollars meant for aid, to Soviet Union to pay for weaponry, it caused the rift between India and U.S.A. In any case both Bharat and Soviets were one up against U.S.A.

These are only few out of many items on which Bharati planners for war doggedly worked to ensure a victory in their Lightning war.

#### **Planning of Pakistan General Headquarters**

However, when we analyse how time factor—which Rangrut considers a godsend—due to panic among the Awami League and the Indian Eastern Command area, was misused if not thrown away into the winds by Pakistan Defence Ministry and General Headquarters. I (Rangrut) constrainedly remark not for criticism's sake only—being wise after the event—but as a food for thought and as a corrective, as we are not out of the wood as yet.

It is not clear what we were planning! Was the planning designed as anti-guerilla? Was it an internal security measure? Was it a plan to meet a combined threat from Mukti Bahini and Indian Army coalition? If so, what measures we took to meet various forms of challenges?

What is well-known that in East Pakistan, Pakistan General

Headquarters took some defensive measures after a '*State of Emergency*' was declared at the eleventh hour in 1971, i.e. :

- (a) The strength of the Pakistan Army was increased to three-four weak infantry divisions. However, even this military force was understrength in man-power. It lacked fire support either from artillery, tanks or air. The logistics of the Pak Eastern Command was very poor. Intercommunication, which was already a weak spot, become worse during the monsoon and due to damage caused by fifth columnists.

#### **Para-Military Forces**

- (b) Recruitment for a Mujahid force was rushed after the catastrophe. It was late in the day. The training, re-grouping of various types of para-military forces and equipping them was still far from satisfactory when axe of Indian aggression fell.
- (c) It became apparent that Pak Defence Ministry had not learnt a lesson for war in Kashmir in 1947-48 by rushing in tribal lashkars and C.A.F.; who were alien to terrain of the country, local language, customs and culture of the people they had been sent as reinforcement. Instead being a source of strength they therefore, created awkward political problems as well as military situation.

The Intelligence Department, both civil and military, it is obvious, very poorly served the nation. If we give them the

credit that Defence Department was duly warned as regard general re-grouping of various Indian Military commands; re-grouping, expansion and training of Mukti Bahini, and the re-composition and the command structure of the Indian Eastern Command, then one is constrained to remark that Pak Strategists were lethargic and incompetent, as defensive measures to meet challenges and threats of aggression to either wing were inadequate and poor.

As regards our foreign relations with big powers, one is in quandry. Which big power was our friend? Whom could we call for aid in weaponry, like Russia and Britain for India? U.S.A., Britain and France had already placed an Embargo on Pakistan since 1963. Pakistan's relations with Russia since U-2 incident had been strained. It is a sad commentary that Pakistan Government did not, even in 1971, put her case clearly to China, who might have helped, had we approached him for it? One is left in quandry also as regards policy, diplomacy and strategy of the Pakistan Government! The purge of war veteran officers had gone unabated since 1949. The new promotions now and onwards had been based on political affiliation rather on professional, mental and physical efficiency, of officers in higher ranks. In a span of 60 years' study of military affairs, I (Rang-rut) had never seen physically unfit officers (categories 'B' and 'C') being posted and promoted in command of troops or on staff, even during worst crisis of officer shortage during First or Second World Wars. While Pak General Headquarters fondly nursed political and party politicals and sacrificed efficiency. Meanwhile Bharati Army was growing from strength to strength. For twenty years we had been unsuccessful to get heavy industry installed in Pakistan, especially steel industry which is a

pre-requisite for becoming self-sufficient in modern weaponry, agriculture and logistics. Admitted we have so far not been blessed with high class coal and iron mines. But it cannot act as an excuse, because there are many countries who are not blessed with mineral wealth, and Japan is one of them, who imports iron and other raw material and yet she acts as an arsenal even to the United States. What was the advantage of being a member of Cento or Seato, if we could not get aid when we were in desperate need of it? Did we join these pacts on sufferance only? Heart searching is essential for our future guidance and action.

**“Afala Tatafakkaroon”** (i.e. why don't you reflect). The Quran.

Pakistan emerged as defender of Islamic Ideology, as a Muslim Republic, yet we ignored the Quranic injunctions about Jihad—*‘to do good whenever possible, to eradicate evil wherever found’* and, “Warfare is prescribed for you, though it be not to your liking...” (2:216). Lastly “Allah changeth not the condition of a nation (folk) until they (first) change that which is in their hearts” (13:2)

### **The aftermath**

Lest we forget, it is a principle of war that, the objects for which the war was undertaken, whether they include the conquest and subjugation of the enemy, or to guard against the dismemberment of our own country through secessionist Movement, or the attainment of guarantees for political security, or are merely to enforce acquiescence in certain demands, or in international obligations, or are defensive and aim at the con-

servation of territory, are gained by bringing the pressure of public opinion to bear on the Government of the enemy's country. This is best effected through the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, and if necessary, by the imminent chance of ruin to the resources on them, and in addition, by the occupation of the territory which is being used as base of operation by the enemy. Let us not forget that Pakistan had imposed restriction on trade and their use of Indian water transport from India through East Pakistan rivers to the sea.

Then there were consideration, which one has to bear in mind as regards Pakistan's future relations with India, Russia, U.K., Mr. Mujib-ur-Rehman, China and U.S.A, as well as, the SEATO and CENTO countries. Although direct diplomatic relations may have, or have not been broken; public opinion is not bound of frontiers made by our guns. Our newspapers reach enemy countries and we study enemy Journals and hear radio. Every official remark, even though uttered in confidential whisper, reaches our enemies in some form or the other, or goes as an echo.

It is, therefore, one of our most important duties, as a soldier, or as a civilian, to study the psychology of our enemies, to follow their intrigues and the changing currents of public opinion so that *'our hands may not be proffered when the spirit of our enemies is hard and unbending'* but also so that a sharp word may not be said when the ice on the other side is melting and conciliatory feeling is beginning to be shown. The Holy Prophet enjoined Muslims : *'Know thyself and know thy enemy.'*

Co-ordination of war-like and political measures and careful

regard as to the consequences that may result from either, are at least as necessary in time of war as they are during peace. A Government, therefore, should be on its guard against taking steps which, although harmful to the enemy, may indirectly strengthen his hands.

The purpose of strategy in peace is so to prepare that should war take place, it may be waged with every prospect of success. From it follows that so far as logistics will permit, the largest possible force should be collected in the area where it can most conveniently be used to inflict the greatest harm to the enemy. In war the primary aim of military strategy are to allot and dispose of the forces so that the victory in battle will be probable, and if gained will be decisive.

It follows then, that it is usually wise to seize the opportunity offered by a substantial military advantage to try to end hostilities on terms which will secure that principal object for which the struggle '*was commenced*' since apart from considerations of humanity, of expense, and of commercial losses, there is always a possibility until peace is made, that the advantage position is reversed.

### **Battle of Wits**

As the saying goes, at the end of war '*to the victor, goes the spoils*'. However, in 1971 war it is not clear who was ultimately the Victor—Mr. Mujib—or Britain—or Bharat—or Russia? Mr. Mujib got the chaos. Britain lost an old friend—Muslims of Pakistan, who had stood by him more than once when her back was against the wall. Bharat received vain-glory for a stab in

in the back of Pakistan, while spoils at Chittagong-Khulna ports and trade went to Soviet. The Soviets, it seems, have collected the cream—a foothold in the Bay of Bengal which places Bharat's navy on a subsidiary role of a powerful naval power even in her own home waters—the Bay of Bengal. It has dashed to the ground Bharat's dream of becoming a super naval power in the Indian Ocean. Soviet has, once again, stolen a march on the Western bloc countries as well as on Bharat and Japan, who aspired to succeed Britain and U.S.A. in the near future in the pacific and Indian oceans. History will be the judge when it eventually, with the passage of them, declares who was the winner!

Finally it matter little which British political party (Tory, Labour, Liberal) is in power in the White Hall, the above mentioned policy recounted by Mr. Churchill 1940 still remains and will remain paramount. It is, therefore, imperative that the leaders of Pakistan while formulating any policy for the security of Pakistan, should bear it in mind.

- (a) the above stated British Policy to counter any future move from White Hall leaders;
- (b) bear in mind also the anti-Pakistan instructions given to F.M. Lord Wavell and Lord Mountbatten by the leaders of Tory and Labour at the time of the partition of India. Because the Revolutionary Government omitted to pay heed to it, we were '*surprised*' and therefore met '*the debacle*'.

Let us face facts that the policy of confrontation was a

pre-conceived one. It was forced on us by the Indian Government because we were not ready to face armed intervention. India knew it. No strategic or tactical planning was ever seriously undertaken or implemented by the Ministry of Defence of Pakistan to defend an invasion, though it had been stated often that the defence of East Wing lay in West Wing. Militarily, defence plan was neither conceived nor pursued in terms of any planning, while Bharat had repeatedly declared that she had never accepted either the partition of India or the cease-fire line of 1949 in Kashmir—which naturally was a pointer that present Indo Pak borders would be changed. Strategically and physically no country can be defended unless the local population are prepared to fight alongside with the government forces. Hostility of Britain, Mukti Bahini and various Bangla political militant groups sponsored and supported by Awami League and financed by Bharat and other foreign powers were not seriously taken into consideration by Pak High Command. It has now been changed in Kashmir. See Map No. 4.

### **A Decisive Victory**

In spite of it all, it is considered, that the defeat of Pakistan Armed Forces either in East Pakistan, or in West Pakistan *'cannot be considered decisive'*.

It should be noted that Pak forces in East Pakistan were isolated from the public and were in hostile surrounding, because neither the Central Government nor the East Pakistan Government had carried out ideological war against anti-Pakistani elements on right lines for the last 25 years. Again Pak forces were neither sufficient in numbers nor properly equipped

and organised to meet a full fledged Indian aggression. Nearly a year or more of bitter war of nerves under '*Internal security*' measures day and night without rest or relief in hot damp climate had sapped the fighting ability and spirit of Pak forces who had been magnificently carrying out their duties under very adverse condition.

Inspite of the fact, that East Pakistan forces' morale and physical stamina had been seriously effected—they gave a tough fight. '*A fact*' which has been officially acknowledged by Bharati Defence Department. They displayed no panic and their surrender was more due to the fact that they were ordered to do so. Inspite of the fact that Pakistan forces who had been deployed for internal security duties since 1970, they gave such a good account of themselves is all the more creditable. And inspite of the fact that Pak forces were '*without air cover. inadequate fire power and served with poor logistics*' goes far to prove that had the Pak forces in the Eastern Wing been regrouped, re-organised, re-equipped adequately to meet new tactical situation as created by the Indian invasion, the story of the war in East Pakistan '*would have been different*'. It would have been a stable protracted and prolonged war. The possibility of blitzkriege would have proved most costly like a War in China or Vietnam. But Pak High Command threw away a most valuable opportunity to teach a lesson to the enemy. It was a Himalayan strategical and tactical blunder committed by Pak High Command. As regards Western Wing front the tale is most sad and most pathetic. It is a comedy of errors and blunders one after the other.

Pak High Command started war in the Western Wing

evidently based on an antique plan of 1965 which since then had never been revised. It seems they hoped by this bluff, they would be able to achieve a cease-fire. However, it is not clear why G.H.Q. ordered a passive role to the troops who could have struck deeper in the enemy's territory which if nothing else, would have forced the enemy to fight a protracted war, on their own territory which Bharat dreaded, because of internal disorders caused by panic and loss of morale and possible intervention by China as it happened in 1965. It would have also given a breathing time to the nations of the world to fathom the cause and possible far-reaching effects of Indian aggression. As already stated Pak Government never properly explained the world the real reasons for India's aggression.

Had India been in position to inflict a death blow to the Pak forces on the Western front, they would have most certainly done so as '*coup de grace*'. The re-grouping plan of the Indian Army on the Western front clearly indicated that she desired to achieve a limited objective on this front and '*Not coup de main*'. She had no intention to fight a protracted war against a nation who was determined to fight to the last. Pak Army in this case would have fought with the zeal and determination not only to save their honour but also their kith and kins and their hearth and home.

The stark truth is that Bharat was well posted and forewarned by its intelligence section and Bengali deserters, so she had very correctly summed up the military situation which would develop if the war was prolonged on this front. This is creditable on the part of our enemy who decided to face the facts. She decided neither to depend on '*gamble*' nor on '*wishful thinking*'. It is admitted that Bharati forces have at present

occupied large chunks of territory in Azad Kashmir, Sind and on Shakargarh area, because :

(a) On Sind front Pak troops had penetrated deep in Bikaner area under, it seems, no co-ordinated strategic plan. No wonder they lost not only the battle but were also forced to retreat in haste and disorder because :

(i) these troops had no air support—while Indian Air Force had strong force of bombers, fighters and heavy artillery. Apparently it was a plunge in the dark—free for all ;

(ii) Pak troops had neither proper artillery fire support, nor tank force of right type or size to stem the enemy's counter attack ;

(iii) their logistics and intercommunication was indeed very poor. The Pak policy of '*rob Peter to pay Paul*' proved fatal.

All forces in the Western Wing had been '*milked*' to increase East Pakistan forces from a weak division and a weak brigade to about four weak divisions.

(b) As regards Shakargarh front, it was not adequately defended. Pak armoured divisions could have played a major role, if not a decisive one in stabilizing the situation on this front, but they were never allowed to leave their peace stations. Why ? Reserve

infantry troops were not available ? Due to lack of foresight or poor planning ?

Rangrüt does not agree with the argument that India's balance of power was so great that it could have forced a military decision even on this front. As already stated, '*that Bharati forces would have done it, had they considered it feasible or possible*'. The Bharatis had correctly summed that on this front too, that Pak armed forces would be fighting on interior lines and with good lines of communications. Moreover, if war became protracted then in addition to China, there was possibility of some other neighbouring nations who would come to Pakistan's aid not only morally but also materially. It hardly needs much stretch of imagination that a serious threat to the security of Western Wing would have directly threatened their security. The military defeat we have received, is being admitted, and it is regrettable, but not by any military standard it can be called a decisive victory of great military significance. '*We can and will defend*' West Pakistan against any aggression. It can be done, as it has been done by those nations who had the will to sacrifice everything to safeguard their independence and honour.

#### Examples :

Let us seek guidance from history of Second World War. Nazi Germany overran Norway, low countries and France. They pushed back the Soviets from their borders up to the coast of Black Sea. Hitler succeeded in establishing a quisling regime in France. Germany erected the Atlantic wall. Many Pundits of military affairs declared all was over and Nazi regime had been firmly established !

But General DeGuale raised the flag of Liberation Movement in exile in U.K. Rangrut was in Britain and witnessed various events at very close quarters. He heard remarks pro and against Liberation Movement. In fact, under orders from War Office London he disarmed at Glasgow a French Battalion. But it was not long before the Atlantic Wall met the same fate as that of Maginote Line. Eventually the whole of Europe and Africa was freed. Gualist party is in power even today (1972). Germany has not only lost all countries she occupied but she herself is divided into East and West Germany. There is NATO '*Occupation force*' on her soil.

Let us visit China in 1945. Japan, who had overrun the mainland of China had established a puppet government. Liberation Movement which had been fighting an uphill war against foreign occupation powers since 1927. This was due to the fact that Chinese Liberation fighters had to fight on many fronts since the Second World War. For example, there were occupation forces of various nations of the Axis power, as well as of the Western bloc powers, who were trying to parcel out China into various spheres of influence. When Japanese surrendered in 1945; U.S.A. became the chief contender for sphere of influence in China. Britain, though a member of the victorious nations, lost all interests for the moment in China as she had no desire to remain a world Naval power, as she had become economically and industrially very weak. She decided to put her own house in order, the soonest possible. France was in deep trouble. She had to rebuild her own badly torn country. Her colonies had rebelled. She was not at present much interested in China. She decided to retrieve her African Colonies and the Indo-China Colonies. Soviet was not in a position to challenge U.S.A. militarily. However, she could not let U.S.A.

have a free run in China and in the Pacific Ocean. She was most anxious to steal secrets of atom bomb by hunting with the hounds—U.S. and her allies and also run with the hare, i.e. Mao's forces.

She encouraged and secretly helped materially Chairman Mao-Tse-Tung, the leader of Communist party in China on one hand, and outwardly helped Marshal Chiang Kai Shek who had been propped up by U.S.A. This policy enabled him to sit on the fence and also remain well posted about events.

The battle between Marshal Chiang and U.S.A. versus Chairman Mao came in the open in 1946. In 1949 Chairman Mao's forces were successful. They drove out Chiang's forces out of Chinese mainland. However, Soviets swooped down and occupied a big portion of northern China, such as Manchuria and area along River Amu and Outer Mongolia and a part of Sinkiang Province. This has been the bone of contention between Soviet and China since 1949.

It will be seen, therefore, as long as a nation on the whole is not beaten and is prepared to fight for her right there is no '*decisive victory*' or '*decisive defeat*'. West Pakistanis have not been decisively beaten. They have the '*will to remain a free nation*'—cost what it may. Rangrut repeats that we are not a defeated nation as alleged by Bharati Government, Bharati press and psywar media.

However, the Quran does not support the policy of chauvinism against any nation, especially India, which is our neighbour. The Quran lays down the following rules :

- (i) "Fight in the cause of Allah against those who fight against you but transgress not...persecution is severer than fighting" (2 : 190, 191).
- (ii) "Hold fast all of you together...Take not for intimates those who are not your own...Lose not heart nor despair, for you are bound to overcome them *'if you are believers'...*" (3 : 103, 118). "Make preparations against them to your utmost...and thereby strike terror into enemy...O Prophet! Urge the believers to fight. If there be twenty persevering one among you, they shall overcome two hundred ...for the present Allah has set you a lighter task...*'If they incline to peace thou should also incline to it'...*".

1971 War also depicts how Western mind reacts or works when pressed hard by a friend or a signatory of a Pact for aid or even for fair play or justice. Let us not forget the Western ideology state : "All is fair in love and War", yet the Islamic ideology enjoins the Muslims : "Nothing but fairness in love and war." It should act as a guideline when we deal with non-Muslims in the fields of strategy, national security. economic and before signing any agreement or a Defence Pact. Lastly, keep your fears to yourself. Do not treat your clubs or offices as sanctuaries. The enemy invariably employs peons, domestic servants, bearers and motor drivers even fair sex as agents who collect information for their Intelligence Section. We lost battles in 1971 as we were careless and could hold no secrets even from our enemies !

## CHAPTER XV

### EPILOGUE

#### Historical background of how it Happened.

“Who follows My guidance shall neither go astray nor be wrecked. But he who turns away from My reminder verily, for him shall be a straitened livelihood” Quran  
(XX - 123, 124).

To understand the rot in East Pakistan, it is necessary to recall the past as well as recent events and place in historical perspective.

During the past 25 years or so, Pakistan has experienced U.S. Administration's attitude towards her of both powerful parties—the Republicans and the Democrats. It was during Republican Administration (Eisenhower) that Pakistan entered the zone of alliance with U.S.A. During the period Pakistan as an ally was neither lionised, nor enlogised, but it was not slighted, under-rated, or treated at par with a country which was netural or non-aligned. Thus there was a mature understanding of the position of an ally—even though a small one in the framework of alliance in the formulation of the foreign policy of U.S. versus Pakistan.

However, with the advent of the Democratic Party to power in 1960, there appeared new shifts of the U.S. foreign policy in their pinophobia and *'the planned containment of Chairman Mao's China'*. Lynden B. Johnson as Vice-President said to Mr. Nehru in 1961—i.e. to reiterate Mr. Kennedy's offer to Mr. Nehru, *'assume the leadership of Asia'*. U.S. thus failed to distinguish between the allies and neutrals. American policy between 1960 and 1968 was uncertain, unreliable and unrealistic towards Pakistan but U.S. fell a prey to threats, blackmail and the like of Bharat whom she supplied with enormous quantities of most modern weaponry, logistics, material, food and money. India was, therefore, able to build a modern army more than double its size in 1960. After the Indian debacle in 1962, against Chinese, U.S. poured in more material and monetary aid than ever before at a very great speed to complete the *'Containment policy'*,

Another most sad episode was when during entire 1965 Wanton covert aggression by Bharat on Pakistan the entire sympathies visible and covert, before, during and after the war, were on side of Bharat. Because Mr. Johnson's regime accused Pakistan of pursuing the policy of *'bilateralism'*. The most unkind cut was inflicted on Pakistan by forcing embargo on the sale of arms on her, and drastic and crippling pressure from the consortium countries under cryptic directives of Mr. L. B. Johnson. This further struck severe damaging blows to the war afflicted economy of Pakistan. Yet India's total military procurements after 1965—not a period of increasing tension with China—was more than four times when Pakistan's main source of supply of arms was dried up for six years since 1965.

Mr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant of President Nixon remarked on 8th December, 1971, that "...if we had not cut the sale of arms to Pakistan, the current problem did not exist..." Mr. Packard, Under Secretary Defence Department agreed with him. This is how an ally had upset the power balance. So it will not be incorrect to assume that even the dismemberment of Pakistan would not have been possible, had there been more sincere relationship between the U.S. Administration and Pakistan. Long before the commencement of war our hands had been tied behind our backs.

The policy adopted by Mr. Johnson to send Pakistan into the political and economic, wilderness and military oblivion had not ceased until the Nixon Administration started appreciating the strategic importance through her various agencies, such as, ideological similarity and political alliance of Pakistan, Ford Foundation in 1971—*'but it proved too late'* the irreparable damage had already been done.

x            x            x            x

## I

### **While Memory Lasts**

As I sat to write my views as a contemporary witness on the situation in East Pakistan. I heard the most unwelcome news about the surrender in East Pakistan of Pakistan Armed forces, more through treachery than defeat on the battle field. It would have been a siege warfare, or a fight to the last, i.e. a protracted battle whose ultimate fate was well-known and

not difficult to predict, yet it could have added another golden chapter in the history of Pakistan. Did General Yahya order General A. K. Niazi to fight his war as counter guerilla war, or a conventional war against the Indian Army ?

We will know only when veil of official secrecy has been lifted. If the siege of Calais in Second World War in France was to gain time for the Allied defeated armies to enable them to make their escape good from Dunkirk, did General Niazi's hope in defending Dacca lay in securing aid from the Security Council or the U.S.A. or the U. N. General Assembly ? But the U. N. and U.S.A. failed miserably to achieve any tangible results in Indo-Pak conflict. Once again the U. N. Security Council and U. N. General Assembly lay prostrate in front of the World Super Powers, who invariably '*look inwards*' in matters of maintaining world peace. Justice, equity and fair play were ignored for national greed when '*fair becomes foul and foul becomes fair*'. U.S.A. sat on the fence till Russian-Indo forces had annihilated Pakistani forces.

It is unfair to lay the blame at the doorsteps of the Government of Pakistan alone because it is considered that the leaders of various political parties and every Pakistani is in it. '*What touches all is the concern of all*'. It is a fact that soon after the demise of Quaid-i-Azam we, as a nation, paid no heed especially to those warnings, the father of nation gave repeatedly to us about '*unity, faith and discipline*'. We began to look inwards, such as, provincialism, nay, tribalism ; in language and even the Islamic ideology, i.e., '*the believers are brothers*' (Quran 49 : 10), was very sadly overlooked.

Secondly, though we had achieved our goal of Pakistan

after many sacrifices, but we soon forgot the injunctions of the Quran (29 : 2-6) and also we omitted to take necessary precautions against us carried out by our enemies in cultural, ideological and preparations in war (4 : 71, 72, 73, 74). We built big and luxurious houses, rode big cars—in fact, we lived a life of luxury while our enemies used most of their energies in living a simple and thrifty life in order to make Bharati Armed Forces strongest in the sub-continent.

Even the Prime Minister of India rode a small Indian manufactured car and lived a life in austerity. In short, what Prophet Moses told his followers—'*But Jeshurum, thou hast waxed fat, thou hast grown big, and thou hast forsaken that made thee*'—is too true in the case of industrialists, Pakistani Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals, civil servants and political leaders. There has been—and is—an affection among certain class in Pakistan that the loss of our Eastern Wing—possessions acquired with great expenditure of life and sufferings and money, would be the cause of no serious or lasting injury to Pakistan or one wing or the other. The people, who say it, are of a stamp not generally accustomed to carry any argument to a logical conclusion ; yet it is not very difficult to comprehend the consequences which insult and spoliation unchecked would bring upon their victim, nor is it hard to imagine that when a '*man's limbs are lopped off*', the subsequent process of cutting his throat or bleeding him to death becomes greatly simplified. It seems obvious that they had forgotten to compare the life of pre-partition of India day to that of post-partition. Now Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman has declared that Bangladesh has severed all connections with Pakistan. Time alone will depict how wise is his step !

## Nationalization and Nationalism

The greatest danger to West Pakistan, however, is not nationalization or socialism, but nationalism, which has already delivered a very heavy blow on the solidarity of Pakistan—the Bangladesh cult—may now be inducted or fanned by our enemies as Baluchistan, Pathanistan, Sind and the Punjab as separate identities. To eradicate this evil is the greatest need of the day! They have already lopped off one of our Wings. What next?

“Hold fast by the covenant of Allah all together and be not disunited—and be not like those who became divided and disagreed after clear arguments had come to them” (Quran : 3, 102, 104).

## II

“Afala Tatafaqaroon”? (Why don't you reflect?) The Quran says

The study of a conflict and its causes must revolve around the study of the executive organization which manages and directs the nation in the conflict. The thinking of Pakistan High command—that is, the command's point of view, focuses the aim, the resources and the plan of employment. Command sees politics, strategy in relation to tactical and logistic capabilities based on economy; unless this is done, lessons cannot be learned and rectified. Such a criticism is the privilege of a contemporary writer, unpleasant though at time it is.

### In Execution of the wisest strategy mistakes are inevitable

A fencing master first teaches the pupil the thrust and the parry, a military critic (Rangrut) points out first a mistake committed by one participant and then a mistake by the other. If there is a parry for every thrust—what is the value of thrust ?

*'A bewildered reader'* may question the value of hearing mistakes that the various leaders committed, many of which simply neutralized similar errors of an enemy ? Many civilian critics have condemned the military leaders on both sides as equally sterile and stupid. They forget that generals being human beings are not infallible. Brilliant or bloodless victories are not won except over relatively inferior leaders, or troops or against inferior numbers. There was little to choose between the military abilities of the High Command of the Indian or Pakistan High Command. But the difference in their chieftains. While Bharati civilian leadership was alert and active, the leaders of the Revolutionary Government and its aids were lethargic and wishful. Surveyed from another viewpoint, the extraordinary efforts made by Bharati Government in psywar, in mobilizing her manpower and planning ahead made her very formidable. Pakistan missed the bus.

Again Bharat's loyalty to their cause to dismember Pakistan was so great that the margin for victory for Pakistan was indeed small especially when Pakistani military leadership on top was lethargic, unstable and wishful. Thus at all times, readers who really seek to understand the 1971 war, must also remember its reciprocal nature—*'to every thrust there is*

*parry, to every weapon a defence, to every attack a counter attack*'. The best leader is one who makes fewest mistakes. Eventually there comes a time when human endurance in the mass fails. Leader can longer inspire their men, terms must be sought and a final decision accepted.

The casual reader learning of many mistakes is apt to conclude that military leaders are '*stupid*' and the decision reached dull chance, whereas there have actually been comparatively few mistakes made and result has come from a wearing down process that has tested every soldier and civilian involved. And this perhaps is the obscure but real purpose of war. For example, psywar, long spells on battlefield, poor man-management.

There is no doubt that we had to surrender in East Pakistan, more due to queer attitude adopted by the Revolutionary High Command who were conducting operations than other factors.

But such events have taken place and will take place, unless and until the national leaders and the nation understands and acts on the advice of the world's greatest military genius, the Holy Prophet who advised: '*Know thyself and know thy enemy*'.

Bharat won the battle in 1971 because Mrs. Indira Gandhi fully appreciated that only dogged determination to follow the ideology of her father for Akhand Bharat was vital to achieve her goal. She kept her sword sharp. She being a student of

Islamic history, followed the ideology, i.e., *'Know thyself and know thy enemy'*

Intelligence about the enemy, through one's agents, the press and the people of the operational area, is the basis of all ideas, orders and action in war. This was very faulty in Pakistan High Command. *'If we always knew the enemy's intentions before hand, we should always—even with inferior forces—be superior to him,'* was constantly stressed by the Holy Prophet through his preachings and he demonstrated it in practice. Military history of Rashideen period is replete with illustrations of this principle of the Islamic Pattern-of-War.

A plan of campaign is not on sound foundation *'unless'* it is based on most reliable information about the enemy which must reach the commander in time, i.e., before he formulates his plan of action and executes it.

### **Information**

Information in regard to enemy's intentions, his actual strength, dispositions and movements and also about his fighting quality and moral of his troops is of equal importance. This principle was not followed by the Pakistan High Command, for example, it seems, that Pakistan Navy was unaware that Indian Navy had been armed by the Russian missiles. Again Pakistan Army suffered heavy losses by fire from Russian long range heavy guns and from Russian tanks which had been equipped with surface missiles.

During 1970-71 crisis Pakistan lost heavily in the field of communication. But no open study of the problem was under-

taken. In Pakistan the information officers have, over the years, become directors of information. They no longer treated the press as their parish. Outside Pakistan, even across the border, research in great depth is being done in the field of communication—*'telling the world'*. Printed and spoken words are not effective by themselves. It is through discussions and medium of reference thinkers, or opinion leaders, both civil and military that information becomes effective.

### **The Guerilla Warfare**

Success or failure depends upon the assessment of enemy actions correctly, this is necessary to approach to battle as much as on using the proper method of fighting in given theatre of war. Lack of training only makes failure worse, it became evident as war progressed. Guerillas are *'symptom of dissatisfaction of people'* against the rulers rather than cause. They emphasize that political, economic, social and ideological problems must be attended to by the government. Lasting success requires a viable political settlement, and even tactical operational successes over a period of time demands the proper political and ideological framework for the effective military action. Pakistan Military High Command slept over it for nearly two decades and awoke only to find herself very late if not too late. The moral dilemma attending the employment of force has become more complicated in era of mechanization. The curious Indian logic, i.e., to help a weak neighbour which justified covert aggression by the Indian Army equipped and trained by most modern Russian weaponry and led by a Zionist general (Jacob) against Pakistan, illustrates what properly geared *'propaganda machinery can do in deceiv-*

*ing'* the public opinion of the world. The Indian High Command caught Pakistani Military High Command napping.

To be plagued with mass movement is disastrous for any country. Pakistan cannot afford them at all. Let all Pakistanis combine and put demonic forces to constructive use—otherwise all dams will burst. Due to this policy the so-called Bangladesh is already on the horns of a dilemma of having many Bahinis in her new desh.

### **Mukti Bahini as Guerillas**

Irregular warfare has now become professional and highly organized. It is a fascinating subject for study by all those citizens, who desire to live in peace and with honour, in the era of cold war, in ideo politico-cum-economic conflicts—the psywar—which would control the policy of the belligerent governments.

The Western approach to Muslim religion, culture and history—which has been distorted—appears somehow a mystery and a source of dilemma to them. They interpret things as outsiders must, or as outsiders with skimpy knowledge must, in terms of their own culture and limited experience with biased mind. No wonder, therefore, that the Western politicians' intellectuals are in state of dilemma over Bangladesh crisis, cleverly stage-managed by Indo-Russian Axis powers. The solution lies in fuller assimilation of the Islamic ideology and culture also by world powers. Their attitude seems to be too critical and biased on distorted knowledge of historical facts and also due to superiority complex. The force Islam

wields as an ideology which solidly stands on peace, has not been fathomed by them. These powers and scholars, therefore, due to ignorance, make some sweeping generalisations. Islam has so far successfully stood the rushing avalanche of the Communists. Because there is no coercion in the matter of religion and, *'nothing but fairness and justice in love and war'*.

### III

#### **Military Concepts**

I have so far refrained from remarking in detail on military aspects of the crisis. Pakistani Generals who controlled or commanded the war in both Wings, as the results of fighting depicts, were ignorant of Islamic Pattern of War. They had absorbed too literally the Western military mind which has been subject to traditionalism and lacked inventivism; hence the Western powers too are in retreat all over the battlefields in Communist World. Maoism and Leninism is on the march, because they critically studied and practised—though in their own way—the Islamic Pattern of war. The followers of the Western military pattern of war, must now receive indoctrination to deal with human factors—factors which control and direct human machine. Pakistani Officers must critically study Islamic military history to enable them to possess trained imagination and their own matured and unbiased opinions on ideo-political, social, cultural, psychological and economic subjects; for each strategic and tactical decision is based on political intentions and the goal. The professional officers should develop more and more skills common to civilian administration and inventions. It is becoming more and more

evident that in the armed forces there are more and more technical specialists now than they were ever before. The military community has already lost its exclusiveness though it was preached and practised by the Holy Prophet—but we, Muslims, forgot to take due notice of it for the last nearly 1000 years.

### **Counter Mukti Bahini**

The 1971 conflicts and the crisis has depicted the aggressive employment of guerillas is dubious task and counter guerrillas are seldom guerillas, name them what one may, Mukti Bahini, the Security police, the Scouts or the Foreign Legion. Then what are conditions for successful counter guerilla action ?

Combating guerillas is both a psychological-cum-political and military action. Much depends on the ideo-political stage of development of the belligerent forces and—guerillas—and the counter guerilla forces. Different tactics must be used against them depending on whether they are well established, closely identified with the population, or just beginning on the process of indoctrination and organization. *'But in no case will military or political measures by themselves haphazardly by themselves solve the problem.'* It is an undenyng fact that Pakistan Government was caught napping—though both Muslim League and the Pakistan Government were duly forewarned in 1952 and in 1954 and since then. The Revolutionary Government was, in fact, warned more than once but they too were laggards.

The tasks for both the Pakistan Government and those

who were pro-one Pakistan were :

- (i) The separation of Mukti Bahini guerillas from the population by systematic Ideological training of the masses. This should have been started soon after the birth of Pakistan, 1947. In any case in 1952 when Cessation Movement had shown her ugly head under the cover of language issue, it had become a must, but the Government and the political leaders allowed their enemies to steal a march on them. This has already been discussed in Chapters II to VI.
- (ii) The re-establishment of governmental authority and social order by removing the ills, both political and economic or cultural. That had caused the upheavals—or revolution. It needed careful handling patience, justice, foresightedness and wise statesmanship. Covenants once made must be honoured.
- (iii) Once the guerillas have been separated from the population, military defeat of the guerilla force should be undertaken. The worst military mistake in fighting guerillas is to treat them as if they were conventional opponents. This has been the cause of our setbacks during 1954-71 crisis. Because no ideological steps were taken to deny the Awami League and various Mukti Bahinis their popular bases ; and no proper steps to isolate them from pupil were carried out through ideo-psychological warfare programme. Thus the tasks of counter-Guerilla of the Awami League and Mukti Bahinis were

as much ideo-political, cultural and economic as military. They continually interact. As with the guerillas themselves, the ideo-political considerations may often have to over-ride military considerations, if permanent success is to be achieved. Tactical successes—as events proved—are of little value if they compromise the strategic objective, because the true objective of guerilla warfare is control of the people, this is one type of war in which friend or foe thinking is inapplicable. The greatest danger for the counter guerilla is to succumb to the lure of a shallow opportunism: to employ the troops of politically discredited faction. Did we pay heed to it? Heart searching is vital. The hard way is often the best way.

### **Lastly we were not vigilant**

*When a strong nation gives aid (food etc.) to another small nation it makes use of the latter'*—Did Pakistan Revolutionary Governments and political leaders keep under vigilance the technical personnel as advisors etc. of aid giving powers, particularly in East Pakistan? We also omitted to take notice that both wings of Pakistan lay across the life line (maritime and air routes) of both blocs. Both were struggling hard to rule over the waves of the Pacific and Indian oceans.

x            x            x            x

### **Visit to China**

Bearing in mind that there were dark clouds hovering over

the political horizon of this homeland, Rangrut, the author, greatly accepted the invitation of the Chairman of the People's Republic of China to visit that great country in 1959. His object was to study the contemporary history of that great country. He found it most fascinating and educative. On return he presented to the Government two books, 40,000 Kilometers travel in China and Guerilla Warfare, Past, Present and Future, and Counter-Guerilla Warfare, as a food for thought to the country and the world at large. As he did not feel satisfied with the results, Rangrut presented few more books to the nation i.e. Ideologies in Conflict, On War Islamic policy, Strategy and Diplomacy, the Islamic Pattern of War Timur (Tamerlane) as an Amir, Sultan Salah-ud-din Ayubi and Choice of the Arabs Versus Israel to arouse the interest of his countrymen as regards study of war. Because if '*you desire peace study war*' and Quran has enjoined Jihad on every Muslim—male and female. It seems that although these books had good circulation through sale in foreign countries, he is very sad to state that he had failed to achieve his object among the hierarchy of Pakistan—at least, the debacle in East Pakistan depicts it. When I, Rangrut, left the Army two decades ago, Pakistani forces were an invincible victorious Mujahid forces. We have now gone down. Why ?

### **Military concepts**

Prophecy in politics is dangerous. As regards military plans it is still more so especially due to the fact that Prime Minister of Bharat is repeating and constantly declaring in every mass meeting that war is not as yet over! No sane person or the country which may once again become a prey of wanton covert aggression should openly discuss the pros and

cons of the defence plans of his own country—Pakistan. It is better to wait and see. The best one can do at present is to discuss such hypothetical cases of history. For example, invasion of France by Germany during World Wars or counter-attack in 1946-48 by Red China forces against occupation forces of Japan, or Liberation of Turkey by Ata Turk. These examples, and other similar ones, can act as 'guide lines' for those generals, the political leaders and the masses who are compelled to face such military situations in the defence of their country.

The defence of French soil against a powerful enemy—Germany, can give most useful guidance to those generals and hierarchy who have to face similar situation. For example, Paris was not only capital of France but it had also strategical value, as it was a nerve centre of France's rail-road and of air communication system. Sentimentally and politically, the defence and safeguarding it from falling in the hands of an enemy force, was as if Mecca had slipped away from the hands of the Muslims to a non-Muslim State. In East Pakistan Dacca was a hypothetical example. In both World Wars the French fought with determination away from Paris. But once they felt that they could not defend it against much stronger enemy's army, they left it as an 'open city' and retreated southwards to keep their exits in the rear, sea-ports and air-ports, secure so as to enable them to go to an area where they would be able to find breathing time to re-organise and re-equip their beleaguered and defeated army. In this case they protected their seaports and well defended it, so as to enable them to retire as far as possible unmolested, even to Africa (Magrib) and to Britain. In fact it was a classic copy of '*Hijrat*' by Holy Prophet.

Why did our forces, once Guerilla war by Mukti Bahini had ended and a regular war (conventional) had started with India, they did not retire towards an area, such as Chittagong Forest and Khulna, where if succour could not reach them in time, they could have retreated into a neutral country and saved themselves humiliation of surrender to an unscrupulous enemy? Moreover, strategically the defence of Dacca to the last man had no value.

It was sentimentally very dear to the people of Bengal but tactically it was a trap to pin down the forces who decided to defend it, because it had a very long precarious lines of communications which could be cut at many places and where neither succour in manpower nor in material not even food and water could be guaranteed to the besieged Army. Its fall would invariably be a matter of time, especially the besieged force had no air support and lack of co-operation of the local people.

One could safely conjecture that a weak force could hold on longer if her rear was secure, than if she could in an isolated place, like Dacca, where all routes of escape could be easily blocked by the enemy. The most unfortunate and adverse factor which was rapidly eating away the strength of the defending Pakistani army was that the enemy's subtle covert propaganda had made the local people hostile to the Pakistan Army. This weakness of lack of public support had made Pakistani army's position most precarious. These factors remain constant hence it deserves most serious attention—but these factors it seems our High Command omitted to safeguard, and thereby, our army had to taste the dust of defeat, humiliation and uncon-

ditional surrender. *'This is the most important lesson'*. Secondly, has the recent tragic events—shocking in the extreme and reaching to the deepest care—awakened the country or what is left of it into a stage of frustration and profound disappointment on the conduct of those who had usurped into their hands the fate and destiny of Pakistan?

#### **Pertinent question and the answer**

Has the nation been jolted into a realisation of the depth of ignorance and bondage in which it had been made to live all these 22 years?

The Quran has warned the Muslims thus :

“O ye who believe! Take not My enemy and your enemy for friends; Would you show them friendship when they disbelieve in that of the Truth which has come to you...? If they gain mastery over you, they would act as your enemies and would hold forth their tongues against you for evil...” (60:1,2), Moreover, we, Pakistanis forgot to pay heed to “Mutual rivalry in multiplication (of worldly things) distract you until you come to the graves...(101:1,2). The believers are but brothers” (49:10).

Thus the Pakistani flag was hauled down not by the hands of external forces alone but also by enemies from within and by the religious and political marauders who flourished through disruption. Even today, when the Muslim countries are struggling again to rise from the slumber of ages; Pakistan itself is straining every nerve to work out its regeneration and survival, we are faced with the same challenge from within.

The chaos and utter confusion that has overwhelmed Pakistan due to debacle of defeat in East Pakistan and ceasefire in West Pakistan cannot be dismissed as a minor interlude in national life. We cannot condone it as a freak of political hierarchy dropped up in the mantle of obscurantism. What happened in East Pakistan should not be considered a sordid affair only confined to East Pakistan. *'It calls for a thorough inquiry—not only about the debacle itself but where its roots lay and how it had been allowed to grow since the demise of Quaid-i-Azam.'* All overt and covert attempts therefore, to create confusion by any section of the tribal-cum-political elite should have been put down with a heavy hand. Both the government and the people sat on the fence, gazing helplessly at the events till it was too late—even then the elite took half measures to rectify it. The Government and the people would do well to wake up its somnolence.

We must not waste time over vain regrets. What we need is to overcome lethargy and to fulfil the covenant of Allah by freeing ourselves from prevailing evils and resolutely following the Sirat-al-Mustaqim (tenet) that is Islam.

We are sure to overcome all obstacles if we have faith. Allah helped believers in the past and is sure to help us again if we prove our Faith by fulfilling His Covenant—"Verily Allah changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts (xiii:2). What is needed most is the raising of the standard of morality."

#### **Quranic-Islamic Policy on War—Islam stands for peace**

"God does not love disorder" (2:205). "And if they incline to peace do thou incline to it." Quranic Verses (8:61, 62, 5:28,

2:190, 193) state '*aggression*' is prohibited and there shall be no '*total war*'. If the enemy inclines to peace, hostilities must end forthwith.

Again in verses (60:8, 9) the Quran enjoins that the end is peace, and war is but the extreme means—a necessary evil to that end and regards war abnormal and permits recourse to it only in exceptional circumstances (20:132, 49:12, 2:195, 220) and to rid of tyranny and oppression (2:190, 193, 4:75, 9:13). In fact it does everything to outlaw war or at least to limit its mischief to the minimum. '*Islam does not reject all wars*' out of hand (8:1, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 ; 2:151). A soldier does not want to die. He goes to action (war) not to die but to live and he wants commanders of the same sort. Islam prohibits treating non-Muslims as potential enemies or to be in a state of perpetual warfare against them (60:8, 9).

## CHAPTER XVII

### EYES ON THE FUTURE AS AN ANTIDOTE WHILE MEMORY LASTS TO TRACE CAUSES AND ITS EFFECTS

#### Plague of military dictatorship's historical background

After the battle of Plassy Colonel Clive (later Lord) introduced military dictatorship in India. The hawks in India considered it a great success. It was a good copy of pattern of crusade designed and successfully carried out by the crusaders in the eleventh century. Through terror, treachery and Kaleidoscopic propaganda, new states were created for stateless barons and knights of Europe and satellite local princes and nobles in Syria and Egypt like their brothers in the Middle East, the Muslims in India had eaten humble pie of defeats on the battlefields, in the field of diplomacy and strategic field. Undoubtedly it was due to the fact that Muslims had neglected to follow their cultural heritage (hedith) and the tenants of Quran. The Muslims as a nation, were no longer keen students of history, science, travels and adventure. They became ease loving and therefore feeble. Their eyes and mental outlook could no longer pierce beyond the horizon.

### Policy of the British hawks

In 1857 while the Indian rulers of states and civilians lay prostrate and remained lethargic, the Indian military mercenaries staged a liberation movement. In spite of the fact it was ill planned, they offered a very stiff fight to the British. However, the British won the final victory not entirely on the battlefield but through diplomacy. A noted contemporary British historian Mr. Kay has stated : "...It was the inevitable tendency of our increased power in India to oust the native functionary—Muslim rulers of states—from their seats, lift him out off his saddle so that the Whiteman might instal himself there..."

This may be natural tendency for victorious usurper, but what was not natural was that the British worked ruthlessly to destroy Muslims as a community in matter of religion culture and economically. Urdu language was suppressed, English and Hindi took its place in courts, commerce and trade. Muslims in Bengal were not employed either in the Police or the army. Class hatred and tribalism was encouraged on Hindu caste system. All this happened because we, Muslims did not pay heed to : "God does not change the conditions of a people until they change their own condition" Quran : (13, 11). I (Rangrut) *'have not singled out Muslims of Bengal'* for this weakness but the entire Muslim community in India was guilty of this shortcoming.

### Bengal as a base of Expansion

The main reason being why Bengal had been selected as a base for expansionist policy of the British in India was, because this was their anchor and jumping off ground. The British

succeeded in making the Hindus and Muslims at loggerhead at each other. However, when the British realized that the Hindus had assumed the role of rivals to the British in agriculture (Zamindari), trade, industry and banking, they decided to nip the trouble in its bud by the partition of Bengal. Another most noticeable event which had caused alarm in Britain was reforms that were being carried out by Lord Curzon as Viceroy (1899-1905), such as allowing respite to the Muslims of Bengal through Agrarian Reforms, Land Alienation Act and 'no, to 'On to the Oxus' policy of the British hawks.

Eventually Lord Curzon had to resign his post and left India. These Reforms had offered a new lease of life to the Muslims. But due to political agitation by the Hindus supported by British hawks the clock of Reforms was set back in 1911 by Lord Hardinge, and Bengal was re-united. It was a most deadly stab in the back of the Muslims not only on the Muslims in Bengal but also to the entire Muslim community of India. Events moved fast and the Turkish Empire was dismembered. Muslims in India were shaken out of their slumber as from now onwards they began to think for their self-defence. After endless struggle, the Muslims won their demand for 'a home'—Pakistan, though it was a truncated one, but it was hoped that by following tenants of Quran and Hadith: '*Muslims are brothers*' a strong united nation would eventually emerge out of it. Unfortunately, we Pakistanis went to sleep once again and forgot that: '*If you desire peace study war*'—jihad—and "O ye who believe! Take your precautions, then advance the proven ones or go forth all together" (4:71). The Quran had warned us: O ye who believe! Take not My enemy and your enemy for friends...If they gain mastery over

you, they would act as your enemies and would hold forth their hands and their tongues (Press, propaganda and diplomacy) against you for evil..."(60 : 1, 2).

### **The Plague**

Our review of the past events in preceeding chapters brings some pertinent questions which it is hoped would enable us to return to reality and thus save Pakistan from another national catastrophe. Some of these are :

How and when Pakistan was plagued with military dictatorship ?

Who were the original carriers ? What was their objective ?

Is there any antidote to exterminate this un-Islamic motive or movement ?

The Quran has said : "*Afala Talamoon*" ? (Why don't you know ?) "*Afala Tatafakkaroon*" (Why don't you think?)

## **BONE OF CONTENTION**

### **Sphere of Influence—The Global Strategy**

World famous naval strategist Admiral Mahan said in 19th century : "Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This Ocean is the key to the Seven Seas. In the 21st century the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters".

At the end of Second World War, Britain was *'one of*

*those who ran*' to win the War for the Western allies. She was now in no mood to be the policemen of the world. French Government had exhausted and was glad to pull out of Magrib of Africa-Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. She had been fighting a rear-guard war in Indo-China. United States of America (U.S.) had come out of the War, the richest and most powerful nation of the world. She was also most advanced in weaponry. She took over from Britain the '*policing of the world*' and also decided to jump in the quagmire of Indochina—though wrongly—boasting that it would finish this war in matter of few weeks which the French Government had lost. U.S. wanted a victory in Indochina to balance off her defeat in China at the hands of Chairman Mao's Army in 1949.

Russia played a queer game of diplomacy. Although she hated to see U.S. firmly established in Asia as a super economic power as well as a super Naval power in this continent with its bases in Japan, China and Indochina, yet he continued to be ally of U.S. Moreover, Russia fully realized that U.S. had forced the hands of Britain to grant freedom to India to ensure that Britain would not be able to stage a comeback in sharing honours as a rival super naval power in the Indian Ocean. Russia, therefore, decided to play a duel role both in the fields of strategy and in diplomacy. She gave lip service as a Western ally to Marshal Chiang Kai Shek, a satellite of U.S. in China, while she gave '*material*' and '*know how aid*' in weaponry to Chairman Mao Tse Tung's forces. In this way he was able to help Mr. Mao to drive out U.S. as her immediate objective, because he hoped eventually to subjugate China at an opportune moment. Secondly, being an ally, Russia managed to steal the nuclear secrets of U. S. Having won his battle in China, Russia invested his support

to North Vietnam where affairs seems to have taken sharp turn against U.S.—as Soviets had hoped and worked for. However, it was not long when China having recovered from her birth pangs began to gain more influence in North Vietnam and North Korea.

India had been partitioned at the cost of great loss of lives, devastation and communal bitterness which has no parallel in the history. In spite of it all the British failed to keep a stranglehold on the Indian soil or on the sea. Britain's navy no longer ruled over the waves which she considered her lifeline.

### **Aftermath**

But the power politics did not end there. Before we discuss what is the situation today in 1972, it is considered essential to recapitulate events in Indo-Pakistan post-partition period, such as, the British, while accepting partition of India, tried their hardest to keep in India one joint Governor-General, joint Armed Forces and one foreign policy. When they failed, the British made a very swift move in the diplomatic field, i.e., revival of Clive's policy by further cementing their relations with the Indian (Hindu) Congress to destroy Pakistan, or to merge it again with Bharat, or lastly to dismember it. It was hoped by the British hawks that by playing one state against the other through trickery, treachery and diplomacy, even through covert war, they might achieve their dreamland as they did after the Liberation Movement after the battle of Plassy 1757 and again in (Mutiny) 1857. They considered that the plan of partition of India would give them pause and time to re-coup, re-fit and then to counter attack.

When Lord Wavell as Viceroy refused to act on hawk's plan, he was replaced by a job hunting Lord, Admiral Mountbatten, who having struck a bargain with the British Government, decided to carry out the plan of disruption of Pakistan which was about to emerge as a new state.

Rangrut (the author) had the honour and privilege to have worked with Quaid-i-Azam since 1921, so he confidently states that Quaid-i-Azam was not ignorant of the fact that the British hawks would take their defeat in the field of diplomacy, at the time of partition lying down as they had the necessary national character of tenacity.

### **The Old Wine in New Bottles**

I wonder how many Pakistanis know the causes and effects of Quaid-Meservay-Gracey controversy. I have narrated it fully in my book '*Quaid-i-Azam as a military genius*'. I may add that Lord Mountbatten's S. E. A. C. Headquarters was located at Delhi from 1943-45 where he had chance to study events in India at very close quarters and to have occasions to renew his contacts with Mr. Nehru whom he had met at Singapore during the war. Another factor, which is perhaps not well known is that Admiral Mountbatten had been asked to push in counter-guerilla groups into Indochina and Burma for example, under General Gracey. Again when he was also appointed Chairman of Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee and joint Defence Council at the time of partition in India, he was able to post his old Comrades, such as, Generals Maservey, Gracey, Hutton to Pakistan. Even War Office London obliged him by posting General Cawthern as he and his wife, i.e., both were employed in Intelligence Service in

War Office. In fact it was a complete team though I have named only a few, for example there were civilians of political service who were posted in Defence Department and in Pakistan Foreign Office, a Zionist under Muslim name was posted to keep him well posted about events.

### Was History to Repeat Itself ?

It may be recalled that more than 70 years ago a dispute arose between Lord Curzon as Governor-General and Lord Kitchener as Commander-in-Chief India over defence policy, administration and re-organization of the Indian Army. When General Maservy at the head of British Military Mission arrived as [Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam was Governor-General of Pakistan. A similar dispute as Curzon-Kitchener arose over the policy of Command, control, employment, administration, such as recruitment of classes between the Governor-General of Pakistan and the Commander-in-Chief.

Let us pause and think the problems which were gigantic, most complicated, yet they needed prompt action. At the birth of Pakistan it was like making bricks without straw. But Quaid-i-Azam was determined to face them squarely and desired to lead the way. So once again when the controversy showed its hideous head, Quaid-i-Azam stuck to his guns and this time the Commander-in-Chief had to resign and General Maservy left the country. Quaid-i-Azam had declared that he would create an Islamic State of Pakistan and her armed forces would be a '*Mujahid force*'. He made a good start in asking the armed forces not only to help the state by defending the country from external aggression but also to give a

helping hand in the care of refugees, to serve the nation in floods, repair of communications, such as, repair of telegraph and telephone lines, and damages to roads, railway lines and bridges caused by the enemy and due to natural calamity. Even when the troops were called '*in the aid of civil administration*', they were asked to serve '*gratis*' as Mujahids and not on extra pay basis which was in vogue pre-partition.

### **Recruitment—National Anthem**

At the termination of Second World War while crucial question of keeping India intact was considered by the British Government, she was also faced with the discontentment in '*Army in India*'—I have used this term as Gurkha and Garhwali and troops in Indian States, were not covered under the term Indian Army.

I served as Vice Chairman on all three committees which were appointed by the Indian Government: so it enabled me to assess the feelings of serving officers and other ranks, the ex-servicemen as well as ex-prisoners-of-war of all three services, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

The Government accepted the recommendation of these committees that although recruitment for the Sikhs, Hindus, such as Jat, Rajputs, Gurkhas and Garhwalis should be continued on class, sub-class and caste basis, but for the Muslims, the recruitment from now onwards would be on '*Believers are brothers*' and there would no restrictions such as Bhatti Punjabi Muslim, or a pathan of Ludhiana, was ineligible in a Pathan or Punjabi Muslim Company etc. of any units of Indian Army. Quaid-e-Azam endorsed this decision. But the British Military

Mission was averse to it and opposed, for instance, recruitment of Bengalis or some Muslim classes of West Pakistan which were not recruited in pre-partition days. But after the demise of Quaid-e-Azam, General Gracey re-introduced the old system. Quaid-e-Azam approved a new '*National Anthem*' and introduced poems of Iqbal and Hali as marching tunes—which was also discontinued and the Armed forces reverted to play British Band tunes. A British band master was employed to teach the bands new tunes.

It is not possible to encompass all events which have been narrated in '*Journe's End*' and my '*Recollections*'. However, I intend to refer only some important ones. For example, Quaid-e-Azam forced the exit of foreign troops from Pakistan. He also altered the set up of Selection Board whose role was to select Pakistani Officers for Senior appointments of brigadiers and of above rank. But some Major issues were still to come but he died.

Pakistan was twice invaded by Afghan lashkars commanded by British Generals, aided by British civil officials of 35,000, and 55,000 strength. They were repulsed. Indian brigands made incursions across the Sind desert. We received millions of Muslims in most pitiable state, yet Pakistan Government allowed evacuees to India everything they wished to carry—even heavy machinery by sea.

Quaid-i-Azam who had not been keeping fit much before the emergence of Pakistan, began to feel the stress and strain of ever increasing problems which were man-made by our enemies.

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### Tribal lashkars

According to Chaudhri Mohammad Ali (later Prime Minister) has stated in his book *'Emergence of Pakistan'* that a tribesmen *'lashkar was pushed into Kashmir without knowledge of Quaid-i-wzam or with the knowledge of Defence Minister'*. It was most serious step as these lashkars proved most harmful and good for nothing for assisting the liberation fighters, on the contrary, they proved a diplomatic and political stumbling block and created serious administrative problems and it gave a pretence under pre-emptive strategy to the British Governor General of India to invade Kashmir, due to a press statement issued by Pakistan Government that *'tribesmen had been allowed to proceed into Kashmir to aid the Liberation army'*. It was a most well conceived plan under pre-emptive strategy by Lord Mountbatten. A copy of a message has been inserted in *'Journey End'* to prove that the announcement of Lashkar was planned to coincide with the execution of the invasion plan by the Indian Army. Please see appendix 'E'. It was most unfortunate act on the part of the politician who made the announcement, as diplomatically it depicted Pakistan as an aggressor in the eyes of the world, and strategically it was tragic blunder, as Pakistan at that time had no Army to support that incursion with force, tactically, *'roving bandits'* do more harm to the public whom they are suppose to help, and on the contrary antagonize them and present most lamentable political repercussion in the friendly country. This is exactly what happened. Most unfortunately our Government repeated this blunder again in 1971 by sending Pathan lashkars—untrained, lawless roving brigands as counter guerilla force (Mukti Bahini)—because those responsible for it had not studied his-

tory of the past events in Kashmir—which is vital for all leaders.

### **A fly in the ointment**

Frontier tribesmen are great fighters and are adept guerillas in their own country because they plan and practice for such an eventually for years from father to son. Their intelligence is excellent. Without such a training, they are no better than roving bandits. If strategic planners wish to use them as guerillas, they should be trained, equipped and organised as such for a psywar. It is possible that batches of C.A. Force could be trained as such to form a framework of such a force. We should have noticed the efficacy of such lashkars when Afghanistan invaded Pakistan in 1948 and 1950—they were described by Afghan Government '*A fly in the ointment*'.

Such study costs little, and ignorance of it did cost the nation very heavy indeed-dismemberment.

### **Exit of foreign troops**

It would be of great interest to know for those who are not aware with the events, that while Quaid-i-Azam was striving hardest to get rid of foreign troops—both British and Indian forces, and he also wanted them to vacate their bases; the Pakistan Defence Ministry which was dominated by the British Military Mission, was delaying the process. Both Governments of the foreign troops also put up lame excuses that they were very short of transport, both rail, sea or air, yet they were taking away tons of heavy machinery by sea to India. However when riots at Karachi and then at Quetta showed their ugly

heads, Quaid-i-Azam forced the issue and ordered them to depart and they left the country.

The history repeated itself in Uganda in 1972—British Government said that she could not transport to Britain only few thousand refugees in 3 months time while she burdened the emerging state of Pakistan with a millions of refugees in rages, hungry, and miserable—Britain repeated that '*they had no transport*'. However, when President Amin stuck to his guns—transport was found to evacuate all within the time limit.

It is indeed a very sad commentary that after the demise of Quaid-i-Azam, the British Air Staging Section was allowed to return to Pakistan and U.S. was permitted Air Staging Posts at Malir and Bedabir which resulted in '*U. 2*' affair—which brought fury of Russia over Pakistan. The events in 1970-71 depict that '*Russia had not forgotten to take his revenge.*'

### Ceasefire

Soon after the demise of Quaid-i-Azam, his successors '*accepted cease fire*' in Kashmir on very disadvantageous terms on the plea :

- (a) Our tanks were worn out and we had no tank spare parts or ammunition for it, as Bharat had refused to handover our share of it. And Azad Kashmir troops were good for nothing. Britain had imposed an embargo on sale of weaponry to Pakistan.
- (b) As regards : '*Our artillery's shells had exhausted*', the true story of it is very disgusting, as the British

Mission betrayed their trust. They ordered all shells to be fired in the air in the infamous '*Operation Beri Pattan*' and declared it a great tactical success. '*Yes—success it was to paralyse Pakistan.*' The tragic part of it was that this operation was carried out under direct orders and planning of British General Staff who unfortunately had not even put their feet across river Jhelum and knew nothing about the tactical situation—at least—this was what the Chief of Staff told me when I met him before taking over this command. Moreover, when Pakistani Mission left for Delhi to discuss terms for '*Cease fire term*', the Pakistani Generals in command of the area were neither consulted, taken in confidence, nor were taken with the mission even as observers. The pathetic side of the issue was, that this high powered military mission consisted of the Defence Minister and British Generals who were ignorant of real tactical state of affairs which were changing hands daily. Another Himalayan blunder committed by this Military Mission was that, they omitted purposely or due to neglect, to take any large scale map with them to Delhi as aid to explain tactical situation on the ground or for demarcation of cease fire line. They, therefore, borrowed a map of scale 1:1,000,000 published in 1940 by Government of India to demarcate the actual tactical positions held by Pakistani and Indian forces in Kashmir !!! A junior Pakistani officer who had accompanied the mission showed me the demarcated map which enabled me to mark it on my map. When I, Rangrut, checked it actually on the ground and with a large

scale map, to my disgust and horror, I found that we had surrendered on a golden platter some very vital strategical key positions in Mander Kotli and Poonch sectors which the Indian Army had attempted hardest to retake from us. But we had repeatedly repulsed these attacks after inflicting very heavy losses on the enemy. It was a most serious matter which we considered it vital to retrieve the situation. (P.S.—The Bharatis are, once again, trying their hardest to retain them, ie, in 1972). See Map No. 4.

### **The Secret Plan**

To redeem our security, we Pak officers planned to act immediately before our (British) General Headquarters or the Indian Government had a chance to put the agreed formula on a firm footing. I as the G.O.C. of the area contacted my opposite number i.e. the senior General, General Atma Singh and asked him for permission to cross over the river Poonch to meet him as well as General Diwan Misri Chand and others on the plea that ceasefire had been accepted by both countries so we should ensure that no more blood was shed to attempt to secure our tactical positions. Luckily they asked me to come over as soon as I could. We were ready as we had planned for it so we crossed over the river.

### **We took the Indian generals by surprise**

I may interlude that the tactical positions on the battlefield of the belligerents (Indo-Pak) were very curved. For example, we were holding positions across the river Poonch over a ridge and had been constantly fighting a sec-saw battle to retain the

top of the rang of hills. These daily counter-attacks had cost both of us many lives. As it is a common feature of fights to occupy commanding hill tops. I had arranged to get cakes and sweetmeat from Pindi to take it alongwith me to give the Indian Generals good tea. I took my senior U.N.O. American Observer and my Sector Commanders with me.

In brief, we met and physically checked our positions on the ground and plotted them on all six copies i.e. enlarged copies of maps. These were signed by generals of both sides and counter-signed also by the senior U.N.O. Observers on both sides. I handed 3 copies of it to General Atma Singh and brought three copies of it, with me. When these maps reached Pakistani G.H.Q. it brought a storm of wrath on me. When I stood firm as Commander of the area in an independent country (under dispute and not in Pakistan) the tempers of the G.H.Q. hierarchy came down. Unfortunately the reaction of it in India was very repulsing. General Atma Singh and Brigadier Usman were accidently killed? While General Dewan Misri Chand and a couple of brigadiers who had signed the maps were retired. See photo.

I may add for the information of those who may not be in the picture that I was commanding a vast area in Kashmir, I was also responsible to guard against incursions along Afghan-Pak border and Indo-Pak borders which was many thousand miles long, uneviable, as it was served with poor communications, which was to be defended by a very inadequate force which was served also with very inadequate and poor logistics. How I was able to do these jobs successfully is considered by me a miracle of Allah, or that Bharati leadership was poor. India has now been able to occupy

those strong tactical points in Kashmir which the British mission had given them in 1948 War. The Bharati Government had stated that they would not return those positions to Pakistan as they are *strategically key position*! I have deviated from brevity to little more detailed account of this episode of 1949 as a food for thought for the readers and to explain how the British diplomacy worked anti-Pakistan and the way the British succeeded in driving a wedge between the civilians and the armed forces in Pakistan. Moreover to depict that I was so overburdened with heavy duties—that I could not keep in constant touch with local affairs—except the probable action by the enemy against our homeland. My constant moves from one sector of command to the other many hundred miles apart, did not make it easy for me or for my brothers-at-arms to be constantly in touch with one and other. Most probably the most important reason to give me such un-wieldy and a big command with lack of means—logistics—was to break me mentally and physically. But they failed in this objective also.

### **The Storm**

The members of my team who had crossed the river with me and signed that vital agreement on the map, did not escape the wrath of the British mission on them. However, I was able to look after their interests being President of the Selection Board. It was in May 1949 that I received a phone call at Pullandri from General Raza to come to Rawalpindi as he had very urgent matter to discuss which he could not discuss on the telephone. When I reached General Raza's Bungalow, I found many senior officers of the Army and Air-force present. After the informal hurried lunch a meeting in closed doors was held. As '*Bara Bhai*' (elder brother) and

senior officer, I was asked to preside it. I was given a list of officers duly signed by them an affirmation that they would stand by the decision which were made by the meeting. I was also given a paper in draft which was to be discussed, if approved, then it should be sent to the Defence Minister by a special courier.

The Salient points put up for the consideration of the Defence Minister were :

- a) Low morale of the Pakistani troops as well as the Pakistani officers who were frustrated about Pakistani Government's lack of confidence in them and the policy and strategy and methods for conducting war in Kashmir.
- b) the dismemberment of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Movement which they consider, had successfully put to flight the State forces of the Maharaja. Even the intervention of Indian army had not cut much ice.
- c) they wanted to know why '*Operation Pattan*' was carried out? They discredited G. H. Q.- coverage story.
- d) why the Nationalization of Pakistan Armed forces was delayed as compared to the Indian Army? Why the Pakistan Government was allowing the British Generals to strengthen their stranglehold?
- e) There were other points such as, Administrative matters

about Pakistani Armed forces but for brevity I have excluded them.

Having read aloud the paper to the audience, I asked opinion of the officers present who unanimously asked me to take the helm of the affairs and they assured me their loyalty and full confidence in me. After some discussions, I told them that I did not like the very idea of holding such a meeting as it was against King's Regulations and also the Indian Army Act (which was still in vogue as we were a dominion) as it could be classified as '*mutiny*.' Secondly, I suggested that the wording of the letter as well as the approach to the subject should be different to the one suggested in it. At last it was decided to elect a committee and I was elected president to draft a letter which should be forwarded to the Ministry of Defence. I drafted a letter, which after few amendments was approved. I sent it to the Secretary General Chaudri Mohd. Ali to be presented to the Defence Minister under '*redress of officers*' under King's Regulations and I. A. Act. But it was a letter from me, as seniormost Pakistani General for the information and for necessary action of the Defence Minister of Pakistan. I adopted this method as it was legally permissible. I then returned to my H. Q. in Kashmir.

Next day I was rung up by General Raza to say that General Gracey had taken him to task as one who had instigated a mutiny and some officers had given him (General Gracey) a copy of the list which had been given to me and also a copy of the first draft and a resume of the letter which I had sent to Chaudhri Mohammad Ali. I suggested to him to sit tight and to make no statements or to give a written statement unless he was forced to do so.

A few days later the Prime Minister Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan who was also the Defence Minister, came to Rawalpindi. I was ordered to meet him. I found the Defence Minister unhappy and furious at the beginning of our talks, but he soon settled down and became normal. This change created an impression on me that the Prime Minister had not been given correct appreciation of the situation in Kashmir, either by the Defence Ministry, or by the General Headquarter. Eventually he told me to gather all Pakistani Senior Officers who could be gathered in the evening *'to meet the Defence Minister at a cup of coffee'*. Eventually at the meeting it was appreciated that the Defence Minister should have met Pakistani Officers of the Defence Services more often informally and also discuss with them the nationalization of the Armed Forces which should have been more speedy than it had been the case. Finally, the Pakistani Officers, such as, Senior Commanders should be taken in confidence in important matters, for example, terms of cease-fire and demarcation of cease-fire line.

### **A Bombshell**

I brought tons of wrath over my head when in spite of very severe opposition I persuaded the Prime Minister to visit Kashmir which had not been done by any member of the British Military Mission. The Prime Minister was more than satisfied that *'he had been fed on false reports'* which he made to me as a passing remarks when he saw a very large size sand model of the cease-fire line and inspected the Azad Kashmir troops. He ordered me to send a signal message to Secretary General at Rawalpindi to arrange a public meeting as he would make *'a very important statement'*. On return from

Azad Kashmir the Prime Minister announced Nationalization of Armed Forces and that the lease of British Officers would not be extended and no more British Officers would be recruited. The Quaid-i-Azam had said in 1928 : '*Nationalize the Armed Forces, or we will throw you out*'. He repeated in 1930: '*Reform or quit India*'.

General Gracey expressed his severe displeasure to me in no uncertain terms. He was justified as, according to him, I had upset his apple cart many times before, such as, exit of foreign troops, National Anthem, re-organization of Azad Kashmir forces, construction of bridges over river and metttled two-way roads in Azad Kashmir without his permission. He had obviously lost his patience. Moreover, in the announcement he saw a death blow to his plans of keeping British stranglehold over Pakistan. He now got another chance to cross swords with me. He called me up from Plunderi my Advance H. Q. to tell me that Pakistan was going to be attacked by Afghan lashkars about 60,000 strong. He told me to hand over my troops in situation in Kashmir to the senior brigadier and to fight the battle with what I had got and ask for more only if I need it badly. I stood the shock well as I did not insist to take with me my own troops. I left him surprised as he expected me to resent. Fortunately the Afghan Government was dreadfully slow in concentrating her troops on our borders. This enabled me to fight and '*win my last battle for the defence of my homeland*' as I had already decided to retire from service prematurely. I sent a telegram ; "Retiring mysely...handed over charge, PAKISTAN ZINDABAD".

General Gracey was not exactly the model of the charasmic leader of a small army pitted in a life and death struggle in Kashmir against an implacable foe. Yet General Gracey had

demonstrated a knack of survival under the umbrella of Lord Mountbatten that had confounded his doubters. His approaches to his task with a mixture of cunning and circumspection was efficacious. The prop of his power was Lord Mountbatten's influence in White Hall, pure and simple. After the demise of Quaid-i-Azam by an adroit system of promoting and demoting in the [so-called 'incubation period', of granting favours and withholding them, General Gracey had built up an apparatus that was loyal to him—which he left as legacy to Commanders-in-Chief of the '*Revolutionary Government*'. In the process, he had not made the best appointments from a strictly military point of view because his objective was to weaken Pak Army. In this he succeeded. The army had been riddled with debilitating corruption and he too, it has been stated did not remain untainted. He was extremely conscious of his survival and greatly modified his views after Lord Mountbatten left Bharat. He, like most Gurkha Officers, was anti-Muslim. It may always be a matter of debate whether British Military Mission led by General Gracey '*missed a chance*' of his survival and good relationship between Britain and Pakistan the way he conducted Beri Pattan Operation and Cease-fire line of demarcation in December 1948—when '*the cat was flung out of the bag*' by his hirelings about these mentioned incidents. They also exposed his '*write off*' of 32 lacs worth of '*Charpoy*' (beds) for Indian soldiers in Malir Cantt. and the furniture and crockery etc. in the flagstaff houses in Karachi, Quetta and Ziarat. These very hirelings exposed the transfer of Jeeps, spare parts for M. T. vehicles and para-brigade equipment to India. But it was too late. Due to General Gracey, Pakistan Army lost many excellent War Veteran Officers who had also qualified at Staff College.

### The last finishing touch to Mounthatten Plan

Before General Gracey left Pakistan, he ensured that the plan to ruin Pakistan Army which he had begun would be completed as :

- (a) He poisoned the mind of the Pakistani Commander-in-Chief who had succeeded him, by telling him that a new revolutionary party under Brigadier Akbar Khan was emerging like '*the Young Turk Party*' to topple over the Government and him.
- (b) He impressed him by subtly warning him that the mutiny in May 1949 '*was halted*', as he along with others, had made a bad choice by selecting an old General as their leader '*who upset*' their plan. But Akbar Khan was most ambitious, vane and proud.
- (c) He also told him that as advised by the Government he had prevailed upon his (C.O.S.) Chief of General Staff, another officer, who was expert in Commando training, and two other senior British Officers, under '*a covert plan*, to stay in Pakistan to advise and keep him well posted. In other words, he kept '*cells*' alive to ensure that the image of the Pakistani Armed Forces' Officers was destroyed. The Government of Pakistan would thus be obliged to look over their shoulders for return of British Military Mission. The fact that he succeeded in his venture is very evident ; which has been confirmed by General Ayub in his book '*Friends and not*

*Masters*'. In spite of it all we Pakistanis were spared a breathing time for couple of decades and still exist—though dismembered, is nothing short of a miracle. *'Let this be our lesson'*.

### **The Members of the British Mission**

It is not possible to encompass anti-Pakistan misdeeds of each member of the British Military Mission which was allocated to Pakistan by the British Government. In fact selection was made by the Government of India, i.e., by Lord Mountbatten, who naturally selected those British Officers whom he had tested and found loyal *'to carry out his plans'*. It may be recalled that Lord Mountbatten had been clearly told by the Prime Minister of Britain to ensure at the time of partition :

- (a) "to do his utmost to keep Indian Armed Defence Services intact—undivided.
- (b) to keep secure the trade routes of Britain in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, i.e., her life lines.
- (c) to keep British interests uppermost and secure. The Mission was a well-knitted team who was given a well-prepared pre-conceived plan to work. Most members of the team had been entrusted such tasks in South-East Asia."

The Mission's main task may be summed up :

*'To keep Pakistan politically, militarily, economically weak*

*to let her die a natural early death*' in due course. The Mission's first objective was to cause dissensions, and anarchy which would hasten her death while she was still suffering from her birth pangs. The members of the Mission were therefore, composed of specialists—each specialist in his own art of psywar warfare.

It is noteworthy that in spite of fact that Quid-i-Azam had declared that he would refuse to take over Pakistan unless he was given his share of armed forces. This handing over was so discretely managed in such a way that ostentatiously Pakistan did get some of her of armed forces, weaponry, store, money etc. but in bits and pieces only.

#### Aftermath

The aftermath of declaration of nationalization brought strong reaction from the White Hall. The Pakistan Defence Ministry resented to it. As I found the Defence Minister in dilemma so I decided to quit the Army. The Defence Minister advised me not to do it and offered me various jobs. But I found it impossible to reconcile with the policy, so I stuck to my decision as I was convinced that my exit would give him more means of manoeuvre in the field of diplomacy. In spite of the setbacks the British Mission cleverly managed to bring discontent and discord among the officers of the armed forces. After my exit a revolution was planted to prove to the Prime Minister that :

- a) redress pition of officers in 1949 was in fact a mutiny?

- b) to ensure that the security of Pakistan lay in presence of British officers as vital.
- c) Some '*British troop should be stationed in Pakistan under staging posts*' of the Royal Air Force. This act, they argued, would enable White Hall to come to Pakistan's aid. Moreover it would act as a deterrent to '*hot head officers*' as well as refrain India from acts of aggression against Pakistan.

The Defence Ministry approved of it. The result was :

- a) successful planting of mutiny—the so called Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case.
- b) The British hopes were fulfilled about weakening Armed Force who lost many war veteran, staff trained senior officers at a time when their services were desperately needed.
- c) The seed of discontentment took firm roots as government postponed elections.
- d) The confidence of civil administration and public about armed forces was shaken. The British Mission felt satisfied that they had won the battle.
- e) But at this very critical moments of *distress* and frustration, nature helped us by blessing good amount of rain which amply rewarded our tillers of the soil to meet all the needs in food, Jute and cotton.

War in Korea brought trade boom and Pakistan was able to retain her rupee value, in foreign markets. Muslim League Government, it was perceived by some, was well set in the saddle. Unfortunately, the Government became overconfident. They postponed elections again under one pretext or other. Emergency measures were enforced under various Acts. The public became restive. The body of the nation became fat and flabby but weak in strength. The British Mission had apparently succeeded in their disruptive mission. They, therefore, outwardly left the country but they left powerful cells in Pakistan. A very senior General (Chief of Staff) who had more than once mentioned to me and many others, that he wishes to go 'home', but he stayed on in a private capacity for couple of years. He was housed in a free furnished government quarter, provided with amenities such as, free car, orderlies etc. A couple more British officers stayed on as advisers to sports, Animal Transport and guerilla warfare. Another senior British officer returned in the grab of a diplomat who was closest friend of Mr. Eskandar Mirza when he staged the Coup.

- f) Mr. Eskandar Mirza had been inducted from Foreign Service into Pakistan Civil Service. Later he was overnight given the rank of seniormost Major General. It was an unprecedented incident. On the other side of our borders, the Bharatis had re-organised their civil and military services with the aid of British Mission in such a way that '*coup would be impossible*'. They nationalised the

armed forces from the very day they gained dominion status. When their British Commander-in-Chief asked Mr. Nehru to allow some British officers to stay on till Indian Officers gained experience or the replacement of senior officers could be found—I Rangrut write without fear of contradiction, that when Mr. Nehru put his proposition to senior officers of the Indian Army—they pleaded him to recall pensioned or released officers to fill up administrative appointments. Mr. Nehru agreed to it. For example, Captain Pounapa who had been released many years ago due to political reasons was recalled as a brigadier. I know many other names. While in Pakistan, I was shocked to find a British divisional signal officer (Lt. Colonel) whose main qualification was that he had served as a farrier in a British Signal troop. Another E.M.E. officer was Electrical Mechanical Engineer (Lt. Colonel) whose qualification was that he had been a band master in E.M.E. Unit. The British Mission did not consider to stop the release of Pakistani officers or temporary officers in order to provide jobs for unqualified British Officers.

The Quran had warned Pakistani leaders: “Afala Taqilcon?”  
i.e., Why don't you think ?

### III

“If the art of war consisted merely in taking risks, glory would be at the mercy of mediocre talent”. Napoleon.

### Preparation for War :

It is not understood by many that strategy in peace will comprise the management of all national resources so that they may be capable of being exploited not only to the greatest possible extent, but also at the time when they will be most useful, should the necessity for protecting national interests of the nation in war. These measure of preparation for war falls into categories :

- a) political, ideological and diplomatic.
- b) moral and material.
- c) military, naval and aerial.

Co-ordination of warlike and ideo-political measures, and careful regard as to the consequences that may result from either, are, at least, as necessary in time of war, as they are during peace. A government, therefore, should be on its guard against taking steps which, although harmful to the enemy, may indirectly strengthen his hand. If war is to be brought to a successful conclusion a government must continue to inspire its own people with sufficient resolution and tenacity of purpose, to undergo inevitable hardships until the moment that is most favourable for advantageous peace. While strategy is confined to the theatre of operations, '*grand strategy looks far beyond the horizon of victory on the battlefield to ultimate peace*'. Again grand strategy is diplomacy's elder sister and has very considerable influence on diplomacy, thinking and action. Both are however subordinated by the policy of the Government.

## Planning

Let us see what one of the Western world's most famous strategist Clausewitz said: "Examples from history make every thing clear and furnish the best description of proof in the empirical sciences. This application with more force to the art-of-war than to any other, for in addition to the principles, *'the human element'* is constant factor. However, one should remember that the exact conditions in which any campaign was fought are also unlikely to be repeated and reliance on the experiences of one war is liable to lead to false conceptions."

The rules and principles of war are always the same. It matters nothing whether the soldier is on his feet, in the open, in a jungle, or shut up in a tank. In the sphere of psychological strategy the primary requirements is not so much technical equipment as an improved and adroit idea which could successfully and effectively wage the global ideological battle. Sincere workers are a pre-requisite to its success. Well planned intelligence system and even Gestapo policy when discretely applied has played a very vital role among many nations—East Pakistan being its latest victim—and forms a crucial component for the structure for their strategy especially when pre-emptive strategy has to play an important role in a wanton covert aggression.

Modern armies are trained on the basis of a well-thought out strategic plan evolved by the best brains of the nation, both civil and military, in relation to defined objectives. Tactics or operational strategical plans are drawn up by the general staff within the framework of national policies laid down by

the supreme authority (national government—civil), facts of geography, resources and the state of economy. It is, therefore, '*collective thought and action not individual orders*'—such as, dictatorial leadership—which govern the implementation of plans. Armed forces are attuned to national purposes and policy.

War is not a theory, it is a reality and a political instrument of Cold War atomic era, and unless policy be founded on morality, a reversion from civilization to barbarism follows. I have explained the history of Bengal—though briefly—because to understand the present we must know the knowable past, for the present is a text, and the past in largely its interpretation. But the essence of interpretation is drawing of conclusions from the study of observable indicators that some underlying pattern or configuration exists. The sentiments, selfimages and disposition of a population are, of course, the only latent pattern that may be identified. Examples from history make everything clear and furnish the best description of proof in the empirical sciences. This applies with more force to the art-of-war.

Because our government paid no heed to this warning, we were forced to meet covert aggression on the wrong foot. The task before the armed forces was colossal. Because they had to face not only angry and misled local civil administrative officials, misled population but also the Mukti Bahini backed by Indian Army aided and abetted by most modern Russian and British weaponry as well as their money, propaganda machineries of India, Britain and Russia and their satellites. There is no doubt that Pakistan Government was caught napping. Mr. Mujib-ur-Rehman's admission before a press conference at Dacca on 17th

January 1972 confirms what has also been narrated in Chapter V that : '*he had been working for secession for the last 24 years*', leaves little doubt that he was in league with foreign powers wanting to dismember Pakistan. It also confirms that he knew who was exploiting whom. The oft repeated slogan of East Pakistan's exploitation by West Pakistan through subtle overt and covert propoganda, had been made into a big issue by these super powers to create hatred between the people of two wings. It also acted as a camouflage to the real issue of expansionist policy of the Indian Congress Government who believed in their British and Russian allies policy : "Just rights? What are rights, never so just, which you cannot make valid? The world is full of such. If you have rights and can assert them into facts, do it, that is worth doing." Gibbon had added to it that?" those who refuse the sword, must renounce the sceptre."

War nevertheless is the most terrible of evils, and too often merely a savage attempt to gain better conditions, or at best a symptom of a grave social defects; for even successful, is said to involve the birth of passions, and an expenditure of life and national resources which far outweigh any actual or potential gains. For example, reports from contemporary witnesses (Hindu and Muslims) that the properties in the so-called Bangladesh such as jute factories, textile mills, Khulna paper mill are being systematically plundered by various Indian parties, such as, Marwaris from West Bengal who are assisted in their loot by the Indian Army. All foreign made cars, such as Toyota, Mercedes, Mazda are seen being driven in Calcutta by these holligans. Moreover, India followed Panikar policy : "If you desire to put your enemy in the wrong or damage his reputation blame him for every vice you feel in yourself."

### The curtain of mystery

Shall I be told to believe that no one in Islamabad's hierarchy had foreseen a grim covert war with India on grand scale? I cannot accept that contention without admitting that there was no limit to the determination of the Olympic gods to deceive themselves. The least that Rangrut hoped for was that our planning for the pattern of war would be such that it would be in condition to force upon Pakistan's enemies to react as we desired and which he would not be in condition to accept. Until and unless the curtain of mystery and secrecy put down by the Government, is lifted, no one can say positively if there was a strategic plan! The sooner the public is taken into confidence, the better. The public has become restive.

Wisdom after the event is an expensive wisdom. Especially when no one can state for certainty that we are out of the wood. One ounce of imagination and foresight for our nation and armed forces is worth ten tons to remove despondency, despair and demoralization among the nation and the armed forces. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power but also a contest of human power and morale. Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor. It is the people not things that are decisive.

Studies of soldiers in combat show that hate and aggression are less commonly felt than fear, homesickness, boredom and lack of food, clothing and water. Few citizens in aggressive nation actually feel aggressive, thus their warlike activity cannot be due solely to their personal motives. On the other hand, wide spread frustrations, such as hunger, arson, loot and

disasters like cyclone, give rise to strong emotions which may be channelled into war by means—as skillful overt and covert psywar propaganda—ideological, national, or sense of revenge.

The most unfortunate part of this tragic story is that it was man-made. It was originally sown by the civilian Government—of Muslim League—in 1950 to retain dictatorial power in their own hands. They assisted by British Military Mission began promoting both civil and military officers, like Hitler; on their political outlook rather than on their professional qualities as an administrator, or a soldier. They met the doom that of Hitler! It is, however, to be remembered that prosperity loving leaders, and money will not command success in war. Here again we in Pakistan failed to observe the causes of the debacle which the Indian Army met in 1962 against Chinese Army. Within few days the Chinese Army was in the proximity of Calcutta. *'Simply because'*, lately the Indian commanders in the Operational Sector had been promoted more on political affiliation to the ruling party than on professional efficiency which includes physical fitness as well. There was no fault of the Indian soldier. This fact was pointed out and fully discussed of Rangrut in his book "On War Islamic Policy, grand strategy and Diplomacy". But the old man's squeak in Pakistan fell on *'deaf ears'*. It is alleged that formations of the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force had carried out no large scale peacetime combined operation or manoeuvres for at least couple of years or more pre-1971. Instead it is alleged, they purchased luxurious cars and other articles for ease from money budgetted for the purchase of most modern weaponry or training for war.

Losing a modern war is, as a rule, a failure larger than the

the failure of a few persons. It goes beyond the inability of a command-structure to translate national aspirations into a viable strategy and workable tactics. It is the failure of the national leadership—of the entire public life. To think then that a few generals or admirals or marshals could have led Pakistan's admirable and gallant forces to disaster is an oversimplification. What touches all is the business of all. But if war were more generally and thoroughly studied, the importance of morale, organization, of training, of education and of readiness would be more generally appreciated; abuses such as a civilian was promoted as seniormost general or a general appointed as a senior civil official would no longer be regarded with lazy tolerance; efficiency would be something more than a political catchword. Nor is this all. A nation that understood something about war (Jihad) would hardly suffer the fantastic tricks which have been played so often by the best meaning statesmen—diplomacy and strategy would keep step. There is no question that the British Military Mission pushed in the tribal lashkars in 1948 to force our hands to fight a war in Kashmir according to their pre-conceived plan. India fought 1962 war to keep Indian National Congress in the saddle. Pakistan fought wars in 1965 and 1971 not with the single purpose of defeating an enemy or to advance some great cause, but for lesser object of keeping some individual or Government in power by pandering to the well known public demand for successful combats, regardless of their ultimate influence upon issue of a war. A more wide spread knowledge of the realities of war would reduce the popularity of such operations and place them and their originators in a truer prospective.

Either it is a modern phenomenon or it is not, if it is, a few individuals mistake should not have cost us more than a

few battles; losing a whole campaign 1971 in the Eastern Wing can only highlight fundamental inadequacies of concepts and assessment of realities. Levels and stages of failure need to be scientifically investigated. "Neither", wrote Bacon, "is money the sinews of war (as it is trivially said) where the sinews of men's arms is base and effeminate people are failing...so are there states great in territory, yet not apt to enlarge or command."

It is astonishing factor that when Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was shot, the nation was shocked but she was not moved to insist to know the cause of the death of their Prime Minister. Even the mother country—Britain—as head of the dominion which Pakistan then was, did not raise even her little finger. British's most world famous Scotland Yard Police remained lethargic. Civil governments in the Provinces were dissolved. Prime Ministers came and were quietly disposed off by the civilian Governor-General who was supposed to have been '*elected by the cabinet*'—who had been nominated by the deceased Prime Minister. But the Cabinet too had been nominated and not elected by the deceased Prime Minister as an interim measure. This is what I was told by the Governor-General who had nominated me as his military aid. I noticed some procedure being adopted by the second Prime Minister and second Governor General who also had nominated me as his aid. So I saw these events at close quarters. It was these incidents and policy matters which along with other such events which pricked my conscience that I decided to resign the service. It was a very hard decision for me to make as financially I was no better than a refugee. I had invested in 1927 all that I had inherited from my parents in what is now called Bharat. But I do not regret my decision to retire even after many sufferings as an

aftermath of this decision. I am constrained to record that inspite of fact I was posted to Pakistan by competent authority F.M. Auchinleck (on the request of Quaid-i-Azam) who also dispatched my heavy baggage which was destroyed enroute. Yet out of 306 claimants who were paid in full amount for their baggage. My claim for the loss of baggage is still pending in 1972 since 1947. Because I did not toe in line with the political views of the Olympic gods. But through court of law, I would have been denied even my pension. But I lost the benefits of temporary rank such as extra pension and rank—why, I do not know ?

After the death of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister— noted politicians from both wings, came and were dismissed. The nation took it as natural and de-jure event. But the biggest Himalayan political blunder which the civilian Governor General committed was to take the defence Secretary and a serving general into his confidence, who more than once accompanied the dismissed Prime Ministers—an East Pakistani to the airport and forced them to leave the country. No wonder, therefore, the Defence Secretary promoted himself as a General overnight and eventually became a self appointed Governor General and later on as the first President of Republic of Pakistan. The nation lay prostrate.

To create dissensions among the civil and military while civilian officials were asked to declare their assets, the military officials were exempted from doing it. Why?

**The nation was lulled to sleep ?**

The Commander-in Chief of the Pakistan army who had escorted various dismissed Prime Ministers had become well

versed with the court intrigues no wonder that he decided to form a group of his own supporters and succeeded in staging the second bloodless '*Coup de grace*'. When the second President—self-appointed—started purges both of military and civil officials, as a repercussion, he was later on forced to resign by those disgruntled elements who once had been his arch friends and supporters. He, however, was clever enough to pass on the baby—very restive and sickly—into the hands of his trusted general friend whom he had promoted a commander-in-Chief over his much more efficient and senior war veteran generals, as the new President. Yet the nation failed to see the real motive of the dethroned President. Even those who had led the agitation accepted the new general as a president without any objection. *'The nation was again lulled to sleep'*.

In the meantime the people of East Pakistan had become more and more restive. As already stated, the acts of our arch enemies from Bharat under their nominated leader Mr. Mujibur-Rehman went unnoticed, unchecked and unabated. All warnings both verbal and writings of loyal citizens of East Pakistan were unheeded. Alas, the President tried to refloat the vessel which had already sunk, Even then to cover up his follies, the President did not take the nation in his confidence, knowing fully well that calamity was at our doorsteps. The nation came to know the cause of her debacle too late. It was tragic and most unfortunate. What the real cause was is being investigated by Mr. Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman committee of eminent persons, under the curtain of secrecy, so nation must wait. It is hoped not too long!

I hope that with the above mentioned very brief review of events it has become clear, how the British inducted military

dictatorship through a civilian, Foreign Service Officer, and his team. However, when those generals had conspired with Mr. Eskander Mirza—as they alleged—*‘that when they were dazzled with their easy victory over a nation, which lay prostrate duly weakened by their own civilian political leaders’* they therefore decided to take over the reins of the government. The military dictatorship was, therefore founded by political hierarchy which eventually fell into the hands of a group of generals. *‘Because the squeak of the old general to the Defence Minister had gone unheeded.’* We have suffered grievously for 24 years because we did not pay heed to the Holy Prophet’s advise: *‘Know thyself and know thy enemy’* and that Jihad has been enjoined on every muslim and muslimah. Militarism, over which we are now in tone edifying funeral orations, was twice on the edge of destroying itself, once when the foreign troops were ordered exit in 1949, and second time in May 1949 when nationalization was announced. Do not let us deceive ourselves by pretending that the failure of efforts was from the first inevitable.

### The remedy

The directing classes in any nation should have a certain general knowledge of the history of the Art-of-War, just as they ought also to be instructed in economic or constitutional history. Till some such general knowledge exists it is open to any person, military man or civilian in the guise of a military man, to pontificate upon of the necessary functions of the state, without being recognised at once as a crank or a sciolist by the audience that he is addressing. *‘This is exactly what has happened in Pakistan’*. It is not soldier alone who should know the outlines

of the past history of this art. As long as we — once again — live under present form of Constitutional Government, our Ministers will be influenced not only by the precepts of their military advisers, but also by the public opinion of their party and of the whole nation. It is absolutely necessary that they should have some knowledge of their own, and not be bound to accept blindly the 'orders' of their military mentor — as it did happen when lashkars of tribesmen were allowed to enter into Kashmir without prior knowledge of the Defence Minister or the head of the State! Again the shameful event of bombardment of Beri Pattan and acceptance of 'ceasefire' 1948 and demarcation of the ceasefire line without understanding the cause of it emboldened the British Mission in their hideous covert anti-Pakistan projects.

#### Amateur Strategist

I know that I am here treading on debateable ground. By the perils '*amateur strategist*' I mean is, that no Defence, or Prime Minister can say to his country "*I handed over the charge of our war to the proper professional authority (C-in-C or Chief of Staff), and am therefore in no wise responsible for its results*" — which happened to be disastrous in the case of 1948 ceasefire in Kashmir. It is clear that the civil heads of the state must retain some power to comment, to criticise, even to quash — though they must use it with all discretion and under terrible consciousness of responsibility. For example, Quaid-e-Azam quashed the plan suggested by the Pakistan General Headquarters British to repel wanton covert aggression by Afghan lashkars in 1948 at the instigation and abettment of Government of India and White Hall, who had provided British merce-

nary generals and civil service officers as directors and commanders of the operation. But lighthearted interference with details is, of course, criminal. Military supreme authorities, like other human beings, are fallible. The better acquainted with the war the Minister may be, the less will he be tempted to interfere without necessity, and the less unreasonable should his suggestions prove. Patriotism is not enough. *'We must learn or perish'!*

Our diplomacy in 1970-71 had outrun our military means of making good our pledges. Since success in war now depends more than was formally the use of mechanical accessories. The function of the National Government, the Navy, military and aerial authorities is, first, to obtain the most accurate information regarding the nature, climate, coast line, communications, resources of probable theatre of war, and as to the strength, organization, preparedness, armament, character and quality of *'possible opponents and friends'*; for on this information the strength, organization, training, and disposition of the national forces must in principle be based. The sudden collapse in 1971 goes far to prove that we were caught napping. In fact our friends turned out to be our enemies. Our information about enemy's weaponry was outdated and incorrect. Our means of inter-communications were most defective. No wonder we met disaster both on the political as well as on battlefield, Before *'I conclude'* we should examine why East Pakistan affair has become an international affair.

### **Why pick on fighting services**

Before we sum up for treasures to reconstruct, we should

recapitulate how the minds of the belligerents and their allies in 1971 Indo-Pakistan War had been working during last two decades or more. Among the practical aims and theoretical puzzles, or modern social science in the assessment of human institutions. Whether we speak of trade union, a political party, a school, a business, a government agency, fighting services, or any other complex enterprise, we wish to know what goals or objectives can be attributed to it, what capabilities it has, what strategies it lives by :

- (a) And what its probable line of evolution may be. Assessment of this kind are necessary for the proper diagnosis of an organization, own troubles and for an understanding of how the organization relates to other institutions and to the community. This sort of understanding is especially relevant when groups are in conflict and we need to assess the possibilities of eventual accomodation or likelihood of irreconcilable struggle. The testing of such a model presents some knotty problems. The bolshevik type of party—the chief ally of Bharat—is an effective organizational weapon because it has solved many of the problems associated with transforming a voluntary association—Awami League, into a managerial structure.
- (b) This is the key to whatever '*mystery*' there may be about the organizational power of bolshevism. Put most simply, the process changes members into agents, transforms those who merely give consents into those (at an extreme, soldier—i.e. Mukti

Bahini) who do work as well as conform. "The things we need", said Lenin, "is a militant organization of agents." This structure transformation marks the great difference between bolshevik party and other voluntary association. Lenin added, "Let us take a modern army, here is a good example of organization. This organization is good simply because it is flexible, because it knows how to impart a single will to millions of people. Today, these millions sit in their various homes at the different ends of the country. Tomorrow mobilization orders are issued and they gather at appointed places. Today they lie in trenches sometimes for months at a stretch. Tomorrow, in a pre-arranged order, they march forward to storm the enemy. Today, they perform miracles in evading bullets and sharpnel. Tomorrow, they perform miracles in open battlas..."

"That is what you call organization, when in name of one object, inspired by a single will, millions of people change the form of their intercourse and their action, the place and methods of their activity, their weapons and arms, in accordance with the changing circumstances and demands of the struggle".

We should also analyse how material, moral disarmament, mental disarmament among our fighting brought us into the last war (1971) a seemingly degenerate and certainly soft race. Disarmament has three forms, i.e., material, moral and mental or educational disarmament. Majority of senior officers lacked mental armament which is of most pernicious form.

There was no study of war in the nation itself; not only that, but the nation resented that anyone else should publicly study war. If, as a soldier he did study it, then he was at once labelled as '*a Blimp*' and was regarded by the civil population as something of '*a criminal*' inspite of fact that the Quran said: "Warfare is prescribed for you, though it be not to your liking..." (2 : 216).

" Afala Taqeloon (why don't you think ?)

Afala Tatafakkaroon (why don't you reflect ?)

Afala Talamoon (why don't you know ?)" The

Quran

and " If you desire peace study war" (Jihad).

Where are they going ?

Some far Eastern countries such as Japan, Australia, New-Zealand, Philippines, Formosa, Indonesia and Malayasia held a meeting at Ito (near Tokyo) on June 11 to discuss :

- (a) Security of the region—which has become a region of maritime power struggle of World powers.
- (b) Maritime co-operation in the Pacific region.
- (c) Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere etc.
- (d) Because British Navy had already left the Oceans for economic reasons.

This need had occurred again as U.S.A. had declared her

policy to pull of this region under her policy '*Let Asians fight the Asians*'. But the pertinent question is : *who fights who ?*

### **Japan**

Many more meetings have been held. Opinion of some leaders are being presented as a food for thought. Japanese Prime Minister said :

"Japan is determined to play a more active role as the region forms on organic whole...". Japan today (1972) is one of the richest and most industrialised nations of the world. For the last two decades she has played the role of a manufacturing arsenal for the latest and most modern sophisticated weaponry, aeroplane and ship building for U.S.A. She has very considerably increased her defence budget. '*Japan desires to be acknowledged as the leader of the Pacific—Indian Ocean region*'. For these reasons, she has demanded the return of those islands which were occupied by USA and USSR at the termination of Second World War. She has made a marked progress in this direction in the diplomatic field as both USA and USSR wish to keep friendly relations with Japan. They are doing their best to persuade Japan not to become an ally of China.

Postscript October 1972.

Japan and China has signed an agreement of mutual friendship of equity.

### **India**

The Indian Prime Minister (Mrs. Indira Gandhi) has declared her policy "India would not tolerate any interference

in the seas of Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean". To achieve this objective she expanded her Navy much beyond her economy which in fact was already tottering and is now on the verge of complete collapse. 1965 Indo-Pakistan war brought home to Bharat that her Western allies had not played fair by selling to her obsolete ships, so her Navy proved weak and ineffective.

She realized that '*Icarian India*' (i.e., in the nuclear era) is an insular country. With much of her industry has been concentrating towards Calcutta so she needs a protecting land-space to the South East. East Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon should supply this space. She had already grabbed a big slice of land in Kashmir, Eastern Punjab and NAFA. She attempted to extend it up to the Himalayas but her debacle in 1962 brought her to senses and she therefore decided to expand towards South-East.

Moreover, a country of great industrial strength, and only such a country is worth considering for modern war, should have both a good agriculture and good level spaces, electric power and water for its industries and its internal communications. Kashmir, East Punjab, NAFA and now the so-called Bengladesh has fulfilled much of her needs. No wonder that India is stirring the Tamil Nado agitation in Ceylon. She has therefore, achieved some of aspirations :

- (i) It must be self-sufficient for war, or as nearly so, which has become possible today, or in the foreseeable future by expansion to S.E.
- (ii) Its land borders must be mountainous—hence her

desire to expand northwards to Himalayas and north westwards in Kashmir, and Afghanistan. It was for this reason she desired to strike a mental blow also to West Pakistan. No wonder she is annoyed with USA—in accordance with China and President Nixon's recent statements.

- (iii) Had she been successful against West Pakistan; Afghanistan would have been—India considered—an easy prey. Its land space then would have allowed her great depth against China outside its vital war supporting area in order to give her time to actuate the defence, information on which to act, space to wear out the attack. Similarly, command of oceans (Indian and Pacific) of adequate extent may be accepted as giving her depth. Narrow seas (Bay of Bengal) are no longer borders to air power.
- (iv) It must possess hard hitting counter-offensive air forces. That was another reason for Indo-USSR pact 1971. Because 1965 Indo-Pak war had depicted that Indian Air Force was weak. But Russia equipped her navy and air force with missiles in 1971 which USA had denied to Pakistan. There seems every likelihood that Bangladesh would permit, like India, the Soviet Union—a military base on its territory to counter Anglo-USA move to build bases at Mauritius and the Persian Gulf. Moscow might sign a Soviet-Bangladesh bilateral defence agreement during Mr. Mujib's scheduled visit to Moscow after March 1973.

Chittagong, Khulna and Cox's Bazar coastal port areas have been under discussion as naval and air bases for the use of USSR.

### The Veil of Secrecy about Indo-Anglo Co-operation during Indo-Pak Crisis—1971

The British Foreign Secretary Sir Douglas Home tore down the British veil of secrecy when on February 8, 1972, he stated: "...India could be the foundation and basis for collective security in the Indian Ocean area as the most powerful nation in the region..."

"India would no doubt increase in authority and influence... We (Britain) are interested that the Indian Ocean should not be a monopoly of any one"—a clear hint against Russia. He added that Britain was, however, "concerned at the fastly increasing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean". The British are, of course, old practitioners of the art of the '*balance of power*'. In maritime matters they depended mainly on making the Royal Navy Supreme. But things have changed. She has now, through her wits, created South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to protect their trade. ASEAN might now collapse as labour parties have won elections in Australia and New Zealand they have different views on it.

Much to the chargin of the Afro-Asian who want the Indian Ocean to be a '*peace-zone*', it is fast becoming the cockpit of the naval confrontation of Super Powers. Now that Soviet has plunged into the troubled waters, the USA is in dilemma. Britain inspired by USA has encouraged '*ASEAN nations*'. In the past Britain's balance of power policy cost Europe many continental wars upto Napoleon era and two World Wars and since then, and now '*cold war conflicts*' as

its aftermath. Now Asia would also become the source of naval balance of power conflicts, if the major powers, within or without Asia, fail to exercise the necessary restraint. Sir Alec said: "Britain had no misgivings about the '*Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty*', as it was sure India had the power to defend its independence". But independence against whom? Ceylon, Burma or Pakistan—or against Russia or NATO powers?

### Russia

The Russians, for their part, are simply there in the international waters. But Russian navy is far away from the Bases in the Pacific. She needs repair of ships, bases where supplies can be stockpiled and sailors can rest and recreate at regular intervals. Hence Soviet need the use of Indian sea ports, like the sea ports in Egypt and Malta. Britain has such facilities in Hong Kong, Malayasia and Singapore.

### U.S.A.

U.S.A. had such facilities on the coast of Japan, Formosa, Indochina as well as in Malta, Greece and Turkey. But changes are underway, hence she must have alternative sea bases. Due to her misjudgement she has little hope now in Bangladesh whose Prime Minister Mr. Mujib is due on a friendly visit to sign a '*Treaty of Friendship*'. What next? What further guarantees would Pakistan need after her unfortunate experience of being a member of CENTO and SEATO Pacts during wars in 1965 and 1971-72? What is the sanction behind these demands? Why should any one listen

to promises? Why should we risk first atomic strike on Pakistan territory what we may possibly or may not, get more weaponry from Western bloc powers—both offensive and defensive?

Moreover, while we are not trusted by Western bloc powers like Japan and Israel with *'the know how'* as well as we are not provided with *'factories'* to manufacture these weapons ourselves. Will mere promises help us any more??

If Russia can provide India heavy industry, machinery, as well as, know how; the pertinent question is—will US and USSR do it now in our case? Both made us wait for 20 years that they would give us a steel plant, while China has already done it. Will they do it now? *'Lip service and paper pacts'* would no longer sooth us. We want something concrete and now on the spot, before we pledge ourselves to another pact.

On 9th February, 1972, at Washington, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger said: "United States did believe that Soviet military aid encouraged India to pursue a more belicose policy than it might otherwise have done in the Indo-Pakistan war. USA had *'conclusive'* proof at the time of last December (1971) war that India intended to attack West Pakistan... Washington's policy in the conflict had resulted from fear that the *'war might spread from East to West'*."... "In his foreign policy speech, Mr. Nixon charged the Soviet Union had pursued in South Asia, policies similar to its role in 1967 Arab-Israel war, and the 1970 Jordanian crisis to allow events to boil up towards crisis in the hope of political gain..."  
AFP, UPI.

What we in Pakistan want is a clear cut policy and then a pact with Super powers, of course—if it suits our national interests and is based on equity.

### Home Affairs

Let us turn to our home affairs to ensure that if and when we get means to manufacture our weaponry whether we would be in a position to use it effectively ?

Pakistan Government (in 1950) absorbed in their own affairs and all abounding interests, activities and accidents of a free community, they gasped at the vast changes which were taking place in Bharat and occupied Kashmir. They imagined that they were no concern of their : USA and Britain shrugged their shoulders at our lethargy. To understand the present, we must know the past, for the present is a text, and the past is largely its interpretation. But the essence of interpretation is drawing of conclusions from the study of observable indicator, that some underlying pattern of configuration exists. The sentiments, self-images and dispositions of a population are, of course, the only latent patterns that may be identified. Examples from history make everything clear and furnish the best description of proof in the imperial sciences. This applies with more force to the art-of-war.

Studies of soldiers in combat show that hate and aggression are less commonly felt than fear, home-sickness, lack of food and water and boredom. Few citizens in an aggressive nation actually feel aggressive, thus their being warlike cannot be

due solely to their personal motivations. On the other hand wide spread frustration, such as hunger, give rise to strong emotions which may be channelled into psywar by such means as skilful covert and overt propaganda—ideological, national, or sense of revenge.

*'Let us regard our fighting services as the preventers of war rather than the makers'* is one of the most essential remedies.

### **Ice Age—Military set up in 1949**

I urge that the nation should regard its fighting services as designed as a shield to guard against enemy's wanton aggression as well as to prevent military coup. There is no doubt in my mind that the British Military Mission in 1947 onwards betrayed the trust that our Government bestowed upon it after the demise of Quaid-i-Azam in 1948. Why they did not introduce similar pattern of military set up in Pakistan which they had introduced in India? But in Pakistan they reverted to Kitchener's scheme of (1905) re-organization of the Fighting services justified only in a colony, i.e., a Commander-in-Chief and not a Defence Council advised by the Chiefs of Staff of the three services for planning and training for war. These twenty-three or more years between September 1948 and 1971 may aptly be Ice Age of Military thought. There was virtually no study of war whatsoever either by the directors of the national policy, or the elite of the nation, or by the nation itself. Another reason for this was that since 1950, our senior regular military officers became to a greater extent, only part-time soldiers because they were encouraged to indulge in local politics. One may well say that *'no officer should hold any rank above'* that of Lieutenant-Colonel unless

he is a military scientist and a student of military history. How many of us can truthfully say that we have this qualification? We are living in an era of mechanization and nuclear era. The senior regular officer must be a military scientist in at least one branch of war and that should be a branch that requires some scientific thought. It is better that he should be a scientist over the whole field of military profession and a specialist in one particular branch. We wasted their energies in appointments, such as Martial Law administrators. The soldier like Rangrut, who has fought much and yet writes of war is not necessarily '*a militarist*'. Let us dismiss this foolery and foolhardiness.

Because of the ignorance of Jihad and the Islamic Military history and the fact that there was little contact between civilians and soldiers who lived in cantonments except when they appeared in the city under Section 144, or Martial Law as administrators, but without any previous special training, or study of the subject—they invariably overstepped the mark.

I did express my views more than once to the Chief Martial Law Administrators against continuance of Martial Law for long periods. But it went on deaf ears.

Again the truth is that a certain class of civilians also cannot rid themselves of the suspicion that soldiers are consumed by an inordinate and blood-thirsty ambition. They cannot understand that a man brought up from a youth to render loyal obedience is less likely than most others, run counter to constituted authority. The civilians also do not

realize—which (as already stated) but which Lenin did—that ‘due to lack of proper ideological training’, the soldier’s loyalty was misused by those who assumed power due to ‘*coup*’. We suffered due to it—it is due to our own fault. The directing classes (political leaders, civilians hierarchy) in any nation should have knowledge of Art-of-War, just as they ought also to be instructed in economic and constitutional history. Till some such general knowledge exists, it is open to any person (military or civilian) to pontificate upon functions of the State. It is absolutely necessary that the political party leaders before elections of National Assembly takes place should train at least some of their members in the Art-of-War and nominate them as defence ministers in their ‘*Shadow ministry*’. It is being done in Britain and many other countries. I know Bharat had done it since 1947—i.e., even by those opposition parties who knew that they had no chance to win elections.

### **Suggested Re-organization Outline**

#### **(A) Other Ranks**

- (i) To promote patriotism and to identify one as a Pakistani, the first and foremost action ‘*is to stop recruitment*’ in the Armed forces on class, tribe, i.e., Punjabi, Pathan, Sindhi, Baluchi, etc. basis. Recruiting officers should post recruits to various Recruit Training Centres according to vacancies. There is no harm of retaining the names, Frontier Force Regiment, or Punjab Regiment, etc. There is no other cure to get rid ourselves of provincialism. ‘*Believers are Brothers*’, says Quran.

- (ii) Promotions up to the Junior Commissioned rank of Subedar-Major should be based on capability and '*not on class basis*'.
- (iii) System and standard of education for other ranks and for Junior Commissioned Officers should be higher in this era of mechanization. '*Military schools*' in the units should be re-designed and improved to include ideological training.
- (iv) While we should make officers and men hardy and become thrifty, we should also improve their lot. While I do not suggest to bring the changes overnight, it is vital that the contacts between the Defence Minister and the officers and troops should be more often.

#### (B) Officers

- (i) The present nuclear era and cold war conflicts and pre-emptive strategy era, makes it essential that officers are well-posted about current affairs. There should be good libraries in each station which is open to all. Study of military history in general and Islamic military history in particular costs little and yet it is most beneficial and can compensate a great deal for war experience. The post of Commander-in-Chief should be abolished. All heads of fighting services should be the Chiefs of Staff. A Commander-in-Chief may be appointed of a '*task force*' in case of war.

(ii) I regret to state that a great deal of harm was done by abandoning the system of selection of promotion introduced by Quaid-i-Azam since his demise by General Gracey. In this way the Commander-in-Chief once again became an autocrat ruler who could make or break an officer's career. Many other abuses crept such as General Gracey, made many land grants of military lands to officers for horse and mule breeding (which should have been surrendered to the Civil Government) as a bait to corrupt officers. This enabled him to form clicks and eventually it led to '*military coups*' one after another. It was mostly due to this above mentioned policy that I decided to retire from the army and even declined the offers to remain employed as a civilian extra regimental employment—another dangerous system—adopted which should be discouraged and discontinued for serving officers both civil and military.

### (C) Defence Council

It is suggested that a Defence Council should be formed :

President : Prime Minister or Defence Minister.

Vice-President : Minister of State Defence (in case the Prime Minister also holds Defence portfolio, this minister can carry on day to day routine work).

Members : Minister of Interior, Minister of Productivity and Industries, Chief of Staff of three services (C.G.S.), and Chief of Joint Services Staff (C.J.S.)

Secretary : Defence Secretary, Ministry of Defence.

### Duties

- (i) To lay down Government's policy in peace and war.
- (ii) To decide the policy of the Government based on her foreign policy for strategic planning and training for the security and defence of the country. This strategic planning should also include a plan to counter covert pre-emptive wanton attack by an enemy, or enemies. Three services should carry out combined operations in peace time. The Defence Minister should take keen interest in such manoeuvres.
- (iii) Planning for provisions of weaponry, logistics and productivity,
- (iv) To approve or reject recommendations of the Selection Board 'A'. If approved, the recommendations should be presented for final approval to the President.
- (v) Officers found unsuitable for promotion should be informed and permitted to appeal.

### Promotion of Commissioned Officers

Each service should have two Selection Boards (A) Brigadiers for Major-Generals and above (B) Major for promotion to Lieut.-Colonels and above, i.e. Brigadiers.

'A' board should also select officers for staff appointments, i.e., Colonels and above in the General Headquarters ; while 'B' board select officers of grades upto Lieut.-Colonels. Military Secretary should select Grade II and III staff appointments for the approval of Chief of Staff. An Officer found unsuitable should be informed and permitted to appeal under '*redress of officers*' through Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence.

### Composition of 'A' Selection Board

President : Chief of General Staff or a nominated officer.

Members : Adjutant General,  
3 Senior General Officers Commanding Corps or Division,  
Engineer-in-Chief,  
Director of Army Service Corps.

Secretary : Military Secretary to the Chief of Staff.

(Note—Director-General of Medical Services, Ordnance, Electrical Engineers and Engineer-in-Chief should attend as advisers for the selection of officers of their services under review by the Board).

**'B' Board**

- President : Adjutant General.
- Members : 2 Divisional Commanders,  
Engineer-in-Chief,  
Director, Army Service Corps,  
Director of Medical Services,  
Director, Electrical and Mechanical Engineer.
- Secretary : Assistant Military Secretary to the Chief of Staff.

Above suggestions have been submitted only in general terms. Details can be worked out. *The underlying objectives are :*

- (a) Justice and fairplay to the officers and other ranks.
- (b) Loyalty to their country and to ensure efficiency.
- (c) To gain mutual confidence between fighting services and the civilians.
- (d) As a deterrent to 'coups' or 'dissatisfaction' or 'dissensions' amongst officers or other ranks.
- (e) To encourage efficiency.
- (f) Permission to 'Redress'.

In the above presentation of the case, I have endeavoured

to be fair, unbiased and just to my brother officers-at-arms and my nation and country whom I am proud to belong, and to the Government. We allowed the enemy to steal a march on us—let us be very careful in future. I believe that there are grounds for hope in our speedy recovery.

I belong to a generation of soldiers most of whom have faded away, and whose lives have been made a nightmare by two awful World Wars. In addition, I have taken part in many Frontier Campaigns. I had the misfortune to witness and satisfaction that I managed effectively to control blood baths in communal riots. Then came the holocaust of partition of India, border incursions by India and Afghanistan. The '*coups by the civilian or military leaders*', the 1965 and 1971 covert wanton aggression by India. I am certain that only those who have personally looked upon a bomb-stricken area or a fully harvested battlefield, or a riot-ridden massacred area, can possibly conceive and abomination of it all. Too many of us accepted that carelessness at its face value, we were equally deceived by the nation's self-deception. We thought there would be no need to critically study each and every event and to make necessary steps that '*it will never occur again*'. At last some of us thought: '*It will never happen again*'. We have tried '*to stop it from happening by ignoring it*'. We have failed. That is our lesson. Let us face the issue squarely and stop '*it*' from happening again by knowing about it and being ready for it.

If the reader finds these pages of sufficient interest to read, to pause and think, let him satisfy himself whether I have clearly shown the things that I set out to show '*why to pick on fighting services*' for all that happened—and whether

I have successfully persuaded them that we must continue and with greater care and industry, in the study of the Science of war.

Presented to President  
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto  
by Rangrut  
on April 1, 1972.

## II

Dear Mr. President,

I am encroaching on your very valuable time as I know that :

- (a) Prisoners-of-War problem is uppermost in your mind;
- (b) Some irresponsible statements have recently appeared in the press which if not put on proper course, may do great harm.

You are well aware that the British had to face this great problem after the Second World war. The first batch of Indian P.O.W. from Germany and Italy was repatriated to U.K. as it was feared that these P.O.W. had been brain washed. The Committee in U.K. classified these P.O.W. as Red (dangerous), Grey (doubtful), White (not bad).

F.M. Lord Wavell as Viceroy directed an inquiry Committee about these P.O.W. to examine their classification and sub-

mit recommendation. These Indian P.O.W. were Punjabis (Muslims and non-Muslims), Gurkhas, Garhwalis, Madrasis, Sikhs etc. General Savoury was appointed as Chairman and myself as Vice-Chairman, with Col. Shiri Nagsh (later Gen. and C-in-C), Col. Kalwant Singh (Lt. Gen.), Col. Kamarmanglam (Gen. C-in-C), Col. Thakur Nathu Singh (Lt. Gen.) and Col. Green (Lt. Gen.) as members.

It had been decided that the Committee should meet P.O.W. batches at Bombay and direct them to Indore where they would be kept as detainees.

There were two opinions; one led by General Savoury to give them i.e, the red of the gray exemplary punishment, as the War in the East was still on and where Bose's I.N.A. were very active. The other was led by me who advocated patience to allow a colling off period and then take an appropriate action. My reasons were that I had tasted experience as P.O.W. in the First World War. Eventually, General Savoury agreed with me after long cross-examination of P.O.W.

Lord Wavell and F.M. Auchinleck decided that all future batches of P.O.W. from the Western and Eastern Fronts should be given hero welcome at the sea ports and they should be sent to their Training Centres, and on arrival there they should be sent on 3 months war leave. This decision proved successful.

After partition inspite of the fact that the British Military Mission opposed the idea of re-employment of I.N.A., the Quaid-i-Azam ruled it otherwise.

I, as your oldest soldier, request you to please consider

the possibility of hostile anti-P.O.W. press interviews and similar matter should be stopped or countered. The Indian P.O.W. pre-partition were mercenaries but these Pakistani P.O.W. are Mujahids and we must not make hasty decisions. We need every one of them. It was not their fault but that of the General Headquarter at Rawalpindi and their strategic plan.

If so desired, I will be glad to discuss it in detail with one of your Ministers as you—I unaware—are extremely busy and I am unable to pay my respects to you at Islamabad.

With kindest regards.

(Mohammad Akbar Khan)

Maj: Gen. (Rtd.)

P.A. No. 1.

Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,  
President,  
Islamic Republic of Pakistan,  
ISLAMABAD.

### III

#### Some guidelines for planning for war

- (a) "In War", wrote Napoleon in 1813, "Opinion is everything. There is not much difference after a battle in the material condition of the victor and the vanquished, but the *'moral'* difference is immeasurably great, enemy are in a rare fright...Not long ago they believed that my troops consisted of recruits;

now they say that I have collected my Veterans, that my troops are picked men and that the French armies are better than ever. You see what '*fear can do*'."

(b) "Neither" wrote Bacon, "is the money the sinews of war, (as it is trivially said) where the sinews of men's arms is base and effeminate people are failing, so are there states great in territory, yet not apt to enlarge or command."

(c) "Preparation for war is an expensive burdensome business", said Field Marshal Slim, "Yet there is one thing important '*that costs little*'—study." These are some of the pre-requisites to the planning and the implementation of a plan for war.

Ref. (a) Opinion have now started swinging in our favour. The Indians are beginning to feel '*the fright*' as they have begun to feel rightly once again that it is the man, and neither men nor machines, that count. However, it is vital that we should patiently train our men, re-organise our forces, re-plan our strategy to be able to meet the challenges of our enemies.

Secondly, '*the cat is out of the bag*'. The World opinion, according to the Western press reports, is busy retracing its steps as regards aid to Bangladesh and as regards the invincibility of Mr. Mujib's so called unquestioned and also Herculean power of the Indian Armed forces.

Thirdly, the spell of unquestioned loyalty to Mr. Mujib of 26,00,000 Mukti Bahinis is being doubted, not only by the

Indian leaders but is evident from Mr. Mujib's own camouflaged statements in mass meeting and press. Display of bold front by us, but with calculated risk only, should be our watch word.

Fourthly, the solidarity of the Arab bloc and other African and Asian Muslim countries as Pakistan's well wishers, has surprised Bharati leaders. They now see the nightmare of their losing trade and sympathy in this Muslim bloc. The B.B.C.— i.e. British policy makers mouth piece, has remarked more than once "Is Mr. Bhutto trying to form a Muslim bloc?" A.I. Radio has been harping the same tune. We must preserve this solidarity as our most sacred trust. The Quran says: *'The believers are brothers.'*

We Pakistanis must not waste time over vain regrets, what we need is to overcome lethargy. We are sure to overcome all obstacles if we have faith. "Verily Allah Changeth not the condition of a nation until they (first) change that which is in their hearts," The Quran (13:2).

As stated earlier, that [policy for national security of one's homeland depends on balanced marger of the following factors :

- (a) Political, which includes psychological and diplomacy. What the diplomatic body is to the policy, the general staff is to the strategy; the former expresses the wishes of the Government, the latter carries out the 'will' of the general in accordance with the strategic plan approved by the national Government.
- (b) War is the ultimate recourse of policy, and every

nation must be ready, in the last instance, to protect its vital interests by force of arms unless it is prepared to surrender them to an enemy without a blow.

- (c) The theatre of war is the province of strategy; the field of battle is the province of tactics. The purely military advantages to be attained by strategical operations are :
  - (i) The probabilities of victory.
  - (ii) The consequences of victory.
  - (iii) Strategic plan must be closely allied at every point with National policy.
  - (iv) It is impossible to be too strong for a decisive victory. Sudden changes in the plan of operations lead to incalculable losses of strength and often produce the greatest misfortunes. We should pause and reflect as regards our direction of Indo-Pak War 1971.
  - (v) There is no decisive victory in a battle or series of battles of a campaign as long as the nation's 'will' to defend her honour is unbroken. It is here where psychological training counts.

Let us not deceive ourselves by pretending, as some allege, that debacle in 1971 was from the first inevitable. More serious heart searching is necessary, if we desire to stop disasters in

wars in the future. The directing classes (the elected Government) as well as the parties in the opposition in any nation, should have a certain general knowledge of the Art-of-War, just as they ought also to be instructed in economic, or constitutional history. To the Muslims, the Quran enjoins : "Warfare is prescribed for you, though it be not to your liking..." (2:216). "Hold fast, all of you together..." (3:103). "O ye who believe! Take not for intimates those who are not your own, they would not fail to corrupt you..." (3:118).

It is, therefore, not the soldier alone who should know the Art-of-War. *'What touches all is the business of all'!*

- (d) While planning for war, our National Policy should very closely bear the logistics of our nation—both civil and military. Pakistan's economy depends mostly on Agriculture. Just as direction of war in the field of operation should be directed by military leaders, so should the agricultural field be exploited, developed and administered by our agricultural experts. Similarly, the industrial projects should be run by those who have studied and mastered this subject. Let us admit that at the birth of Pakistan, the civil services tried to run every department by themselves. But when they failed, the generals, the airmarshals, the admirals, had a go at it, but they too failed. Let us confess our failure! Let it serve us as a warning written on the wall. It is a sad commentary that even now we do not seem to have taken adequate steps to rectify it. Let us plan production, storage (Silos to prevent wastage), distribution of grain, edible oils, etc.

- (e) Undoubtedly '*language*' plays a very important role in bringing the peoples closer to each other. Yet when the first Prime Minister of Pakistan in haste tried to impose Urdu language in East Pakistan without making necessary preparations for it with the aid of (psywar) psychological warfare—the resulted disasters are now glaring at us. Our enemies used it as a lever to uproot us. Should not subtle propaganda launched on sound lines before this imposition of Urdu as a national language had produced better and saner results? Wisdom after the event is an expensive wisdom—yet, it is better than none. Have we learnt a lesson? I am doubtful!
- (f) Similarly, one ounce of imagination and foresight for our strategic planning is worth ten tons of experience. In long periods of peace our armed forces are beating the air in their planning and training for war. It cannot possibly see the results of what it is doing, of what it is teaching, of what it should be doing for the latest developments in weaponry and methods—especially when our armed forces carried out no combined military manoeuvres in the last few years. This is only '*one way*' in which armed forces can possibly know whether what it projects in peace time, will be right for future war, and that is, by constant and free discussions of all new ideas, new suggestions, and new designs. If the discussion is sufficiently open and if in the end, the authority itself brings up the matter when fully ventilated, before its governing body—i.e. the Defence Committee—for sympathetic examination, then the

armed forces will have some means of obtaining progress and of judging whether what it projects in peace, will be advantageous in war. Only by such discussions can we ever get forward, for in peace; we cannot apply the terrible weapons at our disposal, and prove them against our enemy, who in his own turn has his own methods and will react in his own particular way to what we do.

While still on planning and execution of strategic planning let us also admit that we have failed to put our '*Defence House*' in order because :

- i) Since 1949 our three services have been developing more or less independently, and Defence decisions have been made of an '*ad-hoc*' nature by one may call '*amateur strategists*', in the Secretariat of Defence Department, guided not by any long term objectives formulated with regard to the kind of force structures demanded by changing patterns of threat—developments in weapon systems and developing concepts of joint warfare; but based instead upon independent evaluation of various contingencies by '*each service*' without regard to the best utilization of our limited resources. Hence we have unbalanced Armed Forces.
- ii) Joint planning and decision making body did not exist since 1950 and even in 1965 war and since then. It has been stated that C-in-C Air did not know the plans of operations, either in 1965 or

1971. Because Pakistan's planning and execution was run since 1950 on the '*Feldher Concept*' where exclusive authority is delegated to an overall Commander — '*the strongman*'—at the National level,

### **A strong man.**

A strong man, name him what you may, is invariably very unscrupulous, will intentionally distort the significant elements of information shared with any one else, and will impose '*his will*' by force, or by shrewd manoeuvres. A strong man insists on having his own direct line to the information centre; be it a military advisor, a comptroller, or Director of Intelligence. He then makes his own decision—this is what our various strong men did in their turn since 1950, till they left the nation on the edge of a steep precipice.

No matter how brilliantly conceived, or carefully prepared a plan may be, it must always so adjusted to the realities of a developing situation. But information as used in this case is often quite different from the information produced by intelligence section. This in turn will have evil result.

Why don't we learn from history ?

### **Some pertinent questions while we plan.**

What is the '*object*' and the '*objectives*' ?

i) What are geographical limits ?

- ii) What to control, or deny, or indict? Why? What is the purpose of exercising control for our troops and others? Where do we wish to exercise control? What means, or forces or weapons are most suitable for control? Strategy of blockade—its good or evil effects.
- iii) The state of National economics? Critical logistic targets?
- iv) Scope and timing of strategic plan? Composition, balance and deployment of our forces? Force and logistical build up of the belligerents?
- v) Ideological and psychological build up of the belligerents?
- vi) Maintenance of political position by delaying war, or without fighting a war?
- vii) In many instances, because our national economy, supply of weaponry and warlike stores etc. is so largely dependent on the free use of overseas, resources of shipping and shipping facilities, recall and/or of protection of shipping will be major purpose of our action; in war and peace, i.e. in situation of tensions in cold war and in situations once hostilities have started.
- viii) Our policy should remain of '*alertness and watchfulness*'. Our [planning should be such that the

enemy be forced to meet our choice—out of our many choices. The Quran says : “.....Take your precautions and then advance.....”(4 : 71)

### Some Food for thought

Strategy, force development (manpower, weaponry, logistic), and budgets are aspects of the same decision of Defence Planning and policy must therefore be based on long term evaluation based, on long evaluation of threat, and on availability of national resources. The Ministry of Defence with professional advice of the Defence Committee after critical study and approval of strategic '*object and objectives and budgetary allocation*' to various services should present it for approval to the National Defence Council.

The very high acquisition and cost of most modern weapon system demands that strategic objectives, force goals and budget should at all times cover periods of 10—15 years. The fact that research work on invention and modernisation of weaponry demands that the plan should be critically examined and be upgraded annually—on a '*rolling plan*' basis.

The changing patterns of threat, alliances, new pacts, sanctions, arms embargoes, and effects of blockade—for a developing country—is most likely to cripple our war efforts ; unless we pay special attention to develop our heavy industry. A pre-requisite for this is the establishment of an organisation which could formulate higher defence policy.

*To overcome the deficiencies in the present set up, it is*

suggested that :

- (a) Ministers, Ministers of State of the Centre, as well as, of the provinces, should be divided into say three or four batches for receiving training in Defence planning.
- (b) A certain number of M.P.A's should be included in these courses who would form a reserve.

Each course, to start with, may last 4—6 weeks. It should cover introduction of these national leaders to the defence problems, such as : National Defence Policy and present organization, strategy in peace time, logistics both civil and military, critical study of various pacts, their values or loopholes.

It should also consider the responsibility and suitability, or otherwise of the co-ordination of Army, Navy, Airforce, Civil Defence, ideological and psychological warfare. press, Radio, W. T. and T. V. propaganda programmes, are only some of many other subjects. The modern atomic era war has shrunk the world very considerably. The Defence College and the Staff College should formulate a training programme under discussion.

### Security

It is imperative that nation as a whole and leaders, should be made to take intelligent interest in the National Defence. The '*strong man*' should be eliminated—which shall be done the sooner, the better. It is therefore, vital that

there should be a Minister of State of Central Government who should act as a full time Vice-Chairman and he should represent the Defence Minister in day to day co-ordinatory work between all Defence Service (Army, Navy, Airforce, para-military force) and the civil Service as well as the '*Productivity Ministry*'—logistics.

'*Surprise*' is a powerful factor in war, for when men are surprised the emotions, not the intellect, are in control, their minds are consequently confused and unbalanced, and they are more than usual liable to error. Moreover, without the element of surprise, superiority of force at the decisive point may not be attainable, for the enemy will probably be prepared to meet, and may even anticipate the blow if he ascertains when and where it is to be struck—this is '*exactly what happened in 1971 war*'. Our so called '*TOP Secret*' Plan was discussed not only in the bazars of Pakistan but also in India and Afghanistan. General D.K. Palet has confirmed it in the officially A.H.Q. sponsored book '*The Lightning War 1971*'.

It would mean tighter security measures which can be successful only if every man in the street becomes security-minded. It can be achieved only through subtle overt and covert propaganda training in Press, Radio, T.V. and Universities, Colleges and Schools.

From what one hears about across the border, it seems that recently Bharati leaders and public are in a grip of fear. The boot is [on the other leg, therefore it is considered that we should take a firm stand on return of P.O.W. and firmly but plainly tell them that '*we also can*

*and will try for treason Bengali officials' both civil and military and others who number 8,00,000—i.e. more than 90,000. P. O. W. There should be no other Liaquat-Nehru pact. Let us implement in deed Quaid-i-Azam's advice: "Unity—Faith—Discipline".*

Submitted to the  
President  
by Rangrut  
on June 10, 1972

#### IV

#### **Planning and execution of war—importance of logistics**

It is my purpose as one who has lived amidst two World Wars, many Frontier Campaigns, Kashmir wars, countered Afghan Army incursion and communal riots created by political adventurists of the Indian Congress, the Western bloc powers as well as by the Eastern bloc countries to present my views as a critical contemporary observer to the younger generation as a food for thought. We Muslims have as yet to emerge from scene of material ruin and moral havoc, the like of which, has never darkened the imagination of people for centuries, inspite of fact that the Quran and Hadith has oft warned us. After all that we suffered and sometimes achieved, we find ourselves confronted with problems and perils not less but far more formidable than those through which we Pakistani have so narrowly made our way. It is still dissensions within the Muslims and threat of annihilation from without that needs our fullest attention.

While presenting this vital subject of planning at length—even at the risk of repeating myself—I offer no apology to the readers. Because we have neglected it for so long! Let us face facts fairly and squarely that we are not at yet out of the wood. In actual fact we are on the brink of a very steep precipice. It is therefore most imperative that we pay attention immediately to muster. This tricky problem for the national security and survival of our present, as well as, future generation.

The future is mould by the past. The best promise for the future lies in understanding and applying the lessons of the past. In all history there are few more glaring instances of incompetent statesmanship and generalship than 1971 war in the East and West Pakistan, i.e. to detach a large force in the vague hope of solving a political problem by force of arms. The planning for security was even worse, as our strategists were following the policy '*to rob Peter to pay Paul*', i.e. by milking West Pak Forces to strengthen forces in East Pak.

History is something which cannot be deleted by the subjective views of some men or authors. We had not learnt the causes which caused a debacle in South East Asia by robbing it (Paul) to pay Peter (Western Front) in the Second World War. Military history must be studied, because it gives the explanations of many of the great catalysms which break up the annals of the world into separate epochs. What touches all is the business of all. It is not pretended that if military history were thoroughly studied all statesmen would become Khalid-bin-Waleed, or that every citizen would be competent to set squadrons of tanks in the field. But if war were more generally and thoroughly studied, the importance of organisation, or training, of education, intelligence, including ideologi-

cal warfare and of readiness, would be more generally appreciated; abuses would no longer be regarded with lazy tolerance; efficiency would be something more than a political catchword. Patriotism is not enough—we must learn or perish. *'The study of war must be more comprehensive'* and must include the economic element which plays so considerable a part in modern war. It is no more right to hand over the study of military history to professional soldiers alone than it would be to permit no one but lawyers to touch constitutional history. Till some such knowledge exists it is open to any person, military man or civilian—which has unfortunately been the case in Pakistan since Quaid-i-Azam's death—to pontificate upon one of the necessary functions of the state, without being recognised at once as a crank, or a sciolist by the audience that he is addressing. It is not soldier alone who should know the outlines of the past history of his art. Generals are no more infallible than ministers; and looking down the records of our national history we may conclude that each class has had only too much occasion to rail at the other and that neither should claim omniscience, infallibility, or omnipotence.

For example, but for the ignorance about the art of war a minister (civilian) who in 1948 stated to me: "I handed over the charge of our Kashmir war to the proper professional military authority; and am therefore in no wise responsible for the results in war in Kashmir"—which happen to be disastrous. As regards Generals, who did not understand that the Guerillas (Mukti Bahini) are symptoms of dissatisfaction of people against their rulers rather than cause—they emphasise that political, economic, social and ideological problems must be attended by the Government immediately. Lasting success requires a viable political settlement, and even tactical opera-

tional successes over a period of time demand proper political and ideological framework for the effective military action. The aggressive employment of counter guerilla warfare by serving soldiers, name them what you may—regular troops, security armed police, scouts, a dubious task and such counter guerillas are seldom guerillas. Hence the failure of military mission in East Pakistan in 1971 should have been foreseen as doomed. I have invariably stuck to my rule of never criticising any measure of war or policy after the event, unless I had expressed publicly or formally, my opinion about it. It has given me pain to record some of these disagreement with so '*many men whom I liked or respected*': but it would be wrong not to lay the lessons of the past before the future. Let no one look down on those well meaning men whose actions are chronicled in these pages without searching his own heart, reviewing his discharge of public or national duty, and applying the lessons of the past to his future conduct.

As regards warning as '*a squeak of an old soldier,*' I published books on Guerilla warfare, Past, Present and Future and Counter Guerilla Warfare, On War Islamic Policy, Grand Strategy and Diplomacy and Hazrat Ali as an Amir to depict as a comparative study of Islamic Way of '*Meeting the threat*' of the Guerillas, partisan gangs, large modern armies as in vogue in the advanced nations. I followed it up with publication of The Islamic Pattern of War in the two Volumes, the Choice of the Arabs Versus Israel and Israel and Sultan Salahuddin Ayubi and Ideologies in Conflict to illustrate again through comparative study, that On War Islamic Policy is superior today as it was 1400 years ago—over other patterns-of-War of either bloc. Leading critics on works presented by Rangrut on military subjects in both blocs have commented favourably. In all my

such warnings I have tried to follow Quranic warning : “Afala Tatafakkaroon? i.e. why don't you reflect”, and why don't you follow the Holy Prophet's saying : ‘*Know thyself and know thy enemy*’.

An army is dependent on its communication, and intelligence when those communications, are by sea, their severance is fatal. It surrenders to investment. In this Indo-Pak war the main conflict was confined, as it were within a ring, held by the Bharati fleet supported by Russian fleet. ‘*The ultimate object*’ of the sea warfare was to enable the Bharati army to destroy Pakistan army. The ‘*immediate object*’, or call it course of action for attaining the ultimate object, was to disable Pakistan Air and Naval Force. Bharati Air and Naval Force achieved this object. This should have been foreseen by Pakistani strategists—if they did visualize it—then why did they choose Dacca as a place of investment rather than Chittagong Forest and port Sector ?

It is not long ago that in the Second World War the Western Allies retreated towards sea ports such as Dunkirk, Marseilles etc. and did not defend Paris—a most revered and sensitive object both politically, commercially. We can quote so many instances, i.e. the British Allied army took shelter in the forests of Assam rather defend Capital Mamyo, and Marshal Chiang Kai Shek and his Western Allies retired towards sea bases rather trying to defend Peking or Mankiang to the last man.

Again to form plans for war, and particularly (because the opportunity is greater) in sea warfare—which excludes consider-

ation of the neutral country as heaven of refugee when pressed too hard by enemy—in this case Burma, is the height of folly. By retiring into Burma we could have not only saved our men becoming P.O.W. in Bharat but this investment in Chittagong area could have lasted much longer in time and thus it might have given more time to obtain succour from friendly countries, and U.N.O. if not materially, but morally. The questions which should have been uppermost in the minds of our strategists: '*how long war*' of which investment is the character, might possibly last and how much more immune from this form of pressure must be a country so situated as to be able to conduct a large proportion of its trade by other channels than those direct to her sea-ports.

In order to survive or win a conflict, strategies must be planned to the '*scale of decades not years*.' An individual conflict should not be viewed as an isolated phenomenon—as we did in Indo-Pak Conflict 1971—but as a phase of total struggle, an integral part of a multiple series of inte-related conflicts such as emergence of Pakistan, Kashmir issue, Far-rakha Barrage etc. Because one conflict triggers off the other, there is no decisive defeat or victory except the last. If war belongs to policy it naturally takes its character from those. If policy is great and powerful, so also will be the war, and this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its absolute form.

Taken as a whole nobody of armed men can be considered to be an army—that is, an organised force—unless it reacts to the will of one man, the Commander, for a multi-headed army is clearly a monster. There should

be unanimity in planning and co-ordination in its execution. There should be continued meeting of the heads of three services under the Defence Minister—or the Supreme Commander in case of Pakistan's revolutionary Government. No such meetings were held during the crisis or during war, at least the press remained silent. On the contrary press carried stories that a very senior staff officer had to wait for many hours as he could neither see the Supreme Commander, the Chief of Staff nor the President's Advisor.

Nor can this body—'Armed forces'—be maintained as an efficient fighting machine, unless it is fed and supplied with hundred and one necessary stores, such as food, weaponry, fuel, transport, medicines. An army is therefore a 'three-fold' organisation comprising a body—its combatant arms, a stomach—its administrative services; and a brain—its commander. Because the destruction of any of those parts renders the other parts inoperative, it follows that there are three tactical objectives. Of those, the first—the combatant, which may be compared to the shell of an egg, occupies the outer or forward area, and the second and third, the command and administrative services, representing the yolk and white, occupy the inner or rear area. They are therefore tactical areas of attack and defence, i.e. the forward, the rear areas,

### **Planning And Propaganda**

We Pakistani Muslims should admit that we once again allowed India to steal a march on us. Any one who has critically studied the causes for Muslims being given a distorted Pakistan at the time of Partition would realize that

the success achieved in this direction by the Indian Congress was due to the following factors :—

- (a) While planning for achieving power in India, they had prepared well ahead a long term overt and covert propaganda plan.
- (b) They had infiltrated their men in all branches of the Government of India Services. This was repeated in 1970-71.
- (c) The Congress had formulated a shadow cabinet whose cabinet Ministers had been allotted tasks. As regards defence and propaganda Mr. Nehru and his trusted General Secretary (his daughter) Mrs. Indira Gandhi was responsible. Mrs. Indira Gandhi carried on as Minister of information in Shastri Government.
- (d) Their success in covert subtle anti-Muslim League and anti-Princely States had opened new vistas for them in the political field.

### **Propaganda Programme**

In the case of crisis since 1952 in East Pakistan, it was designed to canvass the evils of domination of West Pakistanis, to inflame feelings with published fabricated stories of Western Pakistan atrocities perpetrated upon innocent Bengali civilians, civil servants, and generally to persuade the Eastern peoples that there was no alternative to a complete break with the rest of Pakistan.

Very soon the newspapers in Bengal financed by Bharat

stated the campaign of inequality in the field of economic, such as inadequate quota in civil service in all branches of Central Government and semi-Government institutions, this was an exact copy of what the Congress did in India during British Raj. In order to level up the proportion on population basis of West Pakistani and East Pakistani, due to it the Pakistan Government allowed accelerated promotions to the Bengalis. They were also allowed under pre-conceived Mujib plan to infiltrate into key positions at Islamabad in C.S.P., P.S.P., Defence Services and in Foreign Embassies as well as in State Bank, Insurance P.I.A. etc.

Soon in the pages of Bengla Newspapers alongside the stories of injustices—more horror stories were published. Open letters to Mr. Mujib in which he was urged to take action along the chosen path—the six points. The rebel group came in due course to be referred as Mujib and his Awami League as sole spokesmen of Bengalis by many commentators in India and in Britain. The Pakistan Government was suffering from '*Munich Spirit*' and its very submissive and subdued policy accordingly. Indian Government in support of Mujib's secular ideology drew Christian Church into the conflict—internally to whip up popular support for their plan among its followers in the region and externally to give the world the impression that what had just begun was a fanatic religious conflict between the tolerant secular East Pakistan and the so called Muslim West Pakistan. Now the prospect of creating a virtual Roman Catholic Wing in a secular state offered the church authorities in Britain, U.S.A. and Rome the chance of achieving what they had failed to obtain from the Protestant British hawks. As they could not resist this new crusade, so various church organizations became supporters of Mujib's Awami League. Seldom have the British

Press, Indian Press, U.S.S.R., U.S.A., [Voice] of America controlled by Zionists B.B.C. and A.I.R. drawn world attention to the atrocities, which in fact the Mukti Bahini and its supporters themselves had consistently perpetrated upon fellow Muslims and fellow Pakistanis in East Pakistan. All this happened because the Pakistan Government, it seems, had made no plans to combat it. In any case, the official propaganda machinery proved itself inefficient, lethargic and hopelessly out of date in combating this onslaught. The real reason being that the Pakistani intelligence system—both civil and military—was dormant, because it was entirely controlled by Mujib's lieutenants. It is regrettable that many of the despatches on Bangladesh situation by foreign pressmen who had been to East Pakistan as guests of Pakistan Government, gave a distorted picture of the situation—too often they only echoed the words of Bharat, U.S.S.R. or B.B.C. of information. The truth never reached the world—of course, the fault is ours.

Finally in the diplomatic and political field, it provided solid foundation for the legalised employment of armed aggression by the combined forces of Mukti Bahini and Bharati Armed Forces under pre-emptive, pre-conceived covert strategic plan, as an action in defence of civil liberties and human rights of oppressed people of Bengal.

Had those officials responsible for the security and unity of Pakistan studied the '*Ojukwan's* Rebellions and World Opinion' written by Dr. Nabo B. Graham—Dauglas, formerly Attorney-General for Eastern Nigeria—they could have understood how the hands of Israel, India, Zionist controlled U.S.A. Press media and Russia worked.

## ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING, PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION

### Logistics

Having dwelt with strategical planning—though briefly, I will now try to dwell in more detail on administrative matters while planning on the matters of national security of Pakistan, because, in my opinion the latter has so far not received the attention it so richly deserves—moreover administrative matters—the logistics—are though wrongly described by some, as ‘tail’ as opposed to tactics—*the teeth*. Many noted strategists, for example, Napoleon, who ignored to take proper notice of logistics, came to grief—hence he, after disaster in Russia said: “Army marches on its belly”. The stomach is no less important an organ of the body than the heart, and while it is clearly essential that the heart be protected, it is no less essential also to guard the stomach. The forces capable of giving power to that organ in war are still of all types that navigate on above or under water, or flies in the air, are capable of operating in those operational areas and in that manner which alone protection can be given. Experience and logic inexorably lead to this conclusion.

“I have soldiered for more than forty years” wrote Field Marshall Wavell, “and the more I have seen war, the more I realize how it all depends on logistic—i.e. administration and transportation.” The term logistics became popular and was commonly used and given due attention by the Western allies during Second World War especially after Hitler’s disasters during his invasion of Russia which he had very nearly—by his

Nazi force—overrun. It is an interesting subject, as a comparative study, that Timur—Timarlane, the great advocate of Islamic Pattern of War is the only general who conquered and held Russia under his sway during his life-time. Japanese lost the war because they over-stretched their logistics in her advance in South Asia Campaign in World War II.

In broad description, it is

- (a) Logistics is the process of planning for providing goods, facilities and services for the support of the armed forces and civilian economics at the international level in peace and war.
- (b) National logistics is the planning for and, providing goods and services for the support of the nation's military forces and it's operations: a nation's civilian economy and its international obligations and requirements. Logistics is an art, a science, and a process. Logistics—the bridge—its process is one and at the same time the economic element of our military operations and the military element of our economy. Good programme and financial management should permeate the whole process—comptroller technique is part of this.
- (c) Civilian logistics is the process of planning for and providing support of '*the civilian economy*'. It is also the mobilization of the '*civilian industrial economy*' to support armed forces.
- (d) Military logistics is the process of planning for and

*'providing men, goods and services'* for the support of the military forces—pre and during operations.

- (e) Strategy and tactics provide the scheme for the conduct of operations in accordance with the policy of the government; logistics provide therefore, the *'means'*.

### Civilian Logistics in Pakistan

Agriculture is the single largest sector of the economy. It is the main earner of foreign earnings and employing about 60 percent of the civilian labour out of her 80 percent of her total population and contributes more than 50 percent to the central exchequer. The green revolution in agriculture pushed West Pakistan's overall growth rate from 2.7 percent during the fifties to 6.4 percent. But since then it has remained *'static and stagnant and perhaps in the reverse gear'*. We still import annually millions of tons of foodgrains and edible oil. It was in 1951 when I succeeded the King of U.K. as a Colonel Commandant of Royal Pakistan Army Service Corps—now Army Service Corps; I was asked as Colonel Commandant in 1958 to suggest ways and means to reduce the cost of maintaining military forces without reducing its efficiency as a fighting machine. This was not the first time that I had been asked to make such proposal on agriculture as in 1945 I was responsible for formulating and executing *'Post-War Reconstruction Scheme'* (now Fauji Foundation) and a scheme for the Re-settlement of released soldiers after the termination of Second World War—i.e. the Makhi Dand in Sind and Thal Project Scheme in the Punjab, similar schemes in U.P.

and Bombay, because I am tiller of the soil by birth and [a soldier only by profession. I have kept myself well informed in both subjects. What I submitted to the Government, briefly is :

#### **Food for the Armed Forces**

- (a) Wheat, rice and grain for animal feed and dals was purchased in the Punjab and Sind through civilian commission agents. The responsibilities of these agents ended at closing of sale in the grain markets (Mandis). The stocks were taken over by the Military officers of the Purchasing and Disposal Department under the Ministry of Defence.
- (b) From the markets these grains were railed, and/or shipped to the Army Supply Depots at Karachi and Chittagong which held reserve stocks to last for 1 year and 3 months. Dryage and loss in transit from markets to the military depots to the extent of 3 percent was permitted.
- (c) These grains on basis of 3 months supply were shipped or railed back to Ganesh Flour Mills at Lyallpur for milling. Again 3 percent loss in transit was permitted from Chittagong during shipment to Karachi Depot who despatched this consignment alongwith its own to Lyallpur for milling. Another 3 percent loss in transit was permitted. Again a wastage of 5 percent was allowed for milling and transit to Karachi and another 3 percent for return

voyage to Chittagong was permitted. The main Supply Depots distributed (issued) goods to troops at various stations—again 3 percent loss was permissible in transit.

- (d) The cost of handling, i.e., loading, unloading, stacking and re-stacking and road transport became quite a considerable amount.
- (e) It put great pressure on rail rolling stocks and ships.
- (f) It was worked out that about eight crores of rupees annually could be saved if repeated railing, shipment, handling costs and transport costs was cut down to the minimum.

#### Suggested Remedy

- (i) Middlemen's—the commission agents—fees could be eliminated as it was considered unnecessary. The work could be done by the Military Purchasing and Disposal Department at the grain markets and later on by the Army Service Corps personnel at the Supply Depots.
- (ii) It was suggested that grain etc. for flour in East Pakistan should be milled in Chittagong or Dacca etc. The armed forces would thus get fresher stocks, the cost of double handling, transport and losses in transit would be saved for national security.

(iii) As regards military needs in West Pakistan (Army, Navy, Air and C. A. F.) the grain should be stocked at Military Supply Depots at Bannu, Kohat, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Hyderabad, Quetta and Karachi. The Supply Depots should be responsible for milling it at local flour mills on 3 months stock basis. It would release railway rolling stock and ships for trade purposes.

(iv) It was suggested 'Silos' should be constructed to protect the grain from fungus and insects which causes losses up to 5 to 10 percent.

The scheme was put though only partly in operation but saving of four crore rupees annually was made inspite of the fact no silos were constructed. However, later on, the whole procedure was abandoned for unknown reasons.

### **Civilian Demand**

As regards to meet the civilian demands of such a deficit areas, Azad Kashmir and big cities, such as Karachi, the reserve stocks for civilian needs were stocked in the past at Karachi for East Pakistan and deficit areas in the North; and at Lahore for Kashmir and N. W. F. area. Yet for milling purposes most of it was railed (or shipped) back to Lyallpur for milling.

However, the greatest blunder committed by various governments in the past has been most prominent on the measures that were taken to increase production. It seems

that our Government copied some of the measures taken by Bharat without critically examining them and without taking the profit and loss Bharat gained or suffered due to it.

Bharat as a vindictory measure against Landlords and Jagirdars, who had helped Muslim League during the political tussle pre-partition, decided to hit hard their economy through the so-called '*Land Reforms*' in which the ceiling of land holding was reduced ridiculously low. By doing this, the Congress killed the hen which laid the golden eggs. The production of foodgrain went down greatly as the new tenants were neither helped with seeds, cattle for ploughs, or money on loan for their daily needs. Moreover, the landlords had used their option to turn the best cultivable land into orchards by planting maximum plants or turn it to cattle-farm land to fulfil the conditions as laid down by the government in the Reform. The result was.

- (i) Very low production of grain.
- (ii) Drop in the revenue as the orchards and cattle-farms remained non-productive for few years.
- (iii) The low agricultural production very adversely affected Bharat's Textile industry. It would be an irony of fate if we too followed the suit in our Land Reforms. Whereas no doubt land reforms are required but alongwith reduction in holding steps should be taken to ensure that due to the change over the production does not suffer a set back, as

this will also affect industrial development, if we had to import foodgrains, oil seeds at top priority.

The other Himalayan blunder we committed during this period was that we ignored to make best use of our technicians—i.e. the Officers of the Agricultural Department.

*'To sum up our present problems'* in agricultural economy in 1972 are :

- (a) Improvement in production of grains, oil seeds, cotton. This will depend on provision to the tillers of the soil now that the landlords, if not totally extricated, have been held down under the new reforms, a system has to be introduced to fill up this vacuum which has, or may, very adversely effect the whole scheme of Land Reforms.
- (b) Let us critically study the Government machinery to locate possible trouble spots. When the Military Revolutionary Government noticed the fall in agricultural products they superimposed military officials under the Martial Law over the civil Administration—which resulted in lack of co-operation and confidence. When I was asked to give my views by the President on it in 1960 at Hyderabad, I strongly opposed this system. It was agreed, but I admit it was complied with in mere half-heartedly, and more in letter than in spirit, because a new vista—though faulty—was chosen by the Military regime. I mean, the introduction of Agricultural Development Corporation

(A. D. C.) as an independent body and Agricultural Development Bank (A. D. B.). The ADC was to be run by military officers. I know most of them and as expected only chaos resulted. Then began a race for power politics between the military regime and the civil services. The result was chaos.

### **Remedial Measures**

Let us not '*moan on the past but look at the future with hope and confidence*' and adopt a creative programme which would open up new vistas of progress and prosperity among not only the tiller of the soil but amongst the whole nation. I submit that :

### **Administration**

- (a) Put the right man on the right job. So far the master of all trades—the C.S.P. and the military have failed to deliver the goods to the nation. Let the Agricultural Department carry on the job. They should be trusted to carry on unfettered. A job for which they have been specially trained as experts. Let us admit they have not been given a fair chance in the past to run—the agricultural economy of the country.
- (b) The Secretary of Food and Agriculture in the Central Government should be an Officer of the Agricultural Department who is preferably qualified as a graduate in Agricultural Production or/and Agri-

cultural Engineering. There is nothing new in this procedure as judiciary has been separated from administration in civil services.

- (c) Similarly, in the Provincial Governments the Secretary for Food and Agriculture should be an Officer of Agriculture Department.
- (d) In the Districts and Tehsils the Director of Agriculture should be responsible for management of Agricultural production, distribution of fertilizers, recommendation for loans for bullocks, ploughs, tractors and seeds etc. from A.D.B.
- (e) There are many hundred acre large best tracts of land for stud farms which were gifted to military officers such as Renala, Colesar, in Sahiwal. Similarly, there are many such stud farms in Lyallpur and Sargodha Districts each between 1000 acres to 5000 acres on long lease. These could be divided into small holdings and used as '*seed farms*'.
- (f) There is lack of co-ordination between Centre and Provinces for the purchase of Agricultural machinery. This should be standardized. It may be recalled that the Nazis and the Soviets with small adjustments very effectively used their tractors and bulldozers for military use in the Second World War. One can witness large graveyards all over Pakistan of tractors and bulldozers near barrages, H.Q. of A.D.C. and Irrigation Departments which are useless

due to lack of spare parts. These tractors etc. of various manufacture were purchased by A. D. C., P.W.D. and Irrigation Departments. Each department purchased machinery without central liaison or control. They are now useless as there are no spare parts available. There are many hundred tubewell machinery still lying in packing cases near Hub Chowki.

(g) Again there is lack of liaison between agriculturalists, Agricultural Department, Canal and Tubewell Irrigation Departments as regards supply, and closure of water during different times of the year. A co-ordinated time-table should be produced in advance for the information of the tiller.

(h) We have '*no proper soil testing and advisory department*' who should guide the tiller of the soil as regards the correct use of fertilizers, crop rotation. Many tubewells have been sunk privately by the farmers; however, the water of these tubewells have never been tested for its suitability or otherwise.

(i) '*Construction of silos*' for the storage of grain is vital for meeting various types of emergencies, such as, draught, blockade during war and protection against weevils and pests.

Silos have become very essential since the elimination of big landlords who had constructed their godowns for storage of their own grain, cotton or oil seeds. Construction of godowns is beyond the means of every small cultivator. Every advance

nation, U.S., U.K., France, Soviet—even Bharat—has at least one year's stock in Silos for emergency purposes. In case of Pakistan, either each Provincial Government should construct necessary silos, or get it done by private enterprise which they could lease out.

### **Industry**

The spearhead of the industrial revolution has so far been the private sector. The development of the sector, has been continuing with stale momentum. For example, a nucleus of a heavy engineering is emerging. A heavy machine complex, capable of producing complete sugar and cement mills has been completed. But presently the industrial structure consists mainly of consumer goods and some export oriented units.

With the changing equation of the power balance in Southern Asia in general, and Indian sub-continent in particular, now at least some of our energies should be concentrated on defence—oriented industrial installations in Pakistan. I have discussed its possibilities fully in my book "Weaponry yesterday, today and tomorrow". In this book I have presented as a food for thought the tremendous possibilities of manufacturing most varieties of small arms and Electronic Component as cottage industries which have been very successfully carried out even by most advanced Western countries such as Sweden, Germany and Switzerland. Communist bloc had already achieved great success with the help of this method. These Government lease out tools and machinery to a team of workers who have been fully trained in

this profession in a government managed institution. We in West Pakistan have such talented workmen and artificers who have been devoted to this profession from father to son. These men run their own workshops in the Independent area on the N.W.F. Province as well as in Afghanistan. It is amazing to witness quality of these weapons which they produce from scraps of iron. I have witnessed some of these factories. Their hometown is Wazirabad, Nizamabad in Sialkot and Gujranwala (in the Punjab). Pre-partition days this area provided all technicians and armourers to the Army in India. We can employ out of these technicians also for heavy weaponry manufacturing Government factories. It is a great reservoir of trained personnel to manufacture weapons instead of importing them. Our factory at Wah could then be used for the manufacturing more complicated weaponry than 12 bore shot guns and cartridges for shooting birds. India has stolen a march in this sphere on us. We suffered very badly for sanctions and weapon embargo imposed by advanced nations against us during Kashmir 1948-49, 1965 and 1970-71 operations.

Bharat is already not only self-sufficient in small arms weapons but she is exporting to some Asian and African countries. She has been successful in manufacturing 25 pounder guns, tanks, M.I.G. air craft, telecommunication equipment, lorries and now she has floated her first destroyer. How long are we going to allow other nations to steal a march on us in agriculture, industry and weaponry ?

Submitted by  
Rangrut to the  
President  
on June 10, 1972

### Glossary as a periscope

Glossary is being presented in retrospect to remind the readers that Indo-Pak war preceding insurgency were *'neither abrupt nor unconnected events'*, but they took place under a systematically psywar pre-conceived plan for a covert war and executed efficiently both politically and militarily. It was Bharat's expansionist policy as envisaged by Mr. Nehru under his covert expansionist plan for achieving Akhand Bharat under the cover of *'Containment of (China) Communists'* penetration in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, and in Asia and Africa. This plan enabled him to obtain enormous aid from both super powers (U.S. and U.S.S.R.) who were passionately keen to contain China.

However, it is considered, what Bharat has achieved in re-secession in East Pakistan may give India only temporary satisfaction but that it is the beginning of many troubles in Bharat, and in the long run India itself will be the biggest sufferer. Pakistan is the first victim of U.N.O's failure, but Pakistan is certainly not the last victim. There are already very clear signs for things to come in Nagaland, Assam, Madras, Central India (Madya Pardesh) and Punjab where there is a cry for a separate suba (province) and language problem has taken a bad turn.

1615—East India Company established at Hooghly.

1715—Calcutta becomes a separate presidency.

1757—Clive secures Zamindari rights for the British for

permanent settlement—replaces British Zamindars for Muslim Jagirdars.

1822—Faraizi Movement by Bengali Muslims against newly created British and Hindu Zamindars, traders and industrialists.

1840—Dadu Mian and Titu Mir rebelled against the British and Hindus.

1905—First Partition of Bengal into Western and Eastern Bengal and Agrarian Reforms.

1911—Partition of Bengal and Agrarian Reforms annulled by H.M. King George due to Hindu agitation conspired by the British Hawks.

1912—Morley-Minto Reforms—Auwkaf grants to Mosques and Madrassas abolished, English and Bhasha script replaced Urdu and Arabic as official languages.

1936—Split between Indian National Congress and All India Muslim League. Hitler gains power in Germany.

1939—Second World War. Swastika flutters in Germany and is adopted by the Indian Congress.

1944—Mr. Nehru writes his book at Ahmednagar '*The Discovery of India.*'

1945—Swastika is hauled down by the Western Allies.

- 1946—The Indian Congress replaces Swastika by Ashoka's Charka. Sardar Patel gives reasons why the Indian Congress and Mr. Gandhi refused '*the three group plan*' and accepted the partition of Bengal and Punjab.
- 1947—The emergence of Pakistan.
- 1952—Language riots at Dacca. Ruling Muslim League Government was duly warned on 1.2.52.
- 1952-1971—Incubation period for anti-Pakistan propaganda planned and executed by the Axis powers.
- 1969-February 1971 Mukti Bahini succeeds in destruction of bridges, railways, factories, etc. rape, and destruction yet, subtle propaganda by Bharat blames Pak Forces for it.
- 1971—25th March—Pakistan Army cracks down on the insurgents—the snake was scotched but not killed.
- 1971—April-October—Indian Army re-groups. Mukti Bahini re-organised, re-armed by Bharat General Headquarters. Bharati soldiers and sailors as well as deserters of Pakistani Armed forces are inducted in the Mukti Bahini to raise its morale and fighting quality. See Map No. 3.
- 1971—1st to 9th November—Under the covert Bharati's policy '*humanitarianism and co-existence*' with its neighbours; the Indian Army Artillery opened fire

across the border on first November on Pakistani troops holding defence positions in the Pak territory. It was announced by Bharati Government in Press and Radio that Bharati Artillery *'was obliged to give covering fire'* to the depth of 10 to 15 miles to enable the refugees to leave Bangladesh for Bharat unmolested. 'Rangrut' has searched military history and military manuals and has failed to find any historical parallel to such tactical use of artillery fire before formal declaration of war. These long range guns were supplied by the Soviet Union. But the real objectives were (a) to mislead Pak Forces as regards real intentions of Bharat and (b) to pin them down on the ground.

—November—On 10th November, 1971, Bharat announced that Indian Army troops *'would penetrate'* to the depth of 15 miles all along the border *'to support and protect'* Mukti Bahini inside Pak territory.

It reminded Rangrut (author) the tactics used by Hitler—the great European Aryan before he invaded Poland in Second World War, or when Japanese invaded China in 1927. Of course, the real motive was to form *'a secure bridge-head'* before full scale invasion and official war against Pakistan had been declared.

—November 22nd—India without provocation or declaration of war launched a full scale invasion in East Pakistan all along the border with 8-10 Divisions, supported by Air and Navy.

—December—1st December, 1971—The Security

Council proceeding was bogged down by Soviet's Veto.

—3rd December, 1971—War spread to West Pakistan.

—December—7th December, 1971 U.N. Assembly passed a resolution, in which 104 nations supported the resolution and 11 voted against it and 10 abstained from voting.

—December—15th December, 1971—Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, in protest walked out of the U.N. Assembly.

—December—16th December, 1971—Dacca surrendered under the terms of Geneva Convention.

## VI

### GLOSSARY AS A PERISCOPE

#### WHAT NEXT IN THE PEACELESS SUB-CONTINENT—

#### INDIA

#### Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow

The prospect of another World War in a few years between super powers grows more definite and certain. Conferences such as SALT has given stronger impulse to arms race than reducing tension. In the political arena anything may happen. But '*Pro-*

*phency in the field of politics is a dangerous game.'*

In 1947, after many years of bloody communal riots, arson, and loot, the Indian Congress, who had won major victory over the British Hawks in the political field and also in deceiving the Muslim League by collaboration with British hawks; we Muslims learned nothing from the triangular conflict, and its effects on the partition of India. And now because of this unexpected success in the covert 1971 war, has run its course. From passing events—cease-fire in 1948, Tashkent Agreement in 1966 and now Simla Agreement 1972—it would appear that the Muslims are learning nothing again because they have fallen a prey to dissensions, such as language issue. However, since the partition of India, Bharat also has failed to realize that since war is the instrument of policy, policy to be creative, must be founded on morality. And that unless morality keeps pace with science, materiality will govern the nations and inevitably reduce them to dust.

If this drift is to be stayed, then the covert 1971 war should be examined not merely as a clash of arms, but also as a surgical operation. What the scapled is to the surgeon, war should be to the statesman. Whatever the causes may be, if the aim of the statesman is purely destruction, then clearly the activities of the soldier must become those of the slaughterhouse. But if, instead, the aim is constructive and curative, then these activities become those of surgery. Due to mischance or misunderstanding, or lack of skill, or of judgement, of the knowledge, a surgical operation may fail—it sometimes does; but when the aim of slaughterer becomes the aim of the surgeon, '*it must fail*', there can be no alternative.

War to be a sane political instrument demands a sane political end, and to be attainable that end must be strategically possible. The worst thing about Ang'lo-Bharat wanton covert aggressions since partition has been that their ideological aims justify the use of all means, however abominable and atrocious. Because of its secessionist and communal expansionist aims, the common folk were dragged into the conflict by Bharat by violent overt and covert propaganda, because of its language issue, the Bengaljis came to believe that it was a sacred duty to kill even their own Muslim brothers in the most atrocious ways for the purification or preservation of the true Bengali culture or language, as the case might be.

#### Why and how it happened in 1970-71 ?

What happened during this period in East Pakistan is due to Mr. Nehru's Necti—a mixture of policies of Ashokan period and the British Carlylian ideology on war. The former has been discussed already. As regards the latter we produce the views of two eminent British Military historians—General Fuller and Liddell Hart.

“It may seem a little strange, nevertheless it is a fact, that this reversion to wars of *‘permissive savagery’* was made by Britain and the United States, the two great democratic factions of cadocracy, and not by Germany and Russia, the two great autocratic factions of that same cult. Not because the last two were the more civilized, but, as Captain Liddell Hart pertinent-ly remarks—“the more military minded”. “...the Germans”, Liddell Hart writes: “...having studied war more closely than most people, had come to see the ultimate drawbacks of destroying cities and industry, and the way that this

damages the post-war situation...". Much the same he said of the Russians..." Ruthless bombing from air of civilians by U.S. Air Force in 1967-72 supports the above statement.

Further, historian General Fuller points out that : "...That is why codes of warfare, aiming at mutual limitation, have always tended to grow on the Continent (Europe), Whereas history brings out the fact that our (Britain's) own practice of warfare through centuries, fostered by our relative immunity, has been more than ordinarily ruthless, or reckless, regarding the infliction of economic damage. Military men bred in the Continental tend to have attitude towards the methods of war ...To these men, political necessity justified every means, and in war-time military necessity did likewise. Thus, in order to justify the massacre of civilian population Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir Arther Harris writes : "Whenever the fact that our aircrafts occasionally killed women and children is cast in my teeth; I always produce the example of blockade, although there are endless others to be got from the wars of the past... Even in the more civilized times of today the seige of cities, accompanied by bombardment of the city as a whole, is still normal practice ..." When I (Rangrut) travelled in 1959 40,000 Kilometers in China, I found there has been no looting or burning of cities or industrial complexes during the war of liberation 1946 49.

With the demise of Quaid-i-Azam—the man of honour and principle—political power rapidly passed into the hands of demagogues and adventurers who, by playing upon the emotions and ignorance of the masses—many of whom had sought refuge in Pakistan as refugees—created a permanent war psychosis. Bharat faired no better at the hands of Indian Congress

leaders. Since disappearance of Maulana Azad and later on Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Nehru had free hand to be in '*Quest of his dreamland*'—his policy has already been discussed in preceding chapters.

### The Simla Agreements !

Before I proceed to present to the readers some factors as lessons which are uppermost in my mind on the Simla Agreement, I submit that :

- (a) In commenting on such campaigns, such in 1971 covert war, which led to this agreement in which facts are not sufficiently known to us to lend themselves to criticism; I am fully aware how easy it is to be wise after the event. But I feel it is much better to do it while the memory is still fresh than never! Moreover, the full story of the tragic events may not be made known to the public for security reasons! But we must draw lessons by '*reading in between the lines*' of what has already appeared in the press or what we have come to know. "The greatness of a nation lies neither in the abundance of possessions nor the strength of its arms... A people finds greatness in its response to the historical challenge by how it manages to harness its strings to the aspirations of the age."
- (b) Had we critically followed the events since 1946 i.e. speed with which the Indian Congress exploited every chance offered by British Government due to

her policy of greed to Indian Congress and Mr. Nehru's willingness to accept to further his aim, we would have not suffered such ignomy in 1972 at Simla. Mr. Bhutto had been given the dirty end of the stick by a defeated army and disunited political leaders. He was in a most uneviable position as he was asked to fight the cause of a frustrated nation who had been caught napping. Pakistanis had fallen an easy prey to enemy propaganda because their own Government had ruled her people by Martial Law and Ordinances. Mr. Bhutto had faced a threat of continued aggression from outside and he was asked to eradicate internal security from within.

- (c) Had our leaders, historians, strategists and others become more inquisitive and critical, than they had been since September 1948 onwards, especially at the time of ceasefire in Kashmir war, we would not have been so mentally unprepared for covert wars in 1965 and events that led to another covert war in 1971.
- (d) We omitted to take note that '*history has tendency to repeat itself*'. Pakistanis, it seems to have failed to observe that aggression in Kashmir in 1948 was planned and executed by Lord Mountbatten (see Appendix E) with blessing of White Hall and with collaboration of the Indian Congress and U.S.A. In 1965 aggression against Pakistan, Russia and Britain were more active promoters than U.S.A. However, in 1971, Russia who had been openly fishing in

troubled waters in United Nations by Vetoing on Kashmir dispute and East Pakistan now she has played the leading role very actively and supported by Britain; while '*U.S.A. sat on the fence*' watching the events—as if in a subdued fashion.

It is very noticeable that eventually the loot of the victory went to Russia. Britain may be described as good second and Bharat as third in the race. No super nation gives aid as charity to a developing nation—an underdog—hence, if Russia grabbed the lot and denied Bharat lion's share of loot should not surprise any one.

Another turn of events is the unmaking of the Russian policy of Treaty of Friendship by Mr. Nixon after his visit to Moscow. The world came to know that while Soviet's policy was '*No war no peace*' for his friends, yet U.S.A. declared that '*she would not leave her allies*', such as, Israel and South Vietnam in the lurch but would give them full aid.

No wonder that Egypt asked the Soviet to withdraw her 40,000 odd advisers at once and now a high powered Indian deputation is in Moscow to seek the clarification in the light of these events and is in consultation. The U.S.A. has, therefore, scored a success in this series. Soviet's backdoor is now fully exposed to missile attack by Israel. Thus Soviet has also been denied the use of Mediterranean Sea and also air bases in U.A.R. to the Soviet's spy aircraft and the Russian Naval fleet. Soviets are having a second thought on it.

What may happen next can be anybody's guess as prophecy in world politics would a dangerous thing to do.

### The Simla Agreement 1972—The Balkanization of Pakistan

The Third Treaty of Versailles was signed at Simla, the Second being signed in 1966 at Tashkent. The Directors of the drama were the same. But Mrs. Indira Gandhi acted as the stage manager and heroine in the 1972 Simla melodrama.

It is not necessary here to enter into detail, for all that need be mentioned is, that to enforce the impossible reparation demanded as well as to dismember and disrupt West Pakistan. Bharati forces had occupied East Pakistan in December 1971, Military as well as civilian prisoners of war had been transferred to India. India had declared East Pakistan as Independent Bangladesh—and that the Prisoners of War December 1971 had surrendered to a joint Command—all in one breath.

Marwaris under the protection of the Indian Army and militant Indian (Hindu) organizations moved in East Pakistan and removed all equipment, assets they could grab as a loot to Calcutta by sea and road.

On one hand the Axis powers pushed their anti-Pakistan propaganda in full gear on the other hand. Soviet were chosen to Veto any resolution in the United Nations. Britain played the role of silent spectator and declared himself to be most suitable as '*a negotiator or mediator.*' Bharat assumed the role of spokesman and the only sincere friend of Bangladesh of Muslim majority. This led to the financial ruin of Pakistan and a staggering blow to her very existance. War is politics stained with blood. Before the war, the struggle is fought by men in striped trousers. When the diplomats fail, men in uniform take over with bombs.

General Yahya's aid said that :

“Mr. Mujib is warlike and we must yield to him, but when he ultimately settles down, his friendship will be valuable to Pakistan as a counter-weight to Bharat” Gen. Yahya's guide was immediate advantage, never principle. Unfortunately, it seems that these covert tactics of appeasement of General Yahya enabled Mr. Mujib and Mrs. Indira Gandhi to win bloody victories in 1970 and early 1971 neither critically checked nor observed by world at large which made March-December 1971 war bloodier and longer. Politics can make a war and can also make a war longer and bloodiest. Politics can also waste a victory !

The susceptibility of the modern brain to foreign and domestic propoganda is a major problem of politics. In world of today, the citizen is increasingly bewildered by what he hears and reads. In dictatorship, where the government censors and funnels all news and views of the individual gradually becomes completely receptive and submissive. Since 1966 Bharati Prime Minister had successfully made the world believe that : “Pakistan wanted war and the Indian people are engaged in a difficult war for the freedom of Greater India. Pakistan was the aggressor”. “Indian Government”, she lied, “sees itself compelled to answer with force, the force used by by Pakistan in numerous frontier attacks in Bangladesh”. It will remain for ever a terrible precedent in the modern history, that against all pledges, all precedents and all traditions of an arbitrators, the representatives of the Muslim League in 1947 were cheated by no one else but by the arbitrators i.e. the White Hall and the Viceroy of India. Nothing was left to the

Muslims but to accept a truncated Pakistan, without her share of assets in hard currency, industrial machinery, logistics, armaments and armed forces. Lord Radcliff, Mr. Nahru and Lord Mountbatten after Simla Meeting in 1947 it has been reported gibely said:

“Fair is foul, and foul is fair

Hover through the fog and filthy air.”

The subtlest sophisters and most hypocritical draftsmen were set to work to demarcate the boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal into East and West Provinces. This act of unwisdom probably discredited the Tripartite Agreement between Indian Government, the Indian Congress and the Muslim League more than the ultimatum given by the Viceroy of India and White Hall to the Muslim League ‘to take it or leave it’, i.e., which preceded the partition of India in August 1947.

‘You may further strip Pakistan of her parts’ now in the Western Wing, reduce her armaments to a more police force and navy to nil — like Turkey, China or Germany or Japan after World Wars; all the same; in the end, if she feels that she has been unjustly treated all along—‘which she definitely does’ — she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors. The maintenance of peace will depend upon there being no cause of exasperation stirring up the spirit of patriotism, justice or of fairplay to achieve redress. History is replete with such examples that arrogance, injustice will never be forgiven. War is a relationship between nations and it is natural, therefore, that it elimination should be sought by the establishment of a new relationship between nations through fair play, equity and

justice. Power politics will make matters worse, It may be recalled that the creation of Kashmir corridor crime was a thousand times worse than if Britain had not partitioned India at all. In agreeing to another act to revoke the division of India into three groups under an Agreement at Simla 1947 between Indian Congress, Government of India (i.e. the British hawks and White Hall) committed one of the most violent outrages against civilization and the Muslim League that has ever been known to history.

The weakness of East Pakistan in comparison with Bharat was the immediate impetus to war. If Pakistan had had the support of an international organization or a Super Power (which had also become certain knowledge of Mr. Indira Gandhi) would march to East Pakistan's or the Western Wing's defence, the war might have been avoided.

As the memory of the public (of the world) seems to be short and it oft forgets, it may therefore be recalled that Pakistan was initially brought under dictatorship rule by combined conspiracy of British hawks, the Indian Congress and White Hall. A man had been planted by the Coaspirators—awaiting only some great event to recruit his legions. The event was eventually created after the demise of Quaid-i-Azam in 1948. It reached its finality in 1958. This enabled these conspirators to dismember Pakistan which had already been truncated at the time of its birth in 1947 through media of press, radio and other means such as blackmail in every form—politically, psychologically etc.—but its culmination was reached in 1972. What next ?

At Simla 1972, the Indian used all means of coercion, i.e., the prisoners of war, West Pakistani civilian detainees as hostages

and threat to try P.O.W. The super powers were holding the pistol of embargo on arms and withholding of aid to Pakistan. The views of Pakistan's representatives were never heard. According to the old Indian saying '*even the devil has the right to be heard*', but the new Indian Democracy, the Soviet pressure and the British diplomacy, did not even obey the precepts— '*Etiam diabolus auditur*' — which even the dark Middle Ages held sacred on behalf of the accused. The Axis Powers said: "We are holding all our means of coercion in full operation, or in immediate readiness for use—the threat to resume war!" This act of un wisdom—I shudder to state—has probably discredited the Simla Agreement more than the ultimatum which preceded its signature. A signature was thus forced out of the Pakistani Mission with pistols held at their head and with threats of war and in the field of economic. And this document attained by force was proclaimed a solemn document of magnanimity and chivalry. Rangrut does not envy Mr. Bhutto as leader of the Mission to Simla.

Again the new frontier between two nations (Indo-Pak) has now become most irregular. The two nations overlap. Bharat is two worlds. Where there is mineral wealth, but there is neither fair play nor strength except greed and coercion of a super power. The front is long and the battle—if and when it comes—will be long and bloodiest. Battle lines will shift. Lulls will intervene. Agreements and armistices will be signed. Prisoners of war will be exchanged as it was done in previous occasion in world history. But what and when next ?

I repeat what I said earlier that I do not describe this book as history of the debacle of 1971, but, I claim with confidence,

that it is a contribution by a contemporary writer's contribution to history, which I sincerely hope, would be written one day by the younger generation. Till then, it is hoped that it would give some food for thought to all Pakistanis as well Bharatis for whose defence, security and liberty I toiled hardest for 38 years. We carry no ill will. I consider, unless we both make a fair and unbiased study of any case, weaknesses cannot be eradicated. Hence this presentation by the old soldier, I repeat that I have tried to give my impartial views not for sake of finding faults, but as a well-wishers, a critical study—while our memories are still fresh to bring out some lessons *'with an eye on the future.'* Because, it is often forgotten that the fighting man has occasionally put the clock forward or backward in most unforeseen fashion — the future is invariably moulded by the past. The best promise for the future lies in understanding and applying the lessons of the past. History has tendency to repeat itself.

The Quran has warned; "The man is rebellious that he thinketh himself independent." And ﷻ "Afala Tatafakkaroon"? i.e. why don't you reflect?

Treaties will not help. The path from Indo-Pak covert wars—first war 1948 in Kashmir to Third wanton aggression in 1971 were forced on us through British trickery. The way for aggression was further paved with *'no-aggression treaties'* (Tas-kent Agreement), Peace Conferences and passionate promises to keep the peace in the sub-continent by the super power under their *'No war no peace'* covert policy is futile. It threw dust in our eyes and Pakistan's fake hopes of peace and security.

But this truth is an over-simplification of the world situa-

tion. The fact is that Pakistan did not have the support of either an international organization or a super power. The final key international politics and to peace is not alliances, nor organizations, but the domestic policy of nations and the social character of national regimes.

I (Rangrut) do believe that neither Indians nor Russians desire war. Yet what the Governments of these people whose desire is to grab fruits of victory and indefinite territorial expansion—for the former's aim is Akhand Bharat and for the latter, naval and air supermacy in all oceans of the world. Let us the peoples of Indo-Pak leave behind the hawks, i.e. the promoters of confrontation and move forward solidly to achieve toleration and eventually enter the field everlasting mutual co-operation as equals.

But what the Pakistanis desire is *'to live and let live'*, and also a special relationship based on equity between Bharat and the Muslim World—*'fraternal association'*—which requires the continuance of the intimate relationship in various spheres of life culture.

“When they (Indian Congress) take you British into their confidence I will take you into mine”, said Quaid-i-Azam in 1947.

I, Rangrut, cannot conceive any greater cause of future war than that the Pakistanis, who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous fighters and powerful nations of the world who most strongly feel that they had been unjustly oppressed.

Because these factors were overlooked by the Indian Congress leaders in 1946, that the British hawks were able to use it as a lever to keep Muslims and non-Muslims, since then, at

loggerhead with each other. *'Let us bury the hatchet'*! Islam means peace. And Jihad enjoins Muslims to strive hardest to do good whenever possible and to eradicate evil wherever found. The Quran prohibits *'aggression and no coercion'* even in the matter of religion. And *'mankind is but one community'*.

### Legacy for Pakistan

In his reply of March 11, 1942 to Mr. Gandhi, the Quaid-i-Azam wrote that "Islam stands for justice, equality, fairplay, toleration and even generosity to non-Muslims, who may be under our protection. They are like brothers to us and would be the citizens of the State. This is the view of every responsible Musalman and, what is more, it is so enjoined upon us by the highest authority—the Quran and the Prophet."

Because Indian Congress failed to understand the ideology of Islam and Jihad, things became from bad to worse. Eventually the final stage was set for another covert wanton aggression by Bharat abetted and assisted by her allies in 1971 who encouraged Bharat to flout not only Security Council resolutions but those of the U.N. Assembly.

Unfortunately, U.N. Assembly, like its predecessor League of Nations, has become a debating society. SALT, Disarmament Conferences have met dead end. Super powers use Veto to counter Veto. No genuine effort is being made to stop violence, aggression, and terrorism, and Veto is being applied on resolutions for favouritism's sake and for political reasons only and not for fair play, justice and to maintain peace. No wonder that the aggressor is emboldened to disregard U.N. resolutions with immunity.

## Gandhi's Legacy for Bharat—as a periscope for Tomorrow

When one critically studies this legacy of Mr. Gandhi today (October 72) one should bear in mind :

- (a) Before Bharat started on her '*Long March*' to achieve Mr. Nehru's Dreamland of Akhand Bharat, Mr. Gandhi had announced in August 1942 to the British: '*Quit India*'. To this in November, 1942 Mr. Churchill (P.M. of U.K.) replied "Let me, however, make this clear, if there should be any mistake about it in any quarter...I have not become the King's first Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire..." However, in 1945 Churchill told Lord Wavell (Viceroy) "Keep a bit of India", —i.e. when Tories had been replaced by Labour Government.
  
- (b) For last 40 years before his death Mr. Gandhi had after careful consideration selected his most talented disciple Mr. J.L. Nehru to be trained as a leader to over-throw '*the British Raj and influence and to establish a Hindu Raj*', through his so-called non-violence secret weapon and through covert propaganda; In 1945 Mr. Nehru therefore said : "I have no desire to go to jail..." Moreover, he had fully trained and gave Nehru his secret art, i.e. '*the technique of vagueness and of never making a statement*' (oral or written) which is not somehow so qualified or worded that he cannot be pinned down to anything definite.

Moreover, Mr. Gandhi made it his practice of mixing prayers with politics or rather making prayers a medium of covert political propaganda. It was all a part of the make-up, for example, while Mr. Gandhi's prayers were according to Hindu rights and customs, yet he was great patron saint of secularism. Similarly, he desired Brahmin Nehru also to be saint patron of secularism and not a Brahmin, though by birth he was a Brahmin so as to win sympathy of Labour Party in Britain, Muslims and minorities.

- (c) Mr. Gandhi's subtle move to replace Maulana Azad with Mr. Nehru was, because :
- (i) Mr. Azad had acted as an honest broker, as he had accepted for the Indian Congress Cripp's Mission plan which had also been accepted by the Muslim League, the British Government and it had been also blessed by Mr. Gandhi to lull the fears of his adversaries. But it did not suit the interests of Hindu Congress which did not believe fair play or justice.
- (ii) To Mr. Gandhi the easiest way for the Congress to wriggle out of the Agreement lay in changing the leadership of the Congress. Sardar Patel was the hot favourite of the Congress, but Mr. Gandhi had found him a '*strong man*', so his choice fell on his talented disciple Mr. Jwaharlal Nehru who had mastered Mr. Gandhi's Secret weapon—i.e. '*the technique of vagueness*' and never making a statement which is not somehow so qualified or worded that he cannot be pinned down to anything definite.

(iii) Mr. Gandhi was confident that Mr. Nehru will be flexible as a politician and loyal as a disciple.

(iv) It would act as a deterrent to Sardar Patel or other members who showed signs of being 'strong men'. Mr. Gandhi's flexibility and vagueness can be judged—when Lord Wavell took the blame of the failure of Simla (Cripps) Conference on his shoulder, Secular Mr. Gandhi, who had already given the Agreement his '*blessing in his own covert way*' wrote to Lord Wavell: "This time you have taken the blame on your shoulders. But the world will think otherwise. India certainly does. His Majesty's Government would have to decide sooner or later to accept either '*Hindu (Congress) or the Muslim point of view*', since they were irreconcilable..." Mr. Gandhi wrote this letter to Lord Wavell knowing fully well that Mr. Nehru, as the new President of Congress, had denounced the Cripps Mission accord on his (Gandhi's) advice. Maulana Azad has regretted—too late in the day in his '*memoirs*' of having passed on the leadership of Congress to Mr. Nehru.

Lord Mountbatten and Mr. Nehru having sabotaged the Agreement on Partition in 1947, at first burdened newly created state of Pakistan with millions of refugees and then created riots and instigated armed aggression into Pakistan from her borders to create chaos. When Pakistan, due to it, did not crumble, Bharat invaded Jammu and Kashmir State under a pre-conceived covert plan. However, even when it failed, a cease fire Agreement was signed on 1st January, 1949 under the aus-

pices of United Nations. However, it was not long before Mr. Nehru rigged out of this Agreement which Bharat now calls a 'dead letter' and has declared Kashmir as an 'Atutt' i.e. 'an integral' part of India. U.N.O. lies prostrate as she has been unable to implement her resolutions on Bharat. See photo page 1.

The U.N.O's impotence encouraged Bharat to look in another direction.

- (d) As the long march under expansionist policy in Jammu and Kashmir in 1948 had also failed, Mr. Nehru now decided to move towards Sinkiang, Tibbet, Nepal, Butan, Sikim and Nipa Valley areas by declaring as rightful successor and heir of the British Raj in India, so she had the rightful claim on these lands whose population had close cultural relations with India since Ashokan period. Propaganda machinery of overt and covert anti-Chinese propaganda—(though '*Hind-Chini bhai bhai*'—Indians and Chinese are but brothers since 1947)—was put in full gear. This being a pre-requisite for a wanton aggression under pre-emptive strategy. However, the result of 1962 Sino-Bharat war was a disaster for Bharat. Nepal threw out the Indian troops from her territory. Bhutan and Sikim declared complete independence. But U. S. & British fell a prey to Bharat's covert propaganda that their sea and air lifeline in the Pacific and Indian Oceans were in grave danger!

'U.S.S.R. also moved in' for her ulterior motives to

counter NATO power's move. Bharat feverishly got down to expand her armed forces. Meanwhile, Mr. Nehru died as a heart broken man. Mr. Shastri took over the reign of the Government. He tried the might of his forces against West Pakistan in 1965 but when this wanton aggression failed, Soviet managed to move in to strengthen his political sphere of influence. Mr. Shastri died at Tashkent as he could not stand the strain of this misadventure. Mrs. Indira Gandhi stepped in to complete her father's plan.

- (e) As already stated, Pakistan instead of learning a lesson from the disasters of her neighbour became complacent, and over-confident due to wishful thinking. Pakistan Government made people of Pakistan also a prey to wishful thinking—i.e. all was well on all fronts. Pakistan made another mistake by relying too much on Pacts, such as CENTO and SEATO and adopted cool policy towards Russia and China. Her intelligence service deteriorated. She overlooked the fact that the debacle that Bharat had met in Indo-Sino war in 1962 had very severely damaged the prestige of Bharat as a state and the Indian Army, as well as, the reputation of her Armed Forces who had met a great setback. Pakistan Government omitted to take note that no Government could accept such state of affairs for long. She therefore must try hardest to retrieve her honour and glory. Pak Government took no note of war preparation and the overt and covert anti-Pakistan propaganda that was being carried out at great speed by Bharat assisted by some super powers. The axe fell on Pak-

istan in September 1965. It is nothing short of a miracle that Pakistan escaped the punishment she could have got due to her in 1965 being caught napping, more due to poor Indian leadership, faulty planning with a mixture of wishful thinking not only of Bharat but also of the Super powers i.e. those who had abetted and assisted this covert aggression.

But Pakistan Government did not even now in 1965 learn the lesson and overplayed their luck of having been '*spared a defeat into victory*.' The Pakistani nation was lulled to sleep. Bharat's covert propaganda did take advantage of Pakistan Government's failings. However, Bharat having failed to achieve her goal in the West and North, and North West, now looked to the East, where things had gone well.

- (f) Although Bharat could show little in territorial gain in her expansionist policy in the North, North West and West upto 1966, she was hopeful for her success in the Eastern Wing of Pakistan where she had been seriously carrying out a programme of overt and covert anti-Pakistan propaganda since 1946.

The cyclone and later fall of Ayub's Government, due to internal dissensions, made things more hopeful especially when new factors most encouraging:

- (i) U.N.O. lay prostrate while Israel was boldly pursuing a policy of expansion by flouting 1948 and 1967 U.N.O. Security Council resolution. Bharat as a close friend and a vigilant observer was encouraged

to make use of an opportunity especially when her armed forces had been re-equipped considerably expanded, her logistics very considerably improved.

- (ii) Pakistan's economy had taken a serious downward trend. Political situation in East Pakistan was most favourable to Bharat. Pakistan Government was suffering from Munich spirit. She was all out to follow a policy of appeasement as long as the present regime would be '*allowed to exist*',—though nominally.
- (iii) Some Super Powers were keenly interested in the dismemberment of Pakistan—which if achieved, would give them their much desired air and naval bases to control the sea and air lanes over the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Bharat's diplomacy was at its best form, as she managed to flirt with all powers yet she succeeded in keeping them in the dark, as regards her own real objective. She managed to get material and monetary assistance as well as whole-hearted support in her psywar.

Under these circumstances she could also overlook Nehru-Liaquat pact of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Mr. Indira Gandhi had also mastered Mr. Gandhi's legacy i.e. '*the technique of vagueness*' and never making a statement which is not somehow so qualified or worded that it cannot be pinned down to anything definite. She proved to be '*a worthy heir*' to her illustrious father—Mr. Nehru. She was clever enough to exploit the power of veto which each of the two super powers could use—if she was cornered. In actual fact, these Axis

powers did use it more than once.

It should be noted that U.S.S.R. vetoed more than once in the Security Council to let Bharat wriggle out of difficult situations. This has been and is Soviet Union's policy to keep situation under control and not let it boil to the point of explosion, i.e. its policy of '*no war no peace*'. Its latest examples are return to situation between Russia and Egypt in 1970, in the Middle East which she has manipulated through the President of Syria; or Sino-Japanese new friendship has resulted in an invitation from Russia to the Prime Minister of Japan to discuss peace treaty.

- (g) It seems that this legacy of '*Vague Statements*' and '*interference in the internal affairs*' of other countries and flouting U.N.O's Resolutions, has taken the form of epidemic plague all over the world. Super Powers have agreed to follow the new strategy of '*no war no peace*' to broaden their spheres of influence, as well as to avoid a clash between the giants. This seems to be new clause to Mr. Gandhi's legacy of '*making vague statements*' to achieve one's goal which was called Panj Shilla (five principles) of non-aligned countries.

Reverting to the Simla Agreement, which has been halted—not because no written clause has been violated by Pakistan but for the mere fact that Bharat interprets the discussions before signing the Simla Agreement to mean that '*line of control*' must be demarcated before troops can withdraw from their occupied areas. This reminds Rangrut the way ceasefire

line was drawn on 31 December 1948 on a map one inch to one million. Bharati Government is repeating her policy on the so called 'control line'. (P.S. The troops have now withdrawn—22-12-1972 as the line of control has been mutually agreed.

### **The Remedy**

The remedy lies in drafting any and every treaty with care in a language which excludes vagueness. Even the discussion should be tape recorded and all points of disagreement sorted out before the meeting is closed, or sits down to sign an agreement or treaty. We have allowed Bharat to steal a march on us more than once. That should be our most vital lesson of 1971 war.

Rangrut has no doubt in his mind that Mrs. Gandhi has already sold Mr. Gandhi's legacy to many other nations, name them what you like, non-aligned, peace loving democracies who in their overt statement say that they hate policy of expansion.

## VII

### **POSTSCRIPT—DECEMBER 1972**

#### **Smoke Signal and some Facts**

Any one who reads history knows the danger has been part of common lot of the Muslims in the Indian Sub-Continent since the advent of the British in the guise of traders and the British Raj. It was, in fact, continuation of anti-Muslim phobia since the crusading knights invaded the Holy land

in the tenth century.

Any one who knows the peaceless sub-continent of today, knows that the two nations theory has not all of a sudden overtaken us by some new and unprecedented wave of illwill by one nation against the other. It has—as already been previously discussed in this book—since 1625.

We (Indo-Pak) can lessen its potent and latent dangers, if we can contain it, if we can forge a network of relationship and the type of interdependence that restrain aggression and that take profit out of war—if we both do our best, to forgive and forget and solemnly undertake not to take measures of retaliation or become revengeful.

We cannot make all nations (of the sub-continent) to love one another and it would be wrong to try it. While we cannot make all members of the sub-continent to love one another but we can hope to establish conditions in which they had lived pre-advent of British Raj, or at least we can hope to establish conditions in which they will be more likely to be tolerant and live in peace with one another as good tolerant neighbours. Provided both nations (Bharatis and Pakistanis) decide to live and let live and no coercion even in the matter of religion, caste, class or creed. Both of us need deeds and not only words.

### **Some Factors**

The impending withdrawal of U.S.A. from Indo-China, the elimination of Pakistan as a power *'with a nuisance value'* in

the area stretching from Korea to Aden; the emergence of Bangladesh and the resultant emergence of non-aligned India—backed by Russia—as a medium size power; the emergence of Peoples Republic of China and re-appearance of Japan a strong power, are only some of main factors calling for a re-drawing of diplomatic, as well as global strategical map of this part of the world—vis-a-vis—this part of the world.

The pieces have to fall into its places. The super powers of two blocs and the third world lesser powers with major interests in the area. Will the price of '*friendship with Bharat, Russia and Britain*' in the context be a limited sovereignty '*a la Warsaw bloc and NATO*' for Pakistan—i.e. what is left it; and the status of Bangladesh? Can Mr. Mujib and Mrs. Indira Gandhi, one vane and strong head while the latter a seasoned stateswoman, shrewd and determined, make good mates?

Soviet interests in the Pacific ocean and Indian ocean as well as, its interests in Yemen and Iraq are very disturbing factor to NATO powers and the Arabs and Iran. In the Middle East the Soviet is trying hardest to stage a come back. Plague of nationalism particularly in the East and South Africa has taken NATO powers by complete surprise as it looks, as if Soviets and China are '*in*' and the Western powers are '*out*.' Then there is the problem of resettlement of refugees.

On 16th December, 1971, Bharat won the war after preparations stretching over couple of decades—or as some Western historians state—after wishing for several centuries—what balm for those Indian Armed Forces who had a thre-

shing from Chinese when Bharati forces aggressed into Chinese territory. The Bharati Government now proclaims that they have done their duty to India and justice :

Indian expansionism—by India of non-violence—the dove of peace and meditation, suddenly discovered that under the Vener of Gandhism and Mr. Nehru's dreamland in his book '*Discovery of India*', lay a hard elated and dangerous state of the Asokan period—the Akhand Bharat; all the more dangerous for being innately expansionist. Its overt and covert planning for expansion into Akhand Bharat has been well planned, as it is '*flexible*' and therefore adaptable to the changing conditions in the field of global strategy. So far Bharat has shown skill and tenacity of purpose in pursuit of her policy.

Is Bharat a paper Government ?

No. Although it is rightly said that the Indian Congress since its birth did stoop low, while co-operating with the British hawks especially since 1946, i.e. pre-partition and post-partition not only to Britain but also U.S.A. and Russia. It is, however, considered that it was a flexible posture which has been adopted under '*covert Gandhian plan*'. But now (1972) she is in kicking mood to U.S.A. and Britain, inspite of the fact that to Soviet alone (perhaps to play for time) she is still playing the second fiddle.

Although Mr. Nehru has not produced the equivalent or '*Main Kamph*', yet like his Nazi pure Aryan brother, Hitler, he has written '*Discovery of India*' which is very near like '*Main Khamph*'. Both these books were written while these Aryan

brothers were in jail and both lay down in their books policy for their heirs and successors.

Again Brahman Nehru unlike Manu's Darhamshastra, gave the Indian (Hindu) Congress the Gandhian Code of 'conduct'; which is different to Manu's Code. In the latter there is one rule for the upper classes and another for the lower classes and castes. Again for the lower classes it is a philosophy of passiveness, of acceptance and of obedience. In short, to each class, his fate and his duty. But in Gandhian-Nehru Code, it is a philosophy of power as depicted in Mahabharata, or when Ashoka was a member of princely order. In it Bharat retains his power position. The sword can be wield by all Hindu classes and castes and not only by militant Rajputs. How far this conduct has taken deep roots is still a matter of conjecture. Mrs. Indira Gandhi has recently i.e. in December 1972 bitterly complained '*ill-treatment of huriijans*'.

Since 1946 the Indian Congress very actively pursued to popularize the Gandhian Code, Gandhian legacy with zeal and energy. The Hindu past is being depicted in the form of drawing, and in films, stories of Krishna and all gods and goddesses of Hindu pantheon depicting '*Dharma yuda*'—the Hindu religious war—in which any one and every male and female should throw himself or herself. It explains how and why Lord Krishna persuaded hesitant Pandavas to take arms against even their near and dear relations—the Kauravas. He told them that they were justified to wage war on them as long as they occupy land '*even equivalent to the tip of a needle*'. Lord Krishna also impressed on the enlightened monarches of Pandavas in conquering even the neighbouring territory. Such literature has been printed by Bharati government and sold at very low price—

about few paisas. It is available for sale at all railway book stalls and airports etc. It is said that Mr. Nehru invaded Kashmir and China as the British maps showed Kashmir as part of India and the so called '*MacMohan line*' as the border of India. Mr. Nehru uttered: "MacMohan line is our frontier, map or no map, we will hold this frontier and will not permit any one to cross it". Bharat aggressed in the Chinese territory and met a debacle. But she did not lose heart and continued her expansionist policy now towards east.

For East Pakistan, the Indian Congress created Bengali nationalism and introduced the '*Kali Matta*' cult which '*enjoins human sacrifice*' of all non-Hindus and shuddars at the alter of '*Matta*' because they are '*maleech*'—untouchable, down graded, hence every form of cruelty on them is permissible. This cult was preached and practised by Mukti Bahini in letter and spirit during 1970-71 crisis—nay even after the ceasefire. Thousands of innocent non-Bengali Bhasha speaking Muslim men, women and children were massacred. Their remains of bones are now being exhibited to the foreigners as '*massacres by the Pakistan Army*'.

### **The price of Simla Courtship**

Events have proved so far from the haughty and uncompromising attitude of the Indian Congress and Awami League of Mujib, that Simla Agreement was a price of defeat forced on Pakistan. It could not be called fair or just, which Bharat has been shouting on house tops.

While drawing up the Simla Agreement, Gandhi's legacy

was most religiously pursued in letter and spirit. In it Bharat has tried, though in her own covert way, to lay down the rules of relationship and conduct between Bharat and Pakistan, as well as between Pakistan and outside world, vis-a-vis, to bring reality to Bharat's defence and foreign policy of expansionism in the sub-continent, in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans as well as in the neighbouring countries which lie in Nehru's dreamland. Bharat considers that these factors lie well within the Simla accord!

Under Gandhi's Legacy Code, many factors have been purposely neither committed to writing nor specifically mentioned—they are '*understood to mean it*'. For example, '*the recognition of Bangladesh*'—though key factor to confrontation—was not put down in cold print. The Agreement is so worded, framed and drafted that Bharati Government could wriggle out of any part of it in any unfavourable situation, such as, the demarcation of '*the line of control*', the prisoners of war and foreign relations. Bharat wriggled out of 1st January 1949—ceasefire accord under the auspices of U.N.O. and now Bharat says: "what we have won in Kashmir, we keep; but what you have won you must surrender it being a defeated nation."

Peace cannot be wished into being. It has to be carefully and painstakingly built with a spirit of tolerance and in a spirit of give-and-take in many ways and on many fronts; through network of alliances, through respect for commitments, through respecting agreement that opens the way to others. Does the history of events in this peaceless sub-continent support it?

The trial of anti-Muslim tirade ablated by the Indian Congress since its advent, is most painful. The way Mr. Nehru backed out of Simmon Agreement and the way Redcliff Award was sabotaged in every possible way, is most revolting. Its memories are still fresh. This is another lesson.

On 15th November 1972 while replying questions posed by the editor of Dawn in an interview Mrs. Gandhi said ".....No responsible person in India *'has ever believed'* thnt partition would be undone". We wonder if Mr. Gandhi, Sardar Patel and other hierarchy of the Indian Congress whose statements we have quoted in the preceding chapters, were responsible persons or not?

Did not Mr. Nehru sign the Kashmir ceasefire Agreement on 1st January 1949 and proclaimed Jammu and Kashmir State *'a disputed territory'*? Yet Mrs. Indira Gandhi in the the same breath said on 15th November, 1972 that "Our views on Kashmir are well known"—that it is *'an integral part of India'*. Of course, the reply in each case was evasive and given under Gandhi's legacy.

Should Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Mujib drag the effects of the covert aggressive war of 1971 in this peaceless sub-continent, it will surely eat the bitter fruits of its own making. We—Pakistanis—repeat our desire *'to live and let live'* and *'to forgive and forget'*—to enable us to fight poverty.

It is a well known fact that Mr. M.A. Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam) tried his best for more than three decades to persuade the Indian Congress to adopt a policy *'equity, live and let live'*.

It was only after he failed to achieve it that he made 'a clarion call' for a separate home, so that two nations of the peaceless sub-continent could live in peace and as good neighbours.

We believe that sooner or later, the passions and elation of victory on the battlefield of the Indian Congress and Mujib's Government '*will return to reality and reason will prevail*'. Victory on the battlefield has never been a decisive victory, as long as the nation has '*the will*' to defend her honour and will to fight for just and honourable peace.

Let us give tomorrow's children their birth-right—peace—in this peaceless sub-continent—but not a peace with surrender, but peace with honour—not just as an interlude but a time of lasting friendship, equity and co-operation among all peoples of the sub-continent, a time when mankind can unite in a new alliances against our common enemies—'*poverty, misery, hate, disease, hunger, mistrust and lust for revenge*'.

We, Pakistanis, would reciprocate any and every honourable move made by the Indian Congress and Mr. Mujib to ensure everlasting peace in letter spirit and deed. The Quran says: '*If they incline to peace thou should reciprocate*'.

### To Sum Up

No student of history of the Sub-Continent can deny the fact that Simla Agreement was purposely drafted by Bharat on the principles of Mr. Gandhi's legacy. At least most part of it, therefore, relied on many unwritten assumptions. This is the part which is covertly called private friendly understandings

and gestures among the leaders during their talks at Simla to make the terms friendly and flexible to suit the ever changing political situations. However, these factors were purposely well shielded from public view because they contend that the feelings among the peoples of the Sub-continent were running high!

For Pakistani Mission at Simla, at that moment it was best of the bargain out of a most unwholesome deal. Did Bharati leaders made a slip? Time will only disclose. At the moment a 'Seer' only can foresee the shape of things to come Bharati press media while '*telling the world*', covertly depicted it a most magnanimously generous and humanitarian offer of the victors i.e., Bharat and Bangladesh. In spite of the fact in the same breath they were dangling sword in one hand and in the other hand they were holding an olive branch of peace. But this carefully camouflaged and seemingly harmless intention could not escape an analyst's eyes which penetrates very deeply such '*unintended verbiage*'. Mr. Sawaran Singh unmasked it when he stated in the Lok Sabha that: "...that in return for Pakistan's acceptance of '*the Indian stand*' on Takho Chak... India has agreed to make minor adjustments on the line of Control...". The Axis powers considered that their flexible policy and strategy of attrition was ultimately to bleed PAKISTAN to death, or at least to make it strategically and economically sterile. Yet covertly, it was couched as an alternate to durable peace for what had been left of at first a truncated and now a dismembered Pakistan.

At Simla Conference Pakistan had to fight with her back to the wall on many fronts. While U.K., Bharat and Soviet

Union remained in the background ; Canada and Australia and Warsaw Pact nations assumed the role of spokesmen and defenders of Bangladesh's cause in U.N. Assembly. They have been trying to impress the U.N. that Simla Agreement was a package deal, in fact in offering all the undisclosed ingredients of humanitarian concern, such as under joint command of detention of prisoner of war in Bharat and Bangladesh. They also reiterated that at no time Bangladesh offered to drop the 'War crime trials,' even if legally or morally, it was unjustified. A classic example of Mr. Gandhi's Legacy.

The U.N. Assembly proceedings as pursued by Canada and others have now clearly depicted the attitude of Axis powers and their supporters, i.e. that they have a dubious role to play in a situation like the one prevailing now in peaceless Sub-continent, M.E. and Vietnam. Yet, they contend that the secession is demanded by the I.R.A. is totally different from Mukti Bahini or the Liberation Movement in Rhodesia—because the latter is White Hall's internal affair.

#### A Query :

Would it not be better if the Axis powers—the victors—were to learn to be content with what they have so far already achieved ? No one can describe it insignificant in achievement of their goals—their dreamland. In due course—after the cooling off period, it is considered, they would realize that Pakistan—though loser of some battles and now a dismembered country, has nothing much more to concede. If harshly antagonized, she will fight to the last like Turkey in 1919-20 to save her honour. And there would be no appeasement, as she has

'will' to survive as an equal peace loving neighbour. She will never accept with smile the cloak of subvience which is sought to be wrapped around her as price of her defeat in the first round on the battlefield.

Rangrut is not the least envious of the position of the leader of the Pakistani Mission at Simla Conference. It is now admitted by many foreign commentators that Mr. Bhutto succeeded in seeing through the '*undisclosed*' ingredients of Simla Package deal. Although Mr. Bhutto was cornered in the ring, they state, he managed to gain time. He thus proved himself a shrewd broker. He needed '*time*' precisely because much of the iceberg had not appeared on the surface. He decided that the matter should be deferred till a more mellow mood comes to prevail upon both in Dacca and Delhi. Moreover, he himself had to find his own feet in the trouble tossed and dismembered Pakistan.

Human problems should not, to begin with, be viewed as if it was a balance sheet with debits and credits necessarily evened out at the end. Prejudices die hard. But they vanish quite often when people meet face to face as equals and friends, when goodwill is steadily built up. But when discrimination is rampart and suspicion lurks, it is hard to build bridges of understanding. In politics and in vain pride, when facts cannot be deemed, even the best motives can be twisted and misrepresented. Each man has a distinct individuality: his background and point of view are different. He is an island of his own right. The worst error is to treat them alike, and make sweeping statements about them.

### A Silver Lining

The U.N. Resolution of November opens the way to a

welcome adjustment of relationships in the Sub-continent. Unlike Simla Agreement package deal, it has no unintended verbiage. It has opened a new vista based on the interdependence between the issue of recognition of Bangladesh and release of prisoners of war now held in India or Dacca.

We have *'no quarrel with anybody,'* least of all with our neighbour Bharat and its people and also the people of Muslim Bengal—call them Bangladesh, if like. *'We are not asking for crumbs from the table of elated victors of the first round'* i.e., of only few battles. We are only asking that we be allowed the privilege of living as equals, friends and as good neighbours and not *'as enemy number one'*. Let us both get out of the quagmire of poverty, hunger and disease and not-be used as pawns of the hawks of Super Powers, Last twenty-five years should have given us both bellyful of its nasty taste.

#### **The squeak of the old soldier**

Rangrut who became a soldier by choice, neither considered nor ever dreamt to sit down to write books, or to go the press, or on the air, for airing his views, or enter in discussions, till circumstances forced him to do so. He has many kind hearted Hindu and non-Muslim friends in Bharat. He was a proud Indian for about 52 years. He owes them his gratitude and wishes all Indians well. He only complains about those Hindu Congressmen who have assumed the role of hawks. As a Muslim, Rangrut wishes all Bharatis well. He pleads that let us get out of the quagmire of poverty, disease, hunger and mistrust. Let us live and let live in peace.

## APPENDIX A

### Area of Mr. Nehru's Dreamland in the North and West of India

As already stated that Bharati leaders never accepted the partition of India into Pakistan and Bharat as final. They considered partition of the country as a means to end, to absorb truncated Pakistan into Bharat in few years. The hostile policy of Bharat against Pakistan became a national affair which was expected by many observers.

### A covert Plan—'a tussle between words and deed'

However, it is probably worthwhile to recollect why was Bharat wooing Afghanistan? Was she really wooing her for Pakhtoonistan, or was there any ulterior motive behind it?

We quote Mr. Nehru's views, about the area of his 'dreamland' he expressed in his book *'The Discovery of India'* which resembles *'Mein Kampf'* of Hitler in most respects, such as, an indicator of the Prime Minister Mr. Nehru's future policy and covert plans for a covert psywar:

"...The British remained outsiders, aliens and misfits in India, and made no attempt to be otherwise. Above all, for the first time in India's history, her political control was exercised from outside and her economy was centered in a

distant place. They made India a typical colony of the modern age, a subject country for the first time in her long history."

### **Kashmir and Afghanistan as part of India ?**

"...Mahmud of Ghazni's invasion of India was certainly a foreign Turkish invasion and resulted in the Punjab being separated from the rest of India for a while. '*The Afghans*' who came at the end of the twelfth century were different. They were an Indo-Aryan race closely allied to the people of India. Indeed, for long stretches of time Afghanistan had been, and was destined to be, a part of India. '*Their language, Pashto*', was basically derived from Sanskrit. There are few places in India or outside which are so full of ancient monuments and remains of Indian culture, chiefly of the Buddhist period, as Afghanistan. '*More correctly, the Afghans should be called the Indo-Afghans*'. They differed in many ways from the people of the Indian plains, just as the people of the mountain valleys of Kashmir differed from the dwellers of the warmer and flatter regions below. But in spite of this difference Kashmir had always been and continued to be an important seat of Indian learning and culture. The Afghans differed also from the more highly cultured and sophisticated Arabs and Persians. They were hard and fierce like their mountain fastnesses, rigid in their faith, warriors not inclined towards intellectual pursuits or adventures of the mind. They behaved to begin with as conquerors over a rebellious people and were cruel and harsh."

"But soon they toned down, India became their home and Delhi was their capital, not distant Ghazni as in Mahmud's time. Afghanistan, where they came from, was just an outlying

part of their kingdom. The process of Indianization was rapid, and many of them married women of the country. One of their great rulers, Alauddin Khilji, himself married a Hindu lady, and so did his son. Some of the subsequent rulers were racially Turks, such as Qutb-ud-Din Aibak, Sultana Razia, and Iltutmish; but the nobility and army continued to be mainly Afghans. Delhi flourished as an imperial capital. Ibn Batuta, a famous Arab traveller from Morocco, who visited many countries and saw many cities from Cairo and Constantinople to China, described it in the fourteenth century, perhaps with some exaggeration, as '*one of the greatest cities in the universe*'..."

"The Afghans might well be considered a border Indian group, hardly strangers to India, and the period of their political dominance should be called the Indo-Afghans period. '*The Mughals were outsiders and strangers*' to India and yet they fitted into the Indian structure with remarkable speed and began the Indo-Mughal period."

"Through choice or circumstances or both, the Afghan rulers and those who had come with them, merged into India. Their dynasties became completely Indianized with their roots in India, looking upon India as their homeland, and the rest of the world as foreign. In spite of political conflict, they were generally considered as such and many even of the Rajput princes accepted them as their overlords. But there were other Rajput chiefs who refused to submit and there were fierce conflicts. Feroz Shah, one of the well-known Sultans of Delhi, had a Hindu mother; so had Ghyas-ud-Din Tughlak. Such marriages between the Afghans, Turkish, and the Hindu nobi-

lity were not frequent, but they did take place. In the south the Moslem ruler of Gulbarga married a Hindu princess Vijayanagar with great ceremony..."

Dr. Abdul Hamid's remarks on the above paras are being reproduced as a food for thought :—

"During the British days, the boundaries of the Punjab were rapidly altered and its economy, in which the rivrs assumed a more dynamic role, also was transformed. The separation of the North-West Frontier territory from the Punjab, and its establishment, as a separate province in 1901 by Lord Curzon, brought to an end India's last geographical heritage of the Indo-Afghan period, because for centuries the Punjab had been a part of the Afghan empire, which included a large part of the Punjab, Afghanistan, and some other territories now under the occupation of the Russians. At one time, the Indus was the boundary separating India from the Middle East to cross the Indus at Attock was a pass out of India. See in the light of the fact that, that period was the Indo-Afghan period, when North-Western India and Afghanistan were not territorially and politically separate, the invasions of the Punjab by the Afghan and Pathan rulers could not be regarded as foreign invasions. Pandit Nehru in his *Discovery of India* (page 250) admits, that the Afghans who invaded India towards the end of the 12th century were not foreign invaders because "they were an Indo-Aryan race closely allied to the people of India." In other words, Pandit Nehru regards these Afghans and Pathan incursions into India as India's '*internal affairs*'. He however, refuses to place Mahmud Ghazanvi in that category, because Mahmud was a Turk, not an Indo-Aryan, although he does not

consider Mahmud a religious fanatic, as other Hindu historians do. The political geography of India at the time of Independence, therefore, was the creation of the British rule established itself, the north-western parts of India were historically, ethnically and culturally a part of the Middle East rather than that of India."

"Nehru's interpretation of Afghan invasions, although essentially correct, does not fit in with the position of the Punjab in the larger territory of which it was geographically and historically a part. In the Indo-Afghan period as, in certain preceding periods, the Punjab was a part of Afghanistan and certain other territories to its west: to say, as Nehru does, that Afghanistan was a part of India is to make a pyramid rest upon its apex. While the Afghans had plenty of things in common with the Punjab people, they were completely different from the people of the plains in the north-east or in the south in India. That an enlightened liberal like Nehru should exhibit a peculiar inhibition by branding Mahmud Ghaznavi a Turk in order to declare him a foreign invader is also shocking. Whatever his ethnic origin, Mahmud ruled in Ghazni, which was a part of Afghanistan: and, as such while counterattacking Raja Jaipal of the same region, he was operating within the territories of which his kingdom was a part. Nehru should have realised that it was not the age of democracy, and kingship was a legitimate form of government. Furthermore, military expeditions by kings in neighbouring areas to avenge for one wrong or another were sanctioned by both the prevalent political practice and the political morality, upheld by the doctors of politics and international law of that time. That Mahmud had no intention of operating outside his legitimate region of

influence is evident from the fact that he showed no interest in conquering any part of India to the east of the Punjab, Punjab. Writing about Afghan kings, Nehru says : "India became their home and Delhi was their capital, not distant Ghazni, as in Mahmud's time. Afghanistan, where they came from, was just an outlying part of their kingdom."

Here again, Mr. Nehru shows his same old prejudice against any interpretation of history that links the Punjab Independent tribal area, N.W.F. Province and Kashmir with the region to its west; with the result that his own views become ridiculous. If Afghanistan Independent tribal area and N.W.F. Province was a part of India, as Nehru so fondly asserts, why could not a ruler of an Indian territory establish his capital in Ghazni. If it was right to rule over Ghazni from Delhi, why was the reverse wrong, one may question?

I

**Aide Momorie—The Holy Prophet said : 'Know thy enemy'**

Mr. Gandhi stated in August, 1942 "Quit India..." Mr. Churchill, the then Prime Minister of Britain, replied on 11th November, 1942 "Let me however make this clear, in case there should be any mistake about it in any quarter....I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of British Empire...."

## APPENDIX-B

Phone : 410480

29.

25th February, 1972.

Dear

May I please be granted an interview to present my views to you on current military affairs during your visit to Karachi. My suggestion for your consideration are those of the oldest soldier of Pakistan who has been a patient spectator on military affairs for well over 55 years.

Unfortunately, my doctors do not permit me to travel due to indifferent health—due to '*War injuries*', hence this request for an interview at Karachi.

With kindest regards.

(Mohammad Akbar Khan)

Maj: Gen: Rtd.,

Pakistan Army No. 1.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Esq.,  
President of the Republic of Pakistan,  
President House,  
RAWALPINDI.

## APPENDIX-C

KUDSI,  
Karachi-29.  
10 June, 72.

Dear

Welcome home after your very strenuous but very successful tour.

As asked by you, I am forwarding the third and the last instalment of '*Eye on the future*' for your consideration.

This is, in fact, the last chapter of the book I have written on the Debacle of 1971, as a contemporary history as seen by Rangrut with the hindsight of press reports, radio, and some discussions I have had with leaders of East Pakistan, as well as, my own views as a soldier writer. I have presented '*Eye on the Future*' to you now as it is a sum up of the lessons as a food for thought, especially as I am not sure when my views in a book form will see light. Its publication depends on many factors—the chief one being finance. Though my own personal effort as a writer is '*Fi Sabil Allah*'.

I thank you very sincerely for your encouragement and patience to read '*the squeak of the oldest soldier*' in cold print, especially when you are so very busy. I will be very glad to see

you during your visit to Karachi.

With kindest regards—Wasalam.

Yours sincerely,  
(Mohd. Akbar Khan)  
Maj: Gen: Rtd.  
P.A. No. 1.

Z.A. Bhutto Esq.,  
President of the  
Islamic Republic of Pakistan,  
ISLAMABAD.

## APPENDIX-D

From : Akbar Khan,  
Minister of State for Internal Security

Presidents Secretariat (Public)

N. S. C. Division

Government of Pakistan

DO No. 30 (11)/72-NSC

Rawalpindi, the 20th June, 1972.

Dear General

The President has been pleased to receive your letters dated 16 May and 10 June 72 enclosing papers titled "*Eye of the future*". He has directed me to acknowledge these documents and to say that your views and suggestions are being given due consideration.

Yours sincerely  
Akbar Khan

Maj. Gen. (Retd) Mohd. Akbar Khan  
Kudsi,  
Karachi-29

## APPENDIX-E

## The Message

a)            PRIORITY EMERGENCY            SECRET  
                  MESSAGE FROM,                            2452/No  
 FROM : DEP COMD.  
 TO : 50 PARA BEE (LAHORE PASS)  
 INFO : EAST PUNJAB AREA.    SIP HER    DTO. 30TH  
 I MAHAR TAC HQ 161 BDE SRINAGAR.    30. OCT. 47

02045 (.) REF MY 0206 292920EF (.) 50 PARA BDE GP VIDE MY 02 251900EF WILL CONC AT JAMMU EARLIEST AND COME UNDER OP COMC DEP WEF ARRIVAL BDE TAC HQ DATE AND TIME OF WHICH YOU WILL SIGNAL IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL (.) TROOPS ARMOURD CARS AND SUFFICIENT ESCORT IS ORDERED BY 50 PARA BDE FROM FIRST BN TO ARRIVE JAMMU WILL ADV TO SRINAGAR EARLIEST AND COME UNDER COMB 161 BDE (.)\*\*\* BN LESS ABOVE DET WILL BE LIFTED BY AIR JAMMU TO SRINAGAR IN AIRCRAFT WHICH WILL BRING ONE COMPANY MMG I MAHAR TO JAMMU FROM DELHI AS PART OF BRIGADE GRP (.) APPROX SEVEN SORTIES AVAILABLE AVERAGING 3800 POUNDS EACH SORTIE (.) BN WILL TAKE SRINAGAR MAX RATIONS AND AMN POSSIBLE IN LIFE PROVIDED (.) DATES OF FLY IN MMG COM-

PANY DEPEND ON AVAILABILITY YOUR BN TO FLY SRINAGAR THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT EARLY INFM CONC BN REACHES THIS HQ ( . ) PARA BN LIKELY REJOIN 50 PARA BDE ON RELIEF BY FRESH BN IN SRINAGAR.

EMERGENCY.

\*\*\*COULD BE 'B' OR ONE BN

SGD.....

#### Cipher Message Paraphrased

This message will not be distributed outside *British or U.S.A. Government Departments* or Headquarters or re-transmitted even in Cipher without being paraphrased (Messenger marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased).

b) It is claimed by Bharat that a request was made on behalf of our Defence Department by "the professional authority" requesting Bharat to move his armed forces into Kashmir to restore peace. A copy of it is still in the possession of a retired British General. It is alleged that it was sent by our officiating Commande-in-Chief to his opposite number, under the heading "From Defence Department". This was a deplorable document which proved treacherous to our cause.

c) Is ignorance a bliss ?

The above message is being reproduced (a) to nail the lie circulated by Bharat (b) It exposes the facts that the British Military Mission in Pakistan succeeded in producing excuse (through a lie) that thousands of tribesmen had crossed into Kashmir. They thus abetted in the rape of Kashmir by the

Indian Army under a pre-meditated and pre-conceived plan of the British Admiral. (c) The Message proves that Indian Army invasion force had been concentrated well in advance of the so called tribal invasion in the strategic basis to be airlifted at a moment's notice. (d) It was a stab in the back of the Liberation Forces (Muslim) of the State by the British Military Mission. If the Indian Army failed to achieve its objective is due to bad execution on the part of Indian leaders—both civil and Military. (e) It also depicts that at least some Pakistani leaders were caught napping—as they accepted to have done something which they had neither done nor it had been done! No tribesmen had crossed over.

Again a Cabinet Minister and a senior Pakistani Government official in great hurry made a press statement that "Pakistan troops have marched in to support their brothers-in-faith!" It was an entirely false statement. It was called by them a bluff. Moreover, I had heard from a very responsible person, words to that effect; "I handed over the charge of our war to the proper professional authority (he meant General Gracey), and am therefore in no wise responsible for its results"—which happen to the disastrous!

It is, therefore, clear that the civil heads of the State 'Must' retain some power to comment, to criticise, even to quash—though they must use it with all discretion and under terrible consciousness of responsibility—such as the case in point.

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The Islamic Military Science Association, Kudsi, Karachi-29.  
presents

The History of Army Service Corps., in 4 Volumes. It is an eye witness story of those who first fought against the British, but when they lost the war, later on due to economic stresses and oppressions they were 'forced' to join the Indian Armed Forces. Due to their soldierly qualities they rose to high ranks. It is their graphic story. It also depicts how the British de-Islaminised the Armies in India since 1626.

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